Which science for which Europe? Between the lines of policy discourses in European science policies by Giuffredi, Rita
Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna 
 
 
DOTTORATO DI RICERCA IN 
 
Science, Cognition and Technology 
 
Ciclo XXIX 
 
Settore Concorsuale: 14/C2 – Sociologia dei processi culturali e comunicativi 
 
Settore Scientifico Disciplinare: SPS/08 – Sociologia dei processi culturali e comunicativi 
 
 
 
 
 
Which science for which Europe?  
Between the lines of policy discourses in European science 
policies 
 
 
 
 
Presentata da: Rita Giuffredi 
 
 
 
Coordinatore Dottorato     Supervisori 
 
Prof. Marco Beretta      Prof. Raffaella Campaner 
         Prof. Andrea Cerroni 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Esame finale anno 2018 

Table of contents 
Introduction: the exposed nerves of science policy ......................................................... 5	
The evolving nature of science ............................................................................................................. 6	
Why studying conceptual frames in European science policies? ............................................................... 9	
Conceptual frames, narratives and European scientific discourses .................................. 13	
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 13	
Disclosing Discourses ....................................................................................................................... 14	
Unravelling the policy-making tangle: the actors’ experiences and the documents’ conceptual foundations 24	
How	does	European	scientific	policy-making	work?	Pilot	interviews	to	stakeholders	and	policy-design	
actors	......................................................................................................................................................	24	
How	does	Europe	talk	about	science?	The	choice	and	analysis	of	the	policy	documents	.......................	30	
European integration and the policy-making process on scientific research ..................... 41	
Which science for which Europe? ....................................................................................................... 41	
The scientific policy-making process in the European Union ................................................................. 51	
Theories	of	EU	integration	and	the	European	institutional	structure	.....................................................	51	
The	European	policy-making	models	......................................................................................................	56	
The	EU	decision-making	process(es)	for	scientific	research	....................................................................	58	
The need for a deeper understanding of the research policy design stage ................................................ 76	
Frames and narratives in EU policy discourses on science ............................................. 79	
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 79	
The story told by the Framework Programmes establishing acts ............................................................. 80	
From Knowledge society to Innovation Union: a paradigm-shift ............................................................ 92	
Horizon 2020: three priorities for three visions of the role of research ................................................. 107	
The dominant narrative: the Innovation frame, or “knowledge for growth” ........................................... 112	
«…before	it	is	too	late»:	the	urgency	discourse	....................................................................................	117	
«Real	things!»:	measurability	and	impact	............................................................................................	122	
Innovation	is	the	answer:	a	linear	path	from	wealth	to	happiness	.......................................................	128	
The	Innovation	frame	as	a	political	instrument	....................................................................................	131	
Social orientation of knowledge, or the “knowledge for society” frame ................................................. 132	
The	citizens’	place	in	EU	democracy	......................................................................................................	134	
“Tricks”	and	inclusive	processes	............................................................................................................	139	
Solving	Grand	Challenges	......................................................................................................................	145	
The	social	orientation	of	knowledge	in	EU	science	policy	.....................................................................	150	
Pure science, or “knowledge for knowledge itself” ............................................................................. 151	
Regaining	the	autonomy	of	the	scientific	community:	the	rise	of	the	ERC	...........................................	154	
Fostering	excellence,	defending	autonomy	and	promoting	the	reputation	of	EU	research	funding	....	156	
4	
The	ERC	as	a	political	instrument	..........................................................................................................	159	
Tensions in the European vision of scientific research ........................................................................ 160	
Conclusion: critical points in EU science policy ......................................................... 167	
The temptation of reductionisms ...................................................................................................... 169	
A climate conducive to a democratic confrontation on European shared values ..................................... 171	
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................. 173	
Appendix ............................................................................................................... 175	
List of acronyms ...................................................................................................... 203	
List of Figures ........................................................................................................ 205	
List of Tables .......................................................................................................... 207	
Bibliography ........................................................................................................... 209	
	
	  
Introduction: the exposed nerves of science 
policy 
In	September	2012,	I	participated	to	the	first	meeting	of	the	European	network	PicoSEC-MCNet,	held	
in	Lyon,	in	a	room	of	the	medical	department	of	the	UCBL	University.	
In	presenting	the	planned	activities	for	the	next	four	years,	the	Network	Coordinator,	an	experienced	
CERN	 researcher,	 listed	numerous	 training	events:	 the	majority	was	 focused	on	 specialized	 scientific	 and	
technologic	subjects,	relevant	to	the	projects’	aim	–	scintillators,	laser	lithography,	single-photon	imaging.	
However,	a	 relevant	part	of	 the	trainings	was	going	to	be	devoted	to	non-technical	 topics:	management,	
marketing	and	sales,	certification	of	medical	products,	intellectual	property	rights;	one	of	them	was	named	
“the	 route	 to	market:	how	 innovation	moves	 from	 laboratory	 to	product”.	Facing	a	 slight	 surprise	of	 the	
researchers,	the	EU	projects	support	officer	emphasized	that	the	Commission	was	very	much	concerned	with	
their	training	on	these	aspects	of	the	scientific	activity,	and	that	their	willingness	to	engage	with	them	was	
to	be	considered	a	determining	part	of	the	work.	
The	 project,	 coordinated	 by	 CERN,	 was	 geared	 at	 bridging	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 endeavours	 of	
fundamental	physics	–	including,	alongside	basic	research,	the	development	of	cutting-edge	technologies	for	
particle	detectors	–	and	the	application	of	the	same	technologies	to	real-life	important	issues:	in	this	case,	
the	 diagnosis	 of	 cancer.	 The	 project	 objective	 was	 the	 elaboration	 of	 a	 new	 class	 of	 ultra-fast	 photon	
detectors,	suitable	for	applications	in	medical	diagnostics	and	in	high	energy	physics	–	new,	quicker	and	more	
precise	PET1	machines	and	better	detectors	for	the	big	particle	physics	experiments.		
I	had	been	recruited	in	the	project	a	couple	of	months	earlier	as	science	communicator	and	assistant	
to	the	Network	Coordinator:	my	task	was,	on	one	hand,	to	help	smoothing	the	Network	organizational	issues,	
involving	 complex	 interplays	 among	 the	partners	 –	 eleven	academia	and	 companies,	 distributed	over	 six	
European	 countries.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 I	 had	 to	 study	 the	 project	 contents,	 observe	 the	 researchers’	
activities	and	find	the	most	appropriate	ways	to	communicate	them	to	the	public.	My	working	place	was	a	
building	at	CERN,	 in	Geneva,	where	 some	of	 the	PicoSEC	 researchers	 collaborated	with	other	 young	and	
senior	scientists	coming	from	all	over	the	world,	and	frequently	travelling	to	other	countries	for	conferences	
or	new	jobs	proposals.	
																																								 																				
1		Positron	Emission	Tomography.	
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I	shared	with	the	researchers	their	surprise	about	the	training	topics:	educated	as	a	physicist,	I	didn’t	
expect	marketing	and	management	competencies	to	be	promoted	for	scientific	curricula.	This	was	not,	in	my	
eyes,	 the	 only	 peculiarity:	 public	 and	 private	 partners	 were	 mixed	 in	 the	 same	 project;	 basic	 research,	
technological	development	and	commercialization	coexisted;	the	twenty-two	researchers,	with	backgrounds	
in	different	scientific	disciplines,	were	native	of	diverse	European	and	non-European	countries,	and	had	to	
work	in	other	different	countries,	finding	at	the	same	time	the	way	to	collaborate	effectively	towards	the	
same	objective.	
As	a	science	communicator,	I	was	asked	to	present	the	project’s	activity	in	a	simple	and	organized	
way,	in	order	to	convey	an	image	of	success	and	effectiveness	of	EU	funding	on	research;	it	was	my	daily	job	
to	reflect	on	the	different	perspectives	 from	which	 I	could	promote	the	network,	while	at	the	same	time	
learning	which	were	the	images	most	encouraged	or	deterred	by	the	Commission.		
I	 became	 curious	 about	 who	 was	 taking	 the	 decisions	 over	 the	 features	 of	 EU-funded	 scientific	
research,	about	how	and	where	such	decisions	were	taken,	and	about	the	historical	development	that	led	to	
such	a	vision,	which	I	found	fairly	different	from	the	idea	of	scientific	research	I	obtained	from	my	academic	
studies.	
Unravelling	 the	 tangle	 of	 European	 research	 policy	 landscape,	 features	 and	 framing	would	 have	
formed	the	subject	of	my	subsequent	PhD	research.	
The evolving nature of science 
The	features	of	EU	research	policy	evolved	against	the	background	of	wider	transformations	occurred	
in	the	conceptualization	of	science	and	of	its	role	in	public	policies.		
The evolving understanding of science. During	the	last	century,	not	only	the	involvement	of	scientific	
research	 in	 national	 policies	 radically	 changed,	 but	 the	 same	understanding	 of	 the	 scientific	 activity	was	
questioned	and	discussed.	
The	vision	that	science	students	learn	at	University	usually	dates	back	to	the	19th	century	model	of	
“academic	 science”	 (Ziman,	 2000),	 when	 research	 was	 carried	 out	 by	 professional	 scientists	 inside	
universities,	and	the	scientific	community	was	self-governing	by	means	of	internal	procedures,	specific	social	
interplays	 and	 a	 set	 of	 norms	 and	 values	 founding	 the	 scientific	 activity.	 R.K	 Merton	 identified	 these	
principles,	underlying	 the	ethos	of	modern	 science,	 in	 communalism,	universalism,	disinterestedness	and	
organized	scepticism2:	the	scientist	produces	public	knowledge,	accessible	to	everybody	(communalism);	no	
social	 or	 political	 condition	 influences	 the	 validity	 of	 science	 (universalism);	 researchers	 don’t	 pursue	
personal	 interests,	 but	 contribute	 to	 the	 advancement	 of	 the	 common	 scientific	 endeavour	
																																								 																				
2	Scholars	of	science	studies	use	for	this	set	of	principles	the	acronym	CUDOS.	
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(disinterestedness);	 they	 disregard	 ipse	 dixit	 in	 favour	 of	 systematic	 testing	 and	 discussion	 (organised	
scepticism).	
This	conceptualization	of	science	–	which	anyway,	even	in	the	period	when	it	was	more	resembled	
by	concrete	realizations,	represented	an	ideal-type	of	the	purest	form	of	science	–	changed	with	the	Second	
World	 War.	 The	 new	 scientific	 ethos	 connoting	 the	 “post-academic”	 era	 was	 identified	 by	 qualities	
diametrically	opposed	 to	 the	Mertonian	values:	 contemporary	 science	 is	proprietary,	 local,	authoritarian,	
commissioned,	expert3	(Ziman,	2000).	It	is	no	more	based	on	the	public	nature	of	knowledge,	but	rights	of	
property	play	a	notable	role;	it	focuses	on	local,	technical	issues	rather	than	on	general	problems;	scientists	
don’t	act	as	free	individuals,	but	under	managerial	control;	their	work	is	committed	to	specific	targets,	not	
to	the	advancement	of	science	per	se;	finally,	they	act	more	frequently	as	expert	problem-solvers	than	as	
creative	thinkers.	
The	new,	“Mode	2”,	production	of	knowledge	 is	context-driven,	«socially	distributed,	application-
oriented,	trans-disciplinary,	and	subject	to	multiple	accountabilities»	(Gibbons	et	al.,	1994;	Nowotny,	Scott,	
&	Gibbons,	2003).	Scholars	have	underlined	the	frequency	of	deviations	from	the	Mertonian	norms	in	real	
scientific	activity,	like	scientific	disputes,	interests	bargaining,	secrecy,	plagiarism,	“cherry	picking”	of	results,	
or	the	tendency	to	attribute	credit,	prestige	and	funding	to	already	renowned	and	successful	scientists	(the	
so-called	 “Matthew	 effect”).	 The	 social	 studies	 of	 science	 developed	 an	 understanding	 of	 knowledge	 as	
socially	constructed,	like	all	the	other	aspects	of	social	reality,	and	emphasised	the	influence	of	the	context,	
even	through	its	material	artefacts,	on	the	construction	of	scientific	knowledge.	
In	the	new,	post-academic,	context,	the	socio-political	environment	and	the	scientific	community	can	
no	 longer	be	viewed	as	autonomous,	self-governed	sectors,	but	continuously	 interacting	social	 realms,	 in	
constant	mutual	 reshaping.	The	attention	payed	 to	 the	deep	embodiment	of	 science	 in	 society	has	been	
interpreted	principally	 in	two	main	directions:	to	advocate	more	participation	of	society	in	the	shaping	of	
science	 (the	 “democratic”	 approach	of	many	 STS	 scholars4)	 or	 conversely	 to	 argue	 for	 a	 hybridisation	of	
science	and	businesses.	
To	express	the	deep,	non-deterministic,	interconnection	between	science,	technology	and	society,	
the	STS	scholar	Sheila	Jasanoff	developed	the	concept	of	«co-production»	as	(Jasanoff,	2004):		
Briefly	 stated,	 co-production	 is	 shorthand	 for	 the	proposition	 that	 the	ways	 in	which	we	know	and	
represent	the	world	(both	nature	and	society)	are	inseparable	from	the	ways	in	which	we	choose	to	
live	in	it.	Knowledge	and	its	material	embodiments	are	at	once	products	of	social	work	and	constitutive	
forms	of	social	 life;	society	cannot	function	without	knowledge	any	more	than	knowledge	can	exist	
without	appropriate	social	supports.	Scientific	knowledge,	in	particular,	is	not	a	transcendent	mirror	of	
reality.	It	both	embeds	and	is	embedded	in	social	practices,	identities,	norms,	conventions,	discourses,	
																																								 																				
3	The	new	acronym	is	PLACE.	
4	See	in	this	respect	the	paragraph	Social	orientation	of	knowledge,	or	the	“knowledge	for	society”	frame.	
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instruments	and	institutions—in	short,	in	all	the	building	blocks	of	what	we	term	the	social.	The	same	
can	be	said	even	more	forcefully	of	technology.	
The	 appropriate	 features	 of	 scientific	 activity,	 in	 a	 context	 denoted	by	 a	 diffused	mistrust	 in	 the	
capacity	of	knowledge	to	advance	certainties	and	control	over	the	natural	world,	have	to	be,	according	to	
Silvio	 Funtowicz	 and	 Jerome	 Ravetz	 (Funtowicz	 &	 Ravetz,	 1993),	 «based	 on	 the	 assumptions	 of	
unpredictability,	 incomplete	 control,	 and	 a	 plurality	 of	 legitimate	 perspectives»,	 transcending	 the	 «old	
dichotomies	 of	 facts	 and	 values,	 and	 of	 knowledge	 and	 ignorance»	 and	 dismissing	 reductionism	 to	
acknowledge	complexity	and	dynamicity	of	natural	systems.		The	resolution	of	“post-normal”	science	policy	
issues,	according	to	them,	should	be	based	on	an	“extended	peer	review”,	including	a	wider	set	of	legitimate	
actors	in	the	evaluation	of	scientific	outputs.	Sheila	Jasanoff	names	“civic	epistemologies”	the	«historically	
and	politically	situated,	culturally	specific,	public	knowledge-ways»,	that	should	be	included	in	the	evaluation	
of	science	in	contemporary	knowledge	societies	(Jasanoff,	2005).	
Besides,	other	academic	sectors	advocated	for	more	and	better	inclusion	of	businesses	and	industries	
methods	 and	 cultures	 in	 the	 scientific	 activity:	 scholars	 discussed	 about	 an	 “asymmetrical	 convergence”	
between	academia	and	industry:	universities	adopt	business-like	tenets	and	organization,	while	businesses	
absorb	some	practices	of	the	scientific	community.	The	“triple	helix”	model	(Etzkowitz	&	Leydesdorff,	2000)	
interpreted	 innovation	 as	 produced	by	 the	 interplay	 of	 industry,	 university	 and	 government;	 universities	
would	 be,	 moreover,	 called	 to	 a	 “third	 mission”,	 alongside	 the	 two	 traditional	 ones	 of	 teaching	 and	
researching,	consisting	in	the	diffusion	of	knowledge	through	industrial	enterprises,	public	communication	
and	expert	consultancy.	
The rightful place of science.	Against	this	convoluted	conceptual	landscape,	the	understanding	of	the	
role	of	knowledge	production	in	public	policies	changed	completely:	governments	shifted	from	a	substantial	
patronage	 approach	 –	 allowing	 and	 supporting	 the	 activity	 of	 scientists	 without	 interfering	 with	 the	
development	of	science	–	to	the	acknowledgement	of	the	strategic	importance	of	scientific	research	for	the	
achievement	of	national	targets,	and	increased	their	control	over	the	objectives	and	organization	of	science5.	
On	the	other	hand,	the	new	features	of	“big	science”	–	needing	larger	size	machines,	laboratories,	staff	and,	
consequently,	budgets	no	 longer	affordable	to	universities	–	required	the	scientific	community	to	accept,	
rely	on	and	call	for	public	funding	of	research.		
However	contemporary	research	policies	still	don’t	share	a	common	position	on	«the	rightful	place	
of	science».	This	sentence,	although	pronounced	by	the	US	president	Obama	to	state	his	support	to	science6,	
is	open	to	a	multitude	of	interpretations	(Zachary	et	al.,	2013):	what	is	the	rightful	place	of	science?	Is	it	the	
																																								 																				
5	see	Horizon	2020:	three	priorities	for	three	visions	of	the	role	of	research	for	a	detailed	account	of	the	transition	to	state-
controlled	scientific	research.	
6	President	Obama	pronounced	 it	during	his	 first	 inaugural	speech	 in	2009	(Obama,	2009):	«We'll	 restore	science	to	 its	
rightful	place,	and	wield	technology's	wonders	to	raise	health	care's	quality	and	lower	its	cost.		We	will	harness	the	sun	and	the	winds	
and	the	soil	 to	 fuel	our	cars	and	run	our	 factories.	 	And	we	will	 transform	our	schools	and	colleges	and	universities	to	meet	the	
demands	of	a	new	age.		All	this	we	can	do.		All	this	we	will	do».	
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Polanyian	«republic	of	science»,	or	Bernal’s	«socialized	integrated	scientific	world	organization»7?	Is	the	task	
of	knowledge	fuelling	economic	growth	or	promoting	the	development	of	citizenship?	And	should	it	have	a	
role	at	all?	
All	these	questions	emerge	in	the	study	of	the	European	research	policies	presented	in	this	work.	
Why studying conceptual frames in European science policies? 
The relevance of conceptual frames.	The	analysis	 is	conducted	along	two	principal	dimensions:	 the	
reconstruction	of	the	historical	development	of	the	different	understandings	of	knowledge	policies,	and	the	
systematic,	compared,	analysis	of	policy	discourses	on	science,	as	reported	in	publicly	available	documents8.	
On	the	one	hand,	hence,	the	cultural	and	contextual	origins	of	the	different	visions	are	traced,	while	on	the	
other	the	consequences	of	the	incorporation	of	such	visions	in	contemporary	policies	are	investigated.	
My	attention	 is	 focused	primarily	on	discourses:	 studying	 the	European	 research	policy-making,	 I	
soon	 realized	 the	 recurrence	of	 specific	mind-sets,	or	 frames,	 in	which	 the	policies	were	 inserted	and	by	
which	decisions	were	legitimised.	«Conceptual	frameworks»	is	one	denomination	among	the	numerous	by	
which	 the	 social,	 anthropological,	 political	 and	 science	 studies	 literatures	 (reviewed	 in	 the	 paragraph	
Disclosing	Discourses)	have	identified	powerful	shared	worldviews,	able	to	make	sense	of	a	community	past	
events	and	 to	point	 the	direction	 for	 future	developments.	 These	 frames	have	an	 influential	prescriptive	
effect:	they	distinguish	among	actors	and	issues,	identifying	the	most	relevant	ones;	they	define	the	horizon	
of	 acceptable	 actions,	 and	 establish	 the	 reference	 values	 and	 norms;	 they	 determine	 the	 choice	 criteria	
among	different	policy	options.		
Their	importance	is	even	more	pronounced	in	a	political	entity	like	the	European	Union,	where	the	
weakness	 of	 political	 debate	 doesn’t	 allow	 the	 identification	 of	 clear	 political	 positions	 and	 strong	
responsibilities	over	decisions,	and	–	at	least	in	the	field	of	knowledge	policies	–	abiding	reference	is	made	
to	previous	strategies	and	documents	in	order	to	legitimise	choices	and	actions.	
Every discourse is inextricable from the process producing it.	 Notwithstanding	 the	 importance	 of	
policy	frames,	which	form	the	main	subject	of	this	work9,	every	discourse	is	inextricably	linked	to	the	context	
in	which	 it	 is	produced:	 for	 this	 reason,	my	 first	 concern	was	understanding	 the	European	policy-making	
procedure	in	the	field	of	scientific	research.		
Again,	 the	 European	 context	 is	 complex	 and	 multifaceted,	 also	 with	 respect	 to	 policy-making:	
different	modes	can	be	identified	for	different	policy	areas,	and	the	same	scientific	policies	are	not	governed	
with	a	unique	mode.	However,	the	Framework	Programmes	(FPs)	emerged	as	the	dominant	instrument	of	
governing	science	in	the	EU	context,	constituting	the	major	research	funding	initiative.	
																																								 																				
7	See	paragraph	Horizon	2020:	three	priorities	for	three	visions	of	the	role	of	research.	
8	Presented	in	the	section	How	does	Europe	talk	about	science?	The	choice	and	analysis	of	the	policy	documents.	
9	See	the	chapter	Frames	and	narratives	in	EU	policy	discourses	on	science.	
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I	 traced	 the	 procedure	 leading	 to	 the	 approval	 of	 FPs	 throughout	 the	 European	 institutions,	
identifying	 the	 stages	 when	 conceptual	 frames	 are	 developed	 and	 incorporated	 into	 documents,	 and	
explored	the	actors	involved	in	shaping	scientific	policies.	In	so	doing,	I	couldn’t	rely	on	comprehensive	guides	
describing	 the	European	scientific	policy	making:	a	proper	 shared	 reference	 literature,	 to	my	knowledge,	
doesn’t	exist;	I	undertook,	hence,	an	exploration	of	the	fragmented	corpus	of	information	available	both	in	
institutional	 documents	 and	 in	 EU	 policy-making	 literature	 (where	 usually	 science	 policies	 appear	 as	
examples	or	minor	sectors);	alongside,	I	had	the	chance	to	interview	some	actors	involved	in	the	process,	
and	to	obtain	from	them	the	details	of	the	procedure	and	the	evaluation	of	their	experience10.	
Science policies and European integration.	Analysing	the	historical	evolution	of	European	research	
policies,	 it	 clearly	 appears	 that	 the	 development	 of	 EU	 science	 support	 is	 closely	 interrelated	 with	 the	
dynamics	of	European	integration:	the	factors	and	visions	influencing	integration	had	consequences	also	on	
science	policies,	and	decisions	on	research	represented	a	test	site	for	integration	options	and	a	battleground	
for	competing	political	visions.		
I	 traced	 the	 history	 of	 EU	 research	 policy	 since	 the	 Communities	 foundation,	 in	 the	 ‘50s,	with	 a	
particular	 attention	 on	 highlighting	 the	 ‘phase	 transitions’	 between	 periods	 denoted	 by	 different	
understandings	of	the	role	and	purpose	of	research	(in	the	section	Which	science	for	which	Europe?).	The	
features	of	the	current	vision	are	clearly	grounded	to	its	historical	development.	
Why are European visions of research so important?	The	importance	of	European	research	policies	has	
constantly	increased	in	recent	years:	EU	is	both	a	source	of	funding	and	an	influential	conceptual	reference	
for	what	concerns	the	policies	on	research.	
The	EU	research	funding	budget	grew	constantly	in	the	last	three	decades	(see	paragraph	The	story	
told	by	the	Framework	Programmes	establishing	acts,	Fig.	3	and	Fig.	9).	If	compared	with	national	funding	to	
research,	EU	funding	represents	on	average	15%	of	the	total	public	expenditure	on	research	in	single	member	
states	 (Frenk,	 Hunt,	 Partridge,	 Thornton,	 &	Wyatt,	 2015;	Maes	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 However,	 a	 great	 share	 of	
national	funds	is	invested	in	salaries	and	in	ordinary	expenditures	for	research	infrastructures;	conversely,	
EU	 funds	 are	 usually	 targeted	 directly	 at	 financing	 research	 projects,	 so	 their	 relevance	 for	 researchers’	
activity	is	increasingly	notable.	
The	 impact	 on	 national	 funding	 is	 not	 the	 only	 influence	 of	 EU	 research	 policy:	 the	 tenets	 and	
conceptual	frames	developed	and	promoted	by	the	Union	in	the	field	of	knowledge	policies,	in	fact,	filter	to	
the	 government	 levels	 and	 shape	 the	 national	 approaches	 on	 science	 on	 the	 model	 of	 the	 European	
understandings	and	orientations	of	research	funding	(see,	for	example	how	the	reference	to	the	European	
research	policies	is	frequent	and	influencing	in	the	Italian	document	on	the	National	Research	Programme,	
MIUR,	2015).	
																																								 																				
10	See	the	section	The	EU	decision-making	process(es)	for	scientific	research.	
11	
Reading between the lines of policy documents.	 The	aim	of	 this	work	 is	 to	 identify	and	expose	 the	
different	 political	 visions	 on	 knowledge	 production,	 tracing	 their	 evolution	 across	 EU	 policy	 discourses,	
identifying	their	features	and	elaborating	on	their	consequences	for	future	developments.	To	my	knowledge,	
no	previous	account	has	been	drafted	on	a	systematic	study	and	comparison	of	the	European	research	policy	
frames.	Given	the	complexity	of	the	scenario,	with	diverse	strands	intertwining	at	different	moments	and	in	
different	discourses,	I	refrained	from	the	ambition	of	surgically	dividing	the	discussion	in	independent	and	
exhaustive	 chapters:	 rather,	 I	 will	 return	 repeatedly	 on	 the	 same	 subjects,	 or	 events,	 shedding	 light	 on	
different	perspectives	and	trying	to	depict	the	complex	and	multifaceted	picture	of	EU	research	policy.	
The	research	is	conducted	against	the	background	of	the	reflections	about	science	and	democracy:	
the	identification	and	description	of	the	main	frameworks	on	the	role	and	nature	of	science	policies	is	meant	
as	 a	 service	 to	 the	 quality	 improvement	 of	 the	 European	 democratic	 deliberation.	 A	 relevant	 feature	 of	
conceptual	frameworks,	in	fact,	is	their	frequent	tacit	employment	in	discourses,	in	order	to	obtain	consensus	
with	arguments	that	don’t	need	further	demonstrations,	in	so	doing	closing	up	the	space	for	an	open	public	
debate	on	the	desired	political	developments.		
In	 contemporary	 knowledge	 societies,	 knowledge	 is	 considered	 the	 basis	 of	 social,	 political	 and	
economic	 relations:	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 policy	 frames	 highlights	 a	 series	 of	 critical	 points	 related	 to	 the	
coexistence	 of	 diverse,	 competing,	 visions	 of	 knowledge	 production.	 The	 tensions	 among	 different	
legitimising	values	and	orientations,	which	emerge	manifestly	in	political	discourses	and	–	as	described	in	the	
opening	–	 in	 research	practice,	 should	not	be	downplayed	but	explored	 in	 their	capacity	of	 revealing	 the	
exposed	nerves	of	science	policy	and	lead	to	sounder,	shared	and	more	democratically	grounded	choices	on	
European	future.	
	 	

Conceptual frames, narratives and European 
scientific discourses 
Not	ideas,	but	material	and	ideal	interests,	directly	govern	men’s	conduct.		
Yet	very	frequently	the	‘world	images’	that	have	been	created	by	‘ideas’	have,	like	switchmen,	
determined	the	tracks	along	which	action	has	been	pushed	by	the	dynamic	of	interest.		
(Max	Weber,	“The	Social	Psychology	of	World	Religions”,	1913)11	
I	therefore	claim	to	show,	not	how	men	think	in	myths,		
but	how	myths	operate	in	men’s	minds	without	their	being	aware	of	the	fact	
(Claude	Lévi-Strauss,	“The	raw	and	the	cooked”,	1969)	
Introduction  
The	idea	that	in	every	collective	system	there	are	shared	visions	or	myths	expressing	the	society’s	
identity,	 its	origin	and	orientation,	and	consequently	shape	the	relations	among	the	relevant	social	actors	
and	with	the	outside	world,	is	not	a	novel	idea	in	the	fields	of	social	and	cultural	theory.		
In	political	analysis,	the	significance	of	«ideas»	in	the	interpretation	of	political	development	has	had	
changing	 fortunes,	 rivalled	 by	 the	 notions	 of	 «power»,	 «interests»,	 or	 «rational	 choice»;	 however,	 it	 is	
currently	regaining	attention	on	the	thrust	of	the	«argumentative»,	«interpretive»	or	«cognitive»	turns	in	
social	and	political	sciences.	
Shared	narratives	 are	not	 simple	 “stories”:	 they	at	once	are	 shaped	and	 contribute	 to	 shape	 the	
society	in	which	they	are	originated.	On	one	side,	then,	they	can	be	analysed	in	search	of	the	values,	actors	
and	 institutional	 structures	 they	provide	 as	 societal	 guide	 and	 legitimation,	 and	 they	 can	be	explored	 as	
interpretation	lenses	to	read	past	historical	developments.	At	the	same	time,	these	visions	are	particularly	
relevant	since	they	acquire	the	power	to	shape	new	developments,	they	become	prescriptive,	causative	and	
performative	(Nowotny,	2014;	Wynne	et	al.,	2007),	defining	the	horizon	of	possible	and	acceptable	actions,	
imposing	 classifications,	 legitimating	 actors,	 distinguishing	 issues	 from	 non-issues.	When	 adopted	 in	 the	
public	arena,	they	often	influence,	as	choice	criteria,	important	decisions.	
Notwithstanding	 their	 importance,	 one	 peculiar	 feature	 of	 these	 kind	 of	 imaginaries	 is	 that	 they	
usually	remain	implicit,	tacit,	and	their	cultural	origin	is	no	longer	recognised:	they	simply	make	sense,	they	
																																								 																				
11		(Weber,	1913),	cited	in	(Sanz	Menéndez	&	Borrás,	2000).	
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don’t	need	any	demonstration,	and	they	are	evoked	as	unquestionable	bases	to	political	actions.	They	are	
also	 commonly	 used	 in	 political	 debates	 and	 in	 media,	 acting	 as	 important	 argumentative	 tools	 when	
confronting	different	positions	on	the	interpretation	of	news	or	policy	actions.		
My	attention	here	is	focused	on	the	argumentations	that	are	adopted	in	defining	publicly	political	
issues,	 in	order	to	understand	the	underlying	structures	of	thought	and	bring	them	to	the	surface,	where	
they	regain	a	public	disputability.		
Disclosing Discourses 
The	study	of	ideas	and	shared	worldviews	has	a	(relatively)	recent	but	rich	tradition.	The	importance	
ascribed	 to	 interpretation,	 communication	 and	 language	 is	 actually	 a	 peculiar	 feature	 of	 contemporary	
culture,	in	philosophy	as	well	as	in	social	and	political	sciences,	dating	back	to	the	late	XIX	century.	In	recent	
years,	furthermore,	a	renewed	interest	in	the	study	of	frames,	imaginaries	and	argumentation	emphasized	
the	role	of	structures	in	the	construction	of	individual	beliefs	and	behaviours,	counteracting	the	rationalist	
or	instrumental	understandings	of	social	and	political	dynamics.		
Since	the	times	of	Weber	and	Durkheim,	the	attention	to	imaginaries	has	played	an	important	role	
in	the	field	of	social	studies,	and	anthropology	has	always	been	concerned	with	shared	beliefs	and	hidden	
patterns	recurring	in	different	cultures.	However,	scholars	identify	in	the	early	‘70s	a	discontinuity	in	social	
sciences,	that	they	named	“the	 interpretive	turn”	(Rabinow	&	Sullivan,	1988;	Yanow,	2007),	pointing	to	a	
significant	increment	in	the	study	of	the	systems	by	which	individuals	give	meaning	to	historical	events	and	
socio-political	 structures.	 Such	 a	 shift	 was	 influenced	 by	 the	 development,	 in	 the	 late	 XIX	 and	 early	 XX	
century,	of	new	philosophies	emphasizing	the	role	of	interpretation	and	subjective	experience,	opposing	to	
the	prevailing	posivist	 approaches	 to	 social	 and	political	 phenomena;	Hermeneutics	 and	Phenomenology	
schools	 in	 particular	 were	 influential	 for	 policy	 analysis	 (Yanow,	 2007).	 The	 primacy	 of	 structure	 over	
individuals	argued	by	the	structuralist	school	furthermore	prompted	the	reflections	on	the	collective	cultural	
dimensions	of	 socio-political	and	historical	phenomena,	 that	 the	structuralists	often	studied	by	means	of	
linguistic	and	narrative	analysis.	Interpreting	historical	change	as	the	change	in	the	discourses	over	the	world	
was	a	specific	trait	of	the	structuralist	school	(e.g	Levi-Strauss’s	studies	on	myths	and	Foucault’s	History	of	
Insanity).		
In	 this	context,	 I	am	specifically	 interested	to	the	conceptual	 frames	adopted	 in	public	discourses	
about	scientific	policy	by	the	European	Union,	and	to	how	these	have	influenced	the	interpretation	of	past	
events	 and	 determine	 future	 developments.	 The	 visions	 we	 are	 concerned	 with	 have	 been	 named	 and	
described	 in	a	variety	of	ways,	according	 to	 the	 features	 that	 the	author	 intended	 to	emphasize	and	 the	
positioning	 inside	 his	 system	 of	 thought:	 in	 the	 following	 I	 will	 describe	 and	 analyse	 the	 theoretical	
approaches	of	a	selected	group	of	authors,	particularly	relevant	for	my	analysis.	Science	policy,	for	its	same	
intrinsic	structure,	can	be	observed	and	analysed	by	a	multiplicity	of	points	of	views,	and	any	review	cannot	
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but	be	multidisciplinary:	hence	I	will	present	the	reflections	of	authors	belonging	to	different	fields	–	among	
which	the	most	relevant	are	philosophy,	policy	studies,	sociology	and	science	and	technology	studies	(STS)	
–	,	showing	how	converging	and	mutually	reinforcing	reflections	have	developed	in	the	different	disciplines	
and	how	these	are	relevant	to	the	object	of	this	study.	
Collective representations.	Durkheim,	in	“The	Elementary	Forms	of	Religious	Life”	(1912),	designates	
«collective	representations»	the	ideas,	beliefs	and	values	emerging	from	collective	religious	experiences	that	
cannot	be	reduced	to	the	sum	of	individual	activities;	these	representations,	according	to	him,	help	to	make	
sense	of	the	world,	express	and	symbolize	social	interplay	and	are	able	to	inhibit	or	stimulate	actions	in	the	
group.	His	work	on	«collective	representations»	was	taken	up	and	continued	by	the	social	psychologist	Serge	
Moscovici,	 who	 proposed	 the	 term	 «social	 representations»	 (1961)	 to	 identify	 the	 specific	 forms	 that	
knowledge	takes	when	expressed	by	the	society	or	by	groups	therein,	and	that	are	often	shared	as	“common	
sense”	 ideas.	They	are	evolving	 structures,	dynamically	 related	with	phenomena,	 that	 they	 interpret	and	
process	 in	 order	 to	 organize	 the	 reality	 and	 let	 the	members	 of	 the	 group	 to	 behave	 and	 communicate	
effectively	(Palmonari,	Cavazza,	&	Rubini,	2012).	
Thought collective.	 In	 the	 field	 of	 the	 sociology	 of	 science,	 Ludwick	 Fleck’s	 notion	 of	 «thought	
collective»,	developed	in	the	‘30s,	was	influential	on	later	thinkers	like	Thomas	Kuhn	and	Michel	Foucault.	
Fleck	noticed	that	groups	where	people	are	in	close	intellectual	contact,	sharing	ideas,	influence	each	other	
to	the	point	of	creating	a	«thought	collective»,	to	which	they	scarcely	realize	to	belong,	and	that	«styles	of	
collective	thought»	look	to	them	almost	impossible	to	criticize.		
	Paradigms. Kuhn’	concept	of	«paradigms»	builds	on	Fleck’s	reflections.	Refusing	the	idea	that	the	
scientific	effort	 is	 simply	an	accumulation	of	knowledge,	he	 identifies	 in	 the	history	of	 science	periods	of	
«normal	 science»,	 when	 scientists	 work	 to	 accumulate	 and	 consolidate	 knowledge	 coherently	 with	 a	
paradigm,	 and	 «scientific	 revolutions»,	 which	 change	 the	 overall	 world	 view	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 new,	 often	
incompatible,	 one.	 Paradigms	are,	 hence,	 the	 set	 of	 theories,	 rules,	 procedures	 commonly	 accepted	 and	
practiced	by	a	scientific	community,	and	revolutions	point	the	change	of	paradigms.		
(…)	 some	 accepted	 examples	 of	 actual	 scientific	 practice	 —	 examples	 which	 include	 law,	 theory,	
application,	and	 instrumentation	together	—	provide	models	 from	which	spring	particular	coherent	
traditions	 of	 scientific	 research.	 These	 are	 the	 traditions	 which	 the	 historian	 describes	 under	 such	
rubrics	as	‘Ptolemaic	astronomy’	(or	‘Copernican’),	‘Aristotelian	dynamics’	(or	‘Newtonian’),…and	so	
on.	(Kuhn,	1962)	
	In	the	most	general	sense,	the	paradigm	is	more	than	a	model	or	a	theory	alone:	it’s	an	introjected	
system	of	thought,	able	to	make	sense	of	scientific	evidence	and	to	set	the	direction	for	the	development	of	
the	scientific	work.	
16	
Epistemes.	 Foucault’s	 «epistemes»	 resemble	 Kuhn’	 «paradigms»	 in	 that	 they	 both	 refer	 to	 the	
conditions	making	the	existence	and	development	of	knowledge	possible;	specifically	Foucault	refers	to	the	
codes	ruling	the	empirical	«orders»	in	which	people	live,	the	«historical	a	priori»	of	ideas	(Foucault,	1966):		
[I	am	concerned	to	show]	in	what	way,	as	one	traces	-	against	the	current,	as	it	were	-	language	as	it	
has	been	spoken,	natural	creatures	as	they	have	been	perceived	and	grouped	together,	and	exchanges	
as	they	have	been	practised;	in	what	way,	then,	our	culture	has	made	manifest	the	existence	of	order,	
and	 how,	 to	 the	 modalities	 of	 that	 order,	 the	 exchanges	 owed	 their	 laws,	 the	 living	 beings	 their	
constants,	the	words	their	sequence	and	their	representative	value;	what	modalities	of	order	have	been	
recognized,	posited,	linked	with	space	and	time,	in	order	to	create	the	positive	basis	of	knowledge	as	
we	find	it	employed	in	grammar	and	philology,	in	natural	history	and	biology,	in	the	study	of	wealth	
and	political	economy.	Quite	obviously,	such	an	analysis	does	not	belong	to	the	history	of	ideas	or	of	
science:	it	is	rather	an	inquiry	whose	aim	is	to	rediscover	on	what	basis	knowledge	and	theory	became	
possible;	within	what	space	of	order	knowledge	was	constituted;	on	the	basis	of	what	historical	a	priori,	
and	 in	 the	 element	 of	 what	 positivity,	 ideas	 could	 appear,	 sciences	 be	 established,	 experience	 be	
reflected	 in	 philosophies,	 rationalities	 be	 formed,	 only,	 perhaps,	 to	 dissolve	 and	 vanish	 soon	 after-
wards.	
Foucault	recognizes	in	the	period	of	time	spanning	from	the	XV	to	the	XX	century	two	discontinuities:	
the	first,	at	roughly	half	of	the	XVII	century,	ended	the	Renaissance	period	and	opened	the	Classical	Age,	
which	lasted	until	the	beginning	of	the	XIX	century,	when	the	Modern	Age	began.	Each	period	is	characterized	
exclusively	by	one	«episteme»	at	a	time,	able	to	coherently	base	all	theoretical	and	practical	knowledge.	
Symbolic universes.	While	Foucault’s	concept	of	episteme	is	centred	on	knowledge	pre-conditions,	
Berger	and	Luckmann’s	«symbolic	universes»	focus	on	the	legitimizing	aim	of	the	shared	structure	of	beliefs.	
Institutions,	 according	 to	 them,	 need	 to	 be	 explained	 and	 justified:	 this	 happens	 through	 linguistic	
transmission,	 proverbs	 and	 common	 sense	 expressions,	 specialist	 rationalizations,	 all	 concurring	 to	 the	
construction	of	symbolic	universes.	These	encompass	and	explain	all	aspects	of	life	and	are	able	to	integrate	
different	spheres	of	meaning;	multiple	symbolic	universes	can	coexist	in	complex	societies	and	can	generate	
conflicts.	Symbolic	universes	are	self-legitimizing;	when	they	become	a	problem,	for	generational	shifts	or	
intercultural	confrontation	for	example,	specific	procedures	of	universe-maintenance	are	undertaken,	often	
by	elite	groups,	among	which	Berger	and	Luckman	recognize	the	creation	of	the	discourses	of	mythology,	
theology,	philosophy	and	modern	science	(Berger	&	Luckmann,	1967).	
Metanarratives.	The	French	philosopher	Lyotard	introduced	in	1979	the	concept	of	«métarécit»,	or	
metanarrative,	which	has	remained	as	one	of	the	most	cited,	often	under	the	denomination	of	«master»	or	
«grand	narratives»,	even	in	“pop”	culture.	Metanarratives,	similarly	to	Foucalt’s	epistemes,	are	introduced	
by	Lyotard	in	order	to	describe	the	structures	of	thought	that	distinguish	the	past	eras;	the	accent	is	here,	
however,	on	the	narrative	character	of	these	all-encompassing	argumentations:	knowledge	was	expressed	
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by	means	of	stories	 in	traditional	societies	as	well	as	 in	modern	times.	The	end	of	these	«big	narratives»	
would	be,	according	to	him,	the	key	feature	of	the	«postmodern»	condition	of	knowledge	(Lyotard,	1984):			
Simplifying	to	the	extreme,	I	define	postmodern	as	incredulity	toward	metanarratives.	This	incredulity	
is	undoubtedly	a	product	of	progress	in	the	sciences:	but	that	progress	in	turn	presupposes	it.	To	the	
obsolescence	of	the	metanarrative	apparatus	of	legitimation	corresponds,	most	notably,	the	crisis	of	
metaphysical	philosophy	and	of	the	university	institution	which	in	the	past	relied	on	it.	The	narrative	
function	is	losing	its	functors,	its	great	hero,	its	great	dangers,	its	great	voyages,	its	great	goal.	It	is	
being	dispersed	in	clouds	of	narrative	language	elements—narrative,	but	also	denotative,	prescriptive,	
descriptive,	and	so	on.	
The	metanarratives	Lyotard	refers	to	are	the	«Enlightenment»	and	«Idealistic»	ones:	the	first	framing	
knowledge	as	 an	emancipatory	 instrument,	 favouring	 the	progress	 and	 freedom	of	mankind,	 the	 second	
promoting	disinterested,	pure	knowledge.	These	conceptual	frames	could	not	only	explain,	but	legitimate	
knowledge:	when	intersecting	with	society,	they	were	able	to	make	sense	of	historical	developments	and	
justify	 existing	 power	 relations	 and	 traditions.	 One	 of	 the	 peculiar	 features	 of	 such	 master	 narratives,	
underlined	by	Lyotard,	 is	 the	shift	 from	description	to	prescription:	metanarratives,	 in	 this	sense,	are	not	
simple	stories	because	they	have	a	prescriptive	nature;	unlike	pure	denotative	discourses,	they	position	in	
the	 range	 of	 values	 and	 are	 able	 to	 influence	 individual	 choices	 and	 societal	 developments.	 Lyotard’s	
judgement	on	métarécits	was	clear:	these	are	to	be	considered	instruments	of	oppression,	because	they	tend	
to	be	all-encompassing,	excluding	any	other	vision	and	working	to	reinforce	power	structures.		
Metanarratives	 are	 described	 as	 very	 comprehensive	 systems	 of	 long-term	 historical	 meaning-
making,	totalitarian	in	their	effect	of	foreclosing	alternatives;	Kuhn’s	«paradigms»	play	an	analogous	role	in	
the	more	 restricted	arena	of	 the	 scientific	 community;	 Foucault’s	«epistemes»	 represent	 the	historical	a	
priori	of	 knowledge.	These	 ideas	 can	be	 regarded	as	 the	most-encompassing	 connotations	of	 conceptual	
systems,	 able	 to	 denote	 long	 historical	 periods;	 consequently,	 one	 of	 their	 shared	 distinctive	 feature	 is	
resistance	to	change.	
Policy frames.	The	research	about	analogous	systems	of	thought	in	policy	analysis	focuses	on	more	
dynamic	structures,	retaining	the	same	cognitive	and	prescriptive	capabilities,	but	being	more	adaptable	to	
changes,	 and	 less	 comprehensive:	 different	 policy	 discourses	 can	 coexist,	 and	 the	 confrontation	on	 such	
different	 visions	 is	 a	natural	 feature	of	 the	political	 arena.	Nonetheless,	policy	 scholars	have	 recently	 re-
valued	the	role	of	ideas	in	policy	change,	problematizing	hidden	or	implicit	conceptual	frameworks	affecting	
conflicts	resolution.	The	field	of	policy	analysis,	moreover,	is	not	only	concerned	with	the	observation	and	
description	of	political	developments,	but	rather	it	is	oriented	towards	developing	visions	and	instruments	
actively	useful	in	policy	negotiations.	The	scholars	Donald	Schön	and	Martin	Rein	developed	in	the	early	‘90s	
the	 concept	 of	 «policy	 frames»	 (Schön	 &	 Rein,	 1994)	 to	 overcome	 the	 difficulties	 in	 the	 resolution	 of	
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«intractable	policy	controversies»,	which	they	define	as	the	ones	which	cannot	be	solved	resorting	to	facts	
(conflicts	that	can	be	solved	through	successive	bargaining	are	named	just	«disagreements»).		
Policy	 controversies	 cannot	 be	 solved	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 cost-benefits	 analysis,	 as	would	 argue	 the	
rational	choice	school,	nor	negotiating	on	competing	interests,	which	can	be	disproportionately	unbalanced,	
nor	trying	to	balance	win-win	policies	satisfying	all	stakeholders,	a	compromise	that	doesn’t	take	into	account	
the	fluidity	of	groups	and	cannot	address	conflicts	over	basic	values.	The	authors	propose,	then,	a	«frame-
critical	approach»:	«intractable»	conflicts	can	be	re-framed	by	policy	actors	who	reflect	«in	action	on	the	
frame	 conflicts	 that	underlie	 controversies».	 This	process	might	not	 lead	directly	 to	 resolution	but	 could	
creatively	modify	the	conflict	and	open	up	communication	channels.	«Action	frames»,	or	frames	underlying	
policy	practices,	 are	distinguished	by	Schön	and	Rein	 in	«policy	 frames»	 that	 the	actors	use	 to	 construct	
specific	policy	problems,	«institutional	frames»,	wider	visions	embodying	the	institutions’	prevailing	belief	
system,	and	«metacultural	frames»,	or	culturally	shared	narratives,	metaphors	and	symbols.	Once	again,	the	
key	feature	of	frames	is	the	deflection	from	pure	description	in	favour	of	normativity:	different	frames	imply	
different	types	of	envisaged	solutions,	which	are	seen	as	«graceful,	compelling,	even	obvious»	(Schön	&	Rein,	
1994).	Frames	do	not	erase	 the	 importance	of	 interests,	but	 they	concur	 in	defining	 the	different	actors’	
perceptions	of	which	are	their	 respective	 interests.	Frames	are	difficult	 to	handle:	 the	same	 issue	can	be	
viewed	coherently	 in	more	than	one	frame,	belonging	to	different	policy	actors,	hence	often	the	need	of	
cross-frame	communication	arises;	the	non-existence	of	a	neutral	frame	could	imply	the	in-principle	failure	
of	the	debate,	given	that	all	the	frames	are	equally	relative;	moreover,	it	appears	to	be	very	difficult	indeed	
to	 recognize	 each	 actor’s	 own	 frame	 from	 inside,	 and	 hence	 there	 is	 no	 possibility	 of	 any	 unbiased	
reconstruction	of	others’	frames.	The	authors	anyway	analyse	different	policy	conflicts	and	design	several	
processes	 that	 can	 help	 reducing	 the	 incommunicability	 across	 frames,	 possibly	 leading	 to	 the	 conflict	
mitigation,	especially	at	the	practical	level:	Schön	and	Rein’s	reasoning,	as	already	mentioned,	is	particularly	
oriented	to	real	policy	practice.			
The argumentative turn: argumentations, discourses, narratives, deliberations and rhetoric.	The	1993	
book	The	Argumentative	Turn	in	Policy	Analysis	and	Planning	marked	a	new	orientation	in	the	field	of	policy	
analysis,	taking	stock	of	the	ongoing	valorisation	of	the	role	of	language	and	argumentation	in	policy	making	
(Fischer	&	Forester,	1993):		
What	if	our	language	does	not	simply	mirror	or	picture	the	world	but	instead	profoundly	shapes	our	
view	of	it	in	the	first	place?	(…)	If	analysts’	ways	of	representing	policy	and	planning	issues	must	make	
assumptions	about	causality	and	responsibility,	about	legitimacy	and	authority,	and	about	interests,	
needs,	values,	preferences,	and	obligations,	then	the	language	of	policy	and	planning	analyses	not	only	
depicts	but	also	constructs	the	issues	at	hand.	(…)	
This	book,	accordingly,	explores	practically	and	politically	a	simple	but	profound	insight:	Policy	analysis	
and	planning	are	practical	processes	of	argumentation.	
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The	starting	point	of	the	authors’	analysis	is	the	departure	from	the	«dominant	empirical,	analytic	
approach	to	problem	solving»,	in	favour	of	a	new	approach	that	focuses	on	«argumentation»	as	the	way	by	
which	«people	–	 including	opponents	 –	 reach	and	 justify	mutually	 acceptable	decisions»,	 embracing	«an	
understanding	 of	 human	 action	 as	 intermediated	 and	 embedded	 in	 symbolically	 rich	 social	 and	 cultural	
contexts»	 (Fischer	&	Gottweis,	 2012).	Drawing	 from	Habermas’	 reflections	on	 communicative	action	and	
converging	 with	 the	 contemporary	 developments	 in	 social	 sciences	 on	 discourses,	 interpretation,	
deliberation	and	social	constructivism,	the	«argumentative»	approach	investigates	the	processes	of	policy	
argumentation,	«in	particular	as	reflected	in	the	thoughts	and	deliberation	of	politicians,	administrators,	and	
citizens».	
The	 authors	 discuss	 the	 concept	 of	 argumentation,	 in	 comparison	 with	 the	 related	 notions	 of	
discourse,	narrative,	deliberation	and	rhetoric.	Argumentation,	they	argue,	refers	specifically	to	the	process	
by	which	people	«seek	to	reach	conclusions	through	reason»	engaging	in	persuasive	dialogues,	by	means	of	
«formal	logic»,	but	also	of	«informal	logic»	and	«practical	reason».	Argumentation,	hence,	is	very	close	to	
«deliberation»,	although	with	a	stress	on	the	linguistic	nature	of	the	concept.	Conversely,	«rhetoric»	refers	
to	the	methods	of	argumentation,	both	for	what	concerns	the	linguistic	structure	and	the	communicative	
means	 in	 relation	 with	 the	 audience;	 although	 in	 common	 language	 rhetoric	 has	 acquired	 a	 negative	
connotation,	it	is	an	essential	aspect	of	argumentation,	aiming	at	constructing	a	«particular	representation	
of	reality»	focused	on	the	audience,	instead	than	on	the	object	itself.	
While	 rhetoric	 is	 a	 specific	 facet	 of	 argumentation,	 a	 «discourse»	 is	 a	 more	 general	 concept,	
pertaining	 to	 «a	 body	 of	 concepts	 and	 ideas	 that	 circumscribe,	 influence	 and	 shape	 argumentation»;	 a	
discourse,	then,	is	a	set	of	ideas,	concepts	and	categories	that	constitute	the	reference	world	view	and	to	
which	 arguers	 draw	 when	 trying	 to	 persuade	 others.	 Such	 a	 “pool”	 of	 reference,	 then,	 includes	 and	
circumscribes	«the	views	that	can	be	legitimately	accepted	as	knowledge,	and	constitutes	the	actors	taken	
to	be	the	agents	of	knowledge»;	a	discourse	acknowledges	the	shared	set	of	values	and	«supplies	society	
with	basic	stories	and	narratives	that	serve	as	modes	of	behaviour».		
Moreover,	 discourses	 don’t	 need	 to	 be	 completely	 coherent,	 but	 they	 usually	 incorporate	
«conflicting,	unresolved	elements»	deriving	from	the	historical	struggles	that	have	shaped	that	specific	mind-
set;	discourses,	finally	are	continuously	evolving,	since	no	argumentation	is	deterministically	shaped	by	the	
available	knowledge,	but	contributes	to	produce	new	rationales	and	narratives	better	suited	to	the	context.	
«Narratives»	and	discourses	are	often	used	as	synonymous,	although	narrations,	unlike	discourses,	
are	essentially	stories:	they	are	structured	as	a	sequence	of	events	by	which	experiences	are	meaningfully	
reconstructed	 and	 related	 orally	 or	 in	 written	 form	 to	 other	 people.	 Narratives	 are	 then,	 stricto	 sensu,	
contained	inside	discourses.			
The role of ideas in European policy analysis.	 In	the	context	of	the	EU	studies,	Sanz	Menendez	and	
Borrás	reviewed	the	«role	of	 ideas	 in	policy	change»	(Sanz	Menéndez	&	Borrás	2000;	Borrás	1999)	when	
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discussing	what	Borrás	called	a	«cognitive	turn»	in	EU	studies.	In	the	late	‘90s	ideas	and	values	acquired	new	
relevance	in	EU	policy-making,	following	the	Communities’	shift	from	exclusively	economic	to	political	entity	
with	 the	 Maastricht	 Treaty,	 that	 revamped	 the	 discussion	 about	 the	 European	 legitimacy.	 Before	 that	
moment,	the	traditional	approaches	in	EU	studies	had	analysed	the	dynamics	of	interests	as	the	prevailing	
frame	 of	 analysis,	 marginalising	 the	 role	 of	 conceptual	 dynamics:	 ideas	 were	 mainly	 considered	 as	
instrumental	argumentative	tools	 in	 interest	negotiations.	A	central	contribution	to	this	«cognitive	turn»,	
according	to	Sanz-Menéndez	and	Borrás,	came	from	Institutional	scholars,	who	began	evaluating	the	role	of	
policy	makers’	and	experts’	individual	cognitive	backgrounds	in	policy	deliberation:	they	underlined	the	fact	
that	 some	 «paradigms»	 (a	 concept	 drawn	 from	 Kuhn’s	 works)	 prevailed	 on	 others	 when	 these	 were	
promoted	in	institutional	contexts	like	universities	and	think	tanks	and	shared	by	influencing	groups.	Within	
the	 academic	 community	 of	 the	 European	 studies,	 however,	 Borrás	 recognized	 different	 level	 of	
commitment,	 distinguishing	 between	 strong	 cognitivists	 –	 who	 argue	 for	 a	 substantial	 constructivist	
approach,	 emphasizing	 the	essential	 embeddedness	of	 actors	 in	 their	 societal	 context,	 and	opposing	 the	
rational	choice	or	interest	bargaining	understandings	of	policy	processes	–	and	weak	cognitivists	–	who	are	
willing	 to	 include	 the	 dynamics	 of	 ideas	 among	 the	 other	 relevant	 factors,	 in	 a	 complementary	 position	
(Borrás,	1999).	
Socio-technical imaginaries.	The	analysis	of	the	policies	specifically	centred	on	science	adds	further	
complexity	to	the	study	of	conceptual	frames:	scientific	policy,	indeed,	situates	at	the	intersection	of	different	
sectors	–	politics,	 society,	 science,	economics	–	each	with	 its	own	view	of	 the	 issues	at	 stake	and	with	a	
specific	understanding	of	the	relevant	social	actors,	their	interactions,	and	the	legitimate	goals	of	actions.		
Recently,	Jasanoff	and	Kim	have	proposed	the	concept	of	“socio-technical	imaginaries”	to	describe	
collectively	shared	visions	where	techno-science	plays	a	central	role	(Jasanoff	&	Kim,	2015):		
(…)	we	redefine	socio-technical	imaginaries	as	collectively	held,	institutionally	stabilised,	and	publicly	
performed	visions	of	desirable	futures,	animated	by	shared	understandings	of	forms	of	social	life	and	
social	order	attainable	through,	and	supportive	of,	advances	in	science	and	technology.		
According	 to	 the	 authors,	 socio-technical	 imaginaries	 connect	 the	 socio-political	 theorizations	 of	
collective	 imaginations	and	 the	complex,	but	«politically	neutered»	descriptions	of	hybrid	 socio-technical	
systems	in	in	STS	(Science	and	Technology	Studies).	Socio-technical	imaginaries,	they	argue,	are	distinct	from	
the	aforementioned	political	conceptualizations,	and	from	other	commonly	related	notions:	 they	are	 less	
monolithic	 than	master	 narratives,	 more	 connected	 to	 imagination	 than	 ideologies,	 wider	 in	 scope	 and	
longer-termed	 than	 plans	 or	 projects.	 Allowing	 for	 the	 coexistence	 of	 multiple	 visions,	 they	 avoid	
determinism	and	«restore	some	of	the	 indeterminacy	of	history».	Moreover,	they	are	deeply	 intertwined	
with	practice,	performance	and	«materialization	through	technology»,	and	less	focused	on	language	than	
discourses.	They	are	finally	specifically	pertaining	to	the	social	area	«below	the	seats	of	power»,	differently	
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from	public	reason,	which	is	more	related	to	institutionalized	exchanges	between	citizens	and	ruling	class	
(Jasanoff	&	Kim,	2015,	p.	20).		
Jasanoff	and	Kim	underline	how	socio-technical	imaginaries	are	often	particularly	exposed	in	some	
specific	contexts,	where	they	are	forced	to	crystallize	in	a	permanent	shape,	and	therefore	can	be	identified	
and	studied.	These	are	the	languages	of	power	and	social	ordering,	like	political	discourses,	laws	and	legal	
disputes,	and	the	arenas	where	these	are	spread	and	discussed,	such	as	popular	culture,	communication,	
media	and	advertising	products.	
Performative political imaginaries.	Performance	is	an	aspect	of	collective	imaginaries	that	Jasanoff	
and	Kim	highlighted	 in	 their	description,	drawing	 from	the	work	of	 the	political	 scientist	Yaron	Ezrahi	on	
contemporary	democracies	and	the	contribution	of	science	and	technology	to	them	as	a	continuous	public,	
and	legitimating,	demonstration	of	power	(Ezrahi,	1990,	2012).	In	the	shift	to	post-modern	democracies,	he	
argues,	 the	 founding	 myths	 of	 modern	 democracies	 –	 natural	 law,	 autonomous	 individual,	 rationality,	
progress,	 faith	 in	 the	 possibility	 of	 consensus	 based	 on	 scientific	 facts	 –	 are	 eroding,	 showing	 the	
«bottomlessness»	of	power	structures.	New	political	metaphors,	he	asserts,	refer	no	more	to	the	«machine»,	
but	to	the	«theater»,	and	the	political	performance	of	leaders	is	of	increasing	importance.	In	order	to	avoid	
«both	 anarchy	 and	 tyranny»,	 democracies	 need	 to	 reinvent	 their	 repertoire	 of	 «cultural	 and	 political	
grounds»,	and	«collective	political	imagination»	represents	the	main	instrument	of	this	process	(Ezrahi,	2012,	
p.	3):	
I	will	argue	that	some	political	fictions	become	more	real	than	others,	insofar	as	they	function	as	causes	
of	 political	 behavior	 and	 institutions.	 (…)	 I	 define	 these	 causative	 fictions	 as	 imaginaries.	 Political	
imaginaries,	for	our	purpose,	refers	to	fictions,	metaphors,	ideas,	images	or	conceptions	that	acquire	
the	power	to	regulate	and	shape	political	behavior	and	institutions	in	a	particular	society.		
«Performative	political	imaginaries»,	according	to	Ezrahi,	are	more	advantageous,	as	analytical	tools,	
than	 the	 other	 more	 traditional	 notions	 of	 myths,	 ideas	 and	 political	 knowledge,	 in	 that	 they	 link	 the	
«normative,	cognitive,	and	emotional	components	of	politics»	(Ezrahi,	2012,	pp.	7–8):	
(…)	 the	 imagination	 is	 probably	 the	most	 neglected	 form	of	 power	 in	 the	 field	 of	modern	 political	
science	and,	in	particular,	political	theory.	One	of	my	main	concerns	is	with	the	question	of	how	the	
restoration	of	the	imagination	to	its	rightful	place	in	our	understanding	of	politics	could	and	should	
affect	 political	 theory,	 political	 arguments,	 and,	 most	 importantly,	 our	 interpretations	 of	 political	
practice.	It	 is	because	the	political	imagination	is	indispensable	to	the	creation	of	the	political	order	
while	also	inherently	dangerous	to	its	very	stability	that	it	constantly	problematizes	the	political.	
Collective	 imaginaries	 are	 «necessary	 fictions»	 that	 make	 democracy	 work,	 hiding	 its	 inner	
machinery,	and	invoking	the	suspension	of	disbelief	–	usually	evoked	for	novels	or	theatrical	performances	–	
«to	authorize	public	decisions	and	actions	in	the	midst	of	uncertainties	and	differences	of	opinions,	while	
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enabling	 tolerance	 for	 the	 incoherences,	 ambiguities,	 and	 compromises	 that	 are	 inescapable	 in	 any	
government	by	the	people»	(Ezrahi,	2012,	p.	320).		
Conceptual frameworks.	While	for	Ezrahi	political	fictions	should	not	only	be	criticized,	but	regarded	
as	 necessary	 elements	 of	 any	 real	 political	 systems,	 the	 political	 scientist	 Benoit	 Godin,	 in	 his	 work	 on	
«conceptual	 frameworks»,	 shows	 a	 rather	 negative	 judgement	 of	 rhetoric,	 used,	 according	 to	 him,	 to	
manipulate	consensus	in	the	political	arena	and	sustain	policy-making	everyday	activity.		
He	has	recently	compiled	a	review	of	conceptual	frameworks	in	science,	technology	and	innovation	
policy	in	the	period	1945-2005	(Godin,	2009)	where,	building	on	Schön	and	Rein’s	notion	of	«frames»,	he	
analysed	 some	 relevant	 conceptual	 constructions	 invoked	 in	 post-war	 policy-making.	 His	 work	 is	 here	
particularly	relevant	for	the	structure	he	observed	in	scientific	policy	discourses:	
I	define	a	conceptual	framework	as	an	argument	or	discourse	that	acts	as	an	organizing	principle	to	
give	meaning	to	a	socioeconomic	situation	and	answers	to	a	series	of	analytical	and	policy	questions.	
Ideally,	a	conceptual	framework:	
1.	Identifies	a	problem,	its	origins	and	the	issues	involved;	
2.	Suggests	an	explanation	of	the	current	situation;		
3.	Offers	evidence,	often	in	terms	of	statistics	and	indicators;		
4.	Recommends	policies	and	courses	of	action.	
Often,	he	argues,	policy	frames	are	constructed	as	stories,	or	«narratives»,	which	are	able	to	give	
meaning	to	situations.	In	case	of	science	policies,	these	typically	have	the	following	structure(Godin,	2009,	
p.	14):		
1.	Premise:	science,	technology	and	innovation	are	good	for	you	and	for	society.	
2.	Something	new	is	happening	in	society	(CHANGE)	and	it	is	quite	different	from	the	past.	
3.	Let’s	call	this	change	…	(NEW	NAME).	
4.	The	new	phenomenon	or	event	will	generate	big	effects,	rewards/returns.	
5.	Let’s	collect	STATISTICS	as	evidence.		
6.	It	is	essential	that	policies	be	developed.		
7.	Let’s	imagine	a	FRAMEWORK	to	this	end.	
Meaning-making, prescriptive, structuring, tacit: discourses and conceptual frameworks.	 All	 the	
described	 formulations	 share	 the	principle	of	 recognizing	 the	 importance	of	 conceptual	 structures	 to	 the	
political	ordering	of	societies,	both	as	meaning-making	of	past	history	and	as	providers	of	coherent	direction	
for	future	actions;	these	tools,	in	other	words,	are	characterized	by	their	effective	past-projected	interpretive	
functions	combined	with	their	powerful	prescriptive	effect	on	future	policies.		
As	for	the	structuring	effects	they	have	on	society,	paradigms,	epistemes	or	symbolic	universes	are	
able	 to	 define	 social	 relations,	 to	 legitimize	 institutions	 and	 power	 relations,	 and	 to	 define	 the	 relevant	
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predominantly	 hidden,	 tacitly	 referred	 to	 in	 debates	 and	 only	 rarely	 brought	 to	 the	 surface	 of	 public	
confrontation.	 Furthermore,	 they	 don’t	 need	 to	 be	 demonstrated,	 they	 are	 self-legitimizing,	 with	 the	
consequence	 of	 appearing	 hardly	 contestable	 from	 the	 inside	 and	 possibly	 reaching	 the	 extreme	
consequence	of	working	as	totalitarian	ideologies.	
When	dealing	with	the	European	scientific	policy	documents,	we	are	naturally	not	expecting	to	find	
all-encompassing	 structures	 like	 Lyotard’s	 metanarratives,	 Foucault’s	 epistemes	 or	 Kuhn’s	 paradigms:	
however,	 these	 are	 powerful	 reference	 concepts	 (and	 guides	 for	 understanding)	 when	 researching	 sub-
universal	thought	systems	with	analogous	interpretive	and	prescriptive	effects.	
In	 the	 following,	 I	 will	 analyse	 the	 incorporation	 of	 thought	 structures	 in	 politically	 relevant	
documents	of	science	policy:	the	key	operational	references	will	be	the	notions	of	discourses,	as	described	
by	 Fischer	 and	Gottweis,	 and	of	 conceptual	 frameworks,	 as	 developed	by	Godin	 (after	 Schön	 and	Rein’s	
frames).	 In	 fact,	 these	 approaches	 have	 been	 developed	 to	 interpret	 (and	 possibly	 help	 solving)	 policy	
controversies	 and	 are	 particularly	 suitable	 to	 analyse	 documents	 that	 represent	 the	written	 outcome	 of	
political	negotiations,	like	the	Commission	ones,	and	position	papers	developed	with	the	aim	of	being	used	
in	 successive	 bargaining,	 like	 experts’	 reports:	 discourses	 retain	 the	 marks,	 and	 even	 the	 eventual	
contradictions,	of	previous	confrontations.	I	prefer	not	to	use	directly	the	concept	of	argumentation,	though,	
since	the	EU	documents	I	will	study	have	not	been	developed	to	be	directly	used	in	confrontations	–	as	would	
be	for	lawyers’	pleadings	or	politicians’	speeches	for	example	–	but	are	conceived	as	a	pool	of	reference	of	
ideas,	concepts	and	categories,	useful	to	decision-makers	or	able	to	form	the	basis	of	long-term	strategical	
positions.	The	viewpoints	expressed	in	science	policy	documents,	moreover,	are	often	rooting	on	in-principle	
visions,	including	value-related	points	of	view,	and	are	consequently	more	prone	to	give	rise	to	“intractable”	
controversies,	well	described	by	Schön	and	Rein’s	frames,	than	to	solvable	problems,	reducible	to	interests	
bargaining.		
Additionally,	 I	will	 use	Godin’s	 observations	 on	 the	 structure	 of	 policy	 discourses	 and	 narratives,	
sometimes	adapting	them	to	the	description	of	my	specific	context,	while	from	socio-technical	imaginaries	I	
will	maintain	the	attention	paid	to	science,	with	its	rich	and	specific	nature	and	its	complex	interplay	with	
society,	and	the	accent	on	public	performance,	as	described	by	Ezrahi.	
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Unravelling the policy-making tangle: the actors’ experiences and the 
documents’ conceptual foundations 
A	complex	institution’s	process	of	policy	design	is	never	a	simple,	technical,	procedure:	it	embodies	
the	 very	 self-definition	of	 the	 group,	 in	 the	passage	 from	 the	 ideas	 and	 values	 to	 their	 concretization	 in	
actions;	it	involves	a	multiplicity	of	interplay	levels,	that	cooperate	in	shaping	and	developing	the	institution’s	
political	visions	and	influences	its	future	evolution.	Research	policy	conceptual	frames	are	chosen,	shaped	
and	established	throughout	this	process.	
Exploring	 European	 policy	 discourses	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 the	 conceptual	 frames	 on	 knowledge	
production	 proved	 to	 be	 a	 demanding	 objective,	 both	 in	 the	 phases	 of	 discourses	 analysis	 and	 for	 the	
previous	necessary	stage	of	context	recollection.	
The	main	 instrument	 I	decided	to	adopt	 for	 the	exploration	of	conceptual	 frameworks	and	policy	
narratives	was	documental	analysis:	European	Union	is	characterised	by	a	remarkably	prolific	production	of	
documents	of	different	types	and	scopes	which	is	very	often	the	prominent	medium	by	which	the	community	
exchanges	 information	 internally,	 between	 the	 institutional	 bodies,	 and	 with	 the	 Member	 States,	 the	
involved	 stakeholders	 and	 the	 citizens.	 Although	 complemented	 with	 other	 forms	 of	 communication	 –	
meetings	 and	 workshops,	 consultations,	 and,	 most	 recently,	 audio-visuals	 –	 documents	 represent	 the	
preferred	 instrument	 by	 which	 the	 European	 Union	 communicates	 formally	 its	 political	 positions	 and	
developments.	Furthermore,	EU	documents	are	frequently	regarded	as	the	reference	for	the	development	
of	subsequent	policies,	both	at	the	European	and	at	the	national	levels.		
Since	 every	 document	 is	 a	 «situated	 product»	 (De	 Lillo	 &	 Arosio,	 2010;	 Prior,	 2003),	 inevitably	
connected	with	the	context	in	which	it	was	produced,	the	first	period	of	my	research	was	devoted	to	the	
study	of	European	policy-making	in	the	scientific	field.	To	understand	the	formal	and	informal	stages	of	the	
process	and	 investigate	 the	 role	and	 involvement	of	 the	 relevant	actors,	 I	 realized	a	 small	 group	of	pilot	
interviews	to	people	chosen	for	 their	 institutional	positioning	along	the	policy-design	chain,	 from	which	 I	
obtained	 information	 on	 the	 details	 of	 the	 procedure,	 especially	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 production	 of	
documents,	as	well	as	interesting	insights	on	the	interviewees’	personal	experiences	and	their	evaluations	of	
the	European	research	policy.		
How does European scientific policy-making work? Pilot interviews to stakeholders 
and policy-design actors 
To	understand	 the	 context	 in	which	 the	policy	documents	were	produced,	 I	 needed	 to	 trace	 the	
European	 policy-making	 process	 in	 the	 scientific	 field.	 Alongside	 written	 accounts	 of	 policy	 scholars,	
describing	the	EU	procedure	in	general	terms	(e.g.	Borrás	et	al.,	2009;	 	Princen,	2011;	Wallace,	Pollack,	&	
Young,	2015;	Wallace	&	Wallace,	2006),	and	publicly	available	 information	 (e.g.	EP,	n.d.-a,	2011,	2013),	 I	
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decided	to	realize	some	interviews	to	people	participating	to	the	specific	process	regarding	research	policies	
definition,	chosen	according	to	their	role	inside	the	involved	institutions.	
The	purpose	was	multifold:	these	people	could	actually	guide	me	in	understanding	the	details	of	the	
procedure,	both	in	its	formally	defined	structures	and	in	the	informal	aspects,	while	at	the	same	time	I	could	
obtain	 an	 evaluation	 of	 their	 experience	 inside	 the	 process.	 They	 could,	 in	 other	 words,	 describe	 the	
landscape	of	EU	research	funding	programmes	and	instruments	in	which	the	policy	documents	are	produced,	
evaluate	the	processes	and	political	dynamics	they	identified	and	provide	a	significant	diachronic	account,	
identifying	 and	 assessing	 evolution,	 turning	 points	 and	 perceived	 changes	 in	 EU	 R&D	 support	 and	
coordination	activities.	
The	interviewees	and	their	role	are	listed	in	Table	2.	Naturally,	the	number	of	the	interviews	is	not	
enough	ample	to	represent	a	proper	social	research,	nor	this	was	their	aim.	The	interviews	were	relevant	to	
obtain	 information	on	 the	procedures’	 fine	details	and	 to	 shed	 light	on	 some	blind	 spots	of	 the	process;	
secondly,	they	were	important	to	compare	the	written	institutional	procedural	summaries,	often	inherently	
aseptic,	to	real	experiences,	and	to	obtain	insights	on	the	process	and	personal	evaluations	from	different	
strategic	standpoints.	Not	least,	the	interviews	were	useful	for	their	insights	on	the	intersection	of	personal	
experiences,	knowledge	and	beliefs	with	the	conceptual	frameworks	discussed	in	policy	offices	and	used	in	
documents,	critically	informing	policy	choices.	
The interviewees’ positions in the policy-design process.	The	choice	of	the	interviewees	was	primarily	
connected	with	their	institutional	task:	they	all	shared	the	feature	of	playing	a	role	in	the	European	process	
of	policy	development,	particularly	at	the	crucial	stage	of	policy-design.	
Studying	 the	process,	 I	mapped	 the	 formal	 groups	 involved	 in	 the	definition	of	 research	policies,	
focusing	especially	on	the	phase	of	policy-shaping	centred	around	the	Commission,	taking	place	before	the	
policy	 proposal	 is	 submitted	 to	 the	 Parliament	 and	 the	Council	 for	 the	 formal	 legislative	 procedure.	 The	
majority	of	policy	documents	are	produced	along	this	policy-shaping	chain,	whose	principal	actors	are	listed,	
along	with	their	 role,	 in	Table	1.	An	exception	 is	 represented	by	the	documents	published	on	the	Official	
Journal,	which	undergo	also	the	subsequent	legislative	procedure,	and	result	from	the	negotiations	on	the	
Commission	proposals	carried	out	by	the	European	legislative	bodies;	the	Parliament	is	especially	active	in	
discussing	the	proposals,	and	its	marks	on	the	documents	are	discussed	throughout	this	work.	
Table	1:	The	principal	actors	of	the	EU	policy-shaping	process	in	the	field	of	research	policies.	
Policy-shaping	actor	 Role	in	the	policy-shaping	process	
Commission	Directorates	(DGs)	
Organise	the	development	of	policy	proposals,	collecting	the	
information	base	and	the	policy	orientations,	gathering	inputs	from	
the	stakeholders,	commissioning	expert	advice,	negotiating	policy	
contents	and	drafting	the	documents	on	which	the	legislative	bodies	
will	work.	
Public	administrations	 Provide	political	input	based	on	the	national	interests	on	contents,	instruments	and	budgets.	
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Policy-shaping	actor	 Role	in	the	policy-shaping	process	
National	delegates	 People	entrusted	by	the	Governments	to	express	the	National	position	on	a	specific	issue	to	be	inserted	in	research	policies.	
National	Contact	Points	(NCPs)	
The	network	of	reference	people	and	organisations	chosen	by	
governments	to	offer	country-specific	practical	information	and	
assistance	on	the	participation	to	Framework	Programmes.	
Joint	Research	Centers	(JRCs)	
European	Commission	in-house	science	and	knowledge	research	service	
to	provide	EU	policies	with	independent,	evidence-based	scientific	and	
technical	support	throughout	the	whole	policy	cycle.	
Lobby	groups	
“Interest	Groups”	(IGs),	working	to	influence	the	design	and	execution	
authorities12.	
Research	infrastructures	
Provide	input	on	contents,	instruments	and	budget	allocation	
regarding	their	specific	field	of	activity	at	diverse	stages	of	policy-
design.	
Researchers	in	the	field	 Provide	input	on	contents	and	instruments	regarding	their	specific	field	of	activity.	
Universities	
Provide	input	on	contents,	instruments	and	budget	allocation	
regarding	their	specific	fields	of	activity	at	diverse	stages	of	policy-
design.	
Companies	and	SMEs	 Provide	input	on	contents	and	instruments	regarding	their	specific	field	of	activity.	
Consulting	companies	 Provide	advice	on	design	and	evaluation	of	policies,	and	carry	out	technical	assessment	of	behalf	of	the	Commission.	
Non-governmental	Organizations	(NGOs)	 Provide	input	on	contents	and	instruments	regarding	their	specific	field	of	activity.	
International	organisations	
Provide	input	on	contents,	instruments	and	budget	allocation	
regarding	their	specific	fields	of	activity	at	diverse	stages	of	policy-
design.	
Citizens	 Provide	their	opinions	answering	to	public	consultations.		
	
To	explore	the	origins	and	features	of	conceptual	frameworks,	I	focused	my	attention	on	the	phase	
of	policy-shaping,	and	identified	a	group	of	interviewees	involved	in	this	process.	
Along	the	process,	a	sharp	step	can	be	recognised	between	the	involvement	of	the	actors	working	
inside	or	next	to	the	European	Institutions	–	mostly,	in	the	case	of	the	elaboration	of	scientific	policies,	at	the	
Commission	–	and	the	actors,	whose	activity	is	closely	related	to	EU	policies,	working	outside	Brussels:	while	
the	 first	 are	more	 involved	 in	 the	 first	 phases	 and	 can	 actually	 orient	 the	 policies,	 the	 second	 group	 is	
consulted	at	later	stages	and	usually	provides	inputs	on	the	details	concerning	their	specific	interest	field.	
Fig.	1	schematically	depicts	the	‘layers’	I	recognised	around	the	Commission	Directorates	–	the	main	actor	of	
policy-shaping	–	distinguished	according	 to	 their	different	 involvement	with	 the	process.	The	 inner	 circle	
represents	the	Commission	offices	in	Brussels,	where	the	development	of	the	policies	is	organised,	the	inputs	
collected	 and	 the	 policy	 documents	 committed	 or	 realised;	 the	 external	 one	 depicts	 the	 position	 of	 the	
European	 citizens,	which	are	 the	 final	 recipients	of	 the	policies.	 The	 two	 inner	 circles	 (in	 grey)	 show	 the	
																																								 																				
12	Their	activity	in	the	EU	context	is	regulated	by	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon	as	“European	Interest	Representation”.	
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intermediate	actors,	mainly	 stakeholders	and	knowledge	brokers,	and	 it	 is	distinguished	 into	 two	 further	
layers:	the	darker	one,	where	some	of	the	actors	more	involved	with	Brussels	offices	are	listed,	and	the	light-
grey	one,	where	the	remaining	ones	are	included.	
Alongside	 the	 formal	 positioning	 of	 actors,	 the	 literature	 and	 the	 progress	 in	 the	 interviews	 has	
shown	that	a	dense	network	of	informal	exchanges	of	ideas	and	interests	taking	place	below	and	alongside	
the	formal	procedure:	consequently,	many	actors	are	connected	to	diverse	roles	at	the	same	time,	or	interact	
with	the	Commission	through	various	channels	and	at	multiple	stages13.	
Fig.	1:	A	schematic	depiction	of	the	different	actors	participating	in	the	European	policy	development	chain,	and	the	positioning	of	
the	interviewees	(in	black	italic).	
	
	
Although	not	covering	the	entire	spectrum	of	the	actors	participating	to	the	definition	of	the	policies,	
the	 interviewees	 appear	 to	 be	 well	 distributed	 in	 the	 intermediate	 layers,	 and	 sufficiently	 diverse	 to	
represent	different	perspectives.	The	interviewees	positions	and	roles	are	listed	and	explained	in	Table	2.	
Table	2:	The	interviewees	and	their	institutional	role.	
Interviewees’	position	at	the	
host	organization	 Role	in	the	policy-making	process	and	relations	to	EU	structure	
Senior	scientist,	CERN	
Lobbying	activity	in	favour	of	a	scientific	community	sector;	
Experience	of	advisor	to	the	European	Commission;	
Coordinator	of	European	Projects	and	ERC	grantee.	
																																								 																				
13	See	the	chapter	on	The	scientific	policy-making	process	in	the	European	Union.	
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Interviewees’	position	at	the	
host	organization	 Role	in	the	policy-making	process	and	relations	to	EU	structure	
Member	of	the	EU	Support	Office	
at	CERN	
Development	of	inputs	to	the	Commission	and	the	Parliament	in	relation	to	
consultations	addressed	to	CERN	as	stakeholder	of	EU	policies	and	big	
European	research	infrastructure.	
National	Contact	Point	 Italian	National	Contact	Point.	
ARIC	–	Research	and	Third	Mission	
Division	at	University	of	Bologna	
Development	of	opinions	in	relation	to	her	concerned	field	in	occasion	of	
consultations	where	the	University	plays	the	role	of	the	stakeholder.	
	
The	first	 interview	I	realized	was	to	a	senior	scientist	at	CERN,	whose	scientific	career	intertwined	
with	an	enduring	effort	to	organize	and	reinforce	its	research	sector	through	the	creation	of	international	
collaborations,	not	least	in	the	European	frame:	he	personally	obtained	an	ERC	grant.	His	standpoint,	hence,	
is	from	a	high-level	position	in	the	researchers’	community,	partially	disentangled	from	the	national	interests	
for	his	affiliation	with	CERN;	moreover,	his	experience	returned	a	career-long	history	of	reflections	on	the	
management	and	organization	of	research,	with	a	constant	attention	to	political	support.		
The	second	person	I	could	interview	was	from	the	CERN	European	projects	support	office:	in	addition	
to	assisting	and	helping	the	management	of	the	projects	ongoing	in	the	laboratory,	his	office	was	repeatedly	
involved	 by	 CERN’s	 Director	 General	 in	 the	 elaboration	 of	 inputs	 for	 the	 European	 consultations	 on	 the	
development	of	scientific	policies,	particularly	the	Framework	Programmes,	both	by	the	Commission	and	by	
the	Parliament.	His	standpoint,	then,	is	next	to	the	higher	levels	of	a	European	relevant	laboratory,	involved	
in	thorough	reflections	on	the	nature	and	directions	of	European	research,	and	personally	witnessing	the	
policy-making	mechanism	concerning	its	organization.	
I	had	the	chance,	then,	to	interview	his	counterpart	in	a	University	organization:	the	third	interviewee	
was	from	the	office	devoted	to	Research	and	Third	Mission	at	the	University	of	Bologna.	From	her	viewpoint,	
she	 could	observe	and	participate	 to	 the	 involvement	of	 the	University	 in	 the	European	policy	definition	
phases,	reviewing	the	Work	Programmes14	and	suggesting	greater	emphasis	for	some	issues	pertaining	to	
her	field	or	even	the	inclusion	of	forgotten	subjects.	Although	she	was	not	involved	in	the	policy-definition	
phase,	her	testimony	was	very	useful	on	the	involvement	of	academia	in	the	process	of	refinement	of	the	
policies	and	on	the	institutional	actors	included.	
These	three	interviewees	can	be	securely	positioned,	both	for	their	 institutional	role	and	for	their	
testimony,	in	the	outside	light	grey	layer	of	Fig.	1,	with	the	other	stakeholders	which	are	autonomous	from	
the	Commission;	the	following	interviewee’s	position,	conversely,	is	closer	to	the	Commission,	both	by	formal	
affiliation	and	professional	experience,	even	though	her	role’s	influence	on	the	definition	of	the	policies	is	
not	so	straightforward.	
																																								 																				
14	 The	 preparation	 of	Work	 Programmes	 and	 their	 relation	with	 Framework	 Programmes	 establishing	 acts	 and	 calls	 is	
described	in	section	The	EU	decision-making	process(es)	for	scientific	research.	
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The	fourth	interviewee,	in	fact,	was	belonging	to	the	Italian	Agency	for	the	Promotion	of	European	
Research	(APRE),	which	represents	the	National	Contact	Point	(NCP)	for	H2020:	devoted	NCPs	exist	for	every	
issue	in	the	Programme	in	each	country	 involved	in	the	Framework	Programme	(including	associated	and	
third	 countries).	 Their	 role	 is	 to	 provide	 information,	 guidance	 and	 support	 to	 all	 the	 participants	 and	
potential	 applicants	 to	 the	 Programme;	 they	 are	 nominated	 by	 national	 governments,	 but	 they	 interact	
directly	 with	 specific	 Commission	 officers.	 The	 interviewee	 insisted	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 NCPs’	 task	 is	
predominantly	technical,	in	the	sense	that	they	don’t	provide	support	for	political	choices	in	Brussels,	nor	
they	collect	requests	of	political	pressures	from	the	Italian	stakeholders.	Naturally	though,	from	her	position	
she	had	the	chance	to	observe	from	a	privileged	standpoint	–	next	to	both	the	national	government	and	the	
Commission,	and	in	touch	with	the	national	stakeholders’	community	–	the	dynamics	of	European	scientific	
policy-making	in	the	last	two	decades.	
Each	interviewee	shed	light	on	a	specific	channel	of	interaction	with	the	European	Commission,	and	
showed	 to	 be	 interested	 in	 reconstructing	 the	 complete	 landscape	 of	 research	 policies	 design,	 which,	
however,	none	of	 them	showed	to	grasp	completely	–	nobody	could	answer	to	the	 final	question	on	the	
political	responsibility	of	European	scientific	policy	decisions.	
Interviews type and contents.	 The	 interviews	 were	 semi-structured,	 flexibly	 answering	 to	 the	
emergence	of	themes	during	the	conversation.	After	a	brief	introduction	on	my	research	topic,	I	explored	
the	biographical	background	of	the	interviewees,	and	asked	for	a	description	of	their	professional	task	and	
role	inside	their	host	institution;	the	core	of	the	interview,	then,	covered	two	main	poles:	their	experience	
with	 the	 European	 policy-making	 in	 the	 scientific	 field	 and	 their	 knowledge	 and	 evaluation	 of	 scientific	
research	in	Europe.	The	first	focus	was	stimulated	by	means	of	examples	of	 involvement	in	the	process	–	
their	eventual	 contacts	with	policy-makers,	 their	employment	as	advisors,	or	 their	participation	 to	policy	
negotiations	 on	 R&D	 issues	 –	 and	 further	 explored	 asking	 for	 the	 details	 of	 their	 experience,	 their	
identification	 and	 evaluation	 of	 the	 procedure,	 of	 the	 involved	 actors,	 of	 the	 information	 base,	 of	 the	
decision-makers.		
The	second,	conceptually	broader,	pole	was	explored	by	asking	the	interviewees’	opinion	about	the	
strengths	and	weaknesses	of	the	European	system,	about	their	ideas	on	the	orientation	of	EU	research	policy	
and	 about	 their	 experience	of	 the	historical	 and	 ideational	 development	of	 European	R&D	programmes:	
conceptual	origins,	 turning	points,	 instruments	 comparisons.	The	 interview	usually	was	 concluded	with	a	
question	on	their	opinion	on	where,	and	by	whom,	the	fundamental	decisions	on	research	policy	ideation	
and	development	were	taken.	
The	 description	 of	 the	 policy-making	 process	 reported	 in	 section	 The	 EU	decision-making	 process(es)	 for	
scientific	 research,	 and	 the	 identification	 and	 analysis	 of	 the	 three	main	 conceptual	 frames	 described	 in	
chapter	Frames	and	narratives	in	EU	policy	discourses	on	science	were	confirmed	and	notably	enriched	by	
the	personal	experiences	and	evaluations	of	the	interviewees.	
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How does Europe talk about science? The choice and analysis of the policy documents 
Political	discourses	are	interesting	sources	to	analyse	the	dynamics	of	every	political	entity:	policy	
documents	are	even	more	important	in	a	context	like	the	EU	where	the	internal	political	debate	is	weaker	
than	 in	 nation	 states,	 and	 consequently	 most	 decisions	 ground	 on	 previously	 established	 strategies,	
expressed	mainly	by	means	of	written	reports.	The	abiding	reference	to	previous	EU	decisions	or	strategical	
frames	 is	characteristic	of	European	documents,	be	them	laws,	Commission’s	positions	or	experts	groups	
reports.	
The	documental	production	of	the	European	Union	is	particularly	abundant	and,	also	thanks	to	the	
digital	archives,	it	steeply	increased	in	size	in	recent	years.	Consequently,	it	appeared	not	feasible	to	read	
and	analyse	all	the	R&D-related	documents	of	the	European	institutional	bodies	(the	keyword	“research”	on	
the	 EU	 documental	 repository	 online	 gives	 75704	 results15),	 especially	 if	 the	 analysis	 is	 intended	 to	 be	
conducted	qualitatively,	and	only	for	a	tiny	part	by	means	of	computing	instruments.		
The choice of the documents.	 All	 the	 analysed	 documents	 were	 institutional	 public	 documents,	
diffused	by	the	European	bodies	and	available	in	public	repositories:	hence,	all	the	documents	were	drafted	
and	 circulated	 to	 express	 an	 official	 vision,	 even	 though	 time-	 and	 context-dependent,	 belonging	 to	 EU	
institutions	about	specific	aspects	related	to	research	policy.	
The	prime	criterion	employed	in	the	choice	was	the	importance	ascribed	to	policy	documents	inside	
documents	 themselves:	 beginning	 with	 the	 most	 recent,	 I	 traced	 back	 the	 history	 of	 references	 in	 the	
analysed	documents,	considering	the	frequency	or	emphasis	of	the	citations	as	an	indicator	of	relevance	–	a	
snowball-type	sampling	method.	For	example,	the	Sapir,	Strauss-Kahn,	Kok	and	Aho	reports	were	cited	as	
notably	 influential	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	 Lisbon	 strategy	 by	 the	 account	 on	 the	 design	 of	 the	 7th	
Framework	Programme	drafted	by	the	Commission	research	policy	officers	(Muldur	et	al.,	2006,	pp.	76–77),	
and	references	appear	in	numerous	other	documents.	
Secondly,	 I	 favoured	 the	 documents	 showing	 a	 wider-ranging	 political	 gaze,	 rather	 than	 reports	
narrowly	 focused	 on	 specific	 or	 particularly	 technical	 issues	 (the	 Commission	 is	 exceptionally	 prolific	 in	
producing	such	reports).	
Table	3	shows	the	principal	types	of	analysed	documents,	distinguished	by	authors,	recipients	and	
aim.	
																																								 																				
15	Research	on	the	EU	law	and	publications	repository	(EU,	2017),	realized	on	Nov.	30,	2017.	
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Table	3:	The	most	relevant	documents	with	regards	to	scientific	policy-making	analysed	in	this	work,	and	their	main	features.	
Documents	 Authors	 Recipients	 Time	period	 Aim	
Framework	
Programmes	
establishing	acts	
EU	law-making	
bodies16	
European	bodies,	
Member	States,	
citizens17	
1984-
2014	 Normative	and	descriptive	acts	
ERC	establishing	acts	 EU	law-making	bodies	
European	bodies,	
Member	States,	
citizens	
2006-
2013	 Normative	and	descriptive	acts	
Commission	policy	
docs	 Commission	
Council,	
Parliament,	
Member	States	
ca.	1990-
2017		
Prepare	and	describe	the	
relevant	political	decisions	
Commission	Green	
Papers18	 Commission	 EU	stakeholders	
ca.	1990-
2017	
Organize	and	communicate	
policy	lines	for	debates	and	
consultations	
Reports	
Experts	Groups,	
mandated	by	the	
Commission	
Commission	 ca.	2000-2017	
Provide	the	science	base	and	an	
expert	opinion	on	a	policy	issue	
Commission	policy	
officers’	books	
Commission	policy	
officers	
R&D	policy	
concerned	public	
1998,	
2006	
Trace,	explain	and	legitimize	the	
work	done	in	preparation	of	the	
Framework	Programmes	
Communication	
documents	
(leaflets,	videos,	
institutional	magazines)	
Mostly	
Commission	
Research	funding	
concerned	public,	
European	public	at	
large	
ca.	2006-
2017	
Spread	information	and	generate	
consensus	on	EU	policies	
	
Framework	Programmes	and	ERC	establishing	acts	 are	 the	 legal	 acts,	 published	on	 the	European	
Official	Journal,	enacting	the	initiatives,	and	describing	their	rationales	and	contents.		
The	 Commission	 policy	 documents,	 usually	 identified	 with	 the	 labels	 COM	 or	 SEC,	 describe	 the	
Commission’s	 proposed	 legislations	 and	 their	 preparatory	 documents	 for	 the	 other	 EU	 bodies	 and	 the	
Member	States.	Among	the	documents	issued	by	the	Commission,	the	Green	Papers	are	documents	meant	
to	stimulate	a	debate	and	organize	consultations.	White	Papers	are	the	usual	outcomes	of	such	consultations	
(in	the	table	they	have	been	considered	inside	the	group	of	Commission	Policy	docs).	A	particular	group	of	
documents	originating	from	the	Commission	are	the	two	books	drafted	by	the	Commission	policy	officers	
responsible	for	the	preparation	of	the	Framework	Programmes;	these	documents,	although	published	in	a	
form	 other	 than	 ordinary	 one,	 proved	 particularly	 significant	 for	 the	 exploration	 of	 research	 policy	
procedures	and	conceptual	frameworks	from	the	standpoint	of	the	Commission.	
																																								 																				
16	 The	 EU	 law-making	 bodies	 changed	 over	 time	 together	 with	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 EU	 institutional	 asset:	 the	 first	
Framework	Programmes	(up	to	the	third)	were	established	by	the	Council,	while	from	the	Fourth	on	the	law-making	bodies	were	
jointly	the	European	Parliament	and	the	Council.	
17	Depending	on	the	type	of	act,	and	on	the	legal	framework	in	force	at	the	time	of	publishing	(see	also	note	16),	European	
laws	are	binding	to	varying	degrees	and	for	different	subjects.	However,	we	can	say	that	European	 legal	acts,	as	communication	
products,	are	relevant	for	all	the	actors	of	the	Union.			
18	Although	Green	Papers	are	part	of	the	Commission	policy	documents,	they	are	presented	as	distinct	entries	in	this	table	
because	of	the	different	recipients:	contrarily	to	ordinary	policy	documents,	containing	political	proposals	to	be	evaluated	by	the	
other	institutional	bodies,	the	Green	Papers	are	targeted	to	the	widest	public	of	European	stakeholders.		
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European	bodies,	and	especially	the	Commission,	notably	rely	on	experts	groups	for	enriching	the	
decision-making	knowledge	base	and	evaluating	the	advancement	of	policy	initiatives:	the	experts’	positions	
are	expressed	in	reports,	to	be	subsequently	employed	for	the	development	of	policies.	
Finally,	 although	 not	 institutional	 documents	 stricto	 sensu,	 communication	 products	 provide	 a	
specific	interesting	perspective	on	the	Commission’s	research	policy	framing	(e.g.	the	introductory	video	on	
Horizon	2020	repeatedly	cited	 in	chapter	Frames	and	narratives	 in	EU	policy	discourses	on	science	 for	 its	
concise	inclusion	of	many	of	the	analysed	features	of	the	frames).		
The	group	of	documents	on	which	the	research	was	based	is	reported	in	the	tables	below,	and,	to	
my	 knowledge,	 these	 constitute	 the	most	 influential	 conceptual	milestones	 that	 concurred	 to	 shape	 the	
current	 European	 research	 policy	 physiognomy,	 or	 represent	 notable	 keys	 for	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	
different	perspectives.	
The Framework Programmes and the ERC establishing acts 
The	final	outcome	of	the	policy-making	process,	involving	Commission,	Council	and	Parliament19,	is	
a	 legal	 document	 (or	 a	 set	 of	 legal	 documents)	 published	 on	 the	Official	 Journal	 of	 the	 European	Union	
(OJEU)20	and	binding	for	each	Member	State.		
These	documents	are	very	interesting	for	this	research	project	since	they	are	active	instruments	by	
which	 the	Union	 exerts	 its	 influence	 on	 European	 science,	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 they	 are	 lengthy	 and	
detailed	descriptions	of	the	scientific	landscape	visions	belonging	to	the	European	Institutions,	and	of	their	
projects	 to	modify	 it.	Moreover,	 these	documents	bear	 the	 signs	of	 the	complex	negotiations	 conducted	
among	the	policy-making	actors	to	reach	the	agreement	on	the	final	text.		
The	Framework	Programmes	establishing	acts	(Table	4)	are	constituted	of	a	short	first	part,	more	
formally	legal,	where	the	purposes	and	main	features	of	the	Programme	are	listed,	together	with	the	general	
provisions	and	the	references	to	other	legislation;	the	second,	more	extended,	part	(usually	in	the	form	of	
an	Annex)	 contains	 the	details	of	 the	Programmes	 structure,	 and	each	 research	 theme	 is	 explained	with	
regards	 to	 its	 aims,	 contents,	 and	 relevant	 issues;	 an	Annex	 concerning	 the	 total	 budget	 and	 the	 shares	
devoted	 to	each	 issue	 is	 always	 included	as	well.	On	 the	basis	of	 this	documents,	work	programmes	are	
constructed	and	calls	for	applications	are	launched.	
The	relevant	difference	in	length	between	the	first	Programmes	establishing	acts	and	the	last	ones	
(the	First	Programme,	dated	1983,	is	only	4	pages	long,	while	FP6	is	33,	FP7	is	41	and	Horizon	2020	is	69)	
provides	 an	 additional	 evidence	 of	 the	 increasing	 importance	 of	 Framework	 Programmes	 in	 European	
scientific	policy-making.	
																																								 																				
19	Described	in	the	section	The	scientific	policy-making	process	in	the	European	Union.	
20	Called	until	2003	“Official	Journal	of	the	European	Communities	(OJEC)”.	
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The	authors	of	the	establishing	acts	changed	over	time	with	the	evolving	European	legislation	on	the	
law-making	 bodies:	 the	 first	 three	 FPs	 were	 promulgated	 by	 the	 Council	 alone,	 while	 all	 the	 following	
required	also	the	involvement	of	the	European	Parliament;	the	type	of	legislation	transformed	as	well:	the	
first	 Framework	 Programmes	 was	 proposed	 through	 a	 Council	 resolution,	 not	 legally	 binding,	 while	 the	
following	were	Council	decisions,	binding	on	those	to	whom	they	were	addressed;	Horizon	2020	was	set	up	
with	a	regulation,	i.e.	the	strongest	form	of	binding	legislative	act,	to	be	applied	throughout	the	Union	(see	
Table	4	and	Table	11).	
Table	4:	The	Framework	Programmes	establishing	acts	formal	denominations	and	references.	
Author(s)	 Title	 Year	 OJEC/OJEU	ref.	
Council	of	the	
European	Union	
(CEU)	
Council	resolution	of	25	July	1983	on	framework	programmes	for	
Community	research,	development	and	demonstration	activities	and	a	
first	framework	programme	1984	to	1987.	
1983	 OJEC	C208,	4.8.83	
CEU	
Council	decision	of	28	September	1987	concerning	the	framework	
programme	for	Community	activities	in	the	field	of	research	and	
technological	development	(1987	to	1991).	
1987	 OJEC	L302,	24.10.87	
CEU	
Council	decision	of	23	April	1990	concerning	the	framework	programme	
of	Community	activities	in	the	field	of	research	and	technological	
development	(1990	to	1994).	
1990	 OJEC	L117,	8.5.90	
European	
Parliament	and	
Council	of	the	
European	Union	
(EP	&	CEU)	
Decision	No	1110/94/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	
of	26	April	1994	concerning	the	fourth	framework	programme	of	the	
European	Community	activities	in	the	field	of	research	and	technological	
development	and	demonstration	(1994	to	1998).	
1994	 OJEC	L126,	18.5.94	
EP	&	CEU	
Decision	No	182/1999/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	
of	22	December	1998	concerning	the	fifth	framework	programme	of	the	
European	Community	for	research,	technological	development	and	
demonstration	activities	(1998	to	2002).	
1998	 OJEC	L26,	1.2.1999	
EP	&	CEU	
Dec.	No	1513/2002/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	
27	June	2002	concerning	the	Sixth	framework	programme	of	the	
European	Community	for	research,	technological	development	and	
demonstration	activities,	contributing	to	the	creation	of	the	European	
Research	Area	and	to	innovation	(2002	to	2006).	
2002	 OJEC	L232,	29.8.2002	
EP	&	CEU	
Decision	No	1982/2006/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	
Council	of	18	December	2006	concerning	the	Seventh	Framework	
Programme	of	the	European	Community	for	research,	technological	
development	and	demonstration	activities	(2007-2013).	
2006	 OJEU	L412,	30.12.2006	
EP	&	CEU	
Regulation	(EU)	No	1291/2013	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	
Council	of	11	December	2013	establishing	Horizon	2020	-	the	Framework	
Programme	for	Research	and	Innovation	(2014-2020)	and	repealing	
Decision	No	1982/2006/EC.	
2013	 OJEU	L347,	20.12.2013	
	
The	ERC	establishing	acts	(Table	5)	show	a	similar	nature:	they	are	legal	acts	published	on	the	Official	
Journal,	 although	 they	 are	 not	 as	 lengthy	 as	 the	 FPs	 establishing	 acts.	 The	 author,	 in	 this	 case,	 is	most	
frequently	the	European	Commission,	since	the	ERC	was	founded	on	the	model	of	an	executive	agency	of	the	
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Commission	(see	the	paragraph	Regaining	the	autonomy	of	the	scientific	community:	the	rise	of	the	ERC),	
while	 the	 Council	 is	 involved	 for	 what	 concerns	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 ERC	 inside	 the	 Framework	
Programmes.		
Table	5:	The	documents	relevant	to	the	establishment	of	the	ERC.	
Author(s)	 Title	 Year	 OJEC/OJEU	ref.	
CEU	
Council	decision	of	19	December	2006	concerning	the	specific	
programme:	Ideas	implementing	the	Seventh	Framework	Programme	of	
the	European	Community	for	research,	technological	development	and	
demonstration	activities	(2007	to	2013)	
2006	 OJEU	L400,	30.12.2006	
Commission	of	
the	European	
Communities	
(CEC)	
Commission	decision	of	2	February	2007	establishing	the	European	
Research	Council	 2007	
OJ	L57,	
24.02.2007	
European	
Commission	
(EC)	
Commission	decision	of	14	December	2007	setting	up	the	“European	
Research	Council	Executive	Agency”	for	the	management	of	the	specific	
Community	programme	“Ideas”	in	the	field	of	frontier	research	in	
application	of	Council	Regulation	(EC)	No	58/2003	
2007	 OJEU	L9,	12.1.2008	
EC	 Commission	decision	of	12	December	2013	establishing	the	European	Research	Council	 2013	
OJEU	C373,	
20.12.2013	
 
Exploratory analysis of the occurrences of key terms.	 As	 mentioned,	 the	 Framework	 Programmes	
establishing	 acts	 are	 the	 result	 of	 both	 the	 stages	 of	 policy	 design,	 the	 first	 one	 centred	 around	 the	
Commission	proposal	preparation,	and	the	subsequent	formal	discussion	and	approval	phase,	realized	in	the	
EU	legislative	bodies:	Council	and	Parliament.	They	are,	in	other	words,	the	final	output	of	the	conceptual	
frames	 incorporation	 into	research	policies.	Furthermore,	 they	show	a	peculiar	structural	uniformity,	and	
they	 are	 not	 sector-specific,	 but	 they	 encompass	 the	 whole	 landscape	 of	 research	 initiatives	 (i.e.,	 they	
incorporate	all	the	conceptual	frameworks).	Consequently,	they	were	particularly	suitable	for	an	exploratory	
analysis	by	means	of	computing	assistance,	in	order	to	explore	the	occurrences,	frequencies	and	evolution	
along	time	of	the	key	terms.	
The	 analysis	 of	 keywords	 is	 particularly	 meaningful	 in	 the	 FPs	 establishing	 acts	 since	 the	
argumentations	are	very	rarely	posited	in	negative	terms:	in	other	words,	the	terms	are	used	to	propose	and	
describe,	and	only	exceptionally	to	deny	or	forbid.	Hence,	it	is	possible	to	trust	that,	for	example,	the	word	
«market»	is	used	in	the	documents	with	a	positive	meaning,	to	support	and	sustain	its	development	and	not	
in	negative	expressions	like,	e.g.,	«market	outputs	must	be	excluded».	The	occurrences	of	words,	hence	can	
be	safely	considered	as	a	hint	for	conceptual	preference.	
The	Framework	Programmes	establishing	acts	have	been	analysed	with	the	web-based	text	reading	
and	analysis	environment	Voyant21,	and	further	elaborated	by	the	author	in	order	to	isolate	the	most	relevant	
																																								 																				
21	Sinclair,	Stéfan	and	Geoffrey	Rockwell,	2016.	Voyant	Tools.	Web.	http://voyant-tools.org/	.	
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thematic	groups	and	study	their	evolution	along	time	(the	most	relevant	ones	are	reported	in	Fig.	30,	Fig.	31	
and	 Fig.	 32).	 The	 sectors	 and	 categories	 labelling	 the	 following	 documents	 owe	 their	 first	 input	 to	 this	
exploratory	analysis.	
The Commission policy documents 
The	Commission’s	principal	policy	documents	analysed	in	this	work	are	listed	in	Table	6.		
They	all	express	the	official	positions	of	the	Commission	on	the	specific	issues;	however,	the	group	is	
not	as	uniform	as	the	FPs	and	ERC	establishing	acts:	the	documents	were	produced	by	different	groups	inside	
the	Commission,	with	reference	to	different	debates	and	political	objectives.	On	the	basis	of	the	FPs	acts	
preliminary	analysis	of	themes,	each	document	was	itemised	along	with	its	main	subject,	i.e.	the	activities	
landscape	and	intellectual	reference	in	which	it	was	written.	
The	Commission’s	documents	 constitute	 the	main	 research	 source	 for	 the	 identification	of	policy	
frames,	since	they	are	produced	with	the	specific	aim	of	developing	and	describing	policy	proposals	for	the	
discussion	in	EU	legislative	bodies.	
Table	6:	The	Commission	policy	documents	and	Green	Papers	relevant	to	the	development	of	scientific	policy	lines	considered	in	this	
work	
Title	 Year	 Main	subject	 Commission	classification	code	
Growth,	competitiveness,	employment	-	The	challenges	
and	ways	forward	into	the	21st	century	-	White	Paper	 1993	 Growth	 COM(93)700	
An	Industrial	Competitiveness	Policy	for	the	European	
Union	 1994	 Growth	 COM(94)	319	final	
Green	Paper	on	Innovation	 1995	 Innovation	 COM(95)	688	final	
Towards	a	Europe	of	Knowledge		 1997	 Education	 COM(97)	563	final	
Agenda	2000	-	For	a	stronger	and	wider	union	 1997	 Growth	 COM(97)	2000	final	
The	First	action	plan	for	innovation	in	Europe	 1997	 Innovation	 	
Science,	society	and	the	citizen	in	Europe	-	Commission	
Working	Document	 2000	 Science	&	Society	 SEC(2000)	1973	
Towards	a	European	research	area		 2000	 ERA	 COM(2000)	6	final	
European	governance	-	A	White	Paper	 2001	 Political	integration	 COM(2001)	428	final	
Science	and	society	-	Action	plan	 2002	 Science	&	Society	 	
Innovation	policy:	updating	the	Union’s	approach	in	the	
context	of	the	Lisbon	strategy	 2003	
Innovation/Lisbon	
strategy	 COM(2003)	112	final	
The	role	of	the	universities	in	the	Europe	of	knowledge	 2003	 Education	 	
Europe	and	Basic	Research	 2004	 Basic	Research	 COM(2004)	9	final	
Implementing	the	Community	Lisbon	Programme:	More	
Research	and	Innovation	-	Investing	for	Growth	and	
Employment:	A	Common	Approach	
2005	 Innovation/Lisbon	strategy	 COM(2005)	488	final	
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Title	 Year	 Main	subject	 Commission	classification	code	
Working	together	for	growth	and	jobs	-	A	new	start	for	the	
Lisbon	Strategy	-	Communication	from	President	Barroso	
in	agreement	with	Vice-President	Verheugen	
2005	 Innovation/Lisbon	strategy	 COM(2005)	24	final	
Putting	knowledge	into	practice:	A	broad-based	
innovation	strategy	for	the	EU	 2006	
Innovation/Lisbon	
strategy	 COM/2006/0502	final	
Commission	decision	of	2	February	2007	establishing	the	
European	Research	Council	 2007	 Basic	research	 OJ	L57	
A	single	market	for	the	21st	century	 2007	 Growth	 COM(2007)	724	final	
Inventing	our	future	together.	The	European	Research	
Area:	New	Perspectives	-	Green	Paper	 2007	 ERA	 COM(2007)	161	
Europe	2020	Flagship	Initiative	Innovation	Union	 2010	 Innovation	 COM(2010)	546	final	
Europe	2020	-	A	strategy	for	smart,	sustainable	and	
inclusive	growth	 2010	 Innovation	 COM(2010)	2020	final	
Green	Paper	-	From	Challenges	to	Opportunities:	Towards	
a	Common	Strategic	Framework	for	EU	Research	and	
Innovation	funding	
2011	 Innovation	 COM(2011)	48	final	
Horizon	2020	-	The	Framework	Programme	for	Research	
and	Innovation	 2011	 Research/Innovation	 COM(2011)	808	final	
The	Grand	Challenge.	The	design	and	societal	impact	of	
Horizon	2020	 2012	 Research/Innovation	 	
A	Reinforced	European	Research	Area	Partnership	for	
Excellence	and	Growth	 2012	 ERA	 COM(2012)	392	final	
European	Research	Area	-	Progress	Report	2014	 2014	 ERA	 COM(2014)	575	final	
Taking	stock	of	the	Europe	2020	strategy	for	smart,	
sustainable	and	inclusive	growth	 2014	 Innovation	 COM(2014)	130	final/2	
Research	and	innovation	as	sources	of	renewed	growth	 2014	 Research/Innovation	 COM(2014)	339	final	
	
In	addition	to	official	Commission	documents,	I	analysed	the	Commission	policy	officers’	books	on	
the	design	and	implementation	of	FP5	and	FP7	(Table	7),	which	proved	to	be	detailed	descriptions	of	the	
officers’	reflections	on	the	evaluation	of	past	programmes,	of	the	issues	to	address,	of	the	relevant	actors	
and	 the	 most	 appropriate	 procedures,	 and	 finally	 legitimising	 the	 chosen	 policy	 options.	 Although	 not	
published	 in	 the	same	form	of	 the	other	Commission	documents,	 they	provide	an	 interesting	account	on	
research	policy	from	the	standpoint	of	the	Commission.	To	my	knowledge,	such	accounts	have	been	drafted	
only	 for	 the	 mentioned	 Framework	 Programmes,	 the	 first	 in	 view	 of	 the	 set	 of	 policies	 on	 knowledge	
launched	at	 the	 turn	of	 the	Millennium,	 the	 second	as	 the	output	of	 the	 first	exercise	of	ex-ante	 impact	
assessment,	compulsory	since	2003,	on	Frameworks	Programmes.	The	ex-ante	impact	assessment	of	H2020	
was	published	as	well,	and	it	is	listed	among	the	Commission’s	policy	documents,	but	it	is	far	more	a	technical	
report	than	a	political	account,	and	it	appears	less	relevant.	
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Table	 7:	 The	 Commission	 policy	 officers’	 books	 on	 the	 conceptual	 foundations,	 design	 and	 implementation	 of	 the	 5th	 and	 7th	
Framework	Programmes	
Authors	 Title	 Year	
Caracostas,	P.,	&	Muldur,	U.	 Society,	 the	 endless	 frontier.	 A	 European	 Vision	 of	 Research	 and	Innovation	Policies	for	the	21st	Century.	 1998	
Muldur,	U.,	Corves,	F.,	Delanghe,	H.,	
Dratwa,	J.,	Heimberger,	D.,	Sloan,	
B.,	&	Vanslembrouck,	S.	
A	New	Deal	for	an	Effective	European	Research	Policy	-	The	Design	
and	Impacts	of	the	7th	Framework	Programme.	 2006	
	
The experts groups reports 
Experts	groups	report	form	a	significant	part	of	the	documental	production	of	the	European	Union.	
They	result	from	the	Commission	assigning	the	study	of	specific	issues	to	groups	of	academics,	civil	servants,	
politicians	or	company	managers,	usually	assisted	and	coordinated	by	Commission	officers.	The	choice	of	the	
relevant	experts	is	realized	case	by	case,	showing	significant	variations	in	the	number	and	in	the	composition	
of	groups	as	for,	e.g.,	the	balance	between	public	and	private	sectors,	academia	and	business,	or	different	
academic	fields.	
Experts	 reports	 may	 be	 endorsed	 in	 subsequent	 political	 discourses	 and	 cited	 in	 following	
documents,	 exerting	a	notable	 influence	on	policy	developments,	 or	 conversely	be	archived	without	 any	
significant	 implementation.	 However,	 all	 the	 reports	 in	 Table	 8	 proved	 to	 be	 influential,	 at	 least	 for	 the	
development	of	the	specific	political	stream	for	which	they	were	developed	(corresponding	to	the	subject	of	
the	analysis	identified	in	the	last	column22).	
Table	8:	The	Experts	Groups	reports	relevant	to	the	development	of	scientific	policy	strategies	considered	in	this	work	
Authors	
(chair)	 Title	 Year	 Main	subject	
Sapir,	A.	et	al.	
An	Agenda	for	a	Growing	Europe-	Making	the	EU	Economic	System	
Deliver,	Report	of	an	Independent	High-Level	Study	Group	established	
on	the	initiative	of	the	President	of	the	European	Commission	
2003	 Lisbon	Strategy	/	Innovation	
Mayor,	F.	et	
al.		
The	European	Research	Council		-	A	Cornerstone	in	the	European	
Research	Area	-	Report	from	an	expert	group.		 2003		 Basic	science	
Kok,	W.	et	al.	 Facing	the	challenge	-	The	Lisbon	strategy	for	growth	and	employment,	Report	from	the	High	Level	Group	chaired	by	Wim	Kok	 2004	
Lisbon	Strategy	
/	Innovation	
Strauss-Kahn,	
D.	et	al.	 Building	a	Political	Europe	-	50	proposals	for	tomorrow’s	Europe	 2004	
Political	
integration	
Harris,	W.C.,	
et	al.	
Frontier	Research:	the	European	Challenge	-	High-Level	Expert	Group	
Report	 2005	 Basic	science	
Aho,	E.,	at	al.	
Creating	an	Innovative	Europe	-	Report	of	the	Independent	Expert	Group	
on	R&D	and	Innovation	appointed	following	the	Hampton	Court	Summit	
and	chaired	by	Mr.	Esko	Aho		
2006	 Lisbon	Strategy	/	Innovation	
																																								 																				
22	The	subject	identification	is	analogous	to	the	one	conducted	for	Commission’s	documents.	
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Authors	
(chair)	 Title	 Year	 Main	subject	
Wynne,	B.	et	
al.	
Taking	European	Knowledge	Society	Seriously.	Report	of	the	Expert	
Group	on	Science	and	Governance	to	the	Science,	Economy	and	Society	
Directorate	
2007	 Science	&	Society	
Rocard,	M.	et	
al.	
Science	Education	Now:	A	Renewed	Pedagogy	for	the	Future	of	Europe	-	
High	Level	Group	on	Science	Education	 2007	 Education	
Georghiou,	L.	
et	al.	
Challenging	Europe’s	Research:	Rationales	for	the	European	Research	
Area	(ERA)	-	Report	of	the	ERA	Expert	Group	 2008	 ERA	
Soete,	L.	et	al.	 The	role	of	community	research	policy	in	the	knowledge-based	economy	-	Expert	Group	Report	 2009	
Lisbon	Strategy	
/	Innovation	
Von	Sydow,	B.	
et	al.	 A	Knowledge-intensive	future	for	Europe	-	Expert	Group	Report	 2009	
Lisbon	Strategy	
/	Innovation	
Ozoliņa,	Ž.	et	
al.	
Global	Governance	of	Science	-	Report	of	the	Expert	Group	on	Global	
Governance	of	Science	 2009	
Science	&	
Society	
Barre,	R.	et	al.	 ERA	Indicators	and	Monitoring	-	Expert	Group	Report	 2009	 ERA	
Sutcliffe,	H.		 A	report	on	Responsible	Research	&	Innovation.	 2011	 Science	&	Society	
van	den	
Hoven,	J.,	et	
al.	
Options	for	Strengthening	Responsible	Research	and	Innovation	-	Report	
of	the	Expert	Group	on	the	State	of	Art	in	Europe	on	Responsible	
Research	and	Innovation	
2013	 Science	&	Society	
Hudson,	R.	et	
al.	
The	knowledge	future	-	Intelligent	policy	choices	for	Europe	2050 :	
report	by	an	expert	group	on	foresight	on	key	long-term	
transformations	of	European	systems	-	research,	innovation	and	higher	
education	(KT2050)	
2015	 Knowledge	policy	
Soete,	L.	et	al.	
From	the	old	ERA	to	a	new	era	of	“Open	Knowledge	Creation	in	Europe”	
-	Policy	Brief	by	the	Research,	Innovation,	and	Science	Policy	Experts	
(RISE)	
2015	 Knowledge	policy	
Hunter,	A.,	et	
al.	
Evaluation	of	Joint	Programming	to	Address	Grand	Societal	Challenges	-	
Final	Report	of	the	Expert	Group	
	
2016	 Research	and	Innovation	
Lamy,	P.	et	al.	
LAB	–	FAB	–	APP	-	Investing	in	the	European	future	we	want	-	Report	of	
the	independent	High	Level	Group	on	maximising	the	impact	of	EU	
Research	&	Innovation	Programmes	
2017	 Research	and	Innovation	
	
The communication products 
Although	 not	 institutional	 documents	 stricto	 sensu,	 the	 communication	 products	 realized	 by	 the	
Commission	with	the	purpose	of	promoting	research	programmes	resulted	very	interesting	to	identify	and	
examine	the	most	relevant	conceptual	frameworks	employed	in	policy	discourses.	Communication	products,	
indeed,	commonly	strive	to	convince	the	public	about	the	good	use	of	communitarian	resources	and	cannot	
avoid	relying	on	legitimising	arguments,	revealing	the	value-based	rationales	of	the	initiatives;	moreover,	the	
attention	to	clarity	usually	imposes	a	certain	simplification	of	the	discourse,	resulting	in	a	clearer	exposure	
of	the	features	of	the	different	conceptual	frames.	
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A	wide	use	of	the	media	is	a	relatively	recent	strategy	for	European	institutions,	and	it	is	very	difficult	
to	find	communication	products,	in	the	field	of	research,	older	than	a	decade	(the	YouTube	channel	of	EU	
Science	 and	 Innovation	 –	where	 the	 videos	 are	 commonly	 published	 –	was	 opened	 in	 only	 in	 2010,	 the	
European	Commission’s	one	in	2006).	
Table	9:	The	communication	products	analysed	in	this	work.	
Title	 Year	 Media	type	
Bibliograp
hic	
reference	
Inside	the	Seventh	Framework	Programme	-	Its	past,	progress	and	key	
players,	and	how	it	is	viewed	by	its	partners	|	RTD	info	-	Magazine	on	
European	Research	-	Special	Edition	
2007	 magazine	 (EC,	2007)	
Innovation-Union	 2010	 video	 (EC,	2010d)	
Innovation	Union	(Act	2)		 2010	 video	 (EC,	2010e)	
Responsible	Research	and	Innovation	-	Europe’s	ability	to	respond	to	societal	
challenges	 2012	 leaflet	 (EC,	2012b)	
Discover	Innovation	Union	 2013	 video	 (EC,	2013a)	
Horizon	2020	-	EU	research	and	innovation	 2014	 video	 (EC,	2014d)	
Horizon	2020	-	General	overview	 2014	 video	 (EC,	2014e)	
Horizon	2020	in	brief.	The	EU	Framework	Programme	for	Research	&	
Innovation	 2014	 leaflet	 (EC,	2014f)	
Research	and	Innovation:	Pushing	boundaries	and	improving	the	quality	of	
life	 2014	 leaflet	 (EC,	2014g)	
Responsible	Research	and	Innovation:	aligning	R&I	with	European	society.		 2015	 video	 (EC,	2015d)	
30th	Anniversary	EU	Research	Framework	Programmes	1984-2014	|	Horizon	
Magazine	-	Special	issue	 2015	 magazine	 (EC,	2015a)	
Horizon	2020	video	-	How	to	apply?	 2015	 video	 (EC,	2015c)	
Horizon	2020,	the	new	generation	of	European	funding.	 2015	 video	 (EC,	2015b)	
The	European	Research	Area	(ERA)	 2015	 video	 (EC,	2015e)	
FP7	-	Funding	by	Member	State	-	Report	card	 2016	 leaflet	 (EC,	2016d)	
FP7	-	What’s	next	-	Report	card	 2016	 leaflet	 (EC,	2016e)	
Research	and	Innovation	Funding:	making	a	real	difference	 2016	 leaflet	 (EC,	2016h)	
Horizon	2020	-	Two	years	on	 2016	 leaflet	 (EC,	2016g)	
FP7	-	Boosting	Research	Capacity	-	Report	Card	 2016	 leaflet	 (EC,	2016b)	
FP7	-	Dispelling	some	myths	-	Report	Card	 2016	 leaflet	 (EC,	2016c)	
FP7	for	Excellent	Science	-	Report	Card	 2016	 leaflet	 (EC,	2016f)	
	
The documents analysis.	After	the	preliminary	phases	of	documents	exploration,	constituting	of	a	first	
study	of	the	most	relevant	terms	in	FPs	establishing	acts,	followed	by	the	examination	of	the	documents	in	
search	of	categories	and	principal	themes	–	I	constructed	an	account	of	the	main	conceptual	frameworks,	
their	features	and	sub-narratives,	articulated	along	reading	paths	and	reported	in	detail	 in	the	chapter	on	
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Frames	 and	 narratives	 in	 EU	 policy	 discourses	 on	 science.	 The	 accounts	 combine	 historical	 sources,	
documents	citations	and	scholarly	references	to	depict	the	evolution	and	features	of	the	frames	incorporated	
in	EU	research	policy.	Often	the	same	documents	are	mentioned	as	significant	in	more	than	one	account,	for	
their	intrinsic	relevance	but	also	because	analytical	categories	may	overlap	and	the	same	reference	can	be	
meaningful	for	more	than	reading.	
The	documents	reported	in	this	work	are	the	most	relevant	for	the	development	of	the	theoretical	
landscape	of	this	research;	some	of	the	documents	listed	in	the	tables	above,	even	though	analysed,	are	not	
explicitly	cited,	but	they	anyway	contributed	to	shape	the	analysis.	Conversely,	some	additional	documents	
are	 referenced	 in	bibliography	but	not	 listed	 in	 the	 tables	 above	–	 for	example,	 some	 important	Council	
documents	(the	‘74	decisions	on	the	coordination	of	research,	or	the	Presidency	conclusions	of	the	Lisbon	
2000	Council)	–		because	their	relevance	resides	more	in	their	historical	meaning	than	in	their	contents,	and	
they	appeared	less	relevant	for	the	identification	of	the	features	of	conceptual	frames.
European integration and the policy-making 
process on scientific research 
In	reality,	the	history	of	the	European	research	policy	could	almost	be	described	as	that	of	the	
gradual	development	of	a	small	pool	of	ideas	formulated	thirty	years	ago,	that,	broadly	speaking,	we	
continue	to	exploit	today.	(…)	The	fact	is	that	situations	only	evolve	very	gradually,	and	ideas	take	the	
Commission	over	40	years	a	long	time	to	be	formulated,	understood,	assimilated	and	accepted,	and	
an	even	longer	time	to	be	finalised	and	to	have	a	discernible	effect	on	the	real	world.	
(Michel	André,	DG	Research	adviser,	interviewed	in	(CEC,	2007d))	
The	basic,	founding	ideas	on	the	role,	meaning	and	configuration	of	scientific	research	in	Europe	have	
been	 influenced	 and	 shaped	 by	 a	 number	 of	 different	 factors;	 in	 the	 European	 case,	 in	 particular,	 the	
confrontation	 on	 the	 different	 models	 of	 integration	 never	 stopped	 and	 it	 is	 still	 clearly	 visible	 in	 the	
institutional	asset.	The	history	of	the	European	integration	had	also	a	profound	influence	on	the	development	
of	a	 communitarian	 scientific	policy,	and	 it	 is	not	possible	 to	understand	 the	current	 configuration	 if	not	
acknowledging	its	historical	impressions.	
Which science for which Europe? 
Notwithstanding	the	role	played	by	research	policy	in	the	process	of	European	integration,	science	
and	technology	weren’t	recognised	as	areas	of	communitarian	interventions23	in	the	1957	Treaty	establishing	
the	European	Economic	Community	 (EEC).	This	 lack	of	 legal	provision	delayed	 the	debate	on	a	European	
unitary	science	policy	until	the	‘70s,	and	a	real	coordination	of	actions	was	established	only	in	the	‘80s	with	
the	inception	of	the	Framework	Programmes,	currently	representing	the	principal	instruments	of	European	
research	policy.	
The	 evolution	 of	 the	 European	 policy	 on	 research	 was	 marked	 by	 diverse	 internal	 and	 external	
factors:	the	radical	developments	occurred	in	the	physiognomy	of	science	after	WWII,	the	laborious	process	
of	 European	 integration,	 the	 major	 geopolitical	 historical	 events.	 However,	 the	 dynamics	 of	 opposing	
interests	and	political-economic	powers	alone	cannot	explain	the	changes	occurred	in	European	R&D	policy,	
and	the	subsequent	shifting	paradigms	on	the	role	of	science	and	technology	in	economy	and	society	(Borrás,	
																																								 																				
23	With	the	exception	of	scientific	research	in	agriculture	(Trattato	che	istituisce	la	Comunità	economica	europea,	1958)	.	
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2000;	Sanz	Menéndez	&	Borrás,	2000):	 in	other	words,	 the	 role	of	 “policy	 frames”	needs	 to	be	 rightfully	
considered	as	well,	both	as	the	consequence	of	the	evolution	in	the	understanding	of	research	policy	and	as	
prescriptive	tools	of	following	developments,	defining	its	new	universe,	actors,	values	and	methods.	
Post-war reconstruction and the foundation of the European big laboratories.	The	national	urgencies	
of	 the	 immediate	post-war	period	mainly	 concerned	 the	 reconstruction	efforts,	 in	material,	 political	 and	
economic	terms;	however,	the	fields	related	to	science	and	technology	underwent	relevant	interventions	as	
well,	mainly	geared,	 in	 the	 interests	of	national	governments,	 towards	 the	supply	of	energy	sources	 (the	
traditional	coal	and	the	new	nuclear	energy,	regarded	as	the	basis	of	an	approaching	industrial	revolution),	
and	driven	by	the	scientific	community	demand	of	new	structures	to	enable	European	science	to	regain	the	
ground	lost	to	United	States	(Guzzetti,	1995).	
The	high	costs	and	complexity	of	research	infrastructures	soon	led	to	the	proposal	of	joint	projects,	
realised	 through	multilateral	agreements	among	the	governments.	The	post-war	“golden	age”	of	welfare	
states,	considered	the	principal	model	of	state-economy	relations,	legitimised	massive	direct	interventions	
in	the	production	of	scientific	knowledge,	supported	by	the	belief	that	the	exploitation	of	that	knowledge	in	
industrial	 and	 economic	 terms	would	 have	 been	 consequent,	 although	 happening	 in	 the	 long	 term	 and	
through	paths	positioned	out	of	the	reach	of	political	control	(Borrás,	2000).	In	1951	and	1957	the	European	
Coal	and	Steel	Community	(ECSC)	and	the	European	Atomic	Energy	Community	(Euratom)	were	founded;	
analogously	to	the	EEC,	their	primary	objective	was	economic	and	politic24	–	they	were	aimed	at	developing	
an	internal	market	in	the	respective	sectors	–	and	only	secondarily	scientific	and	technical.	The	evolution	of	
the	Euratom	was	marked	by	political	conflicts	regarding	its	aims	and	role	with	respect	to	the	national		policies;	
it	 transformed	 from	a	 tool	of	 industrial	development	 to	an	 instrument	of	energy	policy	and	 finally	 into	a	
techno-scientific	research	organization	in	the	nuclear	field;	the	launch	of	the	research	on	fusion,	a	possible	
future	clean	energetic	resource,	with	the	project	JET	(Joint	European	Torus)	in	1979,	brought	back	the	lost	
prestige	to	Euratom,	which	is	currently	included	in	the	Framework	Programmes	principally	for	this	research	
line25	(Borrás,	2000;	Guzzetti,	1995).	
On	the	other	hand,	on	the	pure	science	side,	among	the	first	pro-Europeans	figured	some	prominent	
scientists,	like	the	physicists	Edoardo	Amaldi	and	Pierre	Auger,	and	the	director	of	the	French	Commission	à	
l’Energie	Atomique,	Raoul	Dautry,	who	proposed	in	1949	the	creation	of	a	European	laboratory	for	nuclear	
research.	 The	project	was	welcomed	also	 by	 the	US,	whose	post-war	 policy	was	 in	 favour	 of	 reinforcing	
Europe		–	e.g.	with	the	Marshall	Plan	–	in	order	to	counterbalance	the	rise	of	Soviet	Union;	a	strong	scientific	
community	in	Europe	was	regarded	as	a	coherent	development	of	this	policy	(Krige,	2005).	In	1953	twelve	
																																								 																				
24	The	political	objective	of	the	Communities	was	to	realize	a	union	de	facto,	that	the	fathers	of	Europe	were	confident	
would	have	brought	to	the	realization	of	a	proper	political	union:	see	also	the	“functionalistic”	approach	to	European	integration,	
explained	in	the	paragraph	Theories	of	EU	integration	and	the	European	institutional	structure.	
25	And	for	what	concerns	the	research	activities	related	to	nuclear	reactor	maintenance	and	decommissioning.	The	Euratom	
Treaty,	unlike	the	ECSC	one	which	expired	after	50	years	 in	2002,	didn’t	provide	a	deadline	for	the	collaboration:	Euratom	is	still	
legally	distinct	from	the	European	Union,	but	has	the	same	member	states	and	it	is	administered	by	the	European	Institutions.	
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European	 countries26	 signed	 the	 agreement	 establishing	 CERN	 (Conseil	 Européen	 pour	 la	 Recherche	
Nucléaire)	in	Geneva,	on	the	French-Swiss	border27,	devoted	to	research	in	fundamental	physics.	Although	
antecedent	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 European	 Community,	 CERN	 represented	 the	 first,	 successful,	
attempt	of	collaboration	among	European	countries	–	former,	very	recently,	wartime	enemies	–	in	the	field	
of	scientific	research:	CERN	was	the	first	non-national	laboratory	in	Europe,	profiting	from	the	contributions	
of	all	the	member	states.		
CERN	represented	a	model	for	the	establishment	of	other	big	European	laboratories,	appropriate	for	
the	developments	of	the	new	“big	science”,	whose	features	were	shifting	towards	great	concentration	of	
scientists,	 funds	 and	 infrastructures.	 All	 the	 European	 laboratories	 were	 founded	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
intergovernmental,	ad-hoc,	agreements	among	countries	interested	in	pooling	resources	in	the	disciplines	
judged	most	promising,	 also	 in	 response	 to	USA	and	USSR	progresses	 in	 the	 same	 fields:	 ESO	 (European	
Southern	Observatory)	was	built	in	1962	in	Chile	by	Belgium,	Germany,	France,	The	Netherlands	and	Sweden,	
while	 EMBL	 (European	 Molecular	 Biology	 Laboratory)	 was	 established	 in	 Heidelberg	 in	 1974	 by	 the	
collaboration	of	Austria,	Denmark,	France,	Germany,	Israel,	Italy,	The	Netherlands,	Sweden,	Switzerland	and	
United	Kingdom.	Furthermore,	ESA	(European	Space	Agency)	was	founded	in	1975	from	the	merge	of	two	
earlier	 organisations28,	 and	 it	 shared	 with	 Airbus,	 established	 in	 1970,	 a	 prevailing	 orientation	 towards	
industrial	applications.	
Towards a European coordinated scientific policy.	All	these	developments	were	characterised	by	a	set	
of	common	features:	they	were	publicly	funded,	basic	science,	non-military,	big	installations29.	Public	debate	
evolved,	modelled	after	the	successful	example	of	CERN.		
During	the	 ‘60s	and	‘70s	the	understanding	of	science	policy	changed,	 in	Europe	as	well	as	 in	the	
whole	Western	area:	while	previously	the	main	rationale	for	funding	science	with	public	funds	was	essentially	
political	 (and	military	 in	 the	 immediate	post-war),	with	 the	aim	of	 gaining	prestige	and	 catching	up	with	
competing	 countries,	 in	 the	 ‘70s	 the	 changed	 global	 landscape	 –	 the	 ending	 “thirty	 glorious	 years”	 of	
increasing	prosperity	with	the	succession	of	oil	crises,	the	weakening	Cold	War	and	the	rise	of	globalisation	
–	led	to	focus	concerns	no	longer	on	the	fear	of	a	new	war,	but	on	a	“technological	gap”	between	Europe	
and	USA/Japan	and	triggered	a	shift	towards	the	objective	of	industrial	competitiveness;	consequently,	basic	
science	 was	 superseded	 by	 technological	 development	 as	 the	 most	 appropriate	 instrument	 to	 achieve	
“economic	security”	(Borrás,	2000;	Caracostas	&	Muldur,	1998).	Moreover,	big	and	expensive	projects	(like	
the	big	laboratories)	no	longer	seemed	adequate	to	the	new	public	sensibility,	concerned	with	the	limits	of	
growth,	the	pollution	issues	and	the	risks	related	to	nuclear	technology.		
																																								 																				
26	Belgium,	Denmark,	France,	Germany,	Greece,	 Italy,	The	Netherlands,	Norway,	Sweden,	Switzerland,	United	Kingdom,	
Yugoslavia.	
27	The	laboratory	is	currently	still	built	partly	on	the	French	soil	and	partly	on	the	Swiss	territory.	
28	ELDO	(European	Launcher	Development	Organisation)	and	ESRO	(European	Space	Research	Organisation).	
29	With	the	partial	exception	of	ESA	and	Airbus,	whose	orientation	was	prevailingly	industrial,	and	in	the	case	of	Airbus,	not	
founded	by	countries,	but	as	a	consortium	of	industries.	
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Gradually,	the	scientific	research	paradigm	shifted	from	the	building	of	great	infrastructures	to	the	
realization	of	transnational	networks	of	scientists,	institutions	and	industries	(Liverani,	2010).	The	network	
model	proved	to	be	particularly	suitable	for	the	European	context,	overcoming	the	fears	of	some	countries	
to	suffer	a	disadvantage	with	respect	to	the	nations	hosting	the	laboratories:	a	network	structure	is	able	to	
reinforce	 the	 links	 among	 the	 scientific	 actors	 throughout	 Europe	 without	 questioning	 the	 national	
sovereignty	 and	 the	 equilibrium	 among	 countries	 (Barry,	 2001).	 COST	 (Coopération	 européenne	 dans	 le	
domaine	 de	 la	 recherche	 scientifique	 et	 technique)	 and	 ESF	 (European	 Science	 Foundation),	 created	
respectively	 in	1971	and	 in	1974	were	 the	 first	examples	of	multidisciplinary,	network-like	organisations,	
working	as	a	meeting	point	of	governmental	research	institutions,	industries	and	universities.	
Debates	on	the	«technological	gap»	led	to	a	shared	feeling	of	the	need	for	more	coordination	in	the	
European	 system	 of	 scientific	 research;	 the	 main	 unsolved	 issue	 among	 European	 politicians	 was	 the	
management	model	of	the	networks.	There	were	two	main	options:	the	intergovernmental	one,	based	on	
targeted	 agreements	 among	 interested	 countries,	 and	 the	 centralized	 one,	 aimed	 at	 profiting	 of	 the	
economies	 of	 scale	 at	 continental	 level.	 Clearly,	 the	 countries	 keen	 on	 nationalism	 preferred	 the	
intergovernmental	paradigm,	based	on	peers’	agreements,	in	order	to	preserve	their	complete	sovereignty.		
An	 additional	 problem	 affected	 the	 centralized	 model:	 it	 was	 not	 straightforward	 to	 justify	 a	
communitarian	action	 in	the	field	of	scientific	research,	given	the	fact	that	there	was	no	mention	of	such	
activities	in	the	Treaty	establishing	the	European	Economic	Community.	In	order	to	establish	a	centralized	
coordination	of	scientific	research	it	was	indeed	necessary	to	amend	the	Treaty,	and	there	was	not	enough	
time	and	agreement	among	the	European	countries	for	that.	A	compromise	was	reached	in	the	Summit	of	
Heads	 of	 State	 and	 Government	 held	 in	 Paris	 in	 1972:	 new	 policies,	 including	 the	 support	 to	 scientific	
research,	had	to	be	grounded	to	the	contribution	to	economic	development,	which	was	then	perfectly	lawful,	
representing	the	main	aim	of	the	European	Economic	Community30.	Following	the	1973	enlargement	of	the	
Communities	to	Great	Britain,	Ireland	and	Denmark,	the	structure	of	the	Commission	Directorates	connected	
with	 research	 policies	 was	 reorganised:	 Research,	 Science	 and	 Education	 went	 to	 DG	 XIII,	 under	
Commissioner	 Ralf	 Dahrendorf,	 while	 Industry	 and	 technological	 affairs	 remained	 to	 DG	 III,	 under	 the	
responsibility	 of	 Commissioner	 Altiero	 Spinelli	 (Guzzetti,	 1995).	 These	 two	 Directorates,	 under	 different	
political	responsibilities,	were	going	to	be	central	for	the	development	of	EU	R&D	policy31.	
In	 1974	 the	 European	 Community	 for	 the	 first	 time	 legislated	 on	 scientific	 and	 technologic	
development,	with	the	rationale	that	«a	common	policy	 in	the	field	of	science	and	technology	 is	 likely	to	
																																								 																				
30	 Art.	 235	 of	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Rome	 allowed	 for	 any	 communitarian	 action	 that	 «appears	 necessary	 to	 achieve,	 in	 the	
functioning	of	the	Common	Market,	one	of	the	aims	of	the	Community	in	cases	where	this	Treaty	has	not	provided	for	the	requisite	
powers	of	action»	(Trattato	che	istituisce	la	Comunità	economica	europea,	1958).	
The	aim	of	the	Community	was	«to	promote	throughout	the	Community	a	harmonious	development	of	economic	activities,	
a	continuous	and	balanced	expansion,	an	 increased	stability,	an	accelerated	raising	of	 the	standard	of	 living	and	closer	 relations	
between	its	Member	States»	(Trattato	che	istituisce	la	Comunità	economica	europea,	1958).	
31	 See	 in	 Table	 18	 and	 Table	 19	 the	 list	 of	 Commissioners	 responsible	 for	 the	 two	 portfolios	 devoted	 to	 industry	 and	
research,	under	their	different	denominations.	
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contribute	to	social	progress,	to	balanced	economic	expansion	and	to	an	improvement	in	the	quality	of	life»	
(CECs,	1974).	It	was	just	a	one-year	pilot	programme,	aimed	at	selecting	projects	relevant	to	the	overall	socio-
economic	 needs	 of	 the	Community,	 in	 order	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 «development	 of	 a	 common	policy	 on	
science	and	technology»,	but	it	paved	the	way	for	the	developments	of	the	following	decade.	
In	the	‘80s,	the	emphasis	on	technological	applications	and	industrial	development,	paired	with	the	
economic-political	 objective	 of	 competitiveness	 was	 on	 top	 of	 the	 research	 policy	 agenda:	 in	 1982	 the	
Commissioner	for	industry	and	S&T	Etienne	Davignon	launched	ESPRIT	(European	Strategic	Programme	for	
Research	and	Development	in	Information	Technology),	an	initiative	essentially	different	from	the	previous:	
it	 involved	 the	most	 relevant	 industries	 in	 the	 IT	 sector32	 from	the	programme	design	phase,	 in	 so	doing	
circumventing	the	governments’	resistance	to	interventions	in	strategic	industrial	sectors	(since	it	would	have	
implied	not	to	support	the	proposals	of	the	respective	“national	champions”);	in	subsequent	years,	a	similar,	
industry-oriented,	model	was	applied	to	the	BRITE	(Basic	Research	in	Industrial	Technologies)	and	EURAM	
(European	Research	in	Advanced	Materials)	programmes,	launched	in	1985	and	1986.	
However,	 the	 confrontation	 among	 the	 two	management	 paradigms	 –	 strong,	 central,	 or	 weak,	
intergovernmental,	collaboration	–	was	still	not	solved:	this	«was	not	only	due	to	the	question	of	identity	
related	to	the	new	‘Europeanisation’	of	the	competitiveness	problem,	but	also	to	the	question	about	the	
extent	and	forms	of	public	intervention	in	science	and	technology	issues	in	a	period	of	predominant	liberal	
and	right-wing	ideology»	(Borrás,	2000).	The	plastic	representation	of	such	alternative	visions	was	the	co-
existence	of	EUREKA	(EUrope	REsearch	Koordination	Action),	market-driven	and	state-controlled,	launched	
in	1985	by	the	French	President	François	Mitterand	as	a	clear	political	signal	of	distrust	for	communitarian	
initiatives,	 and	 the	 First	 Framework	 Programme	 (FP1),	 supra-nationally	 controlled	 and	 pre-competitive	
oriented.	 The	 Programme,	 spanning	 over	 the	 period	 1984-1987,	was	 the	 first	 attempt	 to	 reorganise	 the	
diverse	and	sparse	European	R&D	activities	in	a	comprehensive	plan	that	would	serve	as	planning	as	well	as	
funding	instrument.	Although	modest	in	dimensions	and	still	hindered	by	some	member	states,	the	efficacy	
of	the	Framework	Programme	as	a	planning	instrument,	together	with	the	success	of	the	other	Community-
run	 programmes	 like	 ESPRIT,	modified	 the	 attitude	 of	 the	 opponent	 states	 and	 opened	 the	way	 for	 the	
uninterrupted	series33	of	consecutive	multiannual	Framework	Programmes,	currently	representing	the	main	
instrument	of	European	research	policy.		
																																								 																				
32	The	so-called	«Big	Twelve»:	ICL,	GEC	and	Plessey	from	Great	Britain;	AEG,	Nixdorf	and	Siemens	from	Germany;	Thomson,	
Bull	and	CGE	from	France;	Olivetti	and	STET	from	Italy;	Philips	from	the	Netherlands	(Guzzetti,	1995).	
33	Second	Framework	Programme	(1987-1991),	Third	Framework	Programme	(1990-1994),	Fourth	Framework	Programme	
(1994-1998),	Fifth	Framework	Programme	(1998-2002),	Sixth	Framework	Programme	(2002-2006),	Seventh	Framework	Programme	
(2007-2013).	
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Fig.	2:	The	European	S&T	infrastructures,	collaborations	and	Programmes	landscape	in	the	‘80s,	until	the	turn	of	the	Millennium	(the	
European	Union	includes	Euratom)	(source:	Borrás,	2000,	p.	19).	
	
In	1986,	at	 last,	with	 the	Single	European	Act,	 the	Treaties	were	amended	with	 the	addition	of	a	
section	 on	 scientific	 research,	 explicitly	 establishing	 that	 periodical	 Framework	 Programmes	 had	 to	 be	
designed	and	implemented	by	the	European	Institutions.	The	rationale	for	scientific	research	grounded	on	
the	mid	‘70s	‘compromise’	of	anchoring	research	to	economic	development	(Single	European	Act,	1986):			
The	Community’s	aim	shall	be	to	strengthen	the	scientific	and	technological	basis	of	European	industry	
and	to	encourage	it	to	become	more	competitive	at	international	level.	In	order	to	achieve	this,	it	shall	
encourage	 undertakings	 including	 small	 and	 medium-sized	 undertakings,	 research	 centres	 and	
universities	in	their	research	and	technological	development	activities.	
A	fundamental	point	to	solve	for	the	realization	of	the	First	Framework	Programmes,	in	consideration	
of	 the	 differences	 between	 nationalistic	 and	 pro-European	 perspectives,	 was	 the	 justification	 of	 the	
communitarian	intervention.	A	set	of	criteria,	named	after	the	German	minister	Reisenhuber,	was	elaborated	
to	 define	 the	 limits	 of	 European	 interventions,	 and	 inserted	 in	 the	 Council	 Resolution	 enacting	 the	 First	
Framework	Programme;	communitarian	action	was	legitimate	in	the	following	cases	(CEU,	1983):	
—	research	on	a	very	large	scale	for	which	the	individual	Member	States	could	not,	or	could	only	with	
difficulty,	provide	the	necessary	finance	and	personnel,			
—	 research,	 the	 joint	 execution	 of	 which	would	 offer	 obvious	 financial	 benefits,	 even	 after	 taking	
account	of	the	extra	costs	inherent	in	all	international	cooperation,			
—	research	which,	because	of	the	complementary	nature	of	work	being	done	nationally	in	part	of	a	
given	 field,	 enables	 significant	 results	 to	be	obtained	 in	 the	Community	as	a	whole	 for	 the	 case	of	
problems	whose	solution	requires	research	on	a	large	scale,	particularly	geographical,			
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—	research	which	helps	to	strengthen	the	cohesion	of	the	common	market	and	to	unify	the	European	
scientific	 and	 technical	 area	 and	 research	 leading,	where	 the	 need	 is	 felt,	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	
uniform	standards.	
This	 first	 set	 of	 criteria	 was	 the	 core	 of	 the	 principles	 shaping	 the	 relations	 among	 European	
centralized	 management	 and	 national	 governments,	 later	 inserted	 in	 the	 Maastricht	 Treaty	 under	 the	
denomination	of	“subsidiarity	principle”.	According	to	subsidiarity,	the	EU	shall	take	action	«only	if	and	in	so	
far	as	the	objectives	of	the	proposed	action	cannot	be	sufficiently	achieved	by	the	Member	States	and	can	
therefore,	by	reason	of	the	scale	or	effects	of	the	proposed	action,	be	better	achieved	by	the	Community»	
(EU,	1992).	It	was	then	established	that	in	European	Union	the	national	governments	were	the	main	subjects	
of	policy-making,	while	at	the	European	level	were	delegated	all	those	activities	too	expensive,	too	big	or	too	
difficult	to	be	managed	by	the	single	nations.	Subsidiarity	is,	of	course,	not	only	an	organizational	principle,	
but	 an	 embodiment	 of	 the	 political	 identity	 of	 European	Union,	 in	 abiding	 search	 of	 a	 balance	 between	
central	management	and	the	national	governments.		
The political unification and the transition to innovation.	 The	 Maastricht	 Treaty,	 signed	 in	 1992,	
marked	a	major	change	in	Europe:	the	political	unification	of	Europe	was	established,	four	decades	after	the	
establishment	of	 the	Communities	 in	 the	 ‘50s.	However,	 the	new-born	European	Union	presented	 some	
weaknesses:	it	didn’t	have	a	Constitution	nor	a	single	currency,	it	showed	different	policy	models34	and	it	had	
to	deal	with	the	requests	of	the	newly	established	European	citizens	to	be	included	in	the	decision-making	
processes35.	
A	 new	 transition	 in	 the	 research	 policies	 happened	 during	 the	 ‘90s:	 in	 parallel	 to	 the	 focus	 on	
competitiveness,	typical	of	the	‘80s,	a	new	emphasis	was	put	on	innovation	as	the	objective	of	R&D	policies:	
the	academic	community	was	indeed	abandoning	the	“linear	model”	for	innovation	–	increasing	funding	for	
scientific	research	leads	“automatically”	to	an	increased	technological	and	economic	development,	through	
the	 separate	 steps	 of	 basic	 research,	 applied	 research,	 development,	 (production	 and)	 diffusion	 (Godin,	
2006b)	 –	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 “systemic”	 view:	 “systems	 of	 innovation”	 were	 understood	 as	 involving	 all	 the	
economic	actors,	linked	by	multiple,	non-linear	interplays,	and	the	role	of	public	policies	was	to	support	the	
creation	of	an	environment	conducive	to	innovation.	
In	the	view	of	European	scientific	policy	officers,	this	turn	to	innovation	would	have	been	paired	to	
the	rise	of	social	objectives,	to	be	pursued	by	research	(Caracostas	&	Muldur,	1998);	actually	for	the	European	
Union,	this	transition	coincided,	as	a	consequence	of	the	political	unification,	to	the	inclusion	for	the	first	
time,	of	«economic	and	social	cohesion»	and	«	protection	of	the	rights	and	interests	of	the	nationals	of	its	
Member	States	through	the	introduction	of	a	citizenship	of	the	Union»	among	the	objectives	of	European	
																																								 																				
34	See	below,	The	European	policy-making	models.	
35	Explained	in	details	in	paragraph	The	citizens’	place	in	EU	democracy.	
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policies.	The	paired	objectives	of	boosting	competitiveness	and	realizing	social	progress	would	have	been	the	
distinguishing	mark	of	the	“European	model”.	
The years 2000s.	The	evolution	of	the	European	research	policies	after	the	turn	of	the	Millennium	
was	determined	by	the	launch	of	the	three-folded	EU	strategy	–	Lisbon	strategy,	ERA	and	Bologna	process	–	
inserting	knowledge	policies	at	the	heart	of	the	political	agenda.		
The	Bologna	process,	centred	on	the	harmonisation	of	European	higher-education	systems,	was	not	
strictly	speaking	a	communitarian	initiative	–	it	was	rather	an	intergovernmental	accord	–	,	but	EU	rapidly	
associated	it	to	its	new	strategy,	aimed	at	transforming	the	Union	into	«the	most	competitive	and	dynamic	
knowledge-based	economy	in	the	world»	(Council,	2000).	To	realise	the	Lisbon	strategy,	a	special	attention	
was	paid	to	the	research	system,	and	in	2000	the	European	Research	Area	initiative	was	launched	in	order	
to	reduce	the	fragmentation	of	the	national	research	systems.	The	conceptual	reference	in	this	decade	was	
initially	the	«knowledge	society»	framework,	which	was	gradually	superseded	by	the	notion	of	innovation	as	
the	driving	force	of	development	(this	conceptual	shift	and	the	2000s	knowledge	policies	are	described	in	
detail	 in	the	paragraph	From	Knowledge	society	to	 Innovation	Union:	a	paradigm-shift).	Europe	2020,	the	
growth	 strategy	 following	 Lisbon	 (closed	 in	2010,	without	having	achieved	 its	 targets),	 is	 in	 fact	 critically	
grounding	on	innovation	the	research	funding	programmes	–	especially	the	current	Framework	Programme,	
opened	in	2014	under	the	name	Horizon	2020	and	aimed	at	realizing	the	«Innovation	Union»	(EC,	2011a,	
2014k).	
The budget for research.	 Fig.	 3	 shows	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 share	 of	 European	budget	 devoted	 to	
research,	as	extracted	from	EU	Financial	Reports36	(CEC,	2009;	EC,	2012a,	2014,	2016a):	research	allocations	
experienced	continued	growth,	both	in	absolute	terms	and	as	a	percentage	of	the	total	EU	budget.	Yet	the	
increase	 of	 the	 overall	 budget	 for	 research,	 including	 the	 FPs,	 is,	 in	 relative	 terms,	 less	 impressive:	 it	
fluctuated	in	the	period	1984-2015	between	2%	and	7%	of	the	EU	total	budget;	as	a	comparison,	funds	for	
agriculture	decreased	in	the	same	period	from	about	70%	to	about	40%	of	the	total	EU	expenditure	(cf.	Fig.	
3	and	Fig.	30).	
Although	the	years	around	2000	represent	a	 fundamental	 turning	point	 in	strategical	 terms,	 they	
singularly	didn’t	involve	an	increase	in	the	budget	share	devoted	to	research;	conversely	a	notable	peak	is	
visible	around	the	years	of	preparation	and	launch	of	the	first	Framework	Programme	(see	Fig.	3,	the	peak	
of	the	years	1982-1985).		
A	negative	peak	is,	on	the	other	hand,	recognizable	in	2007,	corresponding	to	the	cuts	in	research	
budget	decided	during	the	FP7	negotiations;	also	Horizon	2020	underwent	budget	negotiations,	but	the	cut	
was	not	so	severe	as	for	FP737.	
																																								 																				
36	 I.e.,	 the	 data	 appearing	 in	 the	 plot	 express	 the	 allocations	 traced	 and	 grouped	 under	 the	 label	 «research»	 by	 the	
Commission	itself	(see	in	particular	CEC,	2009).	
37	 See	 the	 section	 on	 The	 EU	 decision-making	 process(es)	 for	 scientific	 research	 for	 a	 detailed	 account	 of	 the	 budget	
negotiations	for	FP7	and	H2020.	
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Fig.	3:	The	evolution	of	the	European	share	of	budget	dedicated	to	research	(source:	Financial	Reports	2008,	2011,	2013,	2015	(CEC,	
2009;	EC,	2012a,	2014,	2016a);	from	1968	to	1977:	UA	(Unit	of	Accounts);	from	1978	to	1998:	ECU	(European	Currency	Units);	from	
1999:	euros)	
	
 
A not-yet-completed evolution.	 Table	 10	 summarises	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 timeline	 the	milestones	 of	
European	 research	 policy,	 since	 the	 Communities’	 foundations	 in	 the	 ‘50s,	 highlighting	 the	 reference	
paradigm	 shifts:	 from	 big	 laboratories	 to	 collaborations	 or	 coordinated	 programmes,	 from	 political	 to	
economic	objectives	and	from	basic	science	to	technological	development.		
Table	10:	Timeline	of	 the	European	 research	policy	milestones,	 grouped	by	 type	pf	 initiative:	EU	 institutional	events	 relevant	 to	
research	 policy,	 foundation	 of	 big	 laboratories,	 establishment	 of	 scientific	 collaboration	 or	 coordinated	 research	 initiatives.	 The	
discussed	major	 research	policy	paradigms	are	 reported	 in	 the	 last	 column	 (the	beginnings	and	conclusions	years	are,	naturally,	
approximate,	since	every	periodisation	is	conventional;	in	this	case	I	adopted	the	time	spans	included	in	(Caracostas	&	Muldur,	1998)).	
	 EU	R&D-related	institutional	milestones	 Big	laboratories	
Scientific	Collaborations	/	
Coordinated	research	
initiatives	
Research	policy	
paradigm	
1951	
Signature	of	the	Treaty	
establishing	the	
European	Coal	and	Steel	
Community	(ECSC)	
	 	
Pairing	of	basic	
science	&	political	
objectives:		
- political	objectives	
(prestige);	
- focus	on	basic	
science;	
- public	funding;	
- big	science	
laboratories.	
1954	 	 Foundation	of	CERN	 	
1957	
Signature	of	the	Treaty	
establishing	the	
European	Atomic	Energy	
Community	(Euratom)	
Signature	of	the	Treaty	
establishing	the	
European	Economic	
Community	(EEC)	
	 	
1962	 	
Foundation	of	the	
European	Southern	
Observatory	(ESO)	
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	 EU	R&D-related	institutional	milestones	 Big	laboratories	
Scientific	Collaborations	/	
Coordinated	research	
initiatives	
Research	policy	
paradigm	
1970	 	 	 Foundation	of	Airbus	
1971	 	 	
Foundation	of	COST	
(Coopération	européenne	
dans	le	domaine	de	la	
recherche	scientifique	et	
technique)	
1972	
Paris	Summit	of	the	
Heads	of	State	and	
Government	
	 	
1974	 	
Foundation	of	the	
European	Molecular	
Biology	Laboratory	
(EMBL)	
Foundation	of	the	
European	Science	
Foundation	(ESF)	
Pilot	programme	on	the	
coordination	of	research	
policies	
1975	 	
Foundation	of	the	
European	Space	Agency	
(ESA)	
	
1979	 	 Foundation	of	the	Joint	European	Torus	(JET)	 	
Pairing	of	
technology	&	
industrial	objectives:		
- economic	objectives	
(competitiveness);	
- focus	on	
technological	
development;	
- scientific	
collaborations	or	
centrally	coordinated	
programmes.	
1982	 	 	
Launch	of	ESPRIT	
(European	Strategic	
Programme	for	Research	and	
Development	in	Information	
Technology)	
1984	 	 	
Launch	of	the	First	
Framework	Programme	
(FP1)	
1985	 	 	
Launch	of	BRITE	(Basic	
Research	in	Industrial	
Technologies)	
Launch	of	EUREKA	(EUrope	
REsearch	Koordination	
Action)	
1986	 Signature	of	the	Single	European	Act	 	
Launch	of	EURAM	
(European	Research	in	
Advanced	Materials)	
1987	 	 	 Launch	of	FP2	
1990	 	 	 Launch	of	FP3	
1992	 Signature	of	the	Maastricht	Treaty	 	 	
1994	 	 	 Launch	of	FP4	
1995	 Green	Paper	on	Innovation	 	 	
1998	 	 	 Launch	of	FP5	 Innovation-centred	
model:	
- tension	between	
social	and	economic	
objectives;	
1999	 Signature	of	Bologna	accords	 	 	
2000	 Launch	of	the	Lisbon	Strategy	 	 	
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	 EU	R&D-related	institutional	milestones	 Big	laboratories	
Scientific	Collaborations	/	
Coordinated	research	
initiatives	
Research	policy	
paradigm	
Launch	of	ERA	 - problem-oriented,	
applied	science;	
- innovation	systems	
of	private	and	public	
R&D	actors.	
2002	 	 	 Launch	of	FP6	
2007	 	 	
Launch	of	FP7	
Foundation	of	the	ERC	
(European	Research	
Council)	
2010	 Launch	of	Europe	2020	 	 	
2014	 	 	 Launch	of	Horizon	2020	
	
While	the	models	centring	on	the	“Pairing	of	basic	science	&	political	objectives”	and	on	the	“Pairing	
of	 technology	 and	 industrial	 objectives”	 (adapted	 from	 Caracostas	 &	 Muldur,	 1998)	 show	 actual	
discontinuities,	the	current	“innovation	paradigm”	appears	more	as	an	update	of	the	second	model,	or	a	not-
yet-completed	transitional	period,	sharing	the	economic	focus	(from	competitiveness	to	innovation)	with	the	
previous	period,	but	presenting	significant	news	like	the	societal	involvement	and	the	revaluation	of	basic	
science	 (see	 the	 conceptual	 frameworks	 identified	 in	 the	 chapter	 on	 Frames	 and	 narratives	 in	 EU	 policy	
discourses	 on	 science):	 the	 current	 period	 could	 hence	 represent	 a	 very	 propitious	 opportunity	 for	
confronting	on	the	different	visions	on	the	nature	and	positioning	of	knowledge	and	the	diverse	coexisting	
frames	on	the	role	of	research	in	Europe,	laying	the	groundwork	for	future	developments.	
The scientific policy-making process in the European Union 
Any	 analysis	 regarding	 the	 conceptual	 frameworks	 developed	 and	 inserted	 in	 scientific	 policy	
documents	 cannot	 disregard	 the	 process	 by	 which	 the	 same	 documents	 have	 been	 produced,	 and	 the	
institutional	actors	who	played	a	role	in	shaping	them.	Equally	relevant,	particularly	so	given	the	argument	
of	 this	 research,	 are	 the	 ideas	 about	 European	 integration,	 that	 sustained	 the	 Community	 creation	 and	
evolution	and	that	are	still	influential	to	the	EU	current	self-understanding	and	political	development38.	
Theories of EU integration and the European institutional structure 
European	Union	process	of	policy-making	is	particularly	convoluted,	mainly	because	it	bears	the	signs	
of	its	not-yet-completed	integration	history.	The	confrontation	among	Member	States	on	the	different	views	
of	 European	 integration	 has	 never	 stopped,	 and	 the	 respective	 positions	 were	 also	 tested	 on	 the	
battleground	of	R&D	policies.	The	traditional	depiction	of	European	integration	theories	is	bi-polar,	with	the	
various	schools	schematically	assigned	to	either	“neo-functionalist”	or	“intergovernmentalist”	approaches,	
the	first	calling	for	more	powers	to	a	central	European	government,	and	the	second	working	to	preserve	the	
																																								 																				
38	In	the	following,	the	academic	“state	of	the	art”	on	European	integration	theories	and	of	the	Institutional	structure	is	
based	on	the	description	of	the	7th	edition	of	the	manual	“Policy-Making	in	the	European	Union”	edited	by	Helen	Wallace,	Mark	A.	
Pollack	and	Alasdair	R.	Young	(Wallace	et	al.,	2015).	
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full	 member	 states’	 sovereignty,	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 reducing	 European	 cooperation	 to	 a	 set	 of	 bilateral	
agreements	among	the	Member	States.	Despite	the	fact	that	this	binary	schema	is	still	visible,	real	positions	
are	more	faceted,	and	the	centre	of	gravity	of	the	theoretical	debate	in	EU	integration	studies	has	moved	
nowadays	nearer	to	the	distinction	between	rationalist	and	constructivist	schools.		
A federalist Europe.	The	idea	of	a	political	unification	of	Europe	was	developed	as	early	as	the	‘20s,	
but	 the	project	gained	real	 impetus	only	at	 the	end	of	 the	Second	World	War,	when	 it	was	considered	a	
valuable	countermeasure	to	the	devastations	produced	by	the	exasperation	of	nationalisms.	According	to	
the	analysis	of	the	promoters	of	a	«federalist»	Europe,	the	nation	state	in	crisis	can	no	longer	be	considered	
an	instrument	of	freedom	and	progress,	but	has	become	a	self-sustaining	«divine	entity,	an	organism	that	
has	to	consider	only	its	own	existence,	its	own	development,	without	the	least	regard	for	the	damage	this	
might	cause	to	others»	(Spinelli,	Rossi,	&	Colorni,	1944);	in	their	view,	hence,	after	the	defeat	of	Germany	
the	future	of	Europe	would	have	resided	in	a	united,	federalist,	Europe	(Spinelli	et	al.,	1944):	
the	foundation	must	be	built	now	for	a	movement	that	knows	how	to	mobilise	all	forces	for	the	birth	
of	the	new	organism	which	will	be	the	grandest	creation,	and	the	newest,	that	has	occurred	in	Europe	
for	centuries;	and	the	constitution	of	a	steady	federal	State,	that	will	have	an	European	armed	service	
instead	of	national	armies	at	its	disposal;	that	will	break	decisively	economic	autarchies,	the	backbone	
of	totalitarian	regimes;	that	will	have	sufficient	means	to	see	that	its	deliberations	for	the	maintenance	
of	common	order	are	executed	in	the	single	federal	States,	while	each	State	will	retain	the	autonomy	
it	 needs	 for	 a	 plastic	 articulation	 and	 development	 of	 a	 political	 life	 according	 to	 the	 particular	
characteristics	of	the	various	people.		
The	European	states,	in	the	federalist	vision,	should	renounce	to	their	national	sovereignty	in	some	
sensitive	 fields	 –	 defence,	 foreign	 policy,	 long-term	 economic	 strategies	 –	 in	 favour	 of	 European	
supranational	institutions;	nations	would	retain	the	power	to	deliberate	in	the	other	fields,	but	would	not	be	
able	to	contrast	federal	decisions.	Such	a	polity	would	not	rise	from	diplomatic	agreements	among	states,	
but	would	need	the	establishment	of	a	democratically	elected	constituency	assembly	and	would	be	based	
on	 the	principles	 of	 liberal	 democracies,	 in	 particular	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 funding	on	 fundamental	 rights	 and	
representative	governments.	
The neo-functionalist model of integration.	The	European	Community	was	actually	established	in	the	
‘50s	with	similar	aims	but	with	a	radically	different	approach,	 following	the	«neo-functionalist»	theory	of	
integration,	that	represented	the	prevailing	model	in	the	first	period	of	the	European	Economic	Community	
(EEC)	–	approximately	1958-1963	–	applying	to	the	development	of	the	Common	Agricultural	Policy	and	of	
the	customs	union.	According	to	this	vision,	placing	certain	sectors	under	the	authority	of	central	European	
authorities	would	have	 led	to	“functional	spill-overs”	 to	neighbouring	sectors,	causing	 further	 integration	
and	possibly	leading	to	the	creation	of	a	new	political	entity	(Schumann	declaration,	1950):	
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Europe	will	not	be	made	all	at	once,	or	according	 to	a	 single,	general	plan.	 It	will	be	built	 through	
concrete	achievements,	which	first	create	a	de	facto	solidarity.	
Europe founding on intergovernmental agreements.	The	1965	“Luxembourg	crisis”,	promoted	by	the	
French	president	Charles	De	Gaulle,	showed	the	resistance	of	national	sovereignties	and	stimulated	a	new,	
«intergovernmentalist»,	reading	of	EU	integration,	which	was	strengthened	by	the	creation	in	1974	of	the	
European	Council,	a	regular	meeting	of	the	EU	heads	of	states	and	governments.	During	the	 ‘80s,	after	a	
period	of	stagnation,	the	integration	process	was	relaunched,	and	new	theories	were	developed:	on	one	side,	
a	new	«liberal	intergovernmentalism»	combined	the	features	of	liberal	preference	formation	inside	nations	
and	 intergovernmental	bargaining	at	EU	 level,	with	European	 institutions	viewed	as	providers	of	credible	
commitments	for	member	governments.	Alongside	this	theory,	a	new	interest	in	the	role	of	institutions	and	
EU	 rules	 to	 influence	 political	 outcomes	 was	 promoted	 by	 «new	 institutionalist»	 schools,	 distinguished	
according	 to	 their	 prevailing	 research	 approach:	 «rational-choice»,	 «historical»	 and	 «sociological	
institutionalisms».	While	the	first	two	shared	with	the	intergovernmentalists	a	prevailing	rationalist	approach	
–	where	collective	behaviour	 is	 seen	as	determined	by	 the	behaviour	of	 individuals,	each	of	 them	taking	
decisions	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 an	 informed,	 cost-effective	 balance	 among	 the	 different	 available	 options	 –	
sociological	institutionalism	shared	with	constructivist	approaches	a	wider	definition	of	institutions,	including	
informal	norms	and	habits,	and	positing	that	institutions	can	shape	individual	choices	in	ways	that	rationalist	
approaches	cannot	understand.	Constructivist	approaches	highlighted	the	role	of	the	social	environment	and	
its	shared	systems	of	meaning.	It	was	in	the	constructivist	arena	that	a	new	interest	in	ideas,	identity	and	
discourses	was	promoted.	
A complex physiognomy and the democratic deficit.	There	is	no	common	position	among	scholars	also	
on	the	essential	nature	of	the	European	Union,	whether	it	should	be	studied	as	an	international	organization	
or	a	nation-like	political	 system,	or	a	different	and	new	polity:	 a	 “governance	without	government”.	The	
literature	on	 the	«governance»	approach,	emphasizing	 the	EU’s	 capability	 to	mobilize	 large	and	complex	
institutional	and	informal	networks	of	actors,	has	promoted	an	assessment	of	the	issue	of	an	EU	«democratic	
deficit»,	referring	to	the	fact	that	the	European	Union’s	increasing	intervention	in	domestic	governance	is	
allegedly	 mining	 national	 autonomies,	 without	 empowering	 citizens’	 participation	 to	 decision-making	
through	the	construction	of	a	robust,	completely	democratically	legitimate,	institutional	structure.	This	crisis	
of	legitimation	has	been	obviously	sharpened	by	the	rise	of	Eurosceptic	movements	and	by	the	strict	fiscal	
austerity	 imposed	by	 EU	 institutions	 to	 face	 the	 Euro-zone	 crisis.	 The	main	 arguments	 supporting	 an	 EU	
democratic	deficit	have	focused	on	«the	distant	and	opaque	nature	of	EU	decision-making;	the	strong	role	
of	indirectly	elected	officials	in	the	Commission;	the	weakness	of	the	EP	and	the	second-order	nature	of	its	
elections;	and	the	bias	in	the	treaties	in	favour	of	market	liberalization	over	social	regulation»	(Pollack,	2014).	
Scholars	 identify	 three	possible	paths	of	 reform:	constitutionalization	–	 the	establishment	of	overarching	
rules	 to	ensure	 transparency	and	public	participation	–,	parliamentarization	–	a	more	ambitious	process,	
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aiming	at	an	overall	strengthening	the	powers	of	Parliament	as	the	institution	that	more	directly	represents	
the	citizens’	preferences	–	and	deliberation,	a	third	way	particularly	interesting	for	this	analysis.	Building	on	
the	work	of	Habermas	on	communicative	action,	the	literature	on	the	«deliberative	turn»	concentrates	on	
political	actors’	discussions	and	assumes	that	they	engage	in	sincere	confrontations,	are	open	to	the	power	
of	the	best	argument,	and	collectively	research	the	best	shared	option,	basing	not	only	on	power	balance	or	
cost-effective	rationalization,	but	also	taking	into	consideration	the	dynamics	of	beliefs	and	ideologies,	and	
maintaining	a	certain	willingness	to	change.	Crucially	important	in	this	approach	is	the	existence	of	a	shared	
lifeworld,	and	the	personal	opening	and	capability	to	acknowledge	and	discuss	the	conceptual	frameworks	
underlying	the	political	positions.	
The European institutional structure.	The	current	European	asset	reflects	the	historical	evolution	of	
the	debate	on	EU	self-understanding:	different	coexisting	integration	visions	can	be	recognized	underlying	
many	EU	institutional	features.		
The	principal	bodies	of	the	present	asset	are	the	Council,	the	Parliament	and	the	Commission.	
The	 Council	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 was	 created,	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 to	 emphasize	 the	
intergovernmental	 nature	 the	 Community:	 it	 is	where	 national	ministers	 from	 each	 EU	 country	meet	 to	
coordinate	policies	and	promulgate	laws.	It	is	organized	with	a	multitude	of	specific	groups,	preparing	and	
discussing	deliberations,	in	complex	interaction	with	each	other,	with	the	national	governments	and	with	the	
other	EU	bodies.	The	Council	has	been	the	main	lawmaker	on	EU	policies	for	the	most	part	of	its	history,	until	
the	recent	enhancement	of	the	Parliament’s	powers:	now	that	decisions	are	taken	within	the	frame	of	the	
“Ordinary	Legislative	Procedure”	the	system	is	moving	towards	a	certain	bicameralism.	Alongside	the	Council	
of	 the	 European	 Union,	 another	 intergovernmental	 assembly	 is	 highly	 influential	 on	 European	 policies,	
although	 having	 no	 legislative	 power:	 the	 European	 Council,	 composed	 by	 the	 heads	 of	 states	 and	
governments	and	in	charge	of	setting	the	strategic	policy	lines	of	the	Union.	Some	of	the	crucial	decisions	
affecting	EU	scientific	policy,	like	the	Lisbon	strategy,	have	been	agreed	and	launched	in	European	Council	
meetings39.		
The	relevance	of	the	European	Parliament	in	the	EU	institutional	landscape	has	changed	considerably	
since	its	establishment:	from	a	non-elected,	simple	consultative	organ	in	the	‘50s,	it	has	acquired	increasing	
relevance	during	the	‘70s,	attaining	direct	European	elections	in	1979;	with	successive	Treaties	reforms,	in	
the	 ‘80s	 and	 ‘90s	 it	 gained	 the	 legislative	 power.	 It	 is	 nowadays	 one	 of	 the	 two	 EU	 legislative	 bodies,	
counterpoising	the	member	states’	representations	in	the	Council	and	controlling	the	Community	interest	in	
Commission’s	initiatives.		
																																								 																				
39	Along	this	thesis,	and	especially	in	the	bibliographic	notes,	the	Council	of	the	European	Union	will	be	shortened	with	the	
acronym	“CEU”,	while	the	European	Council	will	be	referred	to	simply	as	“Council”.	
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Although	 the	 Council	 and	 Parliament	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 development	 and	 use	 of	
conceptual	frameworks	in	policy	strategies,	it	is	the	Commission	that	enacts	the	pivotal	actor	with	regards	to	
their	setting	and	elaboration.		
The	European	Commission,	 in	 fact,	 retains	 the	«right	of	 initiative»	 for	new	 legislative	proposals	–	
even	if	it	is	often	asked	to	develop	projects	along	the	political	lines	established	by	the	Council	–,	it	practically	
organizes	 the	 collection	 of	 the	 information	 base	 and	 realizes	 the	 draft	 documents	 to	 be	 debated	 in	 the	
Council	and	in	the	Parliament.	The	Commission’s	powers	are	very	variable	in	relation	with	the	policy	domain:	
depending	on	the	issue	at	stake,	hence,	the	Commission	can	play	the	role	of	a	real	executive	agency	–	e.g.	in	
competition	policies	–	or	of	the	“agenda-setter”,	proposing	new	legislations;	it	can	negotiate	on	behalf	of	the	
EU	–	e.g.	for	what	concerns	the	external	economic	relations	–	 	or	 it	can	be	responsible	of	comparing	and	
coordinating	national	policies,	and	of	building	extensive	cross-EU	networks	to	establish	technical	reference	
standards;	in	intergovernmental	areas	it	acts	as	a	simple	observer.	
The	Commission	is	a	complex	structure,	counting	around	thirty	thousand	staff	officers40,	organized	
into	Directorates	General	(DGs)	in	charge	of	specific	policy	areas	(Table	17	reports	the	current	Commissioners	
college	 and	 their	 mandates);	 however,	 the	 distinction	 is	 not	 very	 neat,	 and	 many	 are	 the	 overlapping	
domains.	The	Commission	is	composed	by	a	‘college’	of	Commissioners	–	from	2007	one	per	member	state,	
nominated	by	national	governments,	endorsed	by	the	Council	and	approved	by	the	Parliament	–	and	it	 is	
chaired	by	a	President,	chosen	by	the	Council	and	approved	by	the	Parliament	(cf.	Fig.	11).	
The	responsibility	on	the	policies	on	science,	in	the	Commission	structure,	have	historically	been	two-
headed,	influenced	by	both	the	Commissioners	for	research	on	one	side	and	for	industrial	development	on	
the	other,	hence	by	the	respective	DGs	(with	the	contribution	of	the	education	department,	mainly	for	long-
term	strategies,	like	the	“Europe	of	knowledge”);	these	departments	and	political	roles	have	had	different	
names	(cf.	Table	18	and	Table	19)	and	in	the	current	configuration	the	number	of	DGs	and	Commissioners	
connected	with	the	policies	on	science	has	multiplied	consistently	(also	to	make	it	possible	the	appointment	
of	28	Commissioners,	cf.	Table	17	and	Fig.	11):	for	example,	the	budget	of	Horizon2020	is	shared	among	8	
Directorates	 (cf.	 Fig.	 29)	 –	 Research	 and	 Innovation	 (RTD),	 Communications	 Networks,	 Content	 and	
Technology	 (CNECT),	 Education	 and	 Culture	 (EAC),	 Energy	 (ENER),	 Internal	 Markets,	 Industry,	
Entrepreneurship	 and	 SMEs	 (GROWTH),	 Mobility	 and	 Transport	 (MOVE),	 Migration	 and	 Home	 Affairs	
(HOME),	Agriculture	and	Rural	Development	(AGRI).		
The	 position	 of	 the	 Commission,	 given	 its	multifaceted	 activity	 and	 its	 dual	 role	 –	 administrative	
secretariat	on	one	side	and	political	proto-executive	and	agenda-setter	on	the	other	–	is	challenging,	also	
considering	the	continuous	efforts	to	maintain	its	influence	in	spite	of	the	other	EU	institutions	and	national	
governments.	
																																								 																				
40	32	546	staff	officer	at	1.1.2017	(EC,	2017d)	
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Because	of	the	exceptional	history	of	the	European	institutional	asset,	and	following	the	differentiate	
distribution	of	responsibilities	between	EU	and	the	member	states,	the	European	policy-making	landscape	is	
characterized	by	different	coexisting	policy	models,	applying	each	to	different	domains.		
The European policy-making models 
In	addition	to	the	controversies	connected	to	European	integration,	the	scientific	field	experienced	
also	fragmentation	in	policy	coordination,	since	scientific	research	was	not	included	in	the	founding	Treaties	
among	the	areas	of	communitarian	action,	and	science	became	a	legitimate,	legally	based,	field	of	European	
intervention	only	with	the	Single	European	Act	in	1986:	a	single	unified	decision-making	process	was	never	
really	developed	for	European	science.	Rather,	there	have	been	many	single	cases	of	science-related	topics	
for	which	specific	processes	have	been	developed	and	used:	for	example,	research	in	the	areas	of	agriculture,	
environmental	issues	and	biotechnologies	were	all	managed	according	to	different	models	of	policy-making.	
We	 find	 in	 European	history	 and	practices	 several	 different	 and	 in	 some	 cases	 contrasting	policy	
methods.	 Scholars	 recognize	 at	 least	 five	 different	 models	 (Wallace,	 2005),	 spanning	 from	 those	 more	
suitable	to	politically	centralized	approaches	to	others	close	to	the	intergovernmental	understanding	of	the	
EU	structure.	
The traditional community model.	 The	 so-called	 «traditional	 community	 method»	 has	 been	
considered	for	a	long	time	the	candidate	for	an	emergent	unified	European	policy-making	method.	It	was	
developed	in	the	early	years	of	the	Community	and	was	applied	to	one	of	the	first	shared	community	policies:	
the	Common	Agricultural	Policy.	 In	this	model,	aiming	at	an	active	 integration	of	policies,	the	powers	are	
clearly	 delegated	 to	 a	 central	 institution,	 the	Commission,	which	 acts	 as	 the	 policy	 designer,	 broker	 and	
executer,	while	the	strategic	negotiations	are	conducted	by	the	Council	of	Ministers.	National	agencies	are	
hierarchically	considered	as	subordinated	operating	arms	and	the	funds	are	gathered	on	a	collective	basis.	
This	policy	model	puts	a	substantial	distance	between	the	policy-making	level	and	the	influences	of	elected	
Parliaments	 at	 the	 national	 level,	 and	 even	 the	 European	 Parliament	 has	 only	 limited	 opportunities	 to	
intervene.	The	traditional	community	method	was	applied	sparsely	along	the	European	integration	history,	
but	a	very	recent	example	can	be	the	single	currency	introduction,	with	the	difference	that	in	this	case	the	
powers	have	not	been	delegated	to	the	Commission	but	to	a	function-specific	agency,	the	European	Central	
Bank.	
The regulatory model.	 By	 the	mid-‘80s,	while	 Europe	was	 shifting	 to	 the	 competition	 regime	and	
developing	 the	 single	 European	 market,	 an	 alternative	 policy	 model	 emerged,	 based	 mainly	 on	 an	
architecture	of	regulations	orchestrated	by	the	Commission.	In	comparison	with	the	preceding	model,	this	
«regulatory	mode»	 has	 been	 referred	 to	 as	 a	 form	 of	 “negative	 integration”,	 for	 it	 is	 built	 upon	 a	 legal	
framework	 instead	 of	 active	 policy	 initiatives.	 In	 this	 configuration,	 the	 Council	 acts	 as	 a	 forum	 for	 the	
national	 governments	 to	 agree	 on	 the	 minimum	 standards	 for	 harmonization,	 and	 the	 stakeholders,	
especially	the	economic	ones,	have	extensive	opportunities	to	influence	the	(often	market-related)	rules.	The	
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surveillance	 role	 on	 the	 application	 of	 the	 rules	 is	 assigned	 to	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Justice,	 while	 the	
European	 Parliament	 is	 the	 place	 to	 discuss	 the	 non-economic	 factors	 (environmental,	 social,	 etc.),	 but	
retains	little	power	to	influence	the	implementation	of	the	regulations.	The	regulatory	policy-making	mode	
was	 applied	 first	 to	 the	development	of	 the	 single	market,	 and	 it	 is	 often	used	 for	 economic	 issues,	 like	
competition	or	industrial	policies.	It	is	sometimes	applied,	at	least	in	the	earliest	stages,	to	other	non-market	
related	 sectors,	 like	 the	 social	 affairs	 and	 the	 environment:	 for	 example,	 the	 European	 policies	 on	
biotechnologies	have	considerably	been	managed	through	a	regulatory	approach.	
Funding distribution. Another	 relevant	way	 to	 apply	 policies	 at	 the	 European	 level	 is	 to	 allocate	
substantial	financial	resources	to	sectors,	regions	or	countries.	Distributing	funds	is	occasionally	associated	
with	wider	policy	 implementation	(as	 it	happened	for	the	Common	Agricultural	Policy,	where	funds	were	
distributed	in	the	frame	of	a	centralized	policy	on	agriculture),	while	other	times	it	is	a	policy	mode	per	se:	a	
significant	example	is	the	distribution	of	funds	to	scientific	research	through	the	Framework	Programmes.	
The	Commission	in	this	case	is	the	policy-designer,	bearing	also	the	workload	of	extensive	consultations	of	
stakeholders,	as	well	as	the	management	of	the	funds	distribution.	The	overall	budget	for	the	policy	is	agreed	
by	the	governments’	members	in	the	Council,	who	are	influenced	by	the	pressures	exerted	by	stakeholders	
and	local	authorities.	
The	 European	 Parliament	 in	 this	 schema	 acts	 as	 a	 controller,	 representing	 the	 preferences	 of	
territorial	politics.	While	 for	previous	models	governments	were	the	only	mediators	of	 the	 interplay	with	
Brussels,	 the	 introduction	of	this	policy	mode	opened	for	the	first	 time	to	more	direct	 interplay	between	
European	officers	and	non-governmental	national	levels	(e.g.	the	National	Contact	Points	or	the	Universities	
in	the	Framework	Programmes	asset	can	interact	directly	with	the	involved	Commission	officers,	bypassing	
the	national	level).	
The policy coordination model.	A	softer	way	to	implement	common	strategies	in	Europe	consists	in	
the	voluntary	coordination	of	policies,	on	the	model	of	what	has	been	happening	since	the	early	‘60s	in	the	
forum	 of	 the	 OECD.	 The	 Commission	 acts,	 in	 this	 frame,	 as	 the	 developer	 of	 a	 Network	 of	 experts	 and	
stakeholders,	while	 the	Council	 is	 the	 convenor	of	 high-level	 groups,	 focusing	more	on	 the	discussion	of	
contents	 than	 on	 the	 diplomacy	 issues;	 the	 European	 Parliament	 is	 sometimes	 included	 in	 the	 process	
through	its	specialist	committees.	The	high	involvements	of	knowledge	experts	and	brokers	makes	this	model	
the	most	prone	to	a	technocratic	policy-making	approach,	and	the	multiplication	of	policy	actors	disperses	
political	responsibilities.	An	important	example	of	the	“policy	coordination”	mode	was	the	coordination	of	
macroeconomic	policies	of	 the	member	states	at	 the	time	when	the	single	currency	was	 introduced.	The	
adoption	 in	the	Lisbon	strategy	of	 the	“Open	Method	of	Coordination”	as	 the	prevailing	policy	technique	
draws	largely	on	the	method	of	«policy	coordination»,	making	wide	use	of	“soft”	policy	incentives,	not	legally	
binding,	in	the	sectors	where	the	EU	lacks	strong	powers	of	intervention,	like	employment	or	the	national	
investments	in	R&D.	
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Intergovernmental negotiations.	 Finally,	 regarding	 the	 most	 sensitive	 policy	 areas	 involving	 the	
countries’	sovereignty,	 like	foreign	policy	and	international	security,	decisions	are	normally	taken	through	
intensive	 intergovernmental	 negotiations	 among	 the	member	 states,	 and	 specifically	 involving	 a	 distinct	
circle	of	key	national	policy-makers.	Consequently,	 in	this	«intensive	transgovernmental»	mode,	the	most	
important	 policy	 actor	 is	 the	 European	Council,	 engaged	 in	 setting	 the	overall	 political	 strategy,	 and	 the	
Council	of	Ministers,	active	in	consolidating	the	cooperation,	while	the	Commission	plays	only	a	marginal	role	
and	the	European	Parliament	is	even	excluded.	It	represents	clearly	the	opaquest	policy	mode,	both	from	
the	point	of	view	of	national	Parliaments	and	of	the	citizens.		
The EU decision-making process(es) for scientific research 
As	aforementioned,	the	field	of	scientific	policy	in	EU	is	not	managed	with	a	single	legislative	process,	
but	with	issue-specific	procedures.		
Open Method of Coordination and regulatory policy-making.	 A	 special	mode	 in	 this	 respect	 is	 the	
application	 of	 the	 «Open	Method	 of	 Coordination»	 to	 the	 field	 of	 the	 investments	 in	 research.	 Initially	
designed	as	a	soft,	non-binding,	method	to	drive	the	Member	States	towards	common	policies	in	areas	which	
fall	under	the	States’	competences	–	employment,	social	protection,	education,	youth	–,	the	«Open	Method	
of	Coordination»	was	applied	in	2000	to	the	implementation	of	the	3%	GDP	target	of	the	Lisbon	strategy	and	
set	in	2003	as	the	method	to	be	used	for	coordinating	the	EU	countries’	investments	in	R&D.	It	is	based	on	
the	common	identification	of	objectives	and	measuring	 instruments	(like	 indicators	and	guidelines)	 in	the	
frame	of	the	Council,	followed	by	a	benchmarking	work	carried	out	by	the	Commission.	The	Scientific	and	
Technical	Research	Committee	(CREST)	was	asked	to	review	and	sustain	the	coordination	process:	given	the	
deep	embedding	of	the	3%	GDP	objective	within	the	economic	growth	strategy	and	the	focus	on	the	financial	
dimension	 of	 enhancing	 the	 investments	 in	 research,	 the	 group	 produced	 mainly	 economy-oriented	
recommendations	 on	 the	 harmonization	 and	 reform	 of	 national	 policy	 strategies,	 fiscal	 regimes,	 public-
private	links	and	intellectual	property41.		
The	 planning	 of	 investments	 in	 research,	 though,	 is	 regulated	 through	 the	 «Open	 Method	 of	
Coordination»,	 apparently	 intergovernmental	 in	 essence;	 other	 scientific	 domains,	 also	 for	 their	 intrinsic	
delicacy,	have	been	and	still	are	particularly	affected	by	regulatory	policy-making:	e.g.	biotechnology,	food	
safety,	 embryo	 research	 are	 affected	 by	 EU	 regulations	 influencing	 the	 development	 of	 their	 scientific	
domains	(e.g.	the	Council	Directive	90/220/EEC	on	the	deliberate	release	of	genetically	modified	organisms	
and	the	subsequent	repealing	in	the	EU	Directive	2001/18/EC,	or	the	regulation	258/97/EC	concerning	novel	
foods	and	novel	food	ingredients42).		
																																								 																				
41	A	detailed	description	of	CREST	work	to	sustain	the	application	of	«Open	Method	of	Coordination»	to	the	management	
of	the	3%	GDP	target	can	be	found	in	the	(archived)	webpage	on	the	Commission	website	(EC,	2008).	
42	For	a	detailed	account	of	the	European	approach	towards	the	introduction	of	GMOs,	in	comparison	with	the	US	attitude,	
see	(Jasanoff,	2005).	
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Funding research: the distributional mode of policy-making.	 The	 field	 of	 scientific	 research	 at	 the	
European	level,	however,	is	mainly	administered	by	means	of	the	distributional	mode:	the	relevant	scientific	
fields	are	selected	at	the	EU	level43,	and	their	development	is	supported	with	the	allocation	of	funds.	
Fig.	4	summarizes	the	flow	of	research	funding	in	Europe	and	the	breakdown	among	the	different	
Programmes.	 Most	 of	 the	 resources	 are	 distributed	 by	 structural	 funds	 –	 the	 European	 Structural	 and	
Investment	 Funds	 (ESIF),	 devoted	 to	 stimulate	 the	 least	 economically	 developed	 regions	 of	 the	 EU	 and	
focused	on	 research	 infrastructures,	 technology	 transfer,	 businesses	 and	 skills	 programmes	 –,	 by	 sector-
specific	research	programmes	–	like	Euratom,	ITER,	or	the	Copernicus	and	Galileo	satellite	programmes	–	and	
the	Framework	Programme,	which	plays	the	major	role,	in	terms	of	contributions44.	Moreover,	as	shown	also	
by	 the	 European	 research	 policy	 history,	 the	 Framework	 Programmes	 are	 the	 instruments	 presenting	 a	
clearer	conceptual	orientation:	they	are	not	sector-specific	but	multidisciplinary,	their	legitimation	involves	
rationales	linked	not	only	to	concrete	economic	or	technologic	targets,	but	also	to	the	construction	of	the	
European	polity	and	 the	betterment	of	 its	 society;	 they	are	hence	 the	most	open	to	 the	development	of	
conceptual	frames	and	consequently	particularly	interesting	to	the	scope	of	this	analysis.	
																																								 																				
43	With	the	exception	of	some	programmes,	like	the	ERC,	which	don’t	fix	the	relevant	fields	and	accept	bottom-up	proposals	
(see	Regaining	the	autonomy	of	the	scientific	community:	the	rise	of	the	ERC).	
44	In	addition	to	the	main	sources	of	funding,	described	in	the	text,	in	the	picture	figure	also	COSME	–	a	programme	aimed	
at	 supporting	SMEs	and	 targeted	also	at	developing	 their	R&D	potential	–,	Erasmus+	–	geared	 to	student	mobility	–,	 the	Health	
Programme	–	supporting	healthcare	structures,	like	research	hospitals	–,	the	Life	Programme	–	fostering	environmental	research	for	
policy	development	–,	the	Connecting	Europe	Facility	–	including	funding	for	communication	infrastructures.	The	contribution	of	such	
programmes	to	R&D,	although	present,	is	difficult	to	separate	from	the	other	targets	of	funding.	
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Fig.	 4:	 The	 flow	 of	 research	 funding	 in	 Europe	 and	 the	 breakdown	 budgets,	 as	 depicted	 by	 the	 Royal	 Society	 in	 a	 2015	 report	
concerned	with	the	effects	of	“Brexit”	referendum	on	UK	science	(Frenk	et	al.,	2015).	
	
	
	
The legislative iter for the design and adoption of Framework Programmes.	The	legislative	procedure	
underlying	the	design	and	promulgation	of	the	Framework	Programmes	has	been,	at	least	since	the	‘90s,	the	
most	“communitarian”	EU	method:	the	«Ordinary	Legislative	Procedure»	–	former	called	the	«Co-decision»	
process	–,	consisting	of	a	complex	interplay	among	the	main	EU	institutions,	including	as	an	important	actor,	
and	recently	as	co-legislator,	the	European	Parliament.		
Table	11:	The	 legislative	procedures	adopted	 to	design	and	establish	 the	Framework	Programmes	 (source:	European	Parliament	
Research	service	(EPRS	&	Reillon,	2015))	
Framework	programme	 Period	 Legislative	procedure		
FP1		 1984-1987		 Consultation	procedure45		
FP2		 1987-1991	 Consultation	procedure			
FP3		 1990-1994		 Consultation	procedure		
FP4	 1994-1998		 Co-decision	procedure		
FP5		 1998-2002	 Co-decision	procedure		
FP6		 2002-2006		 Co-decision	procedure		
																																								 																				
45	The	«Consultation	Procedure»	was,	before	 the	Single	European	Act	 (1986),	 the	prevailing	method	 to	 legislate	 in	 the	
Economic	Community:	in	this	frame,	the	Council	can	adopt	a	law,	based	on	a	proposal	developed	by	the	Commission,	without	the	
consent	of	the	Parliament.	The	Council	is,	however,	bound	to	consult	the	European	Parliament.	This	procedure	is	still	in	use	after	the	
Lisbon	Treaty	as	a	special	legislative	procedure,	an	exception	to	the	rule	of	the	«Ordinary	Legislative	Method»,	for	a	limited	number	
of	 policy	 areas,	 such	 as	 internal	market	 exemptions	 and	 competition	 law,	 as	well	 as	 financial	 topics	 and	 aspects	 of	 intellectual	
property	and	administrative	issues.	
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Framework	programme	 Period	 Legislative	procedure		
FP7	 2007-2013		 Co-decision	procedure		
Horizon	2020	(FP8)	 2014-2020				 Ordinary	Legislative	Procedure		
	
The	«Ordinary	Legislative	Procedure»,	introduced	with	the	Maastricht	Treaty,	was	established	as	the	
prevailing	EU	law-making	procedure	by	the	Lisbon	Treaty	in	2007,	and	applies	to	the	great	majority	of	policy	
fields	 –	 excepted	 those	most	 delicate	 for	 the	 intergovernmental	 supporters:	 foreign	 and	 defence	 policy,	
institutional	reforms,	tax	policy,	a	share	of	social	policies	and	a	part	of	the	areas	in	the	field	of	justice	and	
home	affairs.	
According	 to	 this	procedure	 (cf.	Fig.	13),	 the	Commission	has	 the	«right	of	 initiative»	 to	start	 the	
process46,	and	develops	a	legislative	proposal	to	be	submitted	to	both	the	Council	and	the	Parliament.	The	
Parliament	takes	a	 first	 read	and	may	accept	 it,	 in	which	case	the	act	 is	adopted,	or	 it	can	amend	 it.	The	
Council	can	accept	the	Parliament’s	position,	ending	the	process,	or	return	it	with	its	own	amendments	to	
the	Parliament	for	a	second	read.	The	majority	of	proposals	is	adopted	at	this	stage,	since	dense	negotiations	
are	informally	carried	on	among	the	institutions	before	the	process	formally	starts;	however,	the	Parliament	
has	at	this	point	the	right	to	propose	further	changes	or	to	reject	it,	in	which	case	the	law	is	withdrawn.	If	the	
Council,	 at	 this	moment,	doesn’t	 accept	all	 the	amendments,	 a	Conciliation	Committee,	 composed	of	 an	
equal	number	of	members	of	the	Parliament	and	of	Council	representatives,	is	convened	in	order	to	reach	
an	 agreement	 on	 a	 joint	 text,	 that	 is	 subsequently	 sent	 to	 the	 Parliament	 and	 the	 Council	 for	 approval,	
without	the	possibility	to	modify	it	further.	If	they	both	approve	it,	the	law	is	adopted;	on	the	contrary,	it	is	
rejected.	
Horizon	 2020’s	 formal	 legislative	 iter	 (coded	 2011/0401(COD),	 cf.	 Table	 12)	 was	 launched	 in	
November	 2011,	 when	 the	 Commission	 published	 the	 proposal	 for	 a	 regulation	 concerning	 the	 new	
Framework	Programme,	consisting	of	a	brief	introduction,	the	legal	text	itself,	and	complementing	it	with	a	
series	of	working	documents	describing	 the	expected	 impact	of	 the	Programme.	As	a	 result,	 two	parallel	
debates	were	opened	in	the	Parliament	and	in	the	Council,	leading	two	years	later,	in	December	2013,	to	the	
final	approval,	ratified	by	a	parliamentary	vote,	to	the	Council’s	agreement	and	to	the	final	signature	on	the	
act.	The	Council	was	convened,	as	traditionally	happens	for	decisions	in	the	field	of	research	funding,	in	the	
«Competitiveness»	 configuration	 –	 concerned	 of	 Internal	 Market,	 Industry,	 Research	 and	 Space,	 whose	
mandate	is	to	«enhance	competitiveness	and	increase	growth»	(CEU,	n.d.).	During	the	debate	process,	the	
text	has	undergone	a	series	of	adjustments:	the	review	was	coordinated	by	the	Parliamentary	Committee	on	
Industry,	 Research	 and	 Energy	 (ITRE),	 and	 realized	 both	 with	 internal	 confrontations	 and	 with	 the	
																																								 																				
46	 In	 some	 special	 cases,	 also	other	 institutions	 can	 launch	 the	process,	 like	 the	 European	Central	 Bank,	 the	 European	
Investment	Bank	or	the	Court	of	Justice,	provided	the	issue	pertains	to	their	area	of	concern.	In	addition,	a	quarter	of	the	member	
states	can	initiate	the	process,	when	the	proposal	regards	judicial	cooperation	in	criminal	matters	or	police	cooperation,	and	since	
2007	also	the	citizens	(European	Citizens’	initiative),	if	one	million	of	signatures	from	7	countries	can	be	presented	to	support	the	
initiative.	
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incorporation	 of	 contributions	 from	 the	 other	 concerned	 Committees47.	 In	 addition	 to	 these	 inputs,	 five	
European	 countries	 –	 United	 Kingdom,	 Germany,	 Italy,	 Portugal	 and	 Czech	 Republic	 –	 submitted	 their	
positions	on	the	proposed	legislation	for	the	new	Framework	Programme.	As	a	final	result,	the	rapporteur	
Teresa	Riera	Madurell48	presented	to	the	Parliament	the	amended	text,	that	was	subsequently	debated	(EP,	
2011a)	and	approved.	After	the	approval	by	the	Council,	the	law	was	adopted	and	published	on	the	Official	
Journal	of	the	European	Union	(EP	&	CEU,	2013).	
Table	12:	Horizon	2020	legislative	procedure,	coded	2011/0401(COD):	key	events	and	related	published	documents,	listed	on	the	
European	Parliament	website	(EP,	2013)	
Horizon	2020	legislative	procedure	(2011/0401(COD))	–	key	events	and	related	documents	
30/11/2011	 Legislative	proposal	published	 COM(2011)	 809	 final,	 with	 the	
complementary	 working	 documents	
SEC(2011)1427	and	SEC(2011)1428	
13/12/2011	 Committee	 referral	 announced	 in	 Parliament,	 1st	
reading/single	reading	
	
20/02/2012	 Debate	in	Council	 	
30/05/2012	 Debate	in	Council	 	
10/10/2012	 Debate	in	Council	 	
28/11/2012	 Vote	in	committee,	1st	reading/single	reading	 	
10/12/2012	 Debate	in	Council	 	
20/12/2012	 Committee	 report	 tabled	 for	 plenary,	 1st	 reading/single	
reading	
A7-0427/2012	
18/02/2013	 Debate	in	Council	 	
30/05/2013	 Debate	in	Council	 	
20/11/2013	 Debate	in	Parliament	 	
21/11/2013	 Results	of	vote	in	Parliament	 	
21/11/2013	 Decision	by	Parliament,	1st	reading/single	reading	 	
03/12/2013	 Act	adopted	by	Council	after	Parliament's	1st	reading	 	
11/12/2013	 Final	act	signed	 	
11/12/2013	 End	of	procedure	in	Parliament	 	
20/12/2013	 Final	act	published	in	Official	Journal	 Regulation	(EU)	No	1291/2013	
	
The	legal	text	establishing	the	new	Framework	Programme,	consisting	of	an	introductory	part	with	
the	 legal	provisions	and	the	general	principles	and	purposes	of	the	Programme	and	a	following	extended	
section	 with	 the	 details	 of	 the	 disciplinary	 issues	 to	 tackle	 (see	 the	 devoted	 paragraph	 The	 Framework	
Programmes	and	the	ERC	establishing	acts),	constitutes	the	general	terms	of	reference	of	the	multiannual	
programme	for	research	funding.	After	the	publication	of	the	establishment	act,	the	Commission	is	due	to	
prepare	 topic-specific	 «Work	 Programmes»	 (WPs),	 explaining	 in	 detail	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 calls	 for	
applications	that	will	be	later	opened	by	the	Commission,	and	introducing	the	formal	lingo	that	will	be	used	
for	the	selection	procedure:	for	Horizon	2020	WPs	the	calls	description	is	articulated	around	the	headings	of	
																																								 																				
47	Agriculture	and	Rural	Development,	Culture	and	Education,	Development,	Legal	Affairs,	Foreign	Affairs,	Transport	and	
Tourism,	 Fisheries,	Women’s	 Rights	 and	 Gender	 Equality,	 Environment,	 Public	 Health	 and	 Food	 Safety,	 Regional	 Development,	
Budgets.	
48	Member	of	the	European	Parliament	from	2004	to	2014,	in	the	Socialist	Group;	member	of	the	Committee	on	Industry,	
Research	and	Energy	(ITRE).	Other	information	available	on	Madurell’s	history	of	parliamentary	service	webpage	(EP,	n.d.-b).	
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«specific	 challenge»,	 «scope»,	 «expected	 impact»	 and	 «type	 of	 action»	 and	 indicates	 the	 appropriate	
budgets	for	proposals	(see,	for	example,	EC	2017a).	
Fig.	5:	The	principal	steps	in	the	elaboration	of	Framework	Programmes:	each	of	these	steps	is	focused	around	the	elaboration	and	
publication	of	a	group	of	policy	documents.		
	
The	preparation,	approval	and	management	of	the	Framework	Programmes	spans	through	several	
years	–	usually	the	launch	of	a	Programme	overlaps	with	the	beginning	of	the	preparation	of	the	following:	
for	example,	discussion	on	FP5	(1999-2002)	started	as	early	as	1996	and	already	in	2000	a	first	discussion	
paper	for	FP6	(2003-2006)	was	circulated;	the	preparation	for	FP7	started	in	2004	and	the	Programme	was	
launched	in	2007.	The	process	normally	starts	with	the	circulation	of	an	informal	discussion	document	by	the	
Commission,	drafted	about	six	months	before	the	formal	proposal	is	presented,	launching	the	official	iter	of	
decision-making	(Andrée,	2009).	
The FPs design process. While	 the	approval	of	 the	Programme	 involves	 the	whole	EU	 institutional	
structure,	 the	 previous	 preparation	 and	 the	 following	 administration	 phases	 are	 responsibility	 of	 the	
Commission.		
Dan	 Andrée,	 a	 Swedish	 officer	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Education	 and	 Research	 and	 adviser	 to	 the	
Commission	for	the	Framework	Programmes	and	the	ERA	policies,	describes	the	process	of	priority	setting	
and	the	selection	procedure	as	follows:	
Commission	legislative	proposal
FP	establishing	act	
(published	on	the	Official	Journal)
Work	Programmes
Calls	for	applications
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Fig.	6:	Framework	Programme	priority	setting	and	selection	procedure,	as	represented	in	(Andrée,	2009).	The	“A”	phase	refers	to	
“Political	decision”,	“B”	stands	for	the	“Administration”	phase	and	“C”	for	the	“Implementation”.	
	
Andrée	 distinguishes	 three	 phases:	 a	 first	 articulated	 one,	 concerning	 the	 “Political	 decisions”,	 a	
second	one	regarding	the	“Administration”	of	FPs	and	concerning	the	drafting	of	Work	Programmes	and	calls	
for	 applications,	 and	 a	 third	 one	 considering	 the	 “Implementation”	 through	 the	 actual	 mechanism	 of	
selection.	In	the	political	phase,	the	most	relevant	for	the	elaboration	of	conceptual	frameworks,	decisions	
are	taken	at	a	high	hierarchical	level	on	objectives,	criteria	and	priority-setting,	and	the	top-down	structure	
of	 the	Programme	 is	 defined;	 the	 scientific	 contents	 in	 this	moment	 are	defined	broadly,	while	 they	 are	
specified	down	to	the	level	of	topics	only	in	subsequent	phases.	Alongside	this	main	stream	of	Programme	
structuring,	eventual	strategic	decisions	may	influence	the	priority	setting,	or	other	instruments	or	funding	
schemes	may	be	defined	–	e.g.	 the	 Joint	Technology	 Initiatives,	or	 the	European	Research	Council	 (ERC),	
which	uses	a	different,	bottom-up,	selection	procedure.	
The	 political	 preparation	 stage,	 entailing	 principally	 the	 moments	 of	 agenda-setting	 and	 policy	
formation,	 is	 comprehensibly	a	 very	 sensitive	moment	 for	what	 concerns	 the	elaboration	of	 imaginaries.	
There	is	no	formal	procedure	to	define	how	this	stage	should	be	managed,	and	the	Commission	is	a	highly	
fragmented	structure	where	policy	advocates,	interested	in	influencing	the	shape	of	a	policy	proposal,	can	
enter.	Moreover,	unlike	the	Parliament,	the	Commission	has	no	obligation	to	meet	and	deliberate	in	public	
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and	 policy	 officers’	memoires	 are	 almost	 totally	 absent:	 consequently,	 the	 negotiations	 of	 interests	 and	
positions	in	the	preparation	stage	are	also	difficult	to	trace.	In	order	to	explore	the	policy	preparation	stage	
in	the	Commission	I’ve	based	both	on	a	few	existing	documents	and	on	a	group	of	testimonies	I	collected	by	
means	of	interviews.	
As	explained	 in	 the	chapter	How	does	European	scientific	policy-making	work?	Pilot	 interviews	 to	
stakeholders	and	policy-design	actors,	during	my	PhD	period,	spending	most	of	the	time	at	CERN	in	the	frame	
of	a	European	project	and	frequenting	the	Universities	of	Bologna	and	Milano	Bicocca,	I’ve	had	the	chance	
to	meet	a	diverse	group	of	people	who	have	provided	their	experience	on	the	process	of	policy	shaping	in	
Brussels,	 their	 institutional	 activity	 being	 closely	 related	 to	 EU	 research	 funding	 frameworks:	 research	
organization’s	or	University’s	EU	projects	officers,	National	Contact	Points	for	Framework	Programmes	and	
a	senior	scientist	engaged	in	research	management.	Their	accounts,	sharing	the	feeling	of	a	complicated	and	
multifactorial	mechanism	of	policy-building	taking	place	in	the	Commission	offices,	shed	light	on	some	blind	
spots	of	the	Framework	Programmes	development	process,	as	experienced	from	the	standpoint	of	actors	
working	“outside	Brussels”.	
Complementary	 sources	 of	 information	 on	 the	 work	 of	 proposals	 drafting,	 from	 inside	 the	
Commission	offices,	are	the	ex-ante	assessments	of	the	two	last	Programmes,	especially	the	one	prepared	
for	FP7	(CEC,	2005a),	enriched	and	published	in	2006	for	Springer	under	the	title	A	New	Deal	for	an	Effective	
European	Research	Policy	-	The	Design	and	Impacts	of	the	7th	Framework	Programme	(Muldur	et	al.,	2006),	
and	the	2012	ex-ante	assessment	of	Horizon	2020	The	Grand	Challenge.	The	design	and	societal	impact	of	
Horizon	2020	(EC,	2012c),	both	drafted	by	the	policy	analysts	that	in	DG	Research	have	been	concerned	with	
the	 design	 of	 the	 Programmes.	 Since	 2003,	 in	 fact,	 every	 legislative	 proposal	 drafted	 by	 the	 European	
Commission	has,	by	 law,	to	be	complemented	with	a	detailed	impact	assessment,	explaining	in	detail	the	
rationales	of	the	proposal,	«involving	rigorous	analysis	of	all	the	evidence	and	a	careful	consideration	of	all	
policy	 options»	 (EC,	 2012c).	 Although	 clearly	 these	 documents	 were	 produced	 to	 account	 for	 the	
Commission’s	 activity,	 and	 have	 to	 be	 considered	 ex-post,	 ordered	 and	 finalized,	 descriptions	 (and	 this	
oriented	effort	 is	 from	time	to	time	visible49),	we	can	anyway	read	them	as	first-hand	descriptions	of	the	
Commission’s	standpoint	on	the	Programmes’	preparation	phase	and	we	can	extrapolate	some	information	
on	the	process	of	proposals	drafting.	
Exploring	 the	preparation	phases	of	 the	 Framework	Programmes	at	 the	 European	Commission	 is	
challenging.	In	addition	to	the	lack	of	detailed	documentation	of	the	Commission’s	work,	as	opposed	to	what	
is	common	in	the	Parliament,	the	elaboration	of	scientific	policies	is	a	complex	procedure	involving	a	number	
																																								 																				
49	As	it	happens	when,	in	the	2006	book,	the	authors	–	belonging	to	the	Commission	–	describe	the	legislative	procedure	
involving	the	other	two	EU	institutional	bodies,	the	Council	and	the	Parliament,	as	particularly	intricate	and	unpredictable,	and	adds:	
“At	the	end	of	this	complex	and	unpredictable	process,	how	is	it	that	co-decision	regularly	produces	a	strong	and	viable	Framework	
Programme?	This	is	probably	because	there	is	a	large	political	agreement	that	research	and	innovation	must	be	supported	and	that	
the	Commission’s	proposals	are	generally	pointing	in	the	right	direction”	(Muldur	et	al.,	2006,	p.	227)		
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of	different	Directorates	(DGs),	as	well	as	other	formal	and	informal	bodies	–	it	is	not	rare,	for	example,	that	
a	crucial	policy	development	is	discussed	at	conferences	or	fora	organized	to	explore	other	topics	(e.g.	the	
first	spring	of	the	proposal	for	a	European	Research	Council,	debated	at	a	series	of	conferences	in	2000-2001,	
cf.	König	2016).		
The	landscape	of	actors,	interest	groups,	politicians	or	others,	intervening	in	policy	shaping	is	wide	
and	diverse:	these	“policy	entrepreneurs”	are	interested	and	skilful	in	framing	the	policies	in	ways	that	are	
politically	meaningful,	depicting	them	inside	acquired	strategies	or	sets	of	norms,	or	linking	them	to	shared	
concerns	 or	 contemporary	 crisis	 events	 (Young,	 2014).	 When	 the	 issues	 at	 stake	 are	 technical,	 the	
involvement	 of	 scientific	 expertise	 is	 particularly	 broad	 and	 relevant,	 and	 consequently	 epistemic	
communities	 play	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 defining	 the	 problem	 and	 suggesting	 the	 favourable	 policy	 options.	
Epistemic	communities,	nonetheless,	don’t	behave	like	providers	of	neutral	technical	knowledge,	but	share	
with	policy-makers	also	their	peculiar	worldview,	their	set	of	beliefs,	their	criteria	to	establish	the	relevance	
of	the	issues	and,	not	least,	their	specific	agenda.	If	different	epistemic	communities	are	called	to	express	on	
the	same	topic	–	as	it	happens	for	example	on	environmental	or	economic	problems,	or,	as	in	the	object	of	
this	 study,	on	 the	directions	of	 scientific	 research	–	 these	different	 framing	of	 the	 issues	and,	ultimately,	
these	different	worldviews	lead	fairly	inevitably	to	some	frictions.		
The	construction	of	‘policy	networks’	is	another	relevant	way	by	which	the	Commission	shapes	policy	
proposals:	policy	networks	are	clusters	of	institutions	and	groups,	both	formal	and	informal,	that	show	an	
interest	 in	 a	 policy	 development	 and	 implementation	 and	 which	 are	 consulted	 and	 involved	 by	 the	
Commission	in	the	policy	preparation	phase.	The	inclusion	or	exclusion	of	members	into	these	networks	has	
naturally	significant	impact	on	the	framing	of	the	issues	and	on	the	development	of	policies.	The	Commission	
makes	large	use	also	of	“High	profile	experts’	groups”,	naturally	for	the	most	part	drawn	from	established	
policy	networks,	to	which	the	elaboration	of	policies	is	increasingly	committed,	both	in	the	policy	preparation	
and	 evaluation	moments.	 The	 expected	 outcome	 of	 policy	 networks’	work	 is	 the	minimization	 of	 policy	
alternatives	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 prevailing	 proposal,	 that	 is	 subsequently	 included	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 drafts	
proposals.	
The	Commission	is	even	more	concerned	with	organizing	a	comprehensive	and	cohesive	procedure	
of	 policy	 preparation	 since	 the	 elaboration	 of	 ex-ante	 assessments	 have	 become	 compulsory.	 The	 7th	
Framework	Programme	was	the	first	to	be	prepared	with	an	ex-ante	assessment,	and	the	expectations	in	
terms	of	transparency	and	effectiveness	were	high	(Muldur	et	al.,	2006,	p.	xxiv):	
The	originality	of	the	book	lies	in	its	perspective,	its	transparency	and	its	objectivity.	It	is	the	first	to	
present,	 from	a	viewpoint	 inside	 the	European	Commission,	 the	nuts	and	bolts	of	how	EU	research	
policy	 is	 actually	 constructed.	 It	 also	 provides	 a	 comprehensive	 analysis,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 factual	
evidence,	not	only	of	the	positive	impacts	of	EU	research,	but	also	of	the	various	criticisms	that	have	
been	made	of	the	Framework	Programme.	
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This	degree	of	openness	and	objectivity	is	the	direct	result	of	another	innovative	aspect	of	the	book:	It	
represents	 the	 first	 fruits	 of	 a	 new	 approach	 towards	 policy-making,	 based	 on	 ex-ante	 impact	
assessment	–	a	 structured,	evidence-based	method	of	evaluating	policy	options	and	 their	expected	
impacts.	The	7th	Framework	Programme	was	the	first	to	be	accompanied	by	an	impact	assessment	
report,	and	the	material	presented	here	draws	extensively	on	this	work.	
However,	 the	promise	 to	present	 the	«nuts	and	bolts	of	EU	 research	policy»	was	not	completely	
fulfilled	in	the	book,	not	in	the	sense	of	an	intra-institutional	account	of	how	the	Framework	Programme	was	
shaped	and	the	proposal	was	developed.	The	description	presented	detailed	analyses	of	the	Commission’s	
point	of	view	on	the	European	landscape	in	which	S&T	developed	in	the	past,	its	weaknesses	and	strengths,	
its	 interplay	 with	 the	 productive	 sphere	 and	 the	 legitimation	 of	 the	 proposed	 paths	 for	 positive	 future	
developments.	In	addition,	the	book	offers	a	discussion	on	the	deliberation	procedure	realized	in	the	Council	
and	in	the	Parliament,	including	interesting	details	on	the	political	dynamics,	but	fails	to	report	the	same	for	
the	Commission’s	preparation	process,	limiting	to	an	essential	review	of	the	impact	assessment	preparation,	
structured	as	a	logical,	politically	neutered,	tree	of	contents	(Fig.	7).	The	authors	describe	as	well	the	FP7	ex-
ante	assessment	phases	(Muldur	et	al.,	2006,	p.	xxiv),	that	can	be	summarised	as:	
1. Identify	the	problems	and	set	the	main	objectives:	
- economic,	social	and	environmental	challenges;	
- structural	weaknesses;	
- political	context	(failure	of	Lisbon).	
2. Policy-design	stage:	
- experiences	from	past	Framework	Programmes;	
- consultation	of	stakeholders;	
- assessing	concrete	policy	options.	
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Fig.	7:	The	ex-ante	impact	assessment	schema	of	FP7	reported	in	the	book	A	New	Deal	for	an	Effective	European	Research	Policy	-	
The	Design	and	 Impacts	of	 the	7th	Framework	Programme	 (Muldur	et	al.,	2006):	 the	book	 itself	 follows	 the	steps	of	 the	 impact	
assessment	for	the	Seventh	Framework	Programme.	The	original	caption	is	«View	of	the	policy-making	process	of	FP7	-	Source:	DG	
Research»	
	
The	main	political	objective	of	ex-ante	assessments	is	to	prove	the	legitimacy	of	the	Commission’s	
proposal,	through	extensive	analyses	of	the	political-economic	literature	supporting	it,	frequent	references	
to	 analogue	 studies	 conducted	 by	 other	 world-relevant	 institutions	 (see	 for	 example	 Fig.	 17)	 and	 the	
depiction	of	the	stakeholders’	consultations	phase,	that	is	particularly	important	here	to	shed	light	on	the	
Commission’s	preparation	process.	
The	need	of	broad	consultations	is	explained	in	the	FP7	ex-ante	assessment	book	acknowledging	the	
relevance	of	the	process	to	increase	«the	openness	and	transparency	of	policy-making»,	to	strengthen	«the	
quality	of	the	policy	itself»,	«to	improve	the	dialogue	between	European	science	and	its	stakeholders»,	to	
create	«ownership	of	the	policy	process»,	to	«tackle	a	perceived	“democratic	deficit”	of	the	EU»,	to	meet	
«the	growing	stakeholders’	expectation	that	their	views	are	taken	into	account»,	to	increase	«acceptance»	
and	 finally	«to	make	 it	easier	 to	 find	consensus	during	 the	 formal	 institutional	decision-making	process».	
Therefore,	according	to	the	authors,	consultations	serve	at	the	same	time	the	purposes	of	refining	policies,	
enhancing	 democratic	 participation,	 precociously	 building	 consensus	 and	 –	 not	 least	 –	 enhancing	 the	
Commission’s	position	with	respect	to	the	formal	legislative	bodies,	the	Parliament	and	the	Council,	by	means	
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of	 the	 presentation	 of	 the	 stakeholders’	 consultations	 as	 the	 Commission’s	 peculiar	 way	 of	 obtaining	
democratic	legitimacy		(Muldur	et	al.,	2006,	p.	144):	
Both	the	Council,	representing	Member	States,	and	the	European	Parliament,	representing	EU	citizens,	
possess	 democratic	 legitimacy.	 However,	 this	 formalised	 institutional	 interaction	 does	 not	 exclude	
direct	 contact	 between	 the	Commission	and	 its	 stakeholders.	 In	 fact,	 it	 is	 one	of	 the	Commission’s	
obligations	according	to	the	Amsterdam	Treaty	(…)	
The	 stakeholders,	 according	 to	 the	 policy	 officers,	 are	 not	 a	 pre-defined	 set	 of	 actors,	 but	 are	
identified	according	to	the	«problem	at	stake	and	the	purpose	of	the	policy	action»	(Muldur	et	al.,	2006,	p.	
145);	these	are	«researchers	in	the	field,	policy	makers,	users	of	research	results,	or	interested	individuals»,	
coming	 from	a	 variety	of	 sectors	 including	«public	 administrations,	 research	 institutes,	universities,	 large	
companies,	SMEs,	international	organisations»	(Muldur	et	al.,	2006,	p.	143);	«innovation	agencies,	industries,	
universities,	 NGOs,	 intermediary	 associations»,	 «Member	 States	 and	 associated	 countries,	 regional	
governments,	 national	 research	 councils	 and	 a	 number	 of	 European	 representative	 organisations»	 (EC,	
2012c,	 p.	 11).	 The	 consultation	 methods	 are	 as	 well	 plural:	 Eurobarometers,	 Green	 Papers,	 online	
consultations,	workshops,	conferences	and	seminars;	expert	groups	are	also	significantly	involved	in	order	
to	facilitate	the	exchange	of	information	between	the	stakeholders	and	the	Commission	(Fig.	18	shows	the	
consultation	tools	employed	for	FP7	and	Horizon	2020).	Broad	stakeholders’	consultations	however,	the	FP7	
policy	officers	argue,	don’t	automatically	lead	to	clear	conclusions	or	better	decisions	(Muldur	et	al.,	2006,	
p.	147):		
Policy-makers	must	make	a	conscious	decision	to	what	extent	they	want	to	base	their	policy	decision	
on	 expressed	 needs	 and/or	 its	 policy	 proposals.	 The	wide	 spectrum	of	 policy	 objectives	 and	 public	
budget	constraints	often	imposes	compromises	in	which	not	all	comments	or	suggestions	can	be	taken	
into	account.	But	it	would	be	wrong	to	evaluate	consultation	processes	only	in	terms	of	the	“direct”	
impact	on	decision-making.	They	can	also	have	an	“indirect”	impact	by	stimulating	communication	or	
debate,	setting	the	political	agenda,	removing	a	blockade	within	the	policy	process,	contributing	to	an	
informed	decision-making	process	or	testing	the	acceptance	of	draft	policy	actions.	So,	even	if	no	direct	
impact	 can	be	discerned	or	 no	 real	 representative	 sample	 of	 opinions	was	 gathered,	 dialogue	and	
participation	 still	 contribute	 to	 a	 valuable	 culture	 of	 problem-solving,	 for	 example	 by	 changing	
attitudes	within	stakeholder	groups.	
Not	all	the	stakeholders,	moreover,	have	the	same	impact	on	decision-making	(Muldur	et	al.,	2006,	
p.	147):		
The	opinion	of	advisory	groups,	government	bodies,	 industry	associations,	or	well-	organised	 lobby	
groups	may	carry	more	weight	than	the	opinion	of	unorganised	minorities,	while	the	views	of	a	large	
multinational	may	have	more	influence	than	those	of	a	small	unknown	company	or	of	an	individual	
citizen.		
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Notably	relevant	is	also	the	stage	in	the	policy	definition	process	in	which	a	specific	stakeholder	is	
involved:	the	influence	in	very	early	stages,	or	at	the	moment	of	defining	the	overall	structure,	can	be	much	
deeper	and	far-reaching	than	the	contributions	inserted	later,	“fine-tuning”	the	proposal.	The	interviewee	
from	the	EU	support	office	at	CERN	distinguished	between	the	first	discussions	on	the	physiognomy	of	the	
Framework	Programmes	and	the	beginning	of	more	formal	consultations,	through	Green	Papers,	open	calls,	
workshops	etc.,	highlighting	the	different	weights	of	the	contributions:	
“The	grey	area	is	in	the	very	early	stages,	when	people	informally	start	discussions	in	Brussels;	I	hear	
that	already	now50	in	Brussels	there	are	some	informal	consultations	of	these	think-tanks	people	(…)		
My	experience	and	my	opinion	was	that	the	thing	was	already	cooked	when	it	was	on	the	table	ready	
for	discussion.	So,	the	interesting	part	is	how	they	take	the	decisions	to	arrive	to	what	I	call	the	“raw”,	
let’s	say,	proposal.	Then	it’s	amended,	shaped	etc.,	but	the	butter	already	is	there…	
The	 commission	 people	 decide	 initially	 the	 content,	 the	 priorities.	 Of	 course,	 they	 do	 talk	 to	 the	
Parliament	 in	 advance,	 they	 do	 talk	 to	 the	 Council,	 they	 don’t	 make	 a	 proposal	 if	 they	 have	 not	
consulted	broadly	the	people	(…)	the	final	decision	is	of	course	this	tripartite51	complex	decision	(…)	I	
wouldn’t	say	there	are	minor	only	amendments	but	(…)	the	biggest	things	were	already	there	and	it	
stayed	there.”	
CERN	 was	 requested	 to	 give	 an	 input	 to	 both	 the	 Commission,	 in	 the	 first	 phase	 of	 the	 H2020	
consultations,	 which	 it	 provided	 as	 an	 individual	 organization	 and	 collectively	 through	 the	 EIRO	 forum	
partnership	(gathering	eight	European	international	scientific	facilities52),	and	to	the	Parliament,	during	the	
subsequent	period	of	law-making.	Some	of	the	positions	expressed	by	CERN	were	taken	on	board,	according	
to	the	interviewee,	but	these	were	more	on	the	distribution	of	budget	or	the	refinement	of	the	disciplinary	
details,	rather	than	on	the	core	structuring	of	the	framework,	that	is	developed	in	his	experience	by	a	group	
of	Commission	officers	and	their	trusted	think	tanks,	whose	identity	is	not	open,	it’s	«secretly	guarded»:	
“I	 think	 they	 are	 people	 from	 the	 Commission	 mainly	 that	 start	 thinking	 already	 about	 the	 next	
Framework	that	will	be	starting	in	five	years	from	now53,	and	of	course	they	have	their	own	ideas,	their	
identity	is	secretly	guarded,	so	I	don’t	know	who	they	are,	you	can’t	talk	to	them.”	
The	interviewee’s	experience	of	the	Commission’s	process	to	build	the	broad	lines	of	the	strategy	
and	the	organizational	structure,	hence,	is	very	clear:	a	first,	crucial,	stage	when	some	Commission	officers	
shape	the	fundamental	configuration	of	the	Programme,	gathering	inputs	from	a	selected	group	of	reference	
experts,	and	the	subsequent	phase	of	formal	consultations,	much	broader	and	comprehensive	but	less	able	
to	formulate	influential	changes:	
																																								 																				
50	The	interview	was	realized	in	December	2015.	
51	He	is	referring	here	to	the	Ordinary	Legislative	Procedure	(described	above),	involving	the	three	European	institutions:	
Commission,	Council	and	Parliament.	
52	CERN,	EMBL,	ESA,	ESO,	ESRF,	European	XFEL,	EUROfusion,	ILL.	More	details	on	EIROforum	website	(EIROforum,	2017)	
53	cf.	note	50.	
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“(…)	 they	 could	 have	 done	 the	 other	way,	 they	 first	 collect	 input	 from	 the	 community	 on	 how	 the	
program	could	look	like	and	what	the	priorities	are,	and	all	this,	and	then	they	could	make	a	proposal…	
but	in	fact	(…)	at	least	for	the	Horizon	Programme	they	had	already	in	mind	the	structure,	the	priorities	
and	all	that,	so	they	kind	of	present	their	idea	and	then	they	collect	of	course	input,	but	the	thing	was	
already	cooked.”	
A	 different	 perception	 of	 the	 process	 was	 conversely	 depicted	 by	 the	 senior	 scientist	 at	 CERN	 I	
interviewed,	engaged	since	the	‘90s	in	the	support	and	organization	of	his	research	field:	
“officially	Europe	does	not	decide,	it’s	a	real	democratic	scheme:	Europe	requires	some	inputs	from	the	
different	countries	–	it’s	a	bottom-up	approach	–	(…)	the	role	of	the	PCN54	is	to	have	the	contact	with	
the	 national	 communities	 and	 to	 say:	 ‘Ok,	 bring	 ideas,	 and	 I	 will	 forward	 it	 to	 the	 European	
Commission.	What	do	you	want	to	do,	what	do	you	think	should	be	the	priority	 in	the	next	five-ten	
years?’.	So,	this	information	is	coming	up	and	then,	at	the	European	level	there	are	people	who	are	
trying	to	sort	this	information	and	to	set	up	a	list	of	priorities	(…)		
I	think	it’s	a	democratic	scheme:	there	is	information	coming	up,	there	are	people	responsible	to	clarify	
this	and	say	‘Ok,	apparently,	there	is	general	consensus	that	we	should	do	that	first,	put	in	this	amount	
of	resources	on	that,	etc..’.	And	this	is	the	way	the	calls	are	organized:	each	call	has	a	number	of	topics	
to	be	addressed	which	results	from	this	analysis.”	
He	reverses	the	scheme,	underlining	as	critical,	 in	his	experience,	the	role	of	the	National	Contact	
Points	 (NCPs),	 the	 network	 of	 reference	 organisations	 chosen	 by	 governments	 to	 offer	 country-specific	
practical	 information	 and	 assistance	 on	 the	 participation	 to	 Horizon	 2020:	 each	 topic	 is	 committed	 to	 a	
devoted	NCP	expert,	and	these	can	be	gathered	in	a	single	organization	or	belonging	to	different	institutions	
–	 like	 in	 the	 French	 case,	 where	 the	 experts	 are	 distributed	 among	 several	 institutes.	 According	 to	 the	
scientist,	National	Contact	Points	are	crucial	to	promote	the	flow	of	information	between	the	country	and	
Brussels,	and	to	enhance	the	ability	of	researchers	to	«react	quickly»	in	response	to	funding	opportunities.	
The	 interviewee	 depicts	 what	 he	 calls	 «a	 real	 democratic	 schema»,	 where	 Commission	 officers	 play	 a	
technical	role,	sorting	the	information	and	opinions	shared	by	stakeholders	and	composing	the	Programme’s	
proposal	according	to	the	emergent	consents.		
His	 view,	 compared	 to	 the	previous	CERN	EU	projects	 officer’s	 one,	may	be	determined	by	 their	
different	engagement	in	influencing	Brussels’	science	policies.	Actually,	the	scientist	did	have	the	experience	
of	being	consulted	on	the	disciplinary	contents	of	 the	Programme,	and	he	was	committed	to	support	his	
scientific	community	by	means	of	lobbying	activity,	invoking	politically	resonating	geopolitical	arguments:	
“I	was	participating	in	some	of	the	programs	which	were	proposed	by	the	European	Commission,	and	
therefore,	through	this	link,	I	have	been	asked	to	provide	some	input	about	my	experience	and	perhaps	
sometimes	about	my	wishes,	but	(…)	you	have	to	understand	with	Europe	this	kind	of	things	happen	
																																								 																				
54	He	was	using	the	French	acronym	for	National	Contact	Points.	
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not	necessarily,	and	this	is	not	always	the	most	efficient	way,	through	the	official	links,	so	Europe	works	
on	the	base	of	lobbying,	so	what	matters	is	that	you	get	networks	of	relationships	at	different	levels	of	
the	European	Commission	and	then	you	discuss	with	these	people	in	a	semi-official	way,	and	this	 is	
generally	the	most	effective	way	to	have	your	ideas	get	through.(…)	
CERN	and	the	European	Commission	can	work	together	to	take	benefit	of	the	community	(…)	that	we	
are	working	with	(…).	It’s	about	eight	hundred	people	in	the	world,	so	it’s	a	real	task	force,	to	say:	‘Ok,	
we	are	this	community,	since	many	years	we	try	to	work	together,	we	organized	a	number	of	events,	
we	 organize	 a	 number	 of	 common	 projects,	 this	 is	 a	 chance	 for	 Europe,	 to	 take	 the	 leadership,	
compared	to	what	happens	in	the	States	and	in	Asia’.	Well,	there	are	a	lot,	a	number	of	actions	going	
on,	but	we	have	a	unique	chance	here	that	we	have	the	potential	to	structure	ourselves	on	a	large	scale	
because	European	Commission	only	exists	in	Europe,	and	covers	many	countries	and	also	with	good	
relationships	with	the	rest	of	the	world.”	
From	 her	 observatory	 at	 the	 Unit	 for	 the	 support	 of	 research	 and	 third	 mission	 (ARIC)	 at	 the	
University	 of	 Bologna,	 the	 third	 interviewee	 insisted	 on	 the	 multiplicity	 of	 consultations	 to	 which	 the	
University	participated,	especially	in	the	Work	Programmes	preparation	phases:	WPs,	in	her	words,	are	built	
as	«little	Frankensteins»,	containing	not	only	the	 inputs	of	 the	concerned	Commission’s	Directorates,	but	
also	from	all	the	National	Delegates,	as	well	as	from	big	industries,	academic	alliances	(like	LERU,	the	League	
of	the	European	Research	Universities),	advisory	boards	and	lobby	groups,	of	which	she	acknowledged	the	
different	 weights.	 During	 all	 these	 consultations,	 she	 recognized,	 the	 Universities’	 efforts	 are	 typically	
concentrated	 on	 pressuring	 to	 obtain	 an	 appropriate	 valorisation	 of	 their	 research	 issues:	 they	 watch	
primarily	over	 the	presence	of	 subjects	 that	 are	 relevant	 for	 their	 research	 groups,	 and	 they	discuss	 the	
adequacy	 of	 related	 budgets,	 while	 they	 are	 less	 concerned,	 at	 least	 at	 her	 University	 level,	 with	 the	
overarching	political	structure.	Her	supposition	was	that	the	Programme	configuration	was	decided	by	the	
Commission	on	the	basis	of	the	analysis	of	the	EU	situation	and	of	the	previous	Programmes	assessments;	
besides,	she	didn’t	recognize	 in	Horizon	2020	any	drastic	change,	but	a	general	 reorganization	of	 themes	
already	present	in	FP7.	
The	disciplinary	National	Contact	Points,	 in	 the	 Italian	case,	are	all	belonging	 to	a	 same	no-profit	
organization,	 the	Agency	 for	 the	 Promotion	 of	 European	Research	 (APRE),	 that	 since	 1989	 is	working	 to	
support	 and	assist	 public	 and	private	bodies,	 favouring	 their	 participation	 to	 European	Research	 funding	
programmes.	The	National	Contact	Point	I	could	interview	described	the	NCP	work	mainly	as,	on	one	side,	
an	intense	communication	activity	–	organization	of	events	and	realization	of	informative	materials	on	the	
Framework	Programmes,	their	structures,	their	rules	and	the	calendar	of	the	calls	–	and	on	the	other	as	a	
support	work	 to	potential	participants,	helping	 them	to	write	 the	proposal,	 finding	possible	partners	and	
assessing	the	budgetary	aspects	of	the	projects.		
As	for	the	preparation	phase	of	the	Framework	Programmes,	she	emphasized	the	role	of	the	National	
Delegates,	who	are	entrusted	by	the	Governments	with	the	mandate	to	express	the	National	position	on	a	
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specific	issue	to	be	inserted	in	the	Work	Programmes,	i.e.	their	task	is	to	represent	effectively	the	interests	
of	 the	 national	 communities	 pushing,	 within	 the	 Commission’s	 pre-established	 boundaries,	 for	 the	
development	of	calls	able	to	reflect	the	national	scientific	landscape	in	that	field.	In	this	sense,	she	argued,	
National	Delegates,	have	a	more	political	role	than	National	Contact	Points	and	can	actually	influence	the	
Commission:	
There	are	two	different	figures:	the	Delegate	representatives	of	the	Member	States	and	the	National	
Contact	Points;	in	practice,	we	are	the	operatives,	the	labourers,	while	the	others	are	those	who	set	
the	lines,	the	strategies	that	are	inserted	afterwards	into	the	Work	Programmes.	
Summing	up	the	testimonies	of	the	interviewees,	whose	standpoints	belong	to	different	institutions,	
participating	in	various	ways	to	the	Framework	Programmes’	definition,	we	can	certainly	observe	that	the	
consultation	 activities	 realized	 by	 the	 Commission	 are	 intense	 and	 important,	 and	 that	 the	 consulted	
organizations	spend	a	considerable	share	of	their	time	in	discussing	and	elaborating	the	inputs	to	submit:	
although	there	is	no	fixed	procedure	to	follow	and	there	are	no	institutional	accounts	on	the	Commission’s	
work,	from	the	interviews	we	can	understand	that	the	stakeholders’	consultation	process	is	well	known	and	
its	mechanisms	are	shared	among	the	actors.	On	the	other	hand,	the	clearest	part	in	their	opinion	is	the	one	
concerning	 the	Work	 Programmes	 delineation,	 rather	 than	 the	 FPs	 overarching	 strategy,	 objectives	 and	
structures	design,	that	comes	pre-defined	to	the	stakeholders’	discussion	tables:	the	initial	design	process	
remains	a	«grey	area»,	and	it	is	exactly	in	this	phase	that	the	policy	narratives	are	developed	and	embodied	
in	the	strategies.		
The budget negotiations.	Finally,	additional	insights	on	the	FPs	development	can	be	obtained	by	the	
accounts	on	the	budget	negotiations,	which	involved	the	Council,	the	member	States	and	the	Parliament,	as	
well	as	the	Commission,	and	give	significant	indirect	clues	on	the	tensions	that	arose	around	the	issues	of	
science	policy	among	the	relevant	actors55.	
The	 discussion	 on	 the	 budget	 for	 FP7	 happened	 in	 the	midst	 of	 the	 negotiations	 for	 the	 overall	
Multiannual	Financial	Framework	of	the	Community	(MFF	2007-2013),	and	was	affected	by	the	conflictual	
political	 climate.	 The	 first	 budget	proposal	 elaborated	by	 the	Commission	dates	back	 to	2004,	when	 the	
Lisbon	 Strategy	 had	 just	 undergone	 the	 mid-term	 review,	 and	 was	 still	 very	 high	 in	 EU	 agenda:	 the	
Commission	proposed	an	increase	in	the	spending	for	research	of	a	factor	two,	and	the	figure	of	73	billion	
euros	was	 proposed	 for	 the	 Seventh	 Framework	 Programme	 in	 2005.	 The	 research	 community	 and	 the	
Parliament	welcomed	 the	 Commission’s	 proposal,	while	 the	 Council,	 representing	 the	 national	 interests,	
showed	a	mixed	 reception:	 the	political	 support	 for	 the	Community	had	 just	 suffered	a	 setback	with	 the	
rejection	 on	 the	 Constitutional	 Treaty	 in	 France	 and	 in	 the	Netherlands,	 and	 there	was	 already	 concern	
regarding	the	insufficient	progress	of	the	Lisbon	Strategy.	In	2003	six	European	countries	–	Germany,	France,	
																																								 																				
55	The	accounts	of	budgetary	negotiations	in	the	next	paragraphs	are	mainly	based	on	the	devoted	sections	of	(Muldur	et	
al.,	2006)	and	(EPRS	&	Reillon,	2015).	
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UK,	the	Netherlands,	Austria	and	Sweden	–	had	declared	in	a	letter	to	the	Commission	President	Prodi	that	
they	wouldn’t	have	accepted	any	significant	 increase	of	the	EU	budget,	fixing	the	ceiling	at	the	1%	of	the	
Gross	National	Income	(GNI).	Despite	this,	the	Commission’s	proposal	for	the	new	MFF	was	1,21%	of	GNI,	
with	 the	 part	 devoted	 to	 “Competitiveness	 for	 Growth	 and	 Employment”	 (of	which	more	 than	 half	was	
foreseen	for	R&D)	representing	the	12.2%	of	the	total.	The	reaction	was	polarized	into	two	blocks	of	member	
states,	identified	by	media	coverage	with	the	“Blair	vs.	Juncker”	expression	(see	for	example	Smith,	Watt,	&	
Temko,	 2005):	 the	 first,	 with	 the	 support	 of	 Sweden,	 the	 Netherlands,	 Spain	 and	 Finland,	 argued	 for	 a	
reduction	 of	 the	 budget	 share	 devoted	 to	 agriculture	 in	 favour	 of	more	 Lisbon-related	 topics,	 including	
research;	 the	 second	group	–	among	which	 relevant	 countries	were	France,	Poland,	Spain,	Germany	and	
Luxembourg	–	 conversely	 supported	 the	 “traditional”	budget	prevalence	of	 agriculture	 (see	 Fig.	 19).	 The	
polarization	was	enhanced	by	the	fact	that	during	2005	Luxembourg	and	UK	shared	the	Council	Presidency:	
at	the	end	of	the	first	semester	Prime	Minister	Juncker	presented	a	compromise	proposing	an	overall	budget	
of	1.06%	of	GNI	–	closer	to	the	2003	six	countries’	request	–	at	the	expense,	among	the	others,	of	the	R&D,	
cut	by	more	than	40%	with	respect	to	the	Commission	proposal,	while	agriculture	was	increased	by	3%;	the	
succeeding	 Blair	 Presidency,	 despite	 the	 declarations	 against	 the	 large	 share	 of	 budget	 devoted	 to	
agriculture,	was	 unwilling	 to	 renounce	 to	 the	UK	 rebate	 –	 obtained	 by	 Prime	Minister	 Thatcher	 in	 1985	
precisely	in	the	backdrop	of	the	expenses	for	agriculture,	at	that	time	set	at	around	70%	of	the	budget	–	and	
ended	up	with	a	proposal	largely	following	Juncker’s	lines.	The	Council	agreement	–	1.04%	of	GNI	–	resulted	
in	a	budget	proposal	for	FP7	of	47	billion	euros	for	the	seven	years	of	the	Programme,	instead	of	the	73	billion	
considered	necessary	by	the	Commission.		
The	 Parliament	 and	 the	 research	 community	 showed	 their	 disappointment	 by	 means	 of	 official	
declarations56	 and	 petitions57.	 However,	 the	 final	 deal	 between	 the	 Parliament	 and	 the	 new	 Austrian	
Presidency	was	only	slightly	higher,	accounting	for	FP7	for	no	more	than	338	million	euro	extra.	With	the	
final	decision,	the	contributions	to	agriculture	represented	about	the	80%	of	the	overall	EU	budget,	while	the	
funds	for	R&D	stopped	at	5.5%;	however,	albeit	reduced,	the	budget	for	the	Framework	Programme	was	
significantly	increased	from	previous	FP6	(see	Fig.	9).	
The	discussion	of	the	budget	to	be	devoted	to	Horizon	2020	showed	similar	dynamics	–	Commission,	
Parliament	and	scientific	community	very	favourable	to	a	relevant	increase	of	funding,	Council	reluctant	to	
expand	the	budget	–	but	didn’t	experience	a	drastic	cut	like	FP7.		
																																								 																				
56	“it	is	essential	to	stress	that	only	by	preserving	the	original	level	of	financing,	as	indicated	by	the	European	Commission	
and	the	European	Parliament,	will	it	be	possible	to	guarantee	a	realization	of	the	objectives	mentioned	below.	Any	cuts	in	FP7	budget	
are	against	the	Lisbon	Strategy	and	in	disagreement	with	all	the	declarations	of	European	Union	leaders.	Thus,	a	clear	vision	and	
strong	 leadership	are	necessary.	We	expect	both	of	these	features	to	emerge	 in	the	European	Council	decisions.”	 (Buzek	report,	
Buzek,	2005).	
57	E.g.	the	“European	Petition	for	Research	and	Innovation”	(“MEPs	and	research	personalities	petition	European	Council	
for	more	funds	to	support	European	competitiveness	|	Times	Higher	Education	(THE),”	2006).	
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Horizon	2020	was	conceived	to	represent	a	discontinuity	from	the	previous	Programmes,	perceived	
as	too	complex,	bureaucratic	and	fragmented;	the	new	Programme	was	designed	to	integrate	all	streams	of	
research	funding58	in	one	instrument,	operated	with	a	unique	set	of	rules,	and	it	was	intended	to	implement	
the	new	Europe	2020	strategy,	published	in	2010	to	succeed	to	the	previous	Lisbon	approach.	Horizon	2020	
is	based	on	a	new	architecture	with	three	pillars	–	“Excellent	science”,	“Industrial	Leadership”	and	“Societal	
Challenges”	–,	complemented	by	two	specific	objectives	–	“Spreading	Excellence	and	Widening	Participation”	
and	“Science	with	and	for	Society”	–	(see	Fig.	8)59.	
Fig.	8:	The	structure	of	Horizon	2020	(source:	(EC,	2017c))		
	
The	initial	proposal	of	Horizon	2020,	published	by	the	Commission	in	November	2011	(EC,	2011b),	
set	the	necessary	budget	to	87,7	billion	euros.	Deciding	the	overall	budget	allotted	to	the	different	issues	in	
the	Multiannual	Financial	Framework,	as	we	have	seen,	is	a	Council’s	responsibility,	and	the	figure	committed	
in	the	2013	MFF	to	Horizon	2020,	for	its	seven	years	of	duration,	was	reduced	to	79,4	billion	euros.	
The	European	Parliament,	which	a	couple	of	months	earlier	proposed	for	H2020	a	budget	doubling	
the	FP7	one	(EP,	2011b)	–	100	billion	euros	–,	couldn’t	achieve	its	ambitious	target,	but	managed	anyway	to	
influence	 the	 shape	 of	 the	 Programme:	 the	 two	 specific	 objectives	 “Spreading	 Excellence	 and	Widening	
Participation”	and	“Science	with	and	for	Society”	were	added	on	a	Parliamentary	committee	ITRE	proposal,	
																																								 																				
58	The	Programme	incorporates	some	parts	of	the	Competitiveness	and	Innovation	Framework	Programme	(CIP),	as	well	as	
the	 European	 Institute	 of	 Innovation	 and	 Technology	 (EIT),	 funded	 in	 2008	 –	 on	 the	model	 of	MIT	 in	 the	US	 –	 to	work	 on	 the	
integration	of	the	“Knowledge	Triangle”	dimensions:	higher	education,	business,	research	and	technology.	It	finances	“Knowledge	
and	 Innovation	 Communities”	 (KICs),	 which	 are	 able	 to	 «bring	 ideas	 to	 market,	 turn	 students	 into	 entrepreneurs	 and,	 most	
importantly,	(…)	innovate»	(EIT,	2017).	
59	The	comparison	between	Fig.	15	and	Fig.	16	shows	how	the	sectors	of	FP7	were	re-organized	in	Horizon	2020.	
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together	with	the	addition	of	“Secured	Societies”	as	a	distinct	societal	challenge;	the	Parliament	insisted	also	
on	funding	for	SMEs,	introducing	the	Fast	Track	to	Innovation	initiative60.	
In	 2015,	 the	 so-called	 Juncker	 Plan	 (European	 Fund	 for	 Strategic	 Investments,	 EFSI),	 aimed	 at	
encouraging	the	European	economic	recovery	by	encouraging	private	investments,	allocated	16	billion	of	the	
EU	budget,	thus	reducing	the	budget	for	Horizon	to	74.8	billion;	the	Parliament	tried	again	to	defend	the	
budget	for	research	programmes,	but	only	managed	in	reducing	the	contribution	to	EFSI	from	Horizon	and	
to	 defend	 the	 share	 for	 ERC.	 The	 scientific	 community,	 that	 since	 the	 beginning	 had	 supported	 the	
Commission’s	request	and	the	Parliament’s	position,	expressed	concern	for	the	cuts	to	Horizon,	publishing	
an	 «ERA	 Stakeholders	 Joint	 Statement	 on	 the	 European	 Fund	 for	 Strategic	 Investments	 (EFSI)»	 (CESAER,	
EAERTO,	EUA,	LERU,	&	Science	Europe,	2015).	
The need for a deeper understanding of the research policy design stage 
The	analysis	of	the	factors	 influencing	the	European	Union’s	scientific	policy	 lines	elaboration	and	
the	policy	design	process	returns	an	involved	landscape.		
On	one	side,	the	historical	evolution	of	a	communitarian	scientific	policy	has	followed	–	or	in	some	
cases	even	anticipated	–	the	ups	and	downs	of	the	European	integration.	Different	models	of	research	policy	
were	realised	by	European	institutions,	and	the	current	one	–	based	on	innovation	–	appears	as	a	transitional	
model	 where	 diverse	 visions	 of	 research	 objectives	 and	 methods	 are	 engaging	 in	 a	 not-yet	 completed	
confrontation.	
On	the	battlefield	of	R&D,	not	only	the	visions	and	understandings	of	science	policy	were	at	stake,	
but	also	some	diverse	visions	of	integration	were	tested,	and	this	is	still	visible	in	the	co-existence	of	different	
approaches	 to	 decision-making,	 according	 to	 different	 scientific	 issues,	 and	 in	 the	 specific	 roles	 and	
behaviours	of	the	European	institutions	involved	in	law-making.		
Nonetheless,	 a	 prevailing	 method	 for	 scientific	 policy-making	 has	 emerged:	 the	 multiannual	
Framework	Programme	schema,	which	is	currently	by	far	the	prevailing	method	for	EU	to	exert	influence	in	
the	landscape	of	European	scientific	research.		
The	 Framework	 Programmes	 are	 not	 only	 technical	 procedures	 of	 funding	 distribution,	 but	
incorporate	as	well	theories	of	economic,	social	and	political	order	and,	finally,	visions	of	European	future.	
Throughout	 the	 law-making	 process,	 the	 most	 sensitive	 part	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 building	 of	 reference	
conceptual	frameworks	is	the	initial	conception	of	the	Framework	Programmes	in	the	Commission	offices,	
before	 the	 start	 of	 the	 formal	 iter	 of	 consultations	 and	 institutional	 debates,	 as	 it	 is	 confirmed	 by	 the	
testimonies	of	selected	European	 institutional	actors,	whose	work	put	 them	 in	close	contact	with	 the	EU	
research	frame.	However,	the	very	initial	phase	of	policy	elaboration	is	also	the	least	accessible	from	outside	
																																								 																				
60	A	pilot	project	to	fund	close-to-market	initiatives	with	no	pre-defined	topics.	
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the	Commission,	to	the	point	that	even	a	high	level	officer	in	an	important	research	institution	defines	it	as	
a	«grey	area».	Moreover,	as	the	Parliamentary	debate	and	the	interviewees	accounts	on	the	stakeholders’	
consultation	 show,	 it	 is	 very	 difficult	 to	 touch	 the	 broad,	 overarching	 policy	 structures	 in	 the	 successive	
phases	of	law	elaboration.	
It	is	thus	particularly	interesting	to	investigate	the	conceptual	frameworks	underlying	the	strategies	
on	research,	as	expressed	in	policy	discourses,	in	order	to	reconstruct	the	features	and	origins	of	the	basic	
ideas	and	narratives	on	science	and	the	European	society	that	are	undergoing	confrontation	in	the	current	
research	programmes,	and	set	the	basis	for	a	deeper	understanding	of	the	decisions	taken	in	the	very	first	
phases	of	policy	elaboration,	that	prove	to	be	so	significant	for	the	development	of	the	current	and	future	
EU	research	policy.	
	
	

Frames and narratives in EU policy discourses on 
science 
«Era	l'alba	quando	disse:		
-Sire,	ormai	ti	ho	parlato	di	tutte	le	città	che	conosco.		
-	Ne	resta	una	di	cui	non	parli	mai.		
Marco	Polo	chinò	il	capo.		
-	Venezia,	-	disse	il	Kan.		
Marco	sorrise.		
-	E	di	che	altro	credevi	che	ti	parlassi?		
L'imperatore	non	batté	ciglio.	
	-	Eppure	non	ti	ho	mai	sentito	fare	il	suo	nome.		
E	Polo:		
-	Ogni	volta	che	descrivo	una	città	dico	qualcosa	di	Venezia.»		
(Italo	Calvino,	Le	città	invisibili,	1971)61	
Introduction 
With	Horizon	2020,	for	a	bright	future!	
The	concluding	sentence	of	the	Horizon	2020	introductory	video	(EC,	2014e),	published	in	2014	at	
the	 launch	 of	 the	 Programme,	 sums	 up	 the	 dense	 web	 of	 expectations	 and	 projections	 into	 the	 future	
embedded	into	the	Framework	Programme	for	research	funding.		
Dealing	with	research	programmes	doesn’t	only	mean	describing	the	procedures,	or	explaining	the	
available	 lines	 of	 funding:	 it	 entails	 expressing	 the	 visions	 that	 underpin	 research	 policy,	 its	 orientation,	
motivations,	actors,	 values,	 issues.	 In	other	words:	 it	 involves	conveying	and	 representing	 the	concerned	
conceptual	frames.		
Master	frames	and	narratives	always	imply	explanations	of	the	past	and	visions	of	the	future,	which	
they	 contribute	 to	 shape.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Framework	 Programmes	 –	 analysed	 here	 as	 the	 prevailing	
instruments	of	European	research	policy	of	the	last	three	decades	–	the	historical	roots	date	back	to	the	very	
inception	 of	 the	 Community	 research	 policy,	 and	 are	 deeply	 entangled	 with	 the	 dynamics	 of	 European	
																																								 																				
61	I	owe	this	citation	to	U.	Felt,	in	(Jasanoff	&	Kim,	2015).	
80	
integration:	the	idea	of	a	European	coordination	of	national	policies	appeared	feasible	only	in	the	‘70s,	and	
a	real	affirmation	of	the	FPs	was	achieved	in	the	‘90s.	Since	the	launch	of	the	first	Programme	in	1984,	Europe	
witnessed	the	end	of	the	bipolar	world	order,	transformed	itself	from	an	economic	community	into	a	proper	
polity,	 saw	 the	 rise	of	new	 important	actors	on	 its	political	 scene	 (citizens,	engaged	 scientists),	 launched	
major	strategies	in	the	knowledge	fields	(Lisbon	strategy,	ERA,	Bologna	process),	implemented	an	internal	
reform	 of	 the	 governance,	 opened	 to	 the	 largest	 enlargement	 in	 its	 history,	 failed	 the	 project	 for	 a	
Constitution	and	had	to	face	the	consequences	of	the	economic	crisis.	All	these	events	marked	a	stamp	in	
how	research	policies	have	been	conceived	and	implemented.	
Alongside	 contemporary	 events,	 long-term	 cultural	 reflections	 and	more	 recent	 developments	 in	
academic	thinking	about	the	role	and	orientation	of	research	funding	have	influenced	the	development	and	
employment	 of	 the	 conceptual	 frames	 recognisable	 in	 research	 policy	 discourses.	 These	 different	
perspectives	developed	side	by	side,	although	they	were	not	necessarily	harmonious,	in	the	context	of	an	
overarching	orientation	towards	economic	growth,	clearly	stated	in	policy	discourses.		
In	the	European	scenario,	the	tensions	among	different	visions	of	science	policy	have	represented,	
and	they	may	as	well	do	so	in	the	future,	a	fruitful	debate	arena	for	confrontations	on	the	very	nature	of	the	
Union;	indeed,	the	friction	points	revolve	around	the	issues	of	democracy,	transparency,	orientation	choice,	
funding	distribution	criteria:	all	critical	matters	for	the	definition	of	the	Union	political	physiognomy	at	large.		
Furthermore,	each	position	implies	a	specific	and	diverse	vision	of	the	«bright	future»	promised	by	
the	H2020	introductory	video,	and	envisions	different	instruments	to	achieve	it.	The	debate	about	which	one	
to	choose,	or	which	alternative	vision	of	future	to	pursue	is	still	ongoing:	due	to	the	weakness	of	the	political	
debate	at	EU	level,	a	clear	choice	is	not	likely	to	happen	soon	in	the	European	institutional	bodies.		
Consequently,	 it	 is	 even	more	necessary	 to	unravel	 the	discourses	on	 research	policy	 in	order	 to	
identify	and	expose	the	relevant	conceptual	frames	and	what	their	features	imply	for	future	developments.	
The story told by the Framework Programmes establishing acts 
During	 the	 last	 three	 decades,	 the	 Framework	 Programmes	 have	 been	 the	major	 instruments	 of	
European	research	policy.		
The	Framework	Programmes	establishing	documents62,	as	mentioned,	are	particularly	 relevant	 to	
the	 objectives	 of	 this	 research,	 since	 they	 are	 at	 once	 active	 instruments	 of	 policy-shaping	 and	 detailed	
descriptions	of	the	communitarian	science	policy.	On	one	hand,	they	are	the	legal	instruments	by	means	of	
which	the	analyses,	consultations	and	decisions	taking	place	in	the	Union	policy-making	offices	materialise	
in	concrete	actions,	exerting	influence	on	the	European	scientific	–	as	well	as	economic,	social	and	cultural	–	
landscape;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 they	 concretely	 consist	 in	 lengthy	 documents	 describing	 –	 from	 the	
																																								 																				
62	See	paragraph	The	Framework	Programmes	and	the	ERC	establishing	acts	for	a	detailed	introduction.	
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perspective	 of	 the	 European	 institutions	 –	 the	 aims,	 foundations,	 concerns	 and	 projects	 to	 modify	 the	
scenario	in	the	interest	of	the	Member	States	and	of	the	European	citizens.		
In	other	words,	FPs	establishing	acts	are	situated	at	the	border	between	science	and	society,	where	
both	 co-produce	 each	other:	 they	 are	 thus	 especially	meaningful	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	 socio-technical	 (and	
political)	conceptual	frameworks.	
Their	 first	 part	 in	 particular,	 explaining	 the	 Programmes’	 base	 principles	 and	 describing	 the	
characterising	 features	 that	 such	 research	 should	 have,	 is	 particularly	 interesting	 to	 understand	 the	
frameworks	shaping	and	grounding	EU	science	policy.	
Moreover,	the	establishing	acts	are	the	documental	result	of	the	previous	intensive	and	protracted	
negotiations	among	the	policy	actors,	and	bear	the	signs	of	the	different	voices	and	of	the	historical	events	
that	contributed	to	shape	EU	politics	in	the	last	three	decades.	
The evolution of Framework Programmes.	 Indeed,	 the	 Framework	 Programmes	 objectives,	
structures,	themes,	budgets	and	discourses	changed	significantly	over	time,	even	without	ever	distorting,	
testifying	the	evolution	of	the	European	strategies	on	research.		
The	Programmes	are	running	since	1984	and	had	a	duration	of	approximately	four	years	up	to	FP7,	
which	was	extended	to	seven	years	 in	order	 to	coincide	with	 the	Multiannual	Financial	Framework63	and	
avoid	the	burden	of	multiple,	asynchronous,	budget	discussions;	the	allocated	funds	increased	regularly	in	
absolute	terms,	following	the	increase	in	the	total	EU	expenditure	(Fig.	9),	although	sometimes	undergoing	
harsh	negotiations64.	
Fig.	9:	The	Framework	Programmes,	their	period	of	activity	and	the	evolution	of	Framework	Programmes	budgets	in	absolute	terms	
(source:	EC,	2013b);	for	the	increase	of	the	funds	devoted	to	research	in	terms	of	share	of	the	total	EU	expenditure	see	Fig.	3.	
Framework	Programme	 Period	
First	(FP1)	 1984-1987	
Second	(FP2)	 1987-1991	
Third	(FP3)	 1990-1994	
Fourth	(FP4)	 1994-1998	
Fifth	(FP5)	 1998-2002	
Sixth	(FP6)	 2002-2006	
Seventh	(FP7)	 2007-2013	
Horizon	2020	 2014-2020	
	
																																								 																				
63	The	Multiannual	Financial	Framework	(MFF)	is	a	 legally	established	entity	since	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon	in	2007,	and	the	
current	 one,	 running	 from	 2014	 to	 2020	 is	 the	 first	 with	 this	 name;	 however,	 since	 1988	 European	 institutions	 agree	 on	
Interinstitutional	Agreements	(IIA)	for	multiannual	financial	perspectives.	
64	See	the	accounts	on	budget	negotiations	for	FP7	and	H2020	reported	in	section	The	EU	decision-making	process(es)	for	
scientific	research.	
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A	fundamental	turning	point	in	the	Framework	Programmes	history	was	the	development	and	launch	
of	the	European	Research	Area	(ERA),	around	the	year	2000,	that	opened	to	a	much	stronger	 integration	
between	the	European	level	and	the	nation	states,	and	complicated	the	Commission’s	task	to	prepare	the	
Programmes.	Nevertheless,	it	was	in	the	same	years,	with	the	valorisation	of	research	as	the	base	for	the	
knowledge	 economy	 in	 the	 Lisbon	 strategy,	 that	 research	 policy	 acquired	 the	 current	 relevance	 in	 the	
European	agenda	(Andrée,	2009):	scientific	research	is	currently	considered		–	and	this	is	frequently	reflected	
in	policy	discourses	(CEC,	2005b;	e.g.	Juncker,	2014)	–	one	of	the	main	drivers	of	growth	and	employment	in	
Europe.		
The first Framework Programmes.	 The	 first	 Framework	 Programme	 was	 conceived	 at	 the	
beginning	of	the	‘80s	as	a	pilot	initiative	to	promote	a	reorganization	of	the	confused	and	scattered	landscape	
of	 the	European	research-promoting	 initiatives,	each	of	 them	requiring	a	specific	effort	of	 legitimation	 in	
front	of	the	Council,	a	body	that	is	traditionally	reluctant	to	accept	any	communitarian	initiative.	Up	to	the	
Single	 European	 Act,	 in	 1986,	 there	 was	 formally	 no	 legal	 mandate	 for	 research	 policy	 in	 the	 Treaties,	
therefore	it	was	necessary	to	legitimize	each	communitarian	intervention	in	that	field.	The	debates	on	the	
“technological	 gap”	 with	 the	 US	 during	 the	 ‘60s	 and	 the	 ‘70s	 had	 frequently	 underlined	 the	 need	 to	
strengthen	the	ties	between	research	and	industry,	hence	it	appeared	a	natural	choice	to	ground65	research	
policy	to	the	existing	communitarian	aim	of	economic	development	(Guzzetti,	1995):	the	preamble	of	the	
first	Framework	Programme	establishing	act	(CEU,	1983)	echoed	the	Article	2	of	the	Rome	Treaty66,	which	
paired	the	objectives	of	economic	development	and	of	the	rising	in	the	standards	of	living,	adding	to	it	the	
need	to	promote	a	«balanced	scientific	and	technical	development»:	
Whereas	 Article	 2	 of	 the	 Treaty	 establishing	 the	 European	 Economic	 Community	 assigns	 to	 the	
Community	 the	 task,	 among	 others,	 of	 promoting	 throughout	 the	 Community	 a	 harmonious	
development	of	economic	activities,	a	continuous	and	balanced	expansion	and	an	accelerated	raising	
of	the	standard	of	living;	
Whereas	 it	 is	 important	 to	 promote	 balanced	 scientific	 and	 technical	 development	 within	 the	
Community;	
	The	«scientific	and	technical	objectives»	of	the	Programme	focused	on	the	competitiveness	of	the	
agricultural	 and	 industrial	 sectors,	 on	 the	 management	 of	 raw	 materials	 and	 energy	 resources,	 on	 the	
																																								 																				
65	Via	the	article	235	of	the	Treaty	establishing	the	European	Community	(CEU,	1987,	p.	6):	“If	action	by	the	Community	
should	prove	necessary	to	attain,	in	the	course	of	the	operation	of	the	common	market,	one	of	the	objectives	of	the	Community	and	
this	Treaty	has	not	provided	the	necessary	powers,	the	Council	shall,	acting	unanimously	on	a	proposal	from	the	Commission	and	
after	consulting	the	European	Parliament,	take	the	appropriate	measures.”		
66	Article	2:	“The	Community	shall	have	as	its	task,	by	establishing	a	common	market	and	progressively	approximating	the	
economic	policies	of	Member	States,	to	promote	throughout	the	Community	a	harmonious	development	of	economic	activities,	a	
continuous	and	balanced	expansion,	 an	 increase	 in	 stability,	 an	accelerated	 raising	of	 the	 standard	of	 living	and	closer	 relations	
between	the	States	belonging	to	it.”	(Guzzetti,	1995)	
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improvement	of	the	living	and	working	conditions	and	on	a	better	effectiveness	of	the	European	scientific	
and	technical	potential	(Fig.	20)67.		
The	“Article	2”	rationale,	updated	with	the	evolvements	in	the	European	Treaties,	was	to	represent	
the	ground	for	all	 the	subsequent	Framework	Programmes.	The	Second	Programme	included,	 in	fact,	the	
same	 paragraph	 in	 the	 preamble,	 and	 complemented	 it	 with	 a	 series	 of	 new	 elements,	 expanding	 and	
enriching	the	motivations	for	action	(CEU,	1987):		
(…)	in	order	to	encourage	the	development	of	the	international	competitiveness	of	European	industry,	
it	 is	necessary	 to	promote	scientific	 research	and	technological	development	at	Community	 level	 in	
order	to	strengthen	the	scientific	and	technological	basis	of	its	industry,	thereby	complementing	the	
activities	carried	out	in	the	Member	States;	
(…)		
(…)	it	is	necessary	to	promote	the	overall	harmonious	development	of	the	Community	with	a	view	to	
strengthening	its	economic	and	social	cohesion;	(…)	it	is	intended	that	the	implementation	of	common	
policies	 of	 the	 Community,	 and	 its	 strategy	 for	 research	 and	 technological	 development,	 shall	
contribute	to	this	objective;	
Already	 in	 this	 early	 Framework	 Programme,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 recognize	 the	 polarization	 of	 the	
objectives	 around	 two	main	 orientations:	 on	 one	 side,	 the	 logic	 chain	 connecting	 the	 reinforcement	 of	
research	to	the	strengthening	of	 the	S&T	basis	 for	 the	 industry,	which	 in	 turn	was	 intended	to	boost	 the	
European	international	competitiveness;	on	the	other	side,	the	target	of	«cohesion»	was	inserted	–	i.e.,	in	
the	EU	lingo,	the	aim	of	reducing		the	social	and	economic	differences	among	the	European	regions	–	and	
the	specific	 theme	«quality	of	 life»,	 including	 the	health	and	environment	 fields,	was	better	defined	as	a	
contribution	to	«a	European	concept	of	the	quality	of	life	in	those	aspects	which	are	most	clearly	perceptible	
to	each	individual»68.	For	the	first	time	in	this	Framework	Programme,	after	the	official	procedure	introduced	
by	the	single	European	Act	in	1986,	the	Parliament	could	influence	the	Council’s	decisions,	and	pushed	for	
more	 resources	 to	 be	 devoted	 to	 “market-pulled”69	 industrial	 research,	 to	 be	 coupled	 with	 the	 social	
objectives	 (Guzzetti,	 1995);	 cohesion	 was	 also	 added	 to	 the	 Riesenhuber	 criteria70	 as	 a	 justification	 for	
communitarian	involvement.	
The	Second	Framework	Programme	was	not	yet	completely	developed	when	the	new	Commissioner	
Pandolfi71	decided	to	prepare	and	 launch	a	 third	one,	 inaugurating	 the	scheme	of	successive	overlapping	
																																								 																				
67	All	the	funded	themes	and	the	breakdown	of	the	total	budget	is	described	in	the	Annexes	to	the	FP1	establishing	act,	
reported	in	Fig.	20.	
68	Purpose	of	the	health	sector	(CEU,	1987),	representing	also	the	opening	of	the	objectives	concerning	the		«Quality	of	
life»	headline	(see	Fig.	21).	
69	The	expression	“market	pull”	refers	to	the	development	of	technology	according	to	the	requests	of	the	market,	while	
“technology	push”	to	an	evolution	led	by	the	internal	dynamics	of	the	technological	endeavour.		
70	See	the	paragraph	Which	science	for	which	Europe?.	
71	Filippo	Maria	Pandolfi	was	Commissioner	for	Science,	research,	development,	telecommunications	and	innovation,	and	
the	Joint	Research	Centre	(January	1989	-	January	1993);	see	Table	18	for	the	list	of	all	the	Commissioners	to	research.	
84	
multiannual	 Programmes.	 This	 Programme,	 that	 faced	 fierce	 battles	 on	 the	 budget72,	 confirmed	 the	
increasing	importance	that	the	information	and	communication	technologies	were	beginning	to	represent	in	
the	 eyes	 of	 the	 European	 scientific	 politicians	 and	 officers:	 while	 in	 FP1	 the	 greatest	 budget	 share	 was	
devoted	to	energy	(47.2%),	followed	by	industrial	competitiveness	(28.2%),	FP2	assigned	42.2%	of	the	funds	
to	 information	 and	 telecommunications	 (grouped	 under	 the	 heading	 «Towards	 a	 large	 market	 and	 an	
information	and	communications	society»),	21.7%	to	energy	and	15.5%	to	the	«Modernization	of	industrial	
sectors»	(see	Fig.	20	and	Fig.	21).	In	FP3	the	ICT	accounted	for	the	38.5%,	energy	for	the	14.5%	and	«Industrial	
and	materials	technology»	for	the	15.5%	(see	Fig.	22).		
Maastricht and the broadening of FPs scopes.	The	«six	major	concerns»	guiding	the	elaboration	of	
the	Third	Framework	Programme	reflected	an	evolution	in	the	political	reflections	on	the	role	and	nature	of	
the	European	research	policy:	these	went	beyond	the	traditional	strategic	positioning	of	Member	States	and	
Community	–	the	Riesenhuber	criteria	were	a	clear	product	of	this	approach	–,	including	references	to	longer	
term	strategies	like	the	Single	Market	and	acquiring	a	clearer	European	political	dimension,	 involving	also	
social	and	environmental	aspects.	The	«concerns»	were	(CEU,	1990):	
-	 improving	 industrial	competitiveness	whilst	maintaining	the	pre-competitive	nature	of	Community	
activities;	
-	meeting	the	challenges	linked	to	the	attainment	of	the	large	market	as	regards	norms	and	standards	
by	strengthening	prenormative	research;	
-	modifying	industrial	operators'	attitudes	in	the	direction	of	further	transnational	initiatives;	
-	 introducing	 a	 European	 dimension	 into	 the	 training	 of	 scientific	 research	 and	 technological	
development	staff;	
-	 increasing	economic	and	 social	 cohesion	whilst	 ensuring	 the	 scientific	and	 technical	 excellence	of	
research	projects;	
-	taking	into	account	environmental	protection	and	the	quality	of	life.		
These	developments	would	have	been	sanctioned	in	the	Maastricht	Treaty	in	1992,	where	a	clearer	
political	 dimension	 was	 added	 to	 the	 previous	 economic	 physiognomy	 of	 the	 Community:	 a	 European	
citizenship	was	established,	a	 social	policy	was	 introduced	and	 the	communitarian	areas	of	 interventions	
were	expanded.	In	the	field	of	science,	«all	the	research	activities	deemed	necessary»	were	promoted	by	the	
Treaty,	 thus	 widening	 the	 fields	 of	 European	 intervention	 and	 opening	 for	 the	 Framework	 Programmes	
expansion.		
FP4,	 in	fact,	 included	this	broadening	of	perspective	both	 in	the	evolution	of	the	subjects,	among	
which	for	the	first	time	«Targeted	socio-economic	research»	appeared	(although	with	a	very	small	share	of	
the	budget,	1.5%),	and	in	the	description	of	the	general	principles	orienting	the	research	activities,	where,	
																																								 																				
72	 Commission’s	 initial	 proposal	 was	 7.7	 billion	 ECU,	 Parliament’s	 one	 was	 8.23	 billion,	 while	 the	 Council	 reached	 a	
consensus	on	the	figure	of	5.7	billion	(Muldur	et	al.,	2006,	p.	73ss.).	
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alongside	the	usual	emphasis	on	industrial	competitiveness,	new	importance	was	assigned	to	quality	of	life,	
sustainability	and	employment	–	all	dimensions	related	to	social	objectives	and	citizenship	(EP	&	CEU,	1994):	
(…)	the	purpose	of	Community	RTD	in	accordance	with	the	objectives	laid	down	in	the	Treaty	should	be	
to	foster	a	prosperous	Community	based	on	industrial	competitiveness,	quality	of	life	and	sustainable	
development;	whereas	it	is	also	desirable	that	it	contributes	to	supporting	economic	growth	and	a	high	
level	of	employment;	(…)	
Activities	should	contribute	to	meeting	the	general	objectives	of	the	Community,	such	as	promoting	
sustainable	development	and	improving	the	quality	of	life	of	the	Community's	citizens.	
The turning point: ERA and Lisbon.	 As	 mentioned,	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 Millennium	 has	 to	 be	
considered	a	turning	point	for	Framework	Programmes,	and	FP5,	active	from	1998	to	2002,	is	the	transition	
Programme.		
The	 intellectual	 background	 of	 the	 Fifth	 Framework	 Programme	 was	 constituted	 by	 the	
considerations	on	the	shift	from	periods	in	which	research	was	oriented	prevailingly	to	military	or	industrial	
objectives	towards	a	«third	phase»,	«pairing	innovation	and	society».	The	policy	officers	responsible	for	the	
development	of	R&D	policies	wrote	(Caracostas	&	Muldur,	1998):	
With	the	dawn	of	the	21st	century,	the	main	challenges	for	the	European	Union	(EU)	are	the	need	to	
complete	its	economic	and	monetary	integration,	rediscover	a	pattern	of	lasting	and	sustained	growth	
and	reduce	 levels	of	unemployment	and	social	exclusion.	 It	must	achieve	this,	 furthermore,	without	
sacrificing	 its	social	model	and	 its	cohesion	against	a	background	of	growing	globalisation	which	 is	
prone	to	foster	a	rise	in	national	and	regional	self-interest	rather	than	solidarity	and	co-operation.	
FP5	 showed	 various	 new	 elements:	 in	 the	 establishing	 act	 for	 the	 first	 (and	 only)	 time	 societal	
problems	were	placed	among	the	objectives	before	competitiveness	and	industrial	development	(EP	&	CEU,	
1998):	
(…)	the	Community's	research	and	technological	development	policy	should	address,	as	a	matter	of	
priority,	 problems	 of	 society,	 improving	 the	 international	 competitiveness	 of	 Community	 industry,	
sustainable	development,	job	creation,	the	quality	of	life	and	globalisation	of	knowledge,	contributing	
to	the	development	and	implementation	of	the	Community's	policies	and	the	role	of	the	Community	in	
the	world	as	a	focal	point	of	scientific	and	technological	excellence;	
The	developments	 in	 the	Union	policies	of	 the	 ‘90s,	with	the	establishment	of	 the	new	European	
policies	in	the	social,	educational	and	cultural	areas,	led	to	a	series	of	important	changes	on	the	positioning	
of	 research	 in	 the	 European	 political	 strategy	 and	 in	 the	 significant	 broadening	 of	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	
Programmes.	 As	 we	 will	 see	 below,	 academic	 and	 political	 reflections	 on	 the	 role	 of	 knowledge	 and	
innovation	had	 increasingly	acquired	 relevance,	 leading	 to	 the	 reformulation	of	 the	European	policies	on	
knowledge:	 the	 Bologna	 process	 and	 the	 launch	 of	 the	 European	 Research	 Area	 renovated	 the	 higher	
education	and	the	R&D	sectors	respectively,	and	the	Lisbon	agenda	positioned	research	at	the	heart	of	the	
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European	growth	strategy.	In	the	same	years	a	series	of	protests,	particularly	focusing	on	scientifically-related	
issues,	led	to	the	emergence	of	the	citizens	as	non-negligible	actors	of	the	European	political	scene.		
The	 Lisbon	 strategy	 originally	 was	 conceived	 with	 the	 input	 of	 «coupling	 innovation	 with	 the	
preservation	 of	 social	 cohesion	 and	 this	 as	 a	 compromise	 between	 market	 liberalization	 and	 a	 social	
democratic	approach	under	the	umbrella	of	a	Schumpeterian	vision	of	 innovation»	(Boyer,	2011).	«Social	
objectives»	of	research	–	among	which	employment,	health,	quality	of	life	and	environment	–	were	explicitly	
listed	among	the	FP5	criteria	for	funding	research,	alongside	the	traditional	subsidiarity	arguments	and	the	
techno-economic	 development	 rationales;	 also	 the	 «expectations	 and	 concerns	 of	 (…)	 citizens»	 were	
mentioned	(EP	&	CEU,	1998):	
In	application	of	the	foregoing	principles,	the	framework	programme	shall	be	defined	on	the	basis	of	a	
set	of	common	criteria,	divided	into	three	categories:	
- Criteria	related	to	the	Community	‘value	added’	and	the	subsidiarity	principle	
(…)	
- Criteria	related	to	social	objectives	
- improving	the	employment	situation,	
- promoting	the	quality	of	life	and	health,	
- preserving	the	environment,	
in	order	to	further	major	social	objectives	of	the	Community	reflecting	the	expectations	and	concerns	
of	its	citizens.	
- Criteria	related	to	economic	development	and	scientific	and	technological	prospects	
- areas	which	are	expanding	and	create	good	growth	prospects,	
- areas	in	which	Community	businesses	can	and	must	become	more	competitive,	
- areas	in	which	prospects	of	significant	scientific	and	technological	progress	are	opening	
up,	offering	possibilities	for	dissemination	and	exploitation	of	results	 in	the	medium	or	
long	term,	
in	order	to	contribute	to	the	harmonious	and	sustainable	development	of	the	Community	as	a	whole.	
An	attentive	eye	was	 kept	 throughout	 the	document	on	 the	 citizens,	 often	described	as	 the	end	
beneficiaries	of	 the	policies,	and	thereby	 legitimating	the	actions;	ethical	aspects	of	 research73	and	equal	
opportunities	 were	 also	 inserted	 among	 the	 prescriptions	 for	 research	 projects.	 A	 «key	 action»	 on	 the	
improvement	of	the	«human	research	potential	and	the	socioeconomic	knowledge	base»,	with	a	limited	but	
relevant	share	of	 the	9.4%	of	 the	budget,	was	created,	with	a	 three-folded	aim:	 fostering	human	capital,	
promoting	socio-economic	and	cultural	development	and	providing	the	knowledge-base	for	S&T	policies.	The	
action	included	support	to	training	and	mobility	of	European	researchers	with	the	establishment	of	training	
																																								 																				
73	Although	the	attention	to	ethical	aspects	of	research	had	already	been	introduced	in	FP4	for	the	first	time,	in	FP5	they	
are	stated	more	vigorously:	«it	is	necessary	to	take	into	account	the	ethical	aspects	of	advances	in	knowledge	and	technologies	and	
their	application	and	to	conduct	research	activities	 in	compliance	with	fundamental	ethical	principles	and	with	the	protection	of	
privacy».			
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networks	and	Marie-Curie	fellowships,	and	described	socio-economic	research	on	one	side	as	«the	base	for	
employment-generating	social,	economic	and	cultural	development	and	for	building	a	European	knowledge	
society»,	and	on	the	other	side	as	necessary	to	«support	the	development	of	the	specific	knowledge	base	
needed	by	policy-makers	and	other	users	on	European	science	and	 technology	policy	 issues»	 (EP	&	CEU,	
1998).	
The	Sixth	Framework	Programme	developed	and	expanded	the	same	approach	on	the	inclusion	of	
socio-economic	research,	multiplying	the	funding	lines	(the	share	of	budget	increased	from	approximately	
9%	to	14%	of	the	total	budget74),	and	distinguishing	the	dimensions	of	citizenship	and	society:	two	specific	
thematic	streams	were	established	on	«citizens	and	governance	in	a	knowledge-based	society»	and	«science	
and	society»75	(EP	&	CEU,	2002):	
	(Citizens	 and	 governance	 in	 a	 knowledge-based	 society)	 The	 activities	 carried	 out	 in	 this	 area	 are	
intended	to	mobilise	in	a	coherent	effort,	in	all	their	wealth	and	diversity,	European	research	capacities	
in	economic,	political,	social	sciences	and	humanities	that	are	necessary	to	develop	an	understanding	
of,	and	to	address	issues	related	to,	the	emergence	of	the	knowledge-based	society	and	new	forms	of	
relationships	between	its	citizens,	on	the	one	hand	and	between	its	citizens	and	institutions,	on	the	
other.	
(Science	 and	 society)	 The	 activities	 carried	 out	 under	 this	 heading	 are	 intended	 to	 encourage	 the	
development	of	harmonious	relations	between	science	and	society	and	the	opening-up	of	innovation	
in	Europe,	as	well	as	contributing	to	scientists'	critical	thinking	and	responsiveness	to	societal	concerns,	
as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 establishment	 of	 new	 relations	 and	 an	 informed	 dialogue	 between	 researchers,	
industrialists,	political	decision-makers	and	citizens.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 FP6	 marked	 a	 shift	 towards	 institutionalization:	 it	 was	 the	 first	 Programme	
explicitly	aimed	at	structuring	the	European	Research	Area,	embracing	the	Lisbon	agenda	on	the	knowledge-
based	economy,	and	merging	it	with	the	«European	model	of	society»:		
At	the	European	Council	in	Lisbon	in	March	2000,	the	European	Union	set	itself	the	ambitious	objective	
of	becoming	"the	most	competitive	and	dynamic	knowledge-based	economy	in	the	world,	capable	of	
sustained	economic	growth	providing	more	and	better	jobs	and	greater	social	cohesion".	(…)	
Europe's	transition	towards	a	knowledge-based	economy	and	society,	and	its	sustainable	development	
in	the	interests	of	the	quality	of	life	of	all	citizens	will	be	all	the	easier	if	it	takes	place	in	a	way	which	is	
properly	understood	and	managed.	This	requires	a	substantial	research	effort	concerning	the	issues	of	
integrated	and	sustainable	economic	and	social	progress	based	on	the	fundamental	values	of	justice	
and	 solidarity	 and	 cultural	 diversity	 which	 characterise	 the	 European	model	 of	 society,	 as	 well	 as	
																																								 																				
74	cf.	the	breakdown	budgets	of	FP5	and	FP6	in	Fig.	24	and	Fig.	25-Fig.	26,	keeping	into	account	that	in	FP5	the	«Fourth	
activity»	included	both	human	resources	and	socio-economic	research,	and	consequently	 it	 is	necessary	to	compare	the	devoted	
budget	with	 the	 correspondent	 research	 lines	 in	 FP6	 (including	 as	well	 human	 resources,	 which	 in	 FP6	 compare	 as	 a	 separate	
heading).	
75	With	a	limited	share	of	budget:	respectively	1.5%	and	0.5%	of	the	total	(see	Fig.	25	and	Fig.	26);	however,	unlike	for	FP5,	
human	resources	and	knowledge-base	for	the	policies	had	devoted	lines	of	funding	and	were	not	merged	with	these	ones.	
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research	on	issues	relating	to	entrepreneurship	and	the	setting	up,	growth	and	development	of	small	
enterprises.	
To	the	«European	model	of	society»,	aimed	at	an	«integrated	and	sustainable	economic	and	social	
progress»,	a	set	of	 fundamental	values	were	ascribed	–	 justice,	solidarity,	cultural	diversity	–	that	usually	
pertain	to	the	socio-democratic	political	space.	In	2004	–	two	years	after	the	launch	of	FP6	–	the	head	of	the	
Commission	 changed	 political	 area,	 and	 the	 centre-left	 president	 Romano	 Prodi	 was	 succeeded	 by	 José	
Barroso	 from	 the	 centre-right	 European	 People’s	 Party,	 who	 would	 have	 remained	 in	 office	 for	 two	
mandates,	until	2014.			
The rise of innovation.	 FP7,	 developed	 from	 2004	 and	 2006	 (Andrée,	 2009),	 after	 the	 political	
turnover,	 and	 launched	 around	 the	mid-term	 review	 of	 the	 Lisbon	 strategy	 (2005),	 went	 further	 in	 the	
strategical	 characterization	 of	 the	 Framework	 Programmes	 as	 key	 instruments	 of	 the	 communitarian	
strategy:	 the	 establishing	 act	 preamble	 was	 re-written	 –	 it	 had	 remained	 very	 similar	 since	 the	 first	
Framework	Programmes	–	and	 the	ERA,	 the	 Lisbon	agenda	and	 the	 triangle	of	 knowledge	were	 inserted	
among	the	reference	strategies	for	the	Programme	(EP	&	CEU,	2006b):	
The	 Community	 has	 the	 objective,	 set	 out	 in	 the	 Treaty,	 of	 strengthening	 the	 scientific	 and	
technological	 bases	 of	 Community	 industry,	 thereby	 ensuring	 a	 high	 level	 of	 competitiveness	 at	
international	level.	(…)	Through	its	support	for	research	at	the	frontiers	of	knowledge,	applied	research	
and	innovation,	the	Community	seeks	to	promote	synergies	in	European	research	and	thus	provide	a	
more	stable	foundation	for	the	European	Research	Area.	This	will	make	a	positive	contribution	to	the	
social,	cultural	and	economic	progress	of	all	Member	States.	
The	central	role	of	research	was	recognised	by	the	Lisbon	European	Council	of	23-	24	March	2000	which	
set	the	European	Union	a	new	strategic	goal	for	the	next	decade:	to	become	the	most	competitive	and	
dynamic	knowledge-based	economy	in	the	world,	capable	of	sustainable	economic	growth	with	more	
and	better	 jobs	and	greater	 social	 cohesion.	The	 triangle	of	 knowledge	—	education,	 research	and	
innovation	—	is	essential	for	achieving	this	goal,	to	which	effect	the	Community	aims	to	mobilise	and	
strengthen	the	necessary	research	and	innovation	capacities.	
The	 traditional	 rationale	 –	 research	 aimed	 at	 strengthening	 industrial	 competitiveness	 –	 was	
complemented	with	the	Lisbon	and	ERA	objectives;	however,	while	in	FP5	the	two	poles	–	the	problems	of	
society	 and	 the	 industrial	 competitiveness	–	had	been	presented	 side	by	 side,	 in	 FP7	a	 causal	 relation	 is	
established	between	the	second	and	the	 first:	 strengthening	 the	S&T	basis	 for	 industry,	 thus	boosting	 its	
competitiveness,	 is	 supposed	 to	 achieve	 «a	 positive	 contribution	 to	 the	 social,	 cultural	 and	 economic	
progress»	of	the	Union;	furthermore	the	socio-economic	disciplines	saw	a	shrinking	in	budget76.		
																																								 																				
76	Approximately	from	4%	to	2%.	These	figures	refer	to	the	share	of	budgets	devoted	to	socio-economic	research	FP6	and	
FP7,	which	can	be	computed	separately	from	the	funding	for	human	resources,	as	opposed	to	the	case	of	FP5	(see	Note	74).	
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Hence,	while	since	FP5	there	had	been	a	steep	broadening	in	FPs	scope,	especially	in	the	sense	of	
widening	the	political	grounding	of	research	to	the	dimensions	of	quality	of	life	and	citizenship,	with	FP7	a	
new	reordering	of	objectives	was	set	up,	re-establishing	economic	competitiveness	as	the	prevailing	target	
for	the	communitarian	research	policy.	This	tendency	was	parallel	to	the	rise	in	importance	of	the	concept	
of	 innovation,	which	 has	 become	 the	 key	 concept	 of	 the	 current	 Framework	 Programme,	Horizon	 2020,	
defined	 on	 the	 Commission	website	 as	 «the	 financial	 instrument	 implementing	 the	 Innovation	 Union,	 a	
Europe	2020	flagship	initiative	aimed	at	securing	Europe's	global	competitiveness»	(EC,	2014e).	
The	concept	of	 innovation	had	appeared	in	all	the	establishing	acts77,	mainly	with	the	meaning	of	
novelty	or	associated	with	the	capacities	of	small	and	medium	enterprises	(SMEs)	to	give	fresh	inputs	to	the	
European	 industrial	 landscape;	 however,	 it	 began	 being	 framed	 as	 an	 important	 policy	 axis	 in	 the	 Fifth	
Framework	Programme,	where	a	«horizontal	theme»	on	the	«promotion	of	innovation»	was	introduced	(EP	
&	CEU,	1998):	
Innovation	is	a	key	factor	in	industrial	competitiveness,	sustainable	social	and	economic	development	
and	job	creation.	(…)	Promotion	of	innovation	and	SME	participation,	although	not	synonymous,	are	
closely	linked.	(…)	
General	objectives		
(a)	Promotion	of	innovation	
- to	help	implement	innovation	policies	in	the	European	Union,	in	particular	by	contributing	to	the	
creation	of	an	environment	conducive	to	innovation,	
- to	enhance	public	awareness	of	the	benefits	of	innovation,	
- to	 improve	 the	 economic	 and	 social	 impact	 of	 framework	 programme	 research	 activities	 by	
ensuring	 better	 dissemination	 and	 exploitation	 of	 their	 results,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 transfer	 and	
dissemination	of	technology	from	various	sources,	taking	account	of	the	needs	of	customers	and	
users,	
- to	 facilitate	 access	 of	 programme	 participants	 (particularly	 SMEs),	 through	 provision	 of	
information	and	advice,	to	instruments	which	support	innovation.	
The	 vision	 of	 innovation	 was	 framed	 in	 a	 systemic	 perspective,	 highlighting	 the	 dimensions	
connected	to	the	creation	of	an	innovative	«environment»,	the	involvement	of	actors	(SMEs,	the	public)	and	
the	networking	and	dissemination	activities.	
In	FP5	and	FP6	the	term	innovation	began	appearing	more	frequently,	often	coupled	with	«research»	
in	 the	 compact	 expression	 «research	 and	 innovation»	 (R&I),	which	 gradually	 became	 customary,	 also	 in	
common	language,	in	place	of	«research	and	development	(R&D)».	In	FP6	«innovation»	was	added	to	the	
																																								 																				
77	Excepted	the	First,	but	as	mentioned	FP1	was	relevant	mainly	as	a	political	pilot	enterprise.	
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title	of	the	establishing	act78	and	it	was	declared	as	«one	of	the	most	important	elements	throughout	this	
programme»	(EP	&	CEU,	2002).	In	2007	a	separate	programme	expressly	focused	on	innovation	was	founded:	
the	Competitiveness	and	Innovation	Framework	Programme	(CIP),	running	in	parallel	to	FP7	and	devoted	to	
support	SMEs	with	the	«access	to	finance»,	«business	support»	and	«a	better	take-up	and	use	of	information	
and	communication	technologies	(ICT)»	(EC,	2014a).	
However,	Horizon	2020	represented	the	real	leap	towards	innovation	–	as	shown	by	the	steep	rise	in	
the	 occurrences	 of	 the	 words	 with	 the	 root	 “innovat”	 in	 the	 establishing	 act	 (see	 Fig.	 30).	 H2020	 was	
conceived	as	a	break	from	the	past	(EC,	2011a),	oriented	to	the	building	of	an	Union	based	on	innovation:	
the	objectives	laid	down	in	the	foreword	of	the	document	as	usually	reprise	the	elements	of	the	previous	
Programmes	–	ERA,	knowledge	society,	industrial	competitiveness	–,	but	the	focus	on	innovation	is	evident,	
and	 innovation	 comes	 first	 in	 the	 list	 of	 policies	 useful	 to	 Union	 industry,	 followed	 by	 research	 and	
technological	development	(EP	&	CEU,	2013):			
It	is	the	Union's	objective	to	strengthen	its	scientific	and	technological	bases	by	achieving	a	European	
Research	Area	("ERA")	in	which	researchers,	scientific	knowledge	and	technology	circulate	freely,	and	
by	encouraging	the	Union	to	advance	towards	a	knowledge	society	and	to	become	a	more	competitive	
and	sustainable	economy	in	respect	of	its	industry.	(…)	
It	is	also	the	Union's	objective	to	ensure	that	the	conditions	necessary	for	the	competitiveness	of	Union	
industry	exist.	For	this	purpose,	action	should	be	aimed	at	fostering	better	exploitation	of	the	industrial	
potential	of	policies	of	innovation,	research	and	technological	development.	(…)	
The	political	positioning	in	the	new,	post-Lisbon,	strategy	Europe	2020	–	aimed	at	setting	the	vision	
for	 «Europe’s	 social	 market	 economy	 for	 the	 21st	 century»	 (EC,	 2010a)	 –	 influenced	 the	 conceptual	
framework	of	research:		
The	Union	 is	 committed	 to	 achieving	 the	 Europe	 2020	 strategy	which	 set	 the	 objectives	 of	 smart,	
sustainable	and	 inclusive	growth,	highlighting	 the	 role	of	 research	and	 innovation	as	key	drivers	of	
social	and	economic	prosperity	and	of	environmental	sustainability	(…)	
On	one	hand,	in	fact,	the	social	dimension	of	research	policies	is	re-affirmed	stronger	than	in	FP7,	
where	 it	 experienced	 a	 drop79;	 on	 the	 other,	 the	 overall	 rhetoric,	 when	 compared	 to	 the	 previous	
Programmes,	is	noticeably	bent	towards	a	market-oriented	approach,	with	a	recurrent	encouragement	to	a	
research	closer	to	commercial	exploitation:	
Horizon	2020	focuses	on	three	priorities	(…)	in	order	to	respond	directly	to	the	challenges	identified	in	
the	 Europe	 2020	 strategy	 by	 supporting	 activities	 covering	 the	 entire	 spectrum	 from	 research	 to	
																																								 																				
78	 «Decision	 No	 1513/2002/EC	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 27	 June	 2002	 concerning	 the	 sixth	
framework	 programme	 of	 the	 European	 Community	 for	 research,	 technological	 development	 and	 demonstration	 activities,	
contributing	to	the	creation	of	the	European	Research	Area	and	to	innovation	(2002	to	2006)».	
79	See	the	relative	increase	in	the	occurrences	of	the	socio-democratic	family	of	words	in	Fig.	31.	
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market.	Horizon	2020	should	support	all	stages	in	the	research	and	innovation	chain,	including	non-
technological	and	social	innovation	and	activities	that	are	closer	to	the	market,	with	innovation	and	
research	actions	having	a	different	funding	rate	based	on	the	principle	that	the	closer	to	the	market	
the	 supported	activity	 is,	 the	 larger	 the	additional	 funding	 from	other	 sources	 should	be.	Activities	
closer	to	the	market	include	innovative	financial	instruments,	and	they	aim	to	satisfy	the	needs	of	a	
broad	 spectrum	 of	 Union	 policies	 by	 placing	 emphasis	 on	 the	 widest	 possible	 use	 of	 knowledge	
generated	by	the	supported	activities	up	to	the	commercial	exploitation	of	that	knowledge.	
Three decades of evolution.	The	contents	and	rhetoric	of	the	Framework	Programmes	establishing	
acts	 are	 good	mirrors	 of	 the	 last	 three	 decades	 of	 evolution	 in	 the	 EU	policy	 on	 research,	 and	 of	major	
background	European	changes.	The	changes	in	the	FPs	focuses	and	themes,	as	we	have	seen,	rarely	implied	
the	exclusion	of	older	topics,	and	the	Programmes	grew	in	scope	and	scale,	adding	new	matters,	since	their	
inception;	however,	the	shifts	in	principles,	objectives,	and	supporting	argumentations	show	the	evolution	
of	 the	 overall	 conceptualization	 of	 European	 science	 policies	 and	 involve	 notable	 changes	 in	 the	
understanding	of	the	issues	at	stake	and	of	the	instruments	of	research.	
If	 the	 first	 Programmes,	 developed	 before	Maastricht	 and	 in	 the	 frame	 of	 the	 common	market	
strategy,	were	mainly	aimed	at	strengthening	the	S&T	basis	for	the	European	industry,	in	order	to	boost	its	
competitiveness,	 from	 the	 1992	 signature	 of	 the	 Treaty	 on,	with	 the	 inclusion	 of	 new	 areas	 among	 the	
European	 policies,	 the	 Programmes	 physiognomy	 changed	 considerably,	 particularly	 for	 the	 inclusion	 of	
social	and	political	objectives	–	quality	of	life,	health,	environment,	citizenship.	At	the	turn	of	the	Millennium	
a	big	effort	was	spent	in	the	development	of	policies	supporting	the	European	knowledge	society,	but	the	
Lisbon	strategy	slow	progress	opened	to	a	shift	towards	the	concept	of	innovation	as	the	driving	force	of	the	
research	system.	
Analysing	the	occurrences	of	key	words	in	the	Framework	Programmes	establishing	acts80	(Fig.	31),	
the	immediately	visible	feature	is	the	steep	rise	of	the	terms	related	to	“market”,	led	by	the	explosion	of	the	
concept	of	innovation	in	Horizon	2020	(from	0,22%	in	FP7	to	1,20%	in	H2020,	relatively	to	the	total	document	
words	number).	It	is	also	possible	to	verify	the	gradual	increase	in	the	terms	related	to	the	“socio-democratic	
area”,	which	started	in	the	years	of	Maastricht	and	peaked	in	FP6,	with	a	sudden	drop	in	FP7	and	a	new	rise	
in	Horizon	2020.	The	terms	related	to	“industry”,	conversely,	seem	to	counter-balance	the	increases	in	the	
“socio-democratic”	area	–	the	first	group	shows	a	reduction	in	coincidence	with	the	Programmes	where	the	
second	group	of	 terms	was	more	present	–	suggesting	an	anti-correlation	of	 the	 two	perspectives.	 If	 the	
																																								 																				
80	 The	 Framework	 Programmes	 establishing	 acts	 have	 been	 analysed	 with	 the	 web-based	 text	 reading	 and	 analysis	
environment	 Voyant	 (Sinclair,	 Stéfan	 and	 Geoffrey	 Rockwell,	 2016.	 Voyant	 Tools.	 Web.	 http://voyant-tools.org/),	 and	 further	
elaborated	by	the	author.	More	details	in	section	The	Framework	Programmes	and	the	ERC	establishing	acts.	
The	 terms	 considered	 are:	 for	 the	 “market”	 family:	 market*,	 business*,	 commerc*,	 econom*,	 financ*,	 competitiv*,	
growth*,	 innovat*,	 entrepreneur*,	 capital;	 for	 the	 “socio-democratic”	 family:	 social*,	 socio*,	 responsibl*,	 participat*,	 citizen*,	
governance,	right*,	value*,	equity,	societ*;	for	the	“pure-science”	family:	frontier*,	excellen*,	peer*,	science	base,	basic	research;	
for	the	“industry”	family:	industr*,	manufacturing.	The	symbol	*	at	the	end	of	the	words	denotes	that	all	the	possible	word	endings	
are	taken	into	account.	
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conceptual	 frameworks	 focusing	 on	 industrial	 competitiveness	 and	 on	 economic	 growth	 are	 clearly	
contiguous,	 in	 the	 European	 research	 policy	 the	 first	 represented	 more	 clearly	 the	 key	 orientation	 of	
Programmes	in	the	pre-Maastricht	period,	while	from	the	Lisbon	strategy	onwards	the	anchor	concept	was	
the	 economic	 and	 financial	wealth	 of	 the	 European	market,	 and	 the	 attention	was	 shifted	 from	 the	 big	
industries	to	the	small	and	medium	enterprises	and	to	a	better	integration	of	all	the	other	economic	actors	
in	the	European	“system	of	innovation”.	Although	the	themes	and	structures	of	Horizon	2020	are	complex	
and	diversified,	and	include	different	conceptual	components,	the	overarching	orientation	of	the	research	
Programme	is	firmly	innovation,	with	a	particular	emphasis	on	the	exploitability	of	ideas	in	the	market.	
Finally,	 “pure-science”	 is	 a	 relatively	 new	 entry	 in	 the	 Framework	 Programmes	 and,	 although	
gradually	increasing	(the	budget	share	devoted	to	ERC	in	Horizon	2020	is	the	17%	of	the	total,	see	Table	20),	
particularly	through	the	growth	in	relevance	of	the	target	of	«excellence»	in	research	–	i.e.	the	funding	of	
projects	without	any	other	criteria	than	scientific	relevance	–,	from	the	establishing	acts	it	is	possible	to	verify	
that	 the	 “pure-science”	 perspective	 is	 still	 not	 completely	 integrated	 in	 the	 Programmes	 conceptual	
foundation,	 that	 was	 oriented	 for	 most	 of	 its	 history	 towards	 applied	 research	 and	 technological	
development	and	still	pursues	prevailingly	that	objective.	
From Knowledge society to Innovation Union: a paradigm-shift 
As	mentioned,	a	fundamental	nexus	point	in	the	EU	contemporary	research	policy	was	the	focus	on	
knowledge-based	development	 in	 the	early	2000	and	 the	 following	shift	 towards	 the	current	 innovation-
based	framework.	These	two	conceptualizations	have	been	so	important	to	filter	in	the	common	reference	
ideas	and	 language	of	 the	people	 involved	with	European	research	 (or	education)	also	at	 the	 lower	 local	
levels,	configuring	them	as	real	policy	paradigms,	able	to	shape	the	world-view	of	the	people	concerned	with	
them.		
The origins of the conceptual frameworks.	The	two	theories	diffused	in	the	political	arena	in	the	
same	years,	the	beginning	of	the	‘90s;	they	are	somehow	connected,	sharing	a	re-thinking	of	the	interplay	of	
knowledge,	 society	 and	economic	 life,	 but	 show	 important	differences,	 able	 to	 influence	 relevantly	 their	
outputs,	especially	when	adopted	to	frame	public	decisions.		
The	economists’	reconsideration	of	the	idea	of	innovation	came,	at	the	end	of	the	‘80s,	to	a	systemic	
conceptualization:	 systems	 of	 innovation	 involved	 knowledge-producing	 institutions	 like	 universities	 and	
laboratories	in	crucial	positions,	together	with	governments	and	industries,	and	the	wealth	of	the	systems	
was	 ascribed	 to	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 actors’	 interplay,	 rather	 than	 to	 the	 individual	 performances	
(Metcalfe,	1995;	OECD,	1997b):	
(National	 Innovation	 Systems	 are)	 that	 set	 of	 distinct	 institutions	 which	 jointly	 and	 individually	
contribute	to	the	development	and	diffusion	of	new	technologies	and	which	provides	the	framework	
within	which	governments	form	and	implement	policies	to	influence	the	innovation	process.	As	such	it	
93	
is	 a	 system	 of	 interconnected	 institutions	 to	 create,	 store	 and	 transfer	 the	 knowledge,	 skills	 and	
artefacts	which	define	new	technologies.	
	On	the	other	side,	the	sociological	studies	of	science	had	showed	the	essential	rooting	of	scientific	
knowledge	production	processes	in	the	social	and	institutional	context,	and	reflections	on	the	same	nature	
of	knowledge	were	developed,	with	the	common	denominator	of	establishing	knowledge	production	deeply	
in	the	dynamic	interaction	among	institutions	and	societal	actors	(Cerroni	&	Simonella,	2014).	New	models	
of	 science	 policies	 (triple	 helix,	 third	mission	 of	 the	 Universities)	 were	 developed	 according	 to	 this	 new	
perspective81.	
If	 the	main	 idea	of	both	approaches	was	 the	need	not	 to	consider	knowledge	 in	 the	void,	but	 to	
position	knowledge	production	robustly	in	the	societal	context,	the	developments	were	different.	On	one	
side,	 economic	 analyses	 argued	 for	more	 embeddedness	 in	 the	market,	while	 on	 the	other	 socio-critical	
reflections	insisted	for	a	better	integration	of	science	in	society,	mainly	in	relation	with	the	enhancement	of	
the	citizens’	democratic	participation	to	the	definition	of	policies.	The	European	frame	of	science	policy	was	
influenced	by	both	the	approaches,	although	to	a	different	extent.	
As	an	additional	factor,	the	‘90s	saw	the	emergence	of	information	and	communication	technologies	
as	key	new	dimensions	of	social	and	economic	life,	changing	the	labour	market,	leading	to	the	creation	of	
new	 professional	 roles	 based	 on	 knowledge	 and	 shedding	 light	 on	 the	 identification	 of	 knowledge	 as	 a	
relevant	form	of	capital.	The	traditional	apprehension	for	a	European	economy	lagging	behind	in	the	growing	
international	competition	grew,	and	the	theories	on	systemic	innovation	opened	for	new	understanding	of	
the	low	European	performance	(Godin,	2002).	The	utilisation	of	traditional	forms	of	capital	like	labour	and	
land	were	no	more	seen	as	convenient	against	the	disproportion	with	the	developed	and	rising	countries,	
hence	analysts	and	politicians	identified	in	the	exploitation	of	knowledge	one	of	the	possible	exit	strategies	
(Moore,	Kleinman,	Hess,	&	Frickel,	2011;	e.g.	CEC,	1993).		
The European uptake.	 These	 developments	 were	 taking	 place	 in	 the	 busy	 European	 political	
scenario	of	the	beginning	of	the	‘90s	–	the	fall	of	the	Berlin	Wall	in	1989	and	the	Maastricht	Treaty	in	1993	
–,	sparking	a	rethinking	of	the	boundaries	and	identity	of	the	Community.	
The	1993	White	Paper	on	Growth,	Competitiveness	and	Employment	(CEC,	1993b)	showed	to	uptake	
the	 ongoing	 debate	 about	 the	 contribution	 of	 science	 and	 technology	 to	 growth,	 identifying	 in	 new	
technologies	 and	 S&T	 development	 the	 possible	 solutions	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 European	 competitiveness,	 and	
setting	the	base	for	subsequent	policies.	The	White	Paper	was	developed	on	an	initiative	of	the	Commission	
President	Delors,	at	his	third	mandate,	in	the	scenario	of	a	rising	disappointment	by	the	member	states	for	
the	 growing	 unemployment82,	 despite	 the	 political	 success	 of	 Maastricht	 and	 the	 future	 enlargement	
perspective.	 The	 White	 Paper	 acknowledged	 the	 lack	 of	 competitiveness	 as	 the	 main	 reason	 for	
																																								 																				
81	See	the	introductory	section	The	evolving	nature	of	science.	
82	The	document	opens	with	the	sentence	«Why	this	White	Paper?	The	one	and	only	reason	is	unemployment».	
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unemployment,	and	nearly	a	decade	before	the	launch	of	the	Lisbon	Strategy,	identified	the	target	of	3%	
GDP	for	research	funding,	advocating	the	need	to	exploit	«the	competitive	advantages	associated	with	the	
gradual	shift	to	a	knowledge-based	economy»	(CEC,	1993b):	
The	 wealth	 of	 nations	 is	 increasingly	 based	 on	 the	 creation	 and	 exploitation	 of	 knowledge.	 (…) 
The	key	elements	in	competitiveness	that	are	now	of	greatest	importance	are	no	longer	confined	to	
the	relative	level	of	the	direct	costs	of	the	various	factors	of	production.	They	include	in	particular	the	
quality	 of	 education	 and	 training,	 the	 efficiency	 of	 industrial	 organization,	 the	 capacity	 to	 make	
continuous	improvements	in	production	processes,	the	intensity	of	R&D	and	its	industrial	exploitation,	
the	 fluidity	 of	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 markets	 operate	 the	 availability	 of	 competitive	 service	
infrastructures,	 product	 quality	 and	 the	 way	 in	 which	 corporate	 strategies	 take	 account	 of	 the	
consequences	of	changes	in	society,	such	as	improved	environmental	protection.		
The	White	Paper	also	analysed	the	role	of	education	and	training	in	«a	society	based	far	more	on	the	
production,	transfer	and	sharing	of	knowledge	than	on	trade	in	goods»:		
There	can	be	no	doubt	that	education	and	training,	in	addition	to	their	fundamental	task	of	promoting	
the	development	of	the	individual	and	the	values	of	citizenship,	have	a	key	role	to	play	in	stimulating	
growth	and	restoring	competitiveness	and	a	socially	acceptable	level	of	employment	in	the	Community.	
However,	it	is	essential	to	grasp	the	nature,	extent	and	limits	of	this	role.	Given	the	economic	and	social	
problems	they	are	facing	today,	which	are	cyclical	in	certain	cases	and	essentially	and	more	profoundly	
structural	in	others,	our	societies	are	making	many	pressing	and	sometimes	contradictory	demands	on	
education	 and	 training	 systems.	 Education	 and	 training	 are	 expected	 to	 solve	 the	 problems	 of	 the	
competitiveness	 of	 businesses,	 the	 employment	 crisis	 and	 the	 tragedy	 of	 social	 exclusion	 and	
marginality	–	in	a	word,	they	are	expected	to	help	society	to	overcome	its	present	difficulties	and	to	
control	the	profound	changes	which	it	is	currently	undergoing.		
Notwithstanding	the	focus	on	economic	growth	through	the	increase	in	competitiveness,	the	White	
Paper	insisted	frequently	on	the	need	of	pairing	growth	with	solidarity	in	order	to	mitigate	the	failures	of	the	
market,	and	Delors	acknowledged	in	his	preamble	a	possible	tension	between	the	«ideals»	of	Europe	and	
the	«requirements	of	economy»:	
we	are	faced	with	the	immense	responsibility,	while	remaining	faithful	to	the	ideals	which	have	come	
to	characterize	and	represent	Europe,	of	finding	a	new	synthesis	of	the	aims	pursued	by	society	(work	
as	 a	 factor	 of	 social	 integration,	 equality	 of	 opportunity)	 and	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 economy	
(competitiveness	and	job	creation).	(…)	
These	options	 show	how	 the	dynamism	of	 the	market	 can	help	 boost	 growth.	 Experience	has	also	
shown,	however,	that	the	market	is	not	without	its	failings.	It	tends	to	underestimate	what	is	at	stake	
in	the	long	term,	the	speed	of	the	changes	it	creates	affects	the	different	social	categories	unequally,	
and	it	spontaneously	promotes	concentration,	thereby	creating	inequality	between	the	regions	and	the	
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towns.	 Awareness	 of	 these	 insufficiencies	 has	 led	 our	 countries	 to	 develop	 collective	 solidarity	
mechanisms.	
The	 1995	Green	 Paper	 on	 Innovation	 (CEC,	 1995),	 basing	 on	 the	 1993	White	 Paper,	 emphasized	
especially	the	link	between	competitiveness,	employment	and	innovation:	
(…the)	 firms’	 capacity	 for	 innovation,	 and	 support	 for	 it	 from	 the	 authorities,	 were	 essential	 for	
maintaining	and	strengthening	this	competitiveness	and	employment.	This	Green	Paper	makes	use	of,	
adds	 to	 and	 extends	 that	 work83	 with	 a	 view	 to	 arriving	 at	 a	 genuine	 European	 strategy	 for	 the	
promotion	of	innovation.	(…)	
The	Green	Paper	on	innovation	is	considered	the	turning	point	in	EU	policy	towards	the	new	paradigm	
centred	around	innovation,	conceived	as	a	system:	
There	is	no	hermetic	seal	between	the	innovative	firm	and	its	environment,	by	which	it	is	influenced	
and	which	it	helps	to	transform.	It	is	the	sum	total	of	firms	in	an	industry,	the	fabric	of	economic	and	
social	activities	in	a	region,	or	even	in	society	as	a	whole,	which	makes	up	the	“innovation	systems”,	
whose	dynamics	are	a	complex	matter.		
When	dealing	with	a	definition	of	 the	term,	 the	document	distinguishes	between	 innovation	as	a	
process	or	as	a	product,	and	highlights	the	adoption	of	the	wider	meaning	of	the	concept:	
The	term	"innovation”	is	somewhat	ambiguous:	in	common	parlance	it	denotes	both	a	process	and	its	
result.	 According	 to	 the	 definition	 proposed	 by	 the	 OECD	 in	 its	 “Frascati	 Manual”,	 it	 involves	 the	
transformation	of	an	idea	into	a	marketable	product	or	service,	a	new	or	improved	manufacturing	or	
distribution	process,	or	a	new	method	of	social	service.	The	term	thus	refers	to	the	process.	On	the	
other	hand,	when	the	word	“innovation”	is	used	to	refer	to	the	new	or	improved	product,	equipment	
or	service	which	is	successful	on	the	market,	the	emphasis	is	on	the	result	of	the	process.		
The	new	EU	political	agenda	was	explained	in	the	First	Action	Plan	for	Innovation	in	Europe,	published	
in	1997	(CEC,	1997b)	as	a	follow-up	of	the	Green	Paper	and	centred	around	three	main	drivers:	«fostering	a	
genuine	 innovation	 culture»,	 «setting	 up	 a	 legal,	 regulatory	 and	 financial	 framework	 conducive	 to	
innovation»	and	«gearing	research	more	closely	to	innovation»:	
In	knowledge-based	economies,	the	efficient	systems	are	those	which	combine	the	ability	to	produce	
knowledge,	 the	 mechanisms	 for	 disseminating	 it	 as	 widely	 as	 possible	 and	 the	 aptitude	 of	 the	
individuals,	 companies	 and	 organizations	 concerned	 to	 absorb	 and	 use	 it.	 The	 crucial	 factor	 for	
innovation	 is	 thus	 the	 link	 between	 research	 (the	 production	 of	 knowledge),	 training,	 mobility,	
interaction	(the	dissemination	of	knowledge)	and	the	ability	of	firms,	particularly	SMEs,	to	absorb	new	
technologies	and	know-how. 
																																								 																				
83	The	reference	is	to	the	aforementioned	White	Paper	on	Growth,	Competitiveness	and	Employment,	and	to	the	1994	
communication	on	“An	Industrial	Competitiveness	Policy	for	the	European	Union”	(Kok	et	al.,	2004).	
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Although	described	system-wise,	listing	all	the	actors	of	the	knowledge	production	environment,	the	
mechanism	 is	 ultimately	 conceived	 linearly	 in	 a	 three-steps	 schema	 of	 production,	 dissemination	 and	
absorption.	
The	 reference	 institution	 for	 the	 definition	 of	 innovation	 in	 the	Green	 Paper	was	 the	OECD:	 the	
concepts	 of	 “National	 Systems	 of	 Innovation”	 and	 of	 “knowledge-based	 economy”,	 as	 shown	 by	 Godin	
(Godin,	 2006a),	 were	 particularly	 present	 in	 political	 discourses	 in	 the	 1990s	 under	 the	 input	 of	 the	
Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development,	which	had	always	been	concerned	with	scientific	
and	technological	policies,	and	in	the	late	‘80s	and	beginning	of	the	‘90s	it	was	particularly	promoting	the	
two	concepts,	also	with	the	appointment	of	the	most	relevant	scholars	on	the	issues	(B.-A.	Lundvall	worked	
as	Deputy	Director	of	the	Directorate	of	Science,	Technology	and	Innovation	at	OECD	from	1992	to	1995,	D.	
Foray	was	consulting	for	OECD	from	1994	to	1996).	The	OECD	long-standing	series	of	publications	on	the	
methodology	and	indicators	for	R&D,	the	Frascati	Manual	(Godin,	2006a;	Sharif,	2006),	resulted	particularly	
suitable	for	the	benchmarking	of	the	different	nations’	innovation	systems,	and	in	1992	also	the	first	edition	
of	 the	 Oslo	 Manual	 on	 the	 measurement	 of	 technological	 innovation	 (OECD,	 1992)	 was	 issued.	 OECD	
continued	developing	the	concepts	with	several	contributions	published	from	1995	to	the	end	of	the	decade	
(OECD,	1995,	1996a,	1996b,	1997a,	1999,	2000)	in	a	form	that	was	particularly	suitable	for	policy	makers’	
needs	(Godin,	2006a).	
The Lisbon strategy.	 The	 European	 Community	 embraced	 the	 scholarly	 developments	 on	
knowledge	economy	and	innovation:	the	end	of	the	‘90s	saw	the	development	of	the	new	master	strategy	
for	growth,	the	Lisbon	strategy,	precisely	based	on	knowledge	production	and	exploitation.		
Agenda	2000,	the	communitarian	action	programme	drafted	in	1997,	stated	the	need	of	«putting	
knowledge	at	the	forefront»,	referring	mainly	to	the	ICT	boom,	and	referencing	the	“knowledge	triangle”		
(CEC,	1997a):	
The	key	feature	of	today's	world	economy	is	a	rapid	shift	towards	globalisation	and	information	and	
communication	technologies.	These	technologies	determine	the	global	competitiveness	of	all	economic	
sectors	and	foster	the	emergence	of	new	immaterial	goods.	
In	order	 to	derive	 the	maximum	benefit	 from	this	process	 in	 terms	of	growth,	 competitiveness	and	
employment,	 special	 attention	 must	 be	 paid	 to	 the	 development,	 dissemination	 and	 use	 of	 these	
immaterial	goods.	Knowledge	policies	-	research,	innovation,	education	and	training	-	are	therefore	of	
decisive	importance	for	the	future	of	the	Union.	
In	response	to	the	challenges	of	 technological	development	and	 innovation	coming	at	a	time	when	
Europe's	competitors	are	stepping	up	their	efforts	significantly,	it	is	vital	that	the	Community	research	
and	technological	development	effort	be	given	new	impetus.		
The	 two	 key	 sectors	 for	 knowledge	 production	 and	 circulation	 –	 education	 and	 research	 –	were	
separately	 object	 of	 European-scale	 projects:	 in	 1999,	 the	Bologna	 accords	 asked	 for	 a	 rethinking	of	 the	
national	 higher	 education	 systems,	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 ensuring	 their	 compatibility,	 and	 in	 early	 2000	 the	
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Commission	launched	the	“European	Research	Area”	(ERA),	an	initiative	intended	to	reduce	fragmentation	
of	 European	 R&D,	 boosting	 the	 free	 circulation	 of	 researchers	 and	 promoting	 more	 effective	 funding	
distribution	and	infrastructures	use.		
The	Lisbon	strategy,	launched	at	the	European	Council	in	March	2000,	merged	these	initiatives	in	the	
knowledge	 sectors	 with	 the	 economic	 targets	 of	 competitiveness	 and	 innovation	 and	 the	 goal	 of	
«modernising	the	European	social	model»	(Council,	2000):	
The	Union	has	today	set	itself	a	new	strategic	goal	for	the	next	decade:	to	become	the	most	competitive	
and	dynamic	knowledge-based	economy	in	the	world	capable	of	sustainable	economic	growth	with	
more	and	better	jobs	and	greater	social	cohesion.	
The	 strategy,	 developed	 in	 a	 period	 perceived	 as	 the	 «best	 macro-economic	 outlook	 for	 a	
generation»,	included	macro-economic	policy	measures	aimed	at	sustaining	the	«healthy	economic	outlook	
and	favourable	growth	prospects»,	and	was	oriented	to:		
• preparing	the	transition	to	a	knowledge-based	economy	and	society	by	better	policies	for	the	
information	society	and	R&D,	as	well	as	by	stepping	up	the	process	of	structural	reform	for	
competitiveness	and	innovation	and	by	completing	the	internal	market;		
• modernising	the	European	social	model,	investing	in	people	and	combating	social	exclusion;		
The	Lisbon	plan,	hence,	was	on	one	hand	oriented	to	economic	policies,	with	a	particular	emphasis	
on	the	development	of	ICTs	and	research,	and	on	the	other	it	promoted	the	building	of	an	active	welfare	
state,	in	order	to	ensure	that	«the	emergence	of	this	new	economy	does	not	compound	the	existing	social	
problems	of	unemployment,	social	exclusion	and	poverty».	
Indeed,	the	turn	of	the	Millennium	was	an	especially	favourable	period	for	the	development	of	new	
political	 frameworks:	 debates	 were	 open	 on	 the	 understanding	 of	 knowledge	 policies	 and	 different	
perspectives	were	confronting,	even	co-existing	in	the	same	institutions.	
In	the	education	policy	domain	–	 in	the	EU	organization	separate	directorates	govern	education84	
and	research,	with	different	habits	and	policy	frames	(Elken,	Gornitzka,	Maassen,	&	Vukasovic,	2011)	–	the	
“Europe	 of	 Knowledge”	was	 portrayed	 as	 a	 process	 linked	 to	 the	 economic	 and	 social	 dimensions	 (CEC,	
1997c;	Chou	&	Gornitzka,	2014):		
Economic	 competitiveness,	 employment	 and	 the	 personal	 fulfilment	 of	 the	 citizens	 of	 Europe	 is	 no	
longer	mainly	 based	 on	 the	 production	 of	 physical	 goods,	 nor	will	 it	 be	 in	 the	 future.	 Real	wealth	
creation	will	henceforth	be	linked	to	the	production	and	dissemination	of	knowledge	and	will	depend	
first	and	foremost	on	our	efforts	in	the	field	of	research,	education	and	training	and	on	our	capacity	to	
promote	innovation.	This	is	why	we	must	fashion	a	veritable	‘Europe	of	knowledge’.		
																																								 																				
84	 The	Directorate	 in	 charge	of	 education	 is	 the	DG	 “Education	 and	Culture”,	 and	 the	Commissioner	 portfolio	 has	 had	
different	denominations:	the	current	commissioner	is	responsible	for	“Education,	Culture,	Youth	and	Sport”.	
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Knowledge	policies	were	planned	to	become	«one	of	the	fundamental	pillars	of	the	Union’s	internal	
policies»,	through	the	creation	of	an	open	educational	area	linked	to	the	«enhancement	of	citizenship»	and	
the	development	of	«employability	through	the	acquisition	of	competencies»	(CEC,	1997c):	
This	educational	area	will	 facilitate	an	enhancement	of	 citizenship	 through	 the	sharing	of	common	
values,	and	the	development	of	a	sense	of	belonging	to	a	common	social	and	cultural	area.	It	must	
encourage	a	broader-based	understanding	of	citizenship,	founded	on	active	solidarity	and	on	mutual	
understanding	of	the	cultural	diversities	that	constitute	Europe's	originality	and	richness.	
The	Europe	of	knowledge	was	seen	as	characterized	by	«intellectual,	cultural,	social	and	technical	
dimensions»	(Sorbonne	Joint	Declaration,	1998):	
The	European	process	has	very	recently	moved	some	extremely	 important	steps	ahead.	Relevant	as	
they	are,	they	should	not	make	one	forget	that	Europe	is	not	only	that	of	the	Euro,	of	the	banks	and	
the	 economy:	 it	must	 be	 a	 Europe	 of	 knowledge	 as	well.	We	must	 strengthen	 and	 build	 upon	 the	
intellectual,	cultural,	social	and	technical	dimensions	of	our	continent.	
On	 the	 research	 side	 of	 the	 European	 knowledge	 policies,	 the	 Fifth	 Framework	 Programme	was	
designed,	 as	we	 have	 seen	 above,	 against	 the	 background	 of	 reflections	 on	 the	 new	 role	 of	 research	 in	
society,	centred	on	pursuing	«the	marriage	of	society	and	innovation»	(Caracostas	&	Muldur,	1998,	p.	21).		
The	 study	 Society,	 the	 endless	 frontier,	 produced	 by	 the	 Commission	 Directorate	 for	 Strategy	 and	
Coordination,	analysed	in	detail	the	developments	in	science	policy	theories,	and	put	forward	the	need	to	
shift	to	a	new	model,	where	research	is	geared	towards	social	objectives	by	means	of	innovation.	Given	the	
European	«failure	to	exploit	its	investment»	in	research,	the	changing	nature	of	the	scientific	endeavour	–	
especially	 with	 regards	 with	 the	 soaring	 cost	 of	 research	 –	 and	 the	 fast	 obsolescence	 of	 products	 and	
knowledge	 in	 the	 globalised	 competition	 context,	 it	 proposes	 to	 build	 on	 the	 new	 understanding	 of	
innovation	as	a	system,	coupled	with	the	«new	theories	of	the	“learning	economy”,	endogenous	growth	and	
the	social	shaping	of	technology»	to	redirect	science	polices	towards	a	policy	of	«public	support	for	users	
with	an	eye	to	new	markets»,	i.e.	(Caracostas	&	Muldur,	1998):	
(…)	towards	the	 intensification	of	measures	to	disseminate	knowledge	by	encouraging	co-operative	
networks,	towards	policies	of	“lifelong	training”	and	support	for	organisational	innovation,	needed	to	
help	Europe	cope	with	and	benefit	from	technological	change.	
Even	though	referring	to	the	«society	of	knowledge»	 in	the	Commissioner	Cresson’s	preface,	and	
describing	 the	 OECD	 approach	 to	 the	 «knowledge-based	 economy»	 and	 the	 various	 dimensions	 of	
knowledge,	 the	 study	 preferably	 refers	 to	 the	 «learning	 economy»,	 as	 the	 theoretical	 basis	 for	 the	
valorisation	of	knowledge	in	the	economic	process:	
(…)	continuous	 innovation	 is	now	a	prerequisite	of	 survival	 for	companies	which	 implies	 interactive	
learning	at	every	level	both	inside	and	outside	the	firm.	
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The	role	of	public	policies	in	this	context,	they	conclude,	is	«to	foster	interaction	between	players	in	
the	collective	learning	process».		
Following	documents	were	written	in	the	same	spirit:	in	2000,	the	programmatic	document	on	the	
construction	of	the	ERA,	Towards	a	European	research	area	(CEC,	2000),	although	positioning	research	in	the	
wider	social	realm	and	underlining	its	importance	for	the	overall	European	development,	referred	to	research	
as	«one	of	the	principal	driving	forces	of	economic	growth,	competitiveness	and	employment»	(CEC,	2000;	
Chou	&	Gornitzka,	2014):	
In	 the	 final	 years	 of	 the	XXth	 century	we	entered	a	 knowledge-based	 society.	 Economic	and	 social	
development	will	depend	essentially	on	knowledge	in	its	different	forms,	on	the	production,	acquisition	
and	use	of	knowledge.	
Scientific	research	and	technological	development	more	particularly	are	at	the	heart	of	what	makes	
society	 tick.	 More	 and	 more,	 activities	 undertaken	 in	 this	 domain	 are	 for	 the	 express	 purpose	 of	
meeting	a	social	demand	and	satisfying	social	needs,	especially	 in	connection	with	the	evolution	of	
work	and	the	emergence	of	new	ways	of	life	and	activities.	
By	creating	new	products,	processes	and	markets	research	and	technology	provide	one	of	the	principal	
driving	 forces	 of	 economic	 growth,	 competitiveness	 and	 employment.	 They	 are	 the	 best	 way	 of	
modernising	European	companies,	which	Europe	must	do	to	improve	its	competitive	position.	In	overall	
terms,	both	directly	and	indirectly,	they	help	to	maintain	and	develop	employment.		
From knowledge to innovation.	The	dynamic	 interplay	between	knowledge-	and	 innovation-based	
discourses	was	 indeed	 evolving	 further	 in	 those	 years.	 The	 periodic	 reviews	 of	 the	 Lisbon	 strategy	were	
particularly	influential	in	this	respect85,	promoting	a	gradual	drop	of	the	knowledge	society	conceptual	frame	
in	favour	of	the	innovation	one:	the	policy	documents	increasingly	underlined	the	role	of	scientific	research	
as	a	support	for	public	policies	and	as	an	instrument	to	increase	competitiveness	and	growth.	
As	soon	as	the	healthy	economic	outlook	mentioned	in	the	Lisbon	strategy	document,	favoured	by	
the	“Internet	bubble”,	 collapsed	 (almost	 in	 the	 same	months	of	 the	 strategy	 launch),	 the	policy	analyses	
acquired	less	optimistic	tones	and	were	characterised	by	an	increasing	feeling	of	urgency.	
The	Sapir	report	(Sapir	et	al.,	2003)	represented	a	first	evaluation	of	the	Lisbon	Strategy,	also	in	view	
of	 the	 forthcoming	wave	 of	 enlargement	 in	 200486;	 it	 was	 carried	 out	 by	 an	 expert	 group	 composed	 of	
academics,	policy	advisers	and	bankers87	and	chaired	by	André	Sapir,	economic	adviser	to	the	Commission	
																																								 																				
85	As	attested	by	EU	Commission’s	science	policy	officers	themselves,	in	the	already	mentioned	2006	book	on	the	design	
and	impacts	of	the	Sixth	Framework	Programme	(Muldur	et	al.,	2006).	
86	 Cyprus,	 the	 Czech	 Republic,	 Estonia,	 Hungary,	 Latvia,	 Lithuania,	 Malta,	 Poland,	 Slovakia	 and	 Slovenia	 accessed	
simultaneously	on	May	1,	2004,	to	which	added	Bulgaria	and	Romania	in	2007.	
87	The	complete	list	of	the	experts’	affiliations,	as	reported	in	the	first	pages	of	the	document,	is:	André	Sapir	(Chairman),	
Université	Libre	de	Bruxelles	and	Group	of	Policy	Advisers,	European	Commission;	Philippe	Aghion,	Harvard	University;	Giuseppe	
Bertola,	Università	di	Torino	and	European	University	Institute;	Martin	Hellwig,	Universität	Mannheim;	Jean	Pisani-Ferry,	Université	
Paris-Dauphine;	Dariusz	Rosati,	Szkola	Glowna	Handlowa	w	Warszawie	and	Narodowy	Bank	Polski;	 José	Viñals,	Banco	de	España;	
Helen	 Wallace,	 Robert	 Schuman	 Centre	 for	 Advanced	 Studies,	 European	 University	 Institute,	 and	 Sussex	 European	 Institute;	
rapporteurs:	Marco	Buti,	Mario	Nava	and	Peter	Smith,	Group	of	Policy	Advisers,	European	Commission.	
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President	Prodi.	The	report	combined	economic	and	political	arguments	to	realize	a	complex	analysis	of	the	
previous	two	decades	of	European	economic	and	political	development.	The	report	judgement	was	neat:	
The	Group	views	Europe’s	unsatisfactory	growth	performance	during	the	last	decades	as	a	symptom	
of	its	failure	to	transform	into	an	innovation-based	economy.	
In	fact,	building	on	the	study	of	the	European	economic	policies	–	remote	and	recent	–	and	reflecting	
on	the	economic	governance	models	and	on	the	background	European	integration	issues,	the	expert	group	
could	conclude	that:	
Contrary	to	the	post-war	period	where	growth	and	catching-up	with	the	US	could	largely	be	achieved	
through	 factor	 accumulation	 and	 imitation,	 once	 European	 countries	 had	 moved	 closer	 to	 the	
technology	frontier	and	also	with	the	occurrence	of	new	technological	revolutions	in	communication	
and	information,	innovation	at	the	frontier	has	become	the	main	engine	of	growth	(…).	
In	the	first	thirty	years	after	World	War	II	(the	«trente	glorieuses»),	the	document	reported,	Europe	
could	establish,	thanks	to	the	rapid	economic	growth,	a	high-level	welfare	state,	that	remained	as	the	trait	
of	the	«European	model»;	the	sustainability	of	such	model	started	to	deteriorate	in	the	70s,	with	the	“oil	
shocks”	 and	 the	 profound	 changes	 due	 to	 the	 demographic	 transformations	 (the	 aging	 population),	 the	
technological	breakthroughs	(the	ICT	revolution)	and	the	rise	of	globalisation:	
By	the	mid-1980s,	Europe	was	stuck	 in	a	negative	spiral:	 lower	GDP	growth	and	employment	rates	
meant	increasing	public	expenditure,	which	required	increasing	public	revenue,	which	in	turn	implied	
higher	social	contributions	(these	increased	by	nearly	five	points	of	GDP	between	1970	and	1985)	and	
higher	direct	taxes	(with	an	increase	of	nearly	three	points	of	GDP	between	1970	and	1985),	thereby	
reducing	 the	 incentive	 to	work	 and	 to	 invest,	 hence	 further	 reducing	 the	 prospects	 for	 output	 and	
employment	growth.		
To	break	 the	«negative	 spiral»,	 in	 the	groups’	opinion,	Europe	had	 to	 focus	on	 innovation	as	 the	
«driver	of	economic	growth».	However,	the	authors’	representation	of	the	strategy,	contrary	to	mainstream	
policy	documents	on	 innovation,	 is	not	messianic:	 the	 innovation	process,	 they	argue,	can	show	negative	
consequences	if	it	is	not	properly	managed	with	appropriate	governance	adaptations:		
Innovation	and	change	will	continue	to	open	the	prospect	of	higher	productivity,	higher	wages	and	
improved	 living	 standards.	But	 they	will	 also	 continue	 to	be	disruptive,	displacing	workers,	making	
some	skills	obsolete	and	possibly	creating	more	pressure	towards	income	inequality.	
In	 the	 same	 year,	 a	 communication	was	 issued	 from	 the	 Commission,	 sanctioning	 the	 transition	
towards	an	innovation-centred	approach	from	the	very	beginning,	in	the	title	–	Innovation	policy:	updating	
the	Union’s	approach	in	the	context	of	the	Lisbon	strategy	(CEC,	2003a):	
With	 three	 years	already	passed	of	 the	 ten	 set	 by	 the	 Lisbon	 timetable,	 the	Union	must	 review	 its	
attitudes	and	approaches	to	innovation.	
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The	 document	 reviewed	 different	 types	 of	 innovation88	 –	 technological,	 organisational,	 business	
model,	presentational	–	and	analysed	the	challenges	and	opportunities	of	the	European	context.	The	analysis	
was	especially	addressed	to	enterprises,	describing	them	as	the	main	actors	of	the	innovation	process	and	it	
was	the	entrepreneurial	sector,	rather	than	the	research	compart,	to	be	depicted	as	the	real	value-creator:		
Since	 it	 is	 through	enterprises	 that	 the	economic	benefit	of	 the	successful	exploitation	of	novelty	 is	
captured,	 the	 enterprise	 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 innovation	 process.	 Innovation	 policy	must	 have	 its	
ultimate	effect	on	enterprises:	their	behaviour,	capabilities,	and	operating	environment.	(…)	
While	research	is	a	major	contributor	to	innovation,	if	there	is	no	entrepreneurial	action	there	is	no	
value	creation.	It	is	the	enterprise	that	organises	the	creation	of	value.	With	the	shortening	of	product	
cycles,	enterprises	face	the	need	for	more	capital-intensive	investment	and	must	put	more	emphasis	
on	 the	ability	 to	 react	 quickly.	 For	 enterprises,	 innovation	 is	 a	 crucial	means	 to	 create	 competitive	
advantage	and	superior	customer	value.	Except	for	certain	types	of	technology-based	enterprises,	the	
focus	is	not	on	technological	aspects	of	new	product	development,	but	on	innovative	ways	to	improve	
their	position	in	the	market.	
A	following	experts’	report	(Kok	et	al.,	2004),	published	in	2004	and	meant	to	contribute	to	the	Lisbon	
strategy	 mid-term	 review,	 presented	 no	 particular	 novelties	 in	 the	 argumentation,	 focusing	 on	 the	
recommendation	 to	 boost	 growth	 in	 order	 to	 reduce	unemployment	 and	 to	 sustain	 the	 European	 social	
model,	but	conspicuously	emphasized	the	overall	feeling	of	urgency,	justified	by	the	rising	competition	with	
North	America	and	Asia	(Kok	et	al.,	2004):	
The	arguments	supporting	that	strategy	are	no	less	compelling	today	—	indeed	more	so.	Europe	needs	
to	innovate	on	its	own	behalf.	The	strength	of	its	knowledge	industries	and	Europe’s	capacity	to	diffuse	
knowledge	across	the	totality	of	the	economy	are	fundamental	to	its	success	and	are	key	to	lifting	its	
growth	of	productivity	to	compensate	for	falling	population	growth	and	pay	for	its	social	model.	Lisbon	
should	be	understood	as	a	means	of	transitioning	the	European	economy,	from	structures	in	which	it	
essentially	caught	up	with	the	world’s	best,	to	establishing	economic	structures	that	will	allow	it	to	
exercise	economic	leadership.	
Confronted	 with	 the	 previous	 Sapir	 report,	 the	 line	 of	 reasoning	 presented	 in	 this	 document	 is	
narrower,	specifically	centred	on	the	analysis	of	economic	indicators	and	addressing	political	issues	mostly	
from	the	side	of	better	and	more	coherent	organization	and	practical	suggestions.	Besides,	the	composition	
of	the	expert	group	was	different,	 including	less	scholars	than	the	Sapir	group	and	more	people	from	the	
business	and	administration	sectors89.	
																																								 																				
88	 As	 for	 the	definition,	 the	document	 explicitly	 repeals	 the	 1995	Green	Paper	 on	 Innovation:	 «A	 concise	 definition	of	
innovation	is	“the	successful	production,	assimilation	and	exploitation	of	novelty	in	the	economic	and	social	spheres”».	
89	 «The	 Task	 Force	was	 composed	 of	 the	 following	members:	Mr	Wim	 Kok	 (Chairman),	 former	 Prime	Minister	 of	 the	
Netherlands;	Mr	Romain	Bausch,	President	and	CEO,	SES	Global	(Luxembourg);	Mr	Niall	FitzGerald,	Chairman	of	Reuters,	Chairman	
of	 the	 Trans-Atlantic	 Business	 Dialogue;	 Mr	 Antonio	 Gutiérrez	 Vegara,	 Member	 of	 the	 Spanish	 Parliament;	 Mr	 Will	 Hutton	
(rapporteur),	Chief	Executive	of	 the	Work	Foundation;	Ms	Anne-Marie	 Idrac,	Chairwoman	of	 the	Régie	autonome	des	transports	
parisiens	(RATP);	Ms	Wanja	Lundby-Wedin,	President	of	the	Swedish	Trade	Union	Confederation	(LÖ);	Mr	Thomas	Mirow,	former	
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The	relaunch	of	the	Lisbon	strategy	in	2005	–	Working	together	for	growth	and	jobs	–	A	new	start	for	
the	Lisbon	Strategy	–,	developed	by	the	newly	established	Barroso	Commission,	put	innovation	at	the	centre	
of	 the	 stage,	 largely	 building	 on	 Kok	 report	 recommendations.	 One	 of	 the	 pillar	 actions	 planned	 was	
denominated	«Knowledge	and	innovation	for	growth»,	pairing	in	a	compact	expression	the	two	concepts	we	
are	examining,	and	describing	knowledge	 in	a	distinctly	market-oriented	 frame,	 typical	of	 the	concept	of	
innovation		(CEC,	2005b):		
[Knowledge	and	innovation	for	growth]	In	advanced	economies	such	as	the	EU,	knowledge,	meaning	
R&D,	innovation	and	education,	is	a	key	driver	of	productivity	growth.	Knowledge	is	a	critical	factor	
with	which	Europe	can	ensure	competitiveness	 in	a	global	world	where	others	compete	with	cheap	
labour	or	primary	resources.	
The	 Aho	 report90	 –	 Creating	 an	 Innovative	 Europe	 (Aho,	 Cornu,	 Georghiou,	 &	 Subirà,	 2006)	 –	
represented	 the	vertex	of	 the	climax,	presenting	an	analysis	 that	appeared	strongly	concentrated	on	 the	
promotion	of	innovation	and	notably	imbued	with	urgency:	
This	report	presents	a	strategy	to	create	an	Innovative	Europe.	Achieving	this	requires	a	combination	
of	 a	 market	 for	 innovative	 goods	 and	 services,	 focussed	 resources,	 new	 financial	 structures	 and	
mobility	of	people,	money	and	organisations.	(…)	
Our	central	recommendation	is	that	a	Pact	for	Research	and	Innovation	is	needed	to	drive	the	agenda	
for	an	Innovative	Europe.	This	requires	a	huge	act	of	will	and	commitment	from	political,	business	and	
social	leaders.	Current	efforts	towards	the	revised	Lisbon	Agenda	should	be	continued	and	reinforced	
but	are	not	enough.	In	addition,	simultaneous	and	synchronous	efforts	are	needed	(…).	
This	document	thoroughly	incorporated	the	shift	from	a	discourse	prevalently	centred	on	knowledge	
to	the	one	focused	on	innovation,	recalling	and	pushing	further	the	need	of	«fostering	a	genuine	innovation	
culture»	as	one	of	the	pillars	of	a	strategy	for	innovation.		
Between	 2005	 and	 2006,	 approximately	 after	 this	 report,	 the	 transition	 to	 the	 innovation	 frame	
appears	to	be	completed:	new	documents	showed	to	take	for	granted	innovation	as	the	centre	of	gravity	of	
growth	 strategies,	 and	 devoted	 to	 the	 stabilization	 of	 this	 paradigm	 and	 to	 its	 enrichment	 with	 new	
articulations.	
																																								 																				
Hamburg	 State	Minister,	 Senior	Business	Advisor;	Mr	Bedrich	Moldan,	Chairman	of	 the	Environment	Centre	 (Charles	University,	
Prague);	Mr	Luigi	Paganetto,	Professor	of	international	economics	(Rome-Tor	Vergata	University);	Mr	Dariusz	Rosati,	Professor	of	
economics,	Member	of	 the	European	Parliament	since	June	2004;	Mr	Veli	Sundbäck,	Senior	Vice-President	of	Nokia,	Finland;	Mr	
Friedrich	Verzetnitsch,	President	of	the	Austrian	Trade	Union	Federation	(ÖGB),	Member	of	the	Austrian	Parliament».	
90	The	members	of	the	expert	group	were:	Mr.	Esko	Aho	(Chairman),	Former	Prime	Minister	of	Finland	&	President	of	the	
Finnish	 national	 fund	 for	 research	 and	 development	 (Sitra);	 Dr.	 Jozef	 Cornu,	 Chairman	 of	 the	 Information	 Society	 Technologies	
Advisory	Group	of	the	Commission	(ISTAG),	former	President	and	COO	of	Alcatel	Telecom,	board	member	at	Alcatel,	KBC	Group,	
AfgaGevaert,	Barco	&	Arinso;	Prof.	Luke	Georghiou	(Rapporteur);	Associate	Dean	for	Research,	Faculty	of	Humanities,	Professor	of	
Science	&	Technology	Policy	and	Management,	and	Director	of	PREST,	Manchester	Business	School	-	University	of	Manchester;	Prof.	
Antoni	Subirá	-	Former	Catalan	Government	Minister	of	Industry,	Trade	&	Tourism,	Professor	at	the	IESE	Business	School	(Barcelona),	
Chairman	of	 the	Advisory	Board	of	 the	 competitiveness	 institute	TCI	 and	Member	of	 the	Advisory	Boards	of	Mercapital	 and	Air	
Products.	
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In	2007	the	«free	movement	of	knowledge	and	innovation»	was	introduced	as	a	«fifth	freedom»	of	
the	EU	Single	Market	–	complementing	the	previous	 four:	 free	movement	of	people,	goods,	services	and	
capital.	 In	the	Commission	document	A	single	market	for	the	21st	century	Europe	(CEC,	2007a),	where	the	
concept	is	introduced,	knowledge	and	innovation	are	presented	most	of	the	times	coupled,	as	the	two	faces	
of	 a	 single	 phenomenon;	 they	 represent	 the	 «new	 frontiers»	 of	 the	 «knowledge-based,	 service-oriented	
economy»:	
The	single	market	originally	conceived	for	an	economy	reliant	on	primary	products	and	manufactured	
goods	 has	 to	 adapt	 to	 foster	 openness	 and	 integration	 in	 a	 knowledge-based,	 service-oriented	
economy.	(…)	
Further	 efforts	 are	 needed	 to	 promote	 free	 movement	 of	 knowledge	 and	 innovation	 as	 a	 "fifth	
freedom"	in	the	single	market.	The	single	market	can	be	a	platform	to	stimulate	innovation	in	Europe.	
It	encourages	the	spread	of	new	technologies	across	the	EU.	It	lends	itself	to	networks	-	virtual	and	real	
-	and	fosters	the	development	of	a	sophisticated	logistics	sector	allowing	for	integrated	management	
of	the	flows	of	goods,	energy,	information,	services	and	people.	It	facilitates	exchange	of	knowledge	
through	the	mobility	of	workers,	researchers	and	students.	
Knowledge,	hence,	 in	 this	document	 is	no	more	presented	as	 the	denominator	of	 the	knowledge	
society	that	Europe	was	planning	to	become	in	2000,	but	rather	as	a	means	to	build	a	new	Europe	based	on	
innovation.		
It	is	no	surprise,	then,	that	the	new	growth	agenda	Europe2020	–	launched	in	2010,	at	the	closure	of	
the	Lisbon	Strategy	–	put	innovation	«at	the	heart»	of	its	vision,	as	an	«overarching	policy	objective»	to	which	
all	policies	need	to	orient		(EC,	2010b):	
(…)	 innovation	has	been	placed	at	 the	heart	 of	 the	 Europe	2020	 strategy.	 (…)	 Perhaps	 the	biggest	
challenge	for	the	EU	and	its	Member	States	is	to	adopt	a	much	more	strategic	approach	to	innovation.	
An	approach	whereby	 innovation	 is	 the	overarching	policy	 objective,	where	we	 take	a	medium-	 to	
longer-term	 perspective,	 where	 all	 policy	 instruments,	 measures	 and	 funding	 are	 designed	 to	
contribute	 to	 innovation,	where	EU	and	national/regional	policies	are	 closely	aligned	and	mutually	
reinforcing,	and	last	but	not	least,	where	the	highest	political	level	sets	a	strategic	agenda,	regularly	
monitors	progress	and	tackles	delays.	
Innovation,	aimed	at		turning	ideas	«into	products	and	services	that	create	growth	and	jobs»,	is	also	
described	as	«the	only	answer»	to	the	most	concerning	social,	economic	and	environmental	challenges	(EC,	
2010b):		
How	will	we	 tackle	 growing	 societal	 challenges	 like	 climate	 change,	 energy	 supply,	 the	 scarcity	 of	
resources	 and	 the	 impact	 of	 demographic	 changes?	How	will	we	 improve	 health	 and	 security	 and	
sustainably	provide	water	and	high-quality,	affordable	food?		
The	only	answer	is	 innovation,	which	is	at	the	core	of	the	Europe	2020	Strategy	agreed	by	Member	
States	at	the	June	2010	European	Council,	underpinning	the	smart,	sustainable	and	inclusive	growth	
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the	 Strategy	 is	 aiming	 for.	 The	 "Innovation	Union"	 is	 one	 of	 the	 seven	 flagships	 announced	 in	 the	
Europe	2020	Strategy.	It	aims	to	improve	conditions	and	access	to	finance	for	research	and	innovation,	
to	ensure	that	innovative	ideas	can	be	turned	into	products	and	services	that	create	growth	and	jobs.	
The	“Innovation	Union”,	hence,	was	set	as	the	new	target	vision	underpinning	the	development	of	
Europe	for	the	decade	2010-2020,	and	research	was	committed	to	play	a	key	role	in	building	it:	as	mentioned,	
Horizon	2020,	the	current	Framework	Programme	is	depicted	as	«the	financial	instrument	implementing	the	
Innovation	Union,	a	Europe	2020	flagship	initiative	aimed	at	securing	Europe's	global	competitiveness»	(EC,	
2014e).	
Two interrelated but different frameworks.	The	two	frames	–	knowledge	society	and	innovation	
union	 –	 are	 evidently	 not	 completely	 secluded:	 they	 both	 put	 a	 high	 premium	 on	 the	 rethinking	 and	
valorisation	of	knowledge	 in	the	wider	societal	context.	However,	 in	economic	and	political	speaking,	the	
broad	and	multifaceted	meaning	of	“knowledge	society”	is	often	projected	on	the	narrower	understanding	
of	“knowledge	economy”,	which	refers	fundamentally	to	the	opportunity	of	taking	advantage	 in	terms	of	
profit,	 and	 consequently	 economic	 growth,	 from	 the	 development	 of	 knowledge-intensive	 scientific	 and	
technological	 sectors:	 ICTs,	 biotechnologies,	 neurosciences,	 genetic	 engineering	 etc.	 (the	 humanities,	
although	 undeniably	 knowledge-intensive,	 are	 not	 usually	 implied	 in	 the	 discourse,	 unless	 they	 serve	
achieving	the	competitiveness	target).	 In	common	political	 language,	and	 in	particular	 in	European	public	
discourses,	the	expression	“knowledge	society”	is	then	frequently	used	as	a	synonym	for	“knowledge(-based)	
economy”,	 and	 carries	 with	 it	 the	 collection	 of	 ideas,	 norms,	 actors	 and	 values	 implied	 by	 the	 second	
expression.		
Nonetheless,	the	two	concepts	are	different,	and	in	fact	when	dealing	with	social	and	cultural	issues	
it	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 find	 in	 the	 discourses	 the	 expression	 “knowledge	 society”,	 rather	 than	 its	 economic	
formulation:	when	the	project	of	building	a	knowledge	society	is	examined	in	the	perspective	of	the	European	
identity	 and	 citizenship	 it	 appears	 straightforward	 to	 build	 on	 the	wider,	 and	 consequently	more	 open,	
conceptualization	 (see	 for	example	 the	aforementioned	CEC,	1997b,	2003b;	predominanly	pertaining	 the	
policies	on	education);	in	the	mentioned	Sorbonne	Joint	Declaration,	the	Europe	«of	the	Euro,	of	the	banks	
and	 the	economy»	 is	even	marked	 in	opposition	with	 the	«Europe	of	 knowledge»,	built	on	«intellectual,	
cultural,	social	and	technical	dimensions»	(Sorbonne	Joint	Declaration,	1998).		
The	concept	of	“knowledge”	indeed	retains	a	broad,	multidimensional,	meaning,	and	reflections	on	
the	“knowledge	society”	were	not	only	carried	out	 in	 the	economic	community,	but	were	matter	 for	 the	
social	studies.	The	expression	was	introduced	in	the	‘60s	and	then	diffused	by	the	scholars	Daniel	Bell	and	
Nico	 Stehr	 (Bell,	 1976;	 Cerroni,	 2006;	 Drucker,	 1969;	 Lane,	 1966;	 Stehr,	 1994),	 to	 describe	 the	 “post-
industrial”	society	where	knowledge	has	taken	the	place	of	industrial	machines	as	the	basis	of	social,	political	
and	economic	life.		
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“Knowledge”	 is	 a	 complex	 and	 multidimensional	 concept:	 it	 refers	 clearly	 to	 the	 intellectual,	
linguistically	expressed,	knowledge	of	professors,	but	also	to	the	practical	know-how	of	craftsmen	or,	again,	
to	the	social	understanding	of	communities;	“knowledge”	is	information	content,	useful	for	the	development	
of	sciences,	but	cannot	be	reduced	to	information	only;	it	 is	encapsulated	in	new	technological	objects	as	
well	 as	 in	 old	 tools,	 inherited	 from	 the	 past;	 it	 is	 the	 cultural	 base	 for	 people’s	 education,	 personal	
development	and	participation	to	the	polis;	it	is	finally	also	a	rising	form	of	capital	in	the	economic	system	
and	 an	 instrument	 of	 competence-building	 aimed	 at	 reducing	 unemployment	 (Cerroni,	 2006,	 2013).		
Knowledge,	in	the	expression	“knowledge	society”,	can	be	understood	as	a	common	good,	as	an	instrument	
for	the	individual	development	and	fulfilment,	as	a	tool	to	inform	citizenship,	or	as	an	economic	capital.	
“Knowledge-based	 economy”	 may	 be	 thought	 as	 a	 bridge-concept,	 narrowing	 the	 field	 of	
“knowledge	society”	 to	 its	economic	dimension	and	hence	bringing	 it	closer	 to	 the	notion	of	“innovation	
union”.	The	expressions	“knowledge-based	economy”	and	“innovation	systems”,	in	fact,	both	rely	specifically	
on	a	prolific	creation	of	 ideas	as	 the	basis	 for	 the	generation	of	new	capital,	able	 to	boost	 the	economic	
growth.	The	distinction	between	the	two	approaches	indeed	reflects	the	two	different	scholarly	perspectives	
present	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 systemic	 dimension	 of	 the	 process,	 the	 first	 more	 focused	 on	 the	
conceptualization	 of	 knowledge	 and	 on	 the	 learning	 activity,	 and	 the	 second	 more	 attentive	 to	 the	
institutional	actors	and	to	the	national	performances	(Godin,	2009).	
The	 idea	 of	 “innovation”,	 in	 the	 meaning	 of	 public	 discourses	 on	 socio-economic	 development,	
properly	belongs	to	the	economic	field:	 it	 is	defined	 in	the	most	recent	edition	of	the	OECD	Oslo	Manual	
(OECD,	 2005)	 as	 «the	 implementation	 of	 a	 new	 or	 significantly	 improved	 product	 (good	 or	 service),	 or	
process,	 a	 new	 marketing	 method,	 or	 a	 new	 organisational	 method	 in	 business	 practices,	 workplace	
organisation	 or	 external	 relations».	 In	 European	 documents	 it	 is	 defined	 as	 «the	 successful	 production,	
assimilation	and	exploitation	of	novelty	 in	 the	economic	and	 social	 spheres»	 (CEC,	2003a)	and	one	of	 its	
crucial	feature	is	the	capability	to	open	up	new	markets,	sustaining	growth	(CEC,	1995):		
In	brief,	 innovation	 is	 the	 renewal	and	enlargement	of	 the	 range	of	products	and	 services	and	 the	
associated	markets;	 the	 establishment	 of	 new	methods	 of	 production,	 supply	 and	 distribution;	 the	
introduction	of	changes	in	management,	work	organization,	and	the	working	conditions	and	skills	of	
the	workforce.	
It	follows	that	anchoring	knowledge	policies	to	the	concept	of	innovation	ultimately	implies	linking	
R&D	 and	 education	 to	 their	 exploitability	 in	 the	 market	 economy,	 finally	 minimizing	 the	 non-economic	
dimensions	of	 the	 concept	 and	 consequently	excluding	 the	 related	 interpretive	 realms	 from	 the	debates	
underlying	political	choices.	
The	 economic	 connotation	 is	 indeed	 the	 most	 glaring	 difference	 between	 the	 two	 models.	
Conceptual	frameworks	are	primarily	defined	by	their	content:	“knowledge	society”	refers	to	a	social	system	
whose	 internal	 dynamics	 –	 social,	 cultural,	 political	 and	 economic	 –	 are	 predominantly	 determined	 by	
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exchanges	of	knowledge,	while	“innovation	union”	suggests	a	political	organization	based	on	the	valorisation	
of	new	ideas	by	means	of	the	transformation	into	products,	able	to	open	up	new	markets	and	develop	the	
economy;	in	the	innovation	frame,	hence,	it	is	through	the	economic	valorisation	that	a	better	quality	of	life	
will	be	achieved.	
Moreover,	while	“knowledge”	is	–	complex	as	it	can	be	–	properly	a	content,	an	object,	“innovation”	
is	a	property	of	an	idea,	and	it	refers	to	a	method,	a	criterion	of	discrimination	relatively	to	other	ideas.	It	
doesn’t	really	prescribe	anything	on	the	output	content	–	although	it	actually	implies,	in	the	common	political	
language,	that	any	innovation	is	good	per	se.	“Innovation”	thus,	rather	than	suggesting	a	different	object	for	
the	 creative	 process,	 works	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 reduce	 the	 openness	 of	 the	 knowledge	 creation	 possibilities,	
suggesting	as	preferable	the	choice	of	the	most	marketable	ones.	
Table	13	summaries	the	different	connotations	acquired	by	knowledge	in	the	two	frames.	
Table	13:	a	summary	schema	of	the	different	features	acquired	by	the	concept	of	“knowledge”	in	the	“knowledge	society”	and	in	the	
“innovation	union”	frames.	
Knowledge	in	the	“knowledge	society”	 Knowledge	in	the	“innovation	union”	
Cultural,	social,	economic	understandings;	
knowledge	as	a	common	good.	
Economic	understanding;		
knowledge	as	a	commodity.	
Functions:	personal	development,	social	emancipation,	
construction	of	shared	social	understanding,	economic	
capital.	
Function:	when	turned	into	a	product,	open	up	new	
markets,	boost	competitiveness	and	contributing	to	
economic	growth.	
Problem-setting	as	well	as	problem	solving	tool.	 Problem-solving	tool.	
Actors:	all	the	actors	of	society91.	 Actors:	SMEs	and	industries,	financial	actors;	university	and	higher	education	as	oriented	knowledge	suppliers.	
Actors’	interplay:	in	society,	as	a	whole.	 Actors’	interplay:	in	the	market.	
	
The	shift	to	the	innovation-centred	frame	doesn’t	only	denote	an	ideal	positioning,	but	has	practically	
influenced	the	shaping	of	the	European	research	policy:	as	examples	can	be	regarded	the	evolution	of	the	
research	 funding	 on	 citizenship	 and	 democracy	 and	 the	 family	 of	 requirements	 on	 the	 acceptance	 and	
evaluation	of	research	projects.	The	first,	as	we	have	seen	above	regarding	the	structures	of	the	Framework	
Programmes,	appeared	among	the	funding	lines	in	the	period	between	Maastricht	and	Lisbon	(in	FP5),	when	
the	reflections	on	the	Europe	of	knowledge	were	developing	and	affirming,	and	in	FP6	a	specific	separate	
research	theme	was	included	–	“Citizens	and	governance	in	a	knowledge-based	society”	(see	Fig.	25);	this	
theme	was	subsequently	dropped	in	FP7,	developed	in	the	immediate	post-2000	years,	in	coincidence	with	
the	strengthening	and	prevailing	of	the	innovation	frame.	As	for	what	concerns	the	evaluation	of	the	research	
projects,	increasing	importance	along	the	years	has	been	devoted	to	the	demonstration	of	the	“impact”	of	
the	project	–	the	payback	of	proposed	research	to	economy	and	society	–	and	considerable	relevance	has	
been	paid	to	measurable	deliverables,	like	the	number	of	patents	and	publications,	and	to	the	output	of	the	
																																								 																				
91	Knowledge	can	even	be	embodied	in	objects,	cultural	heritages,	landscapes.	
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project	in	terms	of	“outreach”,	pushing	on	the	realization	of	a	quantity	of	promotion	products;	on	the	other	
hand,	other	possible,	but	less	innovation-oriented,	criteria,	like	the	production	of	new	knowledge	on	a	topic	
or	the	quality	of	citizens’	engagement	in	outreach	effort	haven’t	been	taken	into	account92.	
The	shift	from	“knowledge	society”	to	“innovation	union”	was	therefore	not	just	a	change	in	political	
buzzwords,	but	implied	a	real	subtle	reshaping	of	the	Programmes.		
The	innovation	frame,	however,	although	currently	prevailing	in	EU	discourses	on	scientific	research,	
is	not	monolithic,	showing	articulations	and	sources	of	internal	dynamism.	These	are	particularly	–	plastically	
–	visible	in	the	tripartite	organization	of	Horizon	2020.	
Horizon 2020: three priorities for three visions of the role of research 
The	Commission	has	outlined	a	three-pillars	structure	for	Horizon	2020,	providing	for	the	first	time	
in	the	history	of	Framework	Programmes	a	plastic	representation	of	the	three	principal	distinct	views	that	
contribute	to	shape	the	European	policy	of	scientific	research.	
The	declared	key	priorities	on	which	to	focus	resources	in	H2020	are	«Excellent	Science»,	«Industrial	
Leadership»	 and	 «Societal	 Challenges»,	 corresponding	 to	 three	 distinct	 understandings	 of	 the	 research	
activity	and	knowledge	production	aims.	The	Commission	2011	communication	on	Horizon	2020	(EC,	2011a)	
describes	the	three	priorities	as	follows:	
(1)	Excellent	Science.	This	will	raise	the	level	of	excellence	in	Europe's	science	base	and	ensure	a	steady	
stream	of	world-class	research	to	secure	Europe's	long-term	competitiveness.	It	will	support	the	best	
ideas,	develop	talent	within	Europe,	provide	researchers	with	access	to	priority	research	infrastructure,	
and	make	Europe	an	attractive	location	for	the	world's	best	researchers.	(…)	
(2)	 Industrial	 Leadership.	 This	 will	 aim	 at	 making	 Europe	 a	 more	 attractive	 location	 to	 invest	 in	
research	and	innovation	(including	eco-innovation),	by	promoting	activities	where	businesses	set	the	
agenda.	It	will	provide	major	investment	in	key	industrial	technologies,	maximise	the	growth	potential	
of	European	companies	by	providing	them	with	adequate	levels	of	finance	and	help	innovative	SMEs	
to	grow	into	world-leading	companies.	(…)	
(3)	Societal	Challenges.	This	reflects	the	policy	priorities	of	the	Europe	2020	strategy	and	addresses	
major	 concerns	 shared	by	 citizens	 in	Europe	and	elsewhere.	A	 challenge-based	approach	will	 bring	
together	resources	and	knowledge	across	different	fields,	technologies	and	disciplines,	including	social	
sciences	and	the	humanities.	This	will	cover	activities	from	research	to	market	with	a	new	focus	on	
innovation-related	 activities,	 such	 as	 piloting,	 demonstration,	 test-beds,	 and	 support	 for	 public	
procurement	and	market	uptake.	(…)	
The	three	conceptual	references	can	be	identified	in	the	visions	of	research	articulated	around	the	
ideas,	respectively,	of	scientific	freedom	and	scientific	community-based	evaluation	of	science,	of	economic	
																																								 																				
92	On	the	critical	points	of	the	rise	in	“impact”	requests	in	European	funds	applications	see,	for	example:	(Kelly,	2017a).	See	
also	on	the	same	issue	the	paragraph	«Real	things!»:	measurability	and	impact.		
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competitiveness	 and	 innovation,	 and	 of	 societal	 relevance	 of	 research	 (Ulnicane,	 2015).	 This	 three-polar	
setting	 defines	 not	 only	 the	 research	 policies	 founding	 values	 and	 orientations,	 but	 also	 the	 different	
prominence	ascribed	to	societal	actors,	in	particular	scientists,	entrepreneurs	and	citizens.	The	three-pillars	
structure	was	actually	envisaged	according	to	«who	sets	the	agenda:	the	scientific	community	for	excellent	
science,	 industry	 for	 industrial	 leadership	and	 society	 for	addressing	 societal	 challenges»,	as	 stated	 in	an	
expert	group’s	report	in	preparation	of	FP9	(Lamy	et	al.,	2017).		
However,	a	deeper	analysis	of	the	discourses	on	research	policy,	reported	in	the	following	sections,	
shows	how	the	EU	understandings	of	the	different	reference	frames	is	not	straightforward	and	monolithic,	
but	multifaceted	and	sometimes	including	conflicting	visions.		
More	 specifically,	 not	 only	 the	 three	 approaches	 show	 friction	 points	with	 each	 other,	 but	 also,	
internally	 to	 each	 pillar,	 different	 interpretations	 struggle	 to	 prevail,	 and	 the	 confrontation	 is	 frequently	
conducted	on	the	ground	of	re-framing	arguments	and	issues.	
Different visions for knowledge.	As	argued	by	Luciano	Gallino	(Gallino,	2007),	the	nature	of	Global	
Public	Good	(GPG)	of	scientific	knowledge	–	i.e.	its	feature	of	being	non-rival	and	non-excludable93,	while	at	
the	same	time	being	available	for	all	groups	and	populations	of	the	world	–		is	critically	influenced	by	social,	
political	and	economic	decisions.	Scientific	knowledge	is	nowadays	treated	prevailingly	as	an	«intermediate»	
or	 «instrumental»	 public	 good,	 namely	 it	 is	 meant	 to	 serve	 other	 objectives	 or	 produce	 other	 goods,	
eventually	 public	 themselves.	 Rarer,	 according	 to	 Gallino,	 are	 the	 denotations	 of	 science	 as	 «final»	 or	
«primary»	Global	Public	Good,	whose	production	carries	benefits	per	se,	in	the	forms	of	people’s	intellectual	
development,	new	argumentations,	cultural	and	social	cross-fertilization	with	other	fields	(Gallino,	2007).		
In	the	Horizon	2020	articulation,	the	«Industrial	Leadership»	and	«Societal	challenges»	priorities	are	
clearly	 belonging	 to	 the	 first	 class,	 treating	 knowledge	 as	 an	 instrument	 to	 accomplish	 the	 targets	 of,	
respectively,	economic	competitiveness	and	social	betterment.	«Excellent	science»	appears	nearer	to	the	
second	model,	although,	for	its	same	positioning	inside	H2020,	it	is	as	well	bounded	to	the	overall	objective	
of	innovation,	in	so	doing	compromising	the	nature	of	knowledge	as	‘pure’	final	good.		
The	 tension	 between	 the	 two	 visions	 of	 science,	 guided	 by	 autonomy	 and	 creativity	 or	 oriented	
towards	strategic	purposes,	is	not	recent	(Borrás,	2012;	Turner,	2008)	and	it	was	well-reflected	in	the	debate,	
started	in	the	UK	of	the	‘40s,	between	J.D.	Bernal,	theorizing	an	essential	social	purpose	for	science,	and	M.	
Polanyi,	arguing	for	a	completely	autonomous	organization	and	orientation	of	science.	
The	first,	in	its	1938	essay	on	The	Social	Function	of	Science	(Bernal,	1938),	described	the	«socialized	
integrated	scientific	world	organization»:		
Science,	conscious	of	its	purpose,	can	in	the	long	run	become	a	major	force	in	social	change.	Because	
of	 the	 powers	 which	 it	 holds	 in	 reserve,	 it	 can	 ultimately	 dominate	 the	 other	 forces.	 But	 science	
																																								 																				
93	 In	 economics,	 a	 good	 is	 rival	 if	 its	 consumption	 prevents	 someone	 else	 from	 consuming	 the	 same	 good;	 and	 it	 is	
excludable	if	it	is	possible	to	exclude	people	from	its	consumption,	if	they	have	not	paid	for	it.		
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unaware	of	its	social	significance	becomes	a	helpless	tool	in	the	hands	of	forces	driving	it	away	from	
the	 directions	 of	 social	 advance,	 and,	 in	 the	 process,	 destroying	 its	 very	 essence,	 the	 spirit	 of	 free	
inquiry.	To	make	science	conscious	of	itself	and	its	powers	it	must	be	seen	in	the	light	of	the	problems	
of	 the	 present	 and	 of	 a	 realizable	 future.	 It	 is	 in	 relation	 to	 these	 that	we	 have	 to	 determine	 the	
immediate	functions	of	science.	
According	to	Bernal,	science,	without	a	clear	conscience	of	its	social	function	may	destroy	«its	very	
essence,	the	spirit	of	free	inquiry».	Consequently,	he	supported	the	mobilization	of	state	resources	in	order	
to	achieve	planned	socio-economic	goals.		
The	position	of	Polanyi,	in	The	Republic	of	Science	(Polanyi,	1962),	was	radically	different:		
I	appreciate	the	generous	sentiments	which	actuate	the	aspiration	of	guiding	the	progress	of	science	
into	socially	beneficent	channels,	but	I	hold	its	aim	to	be	impossible	and	indeed	nonsensical.	(…)	
Any	attempt	at	guiding	scientific	research	towards	a	purpose	other	than	its	own	is	an	attempt	to	deflect	
it	from	the	advancement	of	science.	Emergencies	may	arise	in	which	all	scientists	willingly	apply	their	
gifts	to	tasks	of	public	interest.	It	is	conceivable	that	we	may	come	to	abhor	the	progress	of	science	
and	stop	all	 scientific	 research,	or	at	 least	whole	branches	of	 it,	as	 the	Soviets	 stopped	 research	 in	
genetics	for	twenty-five	years.	You	can	kill	or	mutilate	the	advance	of	science,	you	cannot	shape	it.	For	
it	can	advance	only	by	essentially	unpredictable	steps,	pursuing	problems	of	its	own,	and	the	practical	
benefits	of	these	advances	will	be	incidental	and	hence	doubly	unpredictable.		
Polanyi’s	view	was	 that	a	 social	orientation	of	 science	 is	«nonsensical»,	because	«any	attempt	at	
guiding	scientific	research	towards	a	purpose	other	than	its	own»	can	only	slow	it	or	even	destroy	it.	
The	two	views	sprang	apparently	also	from	the	authors’	political	belief:	Bernal	was	a	Marxist,	a	strong	
supporter	of	Soviet	planned	economy,	while	Polanyi	was	radically	a	liberal;	also,	in	arguing	about	the	nature	
and	orientation	of	 science,	 they	cannot	 refrain	 from	establishing	comparisons	between	science	and	 their	
preferred	political	organization.	Polanyi	 in	particular	 refers	 to	Adam	Smiths’	«invisible	hand»	guiding	 the	
market	as	the	model	for	science:	
What	 I	 have	 said	 here	 about	 the	 highest	 possible	 co-ordination	 of	 individual	 scientific	 efforts	 by	 a	
process	of	self-co-ordination	may	recall	the	self-co-ordination	achieved	by	producers	and	consumers	
operating	in	a	market.	It	was,	indeed,	with	this	in	mind	that	I	spoke	of	'the	invisible	hand'	guiding	the	
co-ordination	of	independent	initiatives	to	a	maximum	advancement	of	science,	just	as	Adam	Smith	
invoked	'the	invisible	hand'	to	describe	the	achievement	of	greatest	joint	material	satisfaction	when	
independent	producers	and	consumers	are	guided	by	the	prices	of	goods	in	a	market.	
These	 two	 visions	 for	 knowledge	 –	 autonomous	 or	 oriented	 –	 imply	 two	 different	 rationales	 for	
science	policy,	whose	roots	were	set	immediately	after	WWII	in	the	USA94.	Before	that	moment,	most	of	the	
																																								 																				
94	The	following	paragraphs	on	the	description	of	the	Bush/Steelman	visions	are	based	mainly	on	the	accounts	of	(Cerroni	
&	Simonella,	2014;	Tallacchini,	2010).	
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US	scientists	considered	public	funding	of	research	an	unacceptable	attack	to	their	autonomy.	However,	the	
decisive	contribution	of	scientific	research	to	the	outcome	of	the	war	led	to	a	rethinking	of	the	social	contract	
among	science,	government	and	industry.	The	path	was	paved	by	a	couple	of	reports	concerning	the	changing	
physiognomy	of	science	policy,	drafted	in	1945	and	1947:	the	Bush	and	Steelman	reports.	The	first,	Science	
the	Endless	Frontier:	A	Report	to	the	President	on	a	Program	for	Postwar	Scientific	Research	(Bush,	1945),	
was	prepared	by	Vannevar	Bush,	the	mathematician	and	engineer	who	headed	the	US	Office	of	Scientific	
Research	 and	 Development	 (OSRD),	 the	 office	 coordinating	 wartime	 R&D	 efforts	 (including	 the	 early	
development	of	the	Manhattan	Project);	it	focused	on	the	need	to	publicly	support	scientific	research	if	the	
national	 interest	 and	 prestige	 are	 at	 stake,	 because	 private	 funds	 cannot	 sustain	 appropriately	 the	
development	of	science.	However,	this	support	must	not	become	political	control:	Bush	conceived	the	idea	
of	an	agency	funded	with	public	money	but	run	in	complete	autonomy	by	the	scientists	(Bush,	1945):	
Scientific	progress	on	a	broad	front	results	from	the	free	play	of	free	intellects,	working	on	subjects	of	
their	own	choice,	in	the	manner	dictated	by	their	curiosity	for	exploration	of	the	unknown.	Freedom	of	
inquiry	must	be	preserved	under	any	plan	for	Government	support	of	science	(…)	
The	new	“National	Science	Foundation”,	proposed	by	Bush,	would	have	been	accountable	 to	 the	
President	and	 to	 the	Congress,	but	had	 to	work	autonomously,	 and	 the	government	had	 to	 refrain	 from	
controlling	it,	excepted	for	the	setting	of	the	broad	substantial	orientation	of	research	lines.	
The	 report	 was	 received	 with	 mixed	 feelings,	 both	 by	 whom	 was	 suspicious	 with	 the	 public	
intervention	in	science	and	by	those	who	conversely	asked	for	more	control.	When	the	report	was	published,	
President	Roosevelt	was	dead,	 and	 the	new	one,	 Truman,	didn’t	 accept	 the	 idea	of	 the	 total	 absence	of	
democratic	control	over	the	agency:	he	stopped	the	“National	Science	Foundation	Act”	and	assigned	to	a	
new	 committee,	 headed	 by	 the	 sociologist	 and	 economist	 John	 R.	 Steelman,	 the	 task	 of	 rethinking	 the	
proposal.	The	new	report,	A	Program	for	the	Nation	(Steelman,	1947),	agreed	with	the	previous	one	on	the	
point	that	science	had	to	figure	among	the	strategic	resources	of	the	United	States,	but	didn’t	agree	with	the	
privileged	 position	 accorded	 to	 science	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 other	 public	 sectors,	 and	 proposed	 for	 the	
government	an	active	role	of	coordination	and	guidance.	Steelman	believed	that	all	the	fields	contributing	
to	the	development	of	a	liberal	society	had	to	be	financed,	including	the	social	sciences	–	that	Bush	didn’t	
esteem	–	as	instruments	of	equal	re-distribution	of	the	scientific	and	technologic	benefits	on	the	population.	
The	two	visions,	hence,	can	be	regarded	as	models	of	interaction	between	the	governments	and	the	
scientific	 community	 and	 imply	 a	 different	 status	 for	 knowledge:	 in	 the	 “Bush	 model”	 the	 positive	
development	 of	 science	 is	 seen	 as	 only	 possible	 within	 the	 scientific	 community,	 administered	 with	 its	
consolidated	specific	methods,	and	would	be	endangered	by	any	external	intervention;	the	decision	on	the	
directions	of	research	has	to	be	taken	inside	the	community	–	even	with	a	weak	orientation	provided	by	the	
government	on	the	strategic	priorities	to	pursue	–;	the	“Steelman	model”,	conversely,	puts	a	high	premium	
on	the	contribution	of	science	to	national	and	societal	objectives,	and	advocates	political	control	over	the	
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administration	and	the	orientation	of	research.	In	1950,	the	National	Science	Foundation	was	founded	on	
the	principles	put	forward	by	Steelman.	
Table	14:	a	summary	comparison	of	the	“Bush”	and	“Steelman”	models	of	science	policy.	
	 Bush	model	 Steelman	model	
Agenda	setting	 Scientific	community,	by	means	of	the	confrontation	among	peers.	
Government,	on	the	basis	of	the	national	
priorities.	
Vision	of	
knowledge95	
Final.	The	positive	contribution	to	national	
objectives	will	be	a	necessary	consequence	
of	the	free	development	of	science.	
Instrumental.	Knowledge	has	to	serve	
national	and	societal	objectives.	
Administration	 Scientists.	 Government	bureaucracy.	
Funding	criterion	 Excellence.	 Politically	set	criteria.	
	
As	mentioned,	in	the	European	research	funding	system,	it	is	possible	to	recognize	the	features	of	
both	models.	The	overall	setting	views	research	as	undoubtedly	finalized	to	communitarian	objectives,	with	
the	current	two	pillars	«Societal	Challenges»	and	«Industrial	Leadership»	mirroring	the	two-poles	orientation	
developed	in	the	contemporary	history	of	European	integration,	and	with	the	distribution	criteria	taking	into	
account	political	 juste	retour96	principles;	however,	how	to	exert	the	democratic	control	advocated	in	the	
Steelman	perspective	is	subject	to	different	interpretations,	ranging	from	technocratic	views	to	the	complete	
engagement	of	citizens	advocated	by	the	Science	and	Society	reflections97.	Moreover,	the	recent	inception	
of	the	European	Research	Council,	embedded	in	Horizon	2020	under	the	pillar	«Excellent	Science»,	inserts	in	
the	 scenario	 a	 conflicting	 view	 of	 research	 policy,	 nearer	 to	 the	 orientation	 of	 the	 Bush	 model:	 an	
autonomous	institution,	funding	bottom-up	proposals	of	research	with	the	sole	criterion	of	excellence	and	
by	means	of	peer	evaluation.		
Distinct, yet mutually reinforcing?	The	European	research	policy	landscape	is	nowadays	much	more	
faceted	 than	 it	 was	 two	 decades	 ago,	 when	 the	 Framework	 Programmes	 were	 prepared	 essentially	 in	
Brussels,	 without	 the	 burden	 of	 negotiations	 of	 the	 post-ERA	 period	 (Andrée,	 2009),	 and	 without	 the	
increased	importance	ascribed	to	research	in	strategic	terms.	Different	visions	of	the	role	of	science	coexist,	
and	concern	not	only	the	objectives	of	research,	but	also	the	very	rationale	of	public	support	to	knowledge	
production	 in	the	European	system.	The	context	 is	 thus	rich	of	potential	 tensions,	that	can	 lead	either	to	
conflicts	or	to	constructive	confrontations	and	to	the	establishment	of	new	equilibria.		
Notwithstanding	 the	 Commission’s	 effort	 to	 stress	 the	 compatibility	 of	 the	 Horizon	 2020	 three	
priorities	–	described	as	distinct,	yet	mutually	reinforcing	(EC,	2011a)	–,	these	inevitably	show	multiple	points	
of	 friction:	why	 should	a	 “pure	 scientist”,	 educated	 to	 the	 freedom	and	autonomy	of	 scientific	 research,	
																																								 																				
95	In	reference	to	the	aforementioned	Gallino’s	distinction.	
96	 In	 the	 European	 context,	 this	 principle	 states	 that	 the	 Member	 States	 receive	 from	 the	 UE	 in	 proportion	 of	 their	
contribution	to	the	budget.	
97	For	this	reason,	in	the	following	I	will	name	“economic	Steelman”	model	the	research	funding	in	the	innovation	frame,	
and	 “mixed	 Steelman”	 the	 model	 of	 the	 societal	 frame,	 whose	 control	 and	 orientation	 is	 established	 by	 means	 of	 mixed	 and	
contrasting	instruments:	technical,	political	and	democratic.	See	summary	Table	16	and	note	116.	
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accept	to	work	for	the	solution	of	a	politically-chosen	societal	challenge,	or	for	the	improvement	of	European	
industry?	What	 if	environmental	aims	and	industrial	priorities	don’t	coincide?	How	to	fit	basic,	 inherently	
non-applied,	 blue-sky	 research,	 into	 the	 pragmatic	 frames	 of	 both	 Industrial	 Leadership	 and	 Societal	
Challenges?		
In	the	following	sections	the	policy	discourses	on	research	are	analysed	and	the	features	of	the	three	
conceptual	frames,	in	the	EU	understanding,	are	described.	
Although,	 as	 shown,	 the	 EU	 vision	 is	 by	 large	 dominated	 by	 the	 innovation	 framework,	 other	
perspectives	are	gaining	relevance,	causing	an	internal	labor	in	the	European	system.		
The dominant narrative: the Innovation frame, or “knowledge for growth” 
As	 mentioned,	 the	 European	 Community	 possesses	 a	 long-standing	 tradition	 of	 anchoring	
investments	in	scientific	research	to	their	contribution	to	economic	growth.		
A	specific	European	reason,	linked	to	its	same	foundational	identity,	is	that	the	Community	itself	was	
born	 –	 functionalistic-wise	 –	 primarily	 as	 an	 economic	 community,	 and	 even	 in	 scientific	 intensive	
collaborations,	like	Euratom,	the	prime	aim	was	to	build	an	internal	market	for	the	nuclear	industry,	and		the	
R&D	dimension	was	only	secondary	(Guzzetti,	1995).	The	original	economic	focus	has	naturally	influenced	
the	policies	features	and	orientations.	The	establishment	of	the	European	Union	as	a	polity	is	very	recent,	
when	 compared	 to	 the	 40-years	 long	 history	 of	 economic	 aggregation;	 as	mentioned,	 before	 the	 Single	
European	Act	(1986),	the	coordination	of	research	policies	was	not	even	listed	among	the	competences	of	
the	Community,	and	these	were	therefore	promoted	with	reference	to	economic	development,	the	main	
objective	of	the	Economic	Community.	
However,	 the	 European	 case	 is	 not	 singular:	 it	 is	 part	 of	 a	 general	 trend	 observable	 in	Western	
countries.	 Governments	 have	 always	 strived	 to	 find	 justifications	 for	 the	 funds	 devoted	 to	 R&D,	 and,	
naturally,	they	have	always	been	concerned	with	the	economic	balance	between	public	expenditures	and	
returns	(Godin,	2009);	however,	science	policy	rationales,	in	the	first	post-war	decades,	were	not	principally	
revolving	around	the	anticipated	economic	benefits:	in	the	‘70s,	when	the	argument	framing	science	as	an	
undisputable	engine	of	progress	weakened	(with	the	rise	of	the	environmental	awareness,	e.g.),	a	new	vision	
of	 science	 emerged,	 depicted	 in	 public	 discourses	 as	 embedded	 in	 society,	 with	 strengthened	 ties	 to	
industrial	development	first,	and	later,	in	the	‘90s,	working	as	the	driving	force	for	vibrant	markets	(Slaughter,	
1993).	
A	fundamental	role	in	this	paradigm	shift	was	played	by	the	evolution	of	economic	thinking,	fuelled	
by	internal	disciplinary	dynamics,	but	also	by	a	conspicuous	rise	in	resources	devoted	during	the	‘70s	and	
‘80s	to	the	study	of	what	is	currently	called	the	STI	(Science,	Technology	and	Innovation)	field	(Freeman	&	
Soete,	2009).	Economic	schools	of	thought,	initially	not	particularly	concerned	with	the	contribution	of	R&D	
to	national	 growth,	began	differentiating	during	 the	 second	half	 of	 the	XX	 century,	 and	a	 relevant	 share	
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started	 assigning	 an	 important	 role	 to	 technical	 progress.	While	 neo-classical	models	 of	 growth	 treated	
technology	as	an	exogenous	variable,	new	theories	–	endogenous	growth	theory,	evolutionary	economics,	
neo-schumpeterian	economics	–	emphasized	the	role	of	knowledge	production,	technological	change	and	
innovation	 as	 central	 to	 economic	 growth,	 and	 contributed	 to	 a	 great	 degree	 to	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	
literature	on	science	policies	and	innovation	studies	(Martin,	2012).	Moreover,	some	of	the	proponents	of	
these	 new	 theories	 spent	 part	 of	 their	 careers	 at	 influential	 international	 organisations,	 contributing	 to	
position	 research	 policies	 high	 in	 national	 political	 agendas	 –	 e.g.	 Christopher	 Freeman’s	work	 at	 OECD,	
starting	in	the	‘60s	(see	below),	but	also	the	numerous	contributions	of	scholars	belonging	to	his	and	related	
schools98	as	experts	 for	European	policy	documents.	Their	 inputs	supported	 the	shift	 in	public	policies	of	
science	towards	the	valorisation	of	research	as	functional	to	economic	growth	and	oriented	the	choices	on	
the	kind	of	research	to	promote:	from	basic	to	applied,	and	directed	to	key	technological	fields.	In	the	‘90s,	
they	contributed	to	the	development	of	the	innovation	frame	adopted	by	EU:	the	foundational	Green	Paper	
on	Innovation	(CEC,	1995)	made	explicit	reference	to	the	new	economic	theories,	when	dealing	with	the	role	
of	politics	to	promote	growth	by	means	of	knowledge	policies:	
The	 new	 theories	 of	 growth	 (known	 as	 "endogenous")	 stress	 that	 development	 of	 know-how	 and	
technological	 change	 -	 rather	 than	 the	mere	accumulation	of	 capital	 -	are	 the	driving	 force	behind	
lasting	growth.	
According	 to	 these	 theories,	 the	 authorities	 can	 influence	 the	 foundations	 of	 economic	 growth	 by	
playing	a	part	in	the	development	of	know-	how,	one	of	the	principal	mainsprings	of	innovation.	The	
authorities	can	also	influence	the	“distribution”	of	know-how	and	skills	throughout	the	whole	of	the	
economy	and	society,	for	instance	by	facilitating	the	mobility	of	persons	and	interactions	between	firms	
and	between	firms	and	outside	sources	of	skills,	 in	particular	universities,	but	also	by	ensuring	that	
competition	is	given	free	rein	and	by	resisting	corporatist	ideas.	
In	Europe,	the	debate	about	a	coordination	of	scientific	policies	entered	the	political	arena	during	
the	‘70s,	against	the	background	of	the	incipient	economic	crisis,	announced	by	the	succession	of	oil	crisis,	
and	the	rise	of	economic	liberalism;	the	debate	focused	on	the	“technological	gap”	of	EU	with	respect	to	USA	
and	Japan,	and	the	research	policies	were	anchored	to	the	development	of	strategic	industries	in	the	most	
promising	fields,	like	electronics,	computer	science,	energy	and,	later,	biotechnologies,	with	an	emphasis	on	
the	development	of	leading-edge	technologies	(Caracostas	&	Muldur,	1998;	Guzzetti,	1995).		
If,	 in	 the	 ‘80s	 and	 early	 ‘90s,	 this	 translated	 in	 the	 science	 policy	 documents	 into	 providing	 the	
European	 industry	 with	 the	 scientific	 and	 technological	 bases	 to	 increase	 their	 competitiveness99	 (CEC,	
1997a):	
																																								 																				
98	E.g.	the	economists	coming	from	SPRU	and	Maastricht	University	schools.	
99	 See	 also	 the	 paragraph	 The	 story	 told	 by	 the	 Framework	 Programmes	 establishing	 acts	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 first	
Framework	Programmes	declared	objectives.	
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The	Union	must	focus	research	activities	on	improving	the	competitiveness	of	the	European	economy,	
thereby	promoting	the	creation	of	new	jobs.	It	is	particularly	important	that	Europe	should	be	able	to	
transform	scientific	and	technological	breakthroughs	into	industrial	and	commercial	successes.		
In	the	late	‘90s	the	same	objective	was	re-formulated	in	terms	of	innovation	(Caracostas	&	Muldur,	
1998):	
Inevitably,	of	course,	a	policy	of	this	kind100	will	be	centred	on	innovation,	the	preferred	instrument	of	
economic	 and	 social	 change.	 The	 advantage	 of	 the	 paring	 of	 society	 and	 innovation	 is	 that	 public	
policies	can	be	revitalised	without	earlier	objectives	being	abandoned.	Industrial	competitiveness	will	
no	 longer	be	an	objective	but	a	means	of	 increasing	 the	 contribution	of	 science	and	 technology	 to	
growth,	employment	and	the	 rapid	dissemination	of	 innovations.	Likewise,	 investing	 in	science	and	
technology	becomes	a	means	of	increasing	the	innovative	capability	of	the	economy.	
The	shift	from	industry-led	to	innovation-oriented	research	policy	reflects	a	corresponding	change	of	
focus	 in	 the	 STI	 academia:	 in	 the	 words	 of	 two	 main	 innovation	 scholars,	 C.	 Freeman	 and	 L.	 Soete,	
«‘Innovation’	 began	 to	 receive	 far	more	 attention	 and	 the	 definition	 of	 industrial	 R&D	was	 increasingly	
criticised	as	being	too	restrictive»	(Freeman	&	Soete,	2009).	
Indeed,	in	Horizon	2020,	“Industrial	Leadership”	is	listed	as	one	of	the	three	priorities	contributing	
to	the	building	of	the	innovation	Union	–	and	not	the	other	way	round	–	as	proposed	in	the	aforementioned	
early	study	of	the	Commission	Directorate	Strategy	and	Coordination	(Caracostas	&	Muldur,	1998):	industrial	
competitiveness	and	innovation	thus,	although	with	changes	in	the	respective	hierarchical	positions,	belong	
to	the	same	framework,	legitimizing	public	funding	of	research	as	an	instrument	to	achieve	economic	growth.	
The	roots	of	the	innovation	conceptual	framework	and	of	its	development	into	European	scientific	
and	economic	policy	have	already	been	described	in	detail	in	the	paragraph	above	on	the	affirmation	of	the	
innovation	policies	in	Europe:	although	intertwined	with	the	frame	of	the	“European	knowledge	society”,	the	
innovation	 frame,	 with	 its	 clear	 market	 orientation,	 has	 represented	 the	 backbone	 of	 post-Maastricht	
policies.	
Europe	2020	–	the	current	overarching	strategy,	including	the	Innovation	Union	at	its	core	–	is	the	
mature	output	of	this	evolution.	It	is	aimed	to	economic	growth,	albeit	with	the	qualities	of	being	«smart,	
sustainable	and	inclusive»;	the	betterment	of	the	economic	situation	is	set	as	the	final	target	of	the	priorities,	
as	described	in	the	very	first	paragraphs	of	the	2010	Commission	document	Europe	2020	–	A	strategy	for	
smart,	sustainable	and	inclusive	growth	(EC,	2010a):	
Europe	2020	sets	out	a	vision	of	Europe's	social	market	economy	for	the	21st	century.	
Europe	2020	puts	forward	three	mutually	reinforcing	priorities:		
–		Smart	growth:	developing	an	economy	based	on	knowledge	and	innovation.	 	
																																								 																				
100	The	policy	of	pairing	society	and	innovation,	as	explained	in	the	1997	study	of	the	Directorate	Strategy	and	Coordination	
of	the	Commission	Society,	the	endless	frontier	(Wynne,	1992)	(author’s	note).	
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–		Sustainable	growth:	promoting	a	more	resource	efficient,	greener	and	more	competitive	economy.		
–		Inclusive	growth:	fostering	a	high-employment	economy	delivering	social	and	territorial	cohesion.	
The Innovation Union from the Commission’s perspective: the innovation frame and its sub-narratives. 
The	features	of	the	innovation	frame	are	particularly	visible	in	the	communication	products	realized	by	the	
Commission	at	the	launch	of	Horizon2020,	in	2014,	conceived	as	concise	descriptions	of	the	contents	of	the	
research	 Programmes,	 embodying	 the	 effort	 to	 promote	 the	 values	 of	 the	 programme	 and	 to	 prove	 its	
relevance	to	a	wider	audience	than	the	policy-makers’	community;	this	kind	of	media,	moreover,	are	notably	
interesting	 for	 what	 concerns	 the	 identification	 of	 conceptual	 frameworks,	 for	 their	 positioning	 at	 the	
sensible	border	between	science,	policy	and	society	(Jasanoff	&	Kim,	2015).	
The	introductory	video	to	Horizon2020,	What	is	Horizon	2020?	(EC,	2014e),	was	the	communication	
product	 intended	to	briefly	describe	and	promote	the	programme;	as	such,	 it	offered	a	panorama	of	 the	
strategy,	depicted	from	the	Commission’s	point	of	view,	and	could	not	refrain	from	resorting	to	legitimizing	
arguments,	able	to	motivate	and	position	the	funding	of	knowledge	production	in	front	of	the	public.	The	
video	represents	thus	a	useful	exemplary	communication	of	the	innovation	discourse,	presented	with	a	set	
of	 sub-argumentations	 or	 sub-narratives	 accompanying	 and	 justifying	 the	 policy	 orientation;	 the	
communication	 product,	 in	 other	 words,	 is	 particularly	 interesting	 because	 it	 ‘condensed’	 the	
argumentations	and	narratives	recurrently	appearing	in	European	research	policy	documents.		
The	video	opened	with	the	words:		
Knowledge	is	power,	they	say.	But	in	today’s	global	economy	knowledge	is	more	like	a	currency:	the	
trick	is	to	make	it	work	for	you.	
Among	 the	 different	 possible	 understandings	 of	 knowledge	 production	 and	 circulation,	 the	
Commission	communicators	chose	to	adopt	the	equations	knowledge-power	and	knowledge-currency:	the	
production	of	knowledge	through	scientific	research	was	framed	linking	knowledge	to	the	exercise	of	power,	
and	immediately	after	it	was	valued	through	an	economic	metaphor.	Like	a	currency,	knowledge	should	be	
exchanged	to	serve	one’s	interests	in	a	competitive	scenario	–	«today’s	global	economy».	The	whole	process	
is	portrayed	as	a	«trick»:	not	a	 long,	difficult	 learning	effort	or	a	consuming	 intellectual	endeavour,	but	a	
stratagem,	 a	 «cunning	 act	 intended	 to	 deceive	 or	 outwit	 someone»101,	 ultimately	 geared	 to	 a	 utilitarian	
advantage.	
Horizon2020	was	defined	in	the	video	as	the	instrument	developed	and	implemented	by	the	EU	to	
shift	the	focus	of	the	European	growth	strategy	towards	innovation:	
That’s	why	we	want	to	turn	the	European	Union	in	an	Innovation	Union,	the	plan	to	get	good	ideas	to	
market	faster,	to	boost	the	economy,	create	jobs	and	improve	lives.	
																																								 																				
101	Oxford	British	and	World	English	Dictionary:	http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/trick	(accessed	June	
13,	2016).	
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The	objective,	in	this	statement,	looked	more	ambitious	than	is	the	purpose	of	an	economic	strategy:	
Europe	should	be	«turned»	 into	a	different	kind	of	Union,	 its	very	political	 identity	being	questioned	and	
reinterpreted	 here.	 The	 new	 identity,	 the	 “Innovation	 Union”,	 was	 defined	 as	 the	 strategy	 aimed	 at	
reinforcing	 the	 conversion	 of	 ideas	 into	market	 products,	 in	 order	 to	 «boost	 the	 economy».	 The	 images	
accompanying	 this	 statement	 were	 particularly	 telling:	 the	 sentence	 on	 the	 improvement	 of	 lives	 was	
pronounced	against	the	scene	of	a	family	at	the	supermarket,	happily	engaged	in	buying	the	products	that	
were	manufactured,	 in	the	cartoon’s	plot,	 in	a	 factory	assembly	 line;	 the	boxes	were	depicted	as	directly	
coming	from	the	brain	of	the	researcher,	a	materialization	of	his	ideational	work,	represented	as	a	chain	of	
mechanical	sprockets	(see	the	pictures	in	Fig.	34).	
The	narrative	implied	by	this	statement,	and	reinforced	by	the	pictures,	is	a	linear	causative	relation	
between	economic	growth,	creation	of	new	jobs	and	improvement	of	the	Europeans’	lives.	Elsewhere	in	the	
same	video,	people	were	represented	laying	on	the	grass	of	a	big	lawn	surrounded	by	pines,	or	engaged	in	
playing	outdoor	sports,	while	«knowledge»	was	«working	for»	them.	The	linear	vision	of	the	contribution	of	
R&D	to	quality	of	life,	via	the	incorporation	of	ideas	in	the	market	and	the	economic	growth,	is	a	peculiar	and	
recurrent	sub-narrative	in	the	innovation	frame.	
Another	argument	 frequently	 associated	with	 the	push	 for	 innovation	 in	policy	documents	 is	 the	
need	to	take	action	rapidly;	we	find	in	the	video	a	particular	emphasis	on	the	speed	of	the	research-to-market	
process	(EC,	2014e):	
Investing	in	excellent	projects	and	people,	anywhere	and	in	any	way	that	delivers	innovation	from	the	
lab	to	the	market	much	faster	than	anyone	dreamed	possible	in	Europe:	that’s	a	real	Innovation	Union	
and	now	Horizon2020	makes	it	really	simple.	
The	 feeling	of	urgency	 is	 a	pervasive	 feature	of	 the	Commission’s	discourses	 about	 research	and	
innovation,	since	at	least	the	turn	of	the	Millennium,	mainly	justified	by	the	fears	of	losing	ground	to	US	and	
to	 the	 Asian	 countries	 in	 the	 economic	 race.	 Often,	 in	 the	 documents	 proposing	 and	 describing	 growth	
strategies,	the	arguments	are	justified	on	the	basis	of	crisis	scenarios,	and	Europe2020	makes	no	exception,	
as	is	visible	in	the	words	of	the	document	proposing	it	in	2010	(EC,	2010a):		
Europe	 faces	 a	moment	 of	 transformation.	 The	 crisis	 has	wiped	 out	 years	 of	 economic	 and	 social	
progress	 and	 exposed	 structural	 weaknesses	 in	 Europe's	 economy.	 In	 the	 meantime,	 the	 world	 is	
moving	fast	and	long-term	challenges	–	globalisation,	pressure	on	resources,	ageing	–	intensify.	The	
EU	must	now	take	charge	of	its	future.	
The	discourse	 is	clearly	not	only	describing	the	de	facto	 situation	of	 financial	crisis	 (honestly	very	
recent	at	the	time	of	writing),	but	it	is	relying	on	a	urgency	narrative	–	“there	is	no	more	time,	it	is	necessary	
to	 act	 now	 before	 it	 is	 too	 late”.	 The	 feeling	 of	 urgency	 was	 an	 increasing	 feature	 of	 European	 policy	
documents	–	especially	fuelled	by	the	experts	groups	reports	–	that	had	significant	consequences	in	terms	of	
debate	spaces,	issues	to	tackle	and	choice	of	the	instruments	of	action.	
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Finally,	the	third	sub-narrative	that	 is	often	employed	in	research	policy	discourses,	especially	the	
Commission’s	ones,	 is	a	between-the-lines	negative	 judgement	of	non-tangible	actions,	 like	reflections	or	
speculations,	in	favour	of	more	concrete	(and	urgent)	challenges:		
Horizon	2020	(…)	focuses	on	challenges	we	urgently	need	to	address,	like	clean	energy	and	recycling,	
caring	for	the	elderly,	health	care,	food	safety	and	our	oceans:	real	things!	(…)	
The	Horizon2020	overview	video	describes	the	challenges	as	«real	things»,	directly	affecting	peoples’	
lives,	 apparently	 in	 opposition	 with	 some	 less	 funding-worth	 scientific	 wanderings.	 This	 anti-intellectual	
approach	can	be	highlighted	 in	discourses	 in	 connection	with	 the	 rising	 importance	of	measurability	 and	
impact	of	 research	performances,	 traceable	 to	an	evidence-based	 turn	 in	public	policies	due,	 among	 the	
other	factors,	to	the	absorption	of	New	Public	Management	theories	in	Western	public	administrations	and,	
more	in	general,	to	the	general	shift	towards	neo-liberal	political-economic	theories.	
The	pervasive	use	of	urgency	discourses,	an	increasing	trend	towards	pragmatism	and	measurability	
invoked	 in	 the	political	discourses,	 the	economisation	of	quality	of	 life	are	relevant	sub-discourses	of	 the	
Innovation	frame,	contributing	to	a	general	foreclosure	of	the	alternative	political	paths.	
«…before it is too late»: the urgency discourse 
The	urgency	rhetoric	is	a	recurrent	feature	of	contemporary	EU	discourses	on	growth	strategies.		
As	aforementioned,	the	feeling	of	urgency	increased	particularly	after	the	turn	of	the	Millennium,	
and	it	is	significantly	visible	in	the	reports	on	the	development	of	the	Lisbon	strategy	(Aho	et	al.,	2006;	Kok	
et	al.,	2004;	Sapir	et	al.,	2003),	where	we	can	recognize	a	steep	rise	of	an	anxiogenous	rhetoric.	The	language	
of	such	narrative	reflects	a	connotation	of	fear,	and	of	the	need	to	act	rapidly	in	order	to	avoid	dangerous	
consequences:	words	in	the	semantic	families	of	“threat”,	“failure”,	“danger”,	“urgency”,	“fast”,	“necessary”,	
“imperative”,	 “late”	 abound,	 as	 well	 as	 expressions	 like	 “time	 is	 running	 out”,	 and	 verbs	 linked	 to	
determination	of	action,	as	“must”,	“need”,	“want”	etc.	
In	2000,	the	European	Research	area	was	proposed	against	the	backdrop	of	a	«worrying	situation»:	
«Europe	might	not	 successfully	 achieve	 the	 transition	 to	 a	 knowledge-based	economy»	 (CEC,	 2000).	 The	
statement	is	particularly	relevant	in	consideration	of	the	fact	that	the	document	was	published	before	the	
presentation	of	the	Lisbon	strategy,	centred	on	the	realization	of	the	knowledge-based	economy,	launched	
only	a	couple	of	months	later.	Even	so,	the	situation	was	connoted	as	«urgent»:	
The	situation	is	urgent.	Without	a	co-ordinated	impulse	and	a	determined	effort	to	increase	and	better	
organise	the	European	research	effort,	Europe	might	compromise	its	chances	of	taking	full	advantage	
of	the	potential	offered	by	the	transition	to	a	knowledge-based	economy	and	society.	This	will	not	be	
without	its	negative	impact	on	growth	and	employment.	
The	group	of	experts	chaired	by	André	Sapir	warned	President	Prodi,	in	its	2003	report	presentation,	
of	the	threats	menacing	the	sustainability	of	the	«European	model»:	
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Faster	growth	is	paramount	for	the	sustainability	of	the	European	model,	which	puts	a	high	premium	
on	cohesion.	Sustainability	is	under	threat	from	rapid	developments	in	demography,	technology	and	
globalisation,	 all	 of	 which	 increase	 the	 demand	 for	 social	 protection.	 Failure	 to	 deliver	 on	 the	
commitments	of	the	Lisbon	Agenda	would	endanger	the	present	European	contract	and	could	lead	to	
its	fundamental	revision,	thereby	threatening	the	very	process	of	European	integration.	Fortunately,	
however,	 technology	and	globalisation,	 like	 enlargement,	 also	hold	 the	potential	 for	 faster	 growth	
throughout	Europe.	
The	urgency	of	the	situation,	according	to	these	analyses,	didn’t	allow	to	lose	time	in	«complacency»	
(Kok	et	al.,	2004):	
The	Lisbon	strategy	is	even	more	urgent	today	as	the	growth	gap	with	North	America	and	Asia	has	
widened,	while	Europe	must	meet	the	combined	challenges	of	low	population	growth	and	ageing.	Time	
is	running	out	and	there	can	be	no	room	for	complacency.	Better	implementation	is	needed	now	to	
make	up	for	lost	time.	(…)	
Improved	economic	growth	and	increased	employment	provide	the	means	to	sustain	social	cohesion	
and	environmental	sustainability.	(…)	
The	view	of	 the	High	Level	Group	 is	 that	Lisbon’s	direction	 is	 right	and	 imperative,	but	much	more	
urgency	is	needed	in	its	implementation	—	and	more	awareness	of	the	high	cost	of	not	doing	so.	
The	Aho	report,	in	2006,	emphasized	the	feeling	of	urgency	alerting	the	Europeans	of	the	«threat»	
that	was	menacing	«their	way	of	life»	if	they	didn’t	support	research	and	innovation:	
Europe	and	its	citizens	should	realise	that	their	way	of	 life	 is	under	threat	but	also	that	the	path	to	
prosperity	through	research	and	innovation	is	open	if	large	scale	action	is	taken	now	by	their	leaders	
before	it	is	too	late.	
The	very	 recent	 “Lamy	 report”,	developed	 in	2017	 (more	 than	a	decade	after	 the	Aho	 report)	 in	
preparation	of	FP9,	shows	to	maintain	the	same	momentum	on	the	«urgency	of	global	challenges»	(Lamy	et	
al.,	2017):	
(…)	the	rate	of	technological	and	economic	change	and	the	urgency	of	global	challenges	continue	to	
outpace	Europe’s	response	and	reforms.	
It	is	imperative	for	Europe	to	act,	to	act	now	and	to	act	decisively.	(…)	
The	EU’s	substantial	knowledge	assets,	based	on	science	and	research,	need	to	be	faster	and	more	
intensively	 turned	 into	 innovations,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 new	 products,	 processes,	 services	 and	 business	
models,	which	generate	value	for	economy	and	society.	
The	 warnings	 in	 all	 these	 discourses	 relate	 to	 the	 social	 aspects	 of	 the	 citizens’	 experiences:	
«sustainability»,	 «cohesion»,	 «way	 of	 life».	 In	 other	words,	 in	 order	 to	 show	 the	 necessity	 of	 economic	
growth,	the	reports	put	forward	fears	on	the	failure	of	the	European	«way	of	life».	
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The	urgency	repertoire	in	EU	documents	shows	a	recurrent	narrative	structure:	a	relevant	example	
can	be	the	preface	to	the	Europe	2020	proposal,	personally	signed	by	the	Commission	President	Barroso	(EC,	
2010a):	
2010	must	mark	a	new	beginning.	I	want	Europe	to	emerge	stronger	from	the	economic	and	financial	
crisis.	
Economic	realities	are	moving	faster	than	political	realities,	as	we	have	seen	with	the	global	impact	of	
the	financial	crisis.	We	need	to	accept	that	the	increased	economic	interdependence	demands	also	a	
more	determined	and	coherent	response	at	the	political	level.	
The	 last	 two	years	have	 left	millions	unemployed.	 It	has	brought	a	burden	of	debt	that	will	 last	 for	
many	years.	It	has	brought	new	pressures	on	our	social	cohesion.	It	has	also	exposed	some	fundamental	
truths	 about	 the	 challenges	 that	 the	 European	 economy	 faces.	 And	 in	 the	 meantime,	 the	 global	
economy	is	moving	forward.	How	Europe	responds	will	determine	our	future.		
The	crisis	is	a	wake-up	call,	the	moment	where	we	recognise	that	"business	as	usual"	would	consign	us	
to	a	gradual	decline,	to	the	second	rank	of	the	new	global	order.	This	is	Europe's	moment	of	truth.	It	is	
the	time	to	be	bold	and	ambitious.		
Our	short-term	priority	is	a	successful	exit	from	the	crisis.	It	will	be	tough	for	some	time	yet	but	we	will	
get	 there.	 Significant	 progress	 has	 been	made	 on	 dealing	with	 bad	 banks,	 correcting	 the	 financial	
markets	and	recognising	the	need	for	strong	policy	coordination	in	the	eurozone.		
To	achieve	a	sustainable	future,	we	must	already	look	beyond	the	short	term.	Europe	needs	to	get	back	
on	track.	Then	it	must	stay	on	track.	That	is	the	purpose	of	Europe	2020.	It's	about	more	jobs	and	better	
lives.	It	shows	how	Europe	has	the	capability	to	deliver	smart,	sustainable	and	inclusive	growth,	to	find	
the	path	to	create	new	jobs	and	to	offer	a	sense	of	direction	to	our	societies.		
European	leaders	have	a	common	analysis	on	the	lessons	to	be	drawn	from	the	crisis.	We	also	share	a	
common	sense	of	urgency	on	the	challenges	ahead.	Now	we	jointly	need	to	make	it	happen.	Europe	
has	many	strengths.	We	have	a	talented	workforce,	we	have	a	powerful	technological	and	industrial	
base.	We	have	an	 internal	market	and	a	single	currency	that	have	successfully	helped	us	 resist	 the	
worst.	We	have	a	tried	and	tested	social	market	economy.	We	must	have	confidence	in	our	ability	to	
set	an	ambitious	agenda	for	ourselves	and	then	gear	our	efforts	to	delivering	it.		
The	Commission	is	proposing	five	measurable	EU	targets	for	2020	that	will	steer	the	process	and	be	
translated	into	national	targets:	for	employment;	for	research	and	innovation;	for	climate	change	and	
energy;	for	education;	and	for	combating	poverty.	They	represent	the	direction	we	should	take	and	will	
mean	we	can	measure	our	success.		
They	are	ambitious,	but	attainable.	They	are	backed	up	by	concrete	proposals	to	make	sure	they	are	
delivered.	 The	 flagship	 initiatives	 set	 out	 in	 this	 paper	 show	 how	 the	 EU	 can	 make	 a	 decisive	
contribution.	We	have	powerful	tools	to	hand	in	the	shape	of	new	economic	governance,	supported	by	
the	internal	market,	our	budget,	our	trade	and	external	economic	policy	and	the	disciplines	and	support	
of	economic	and	monetary	union.		
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The	condition	for	success	is	a	real	ownership	by	European	leaders	and	institutions.	Our	new	agenda	
requires	a	coordinated	European	response,	 including	with	social	partners	and	civil	society.	 If	we	act	
together,	then	we	can	fight	back	and	come	out	of	the	crisis	stronger.	We	have	the	new	tools	and	the	
new	ambition.	Now	we	need	to	make	it	happen.		
José	Manuel	BARROSO	
Filled	 with	 words	 relating	 to	 urgency	 and	 determination	 of	 action,	 the	 narrative	 comprises	 the	
following	steps:	
1. Declaration	of	intents	in	a	short	form;	
2. Emphasis	on	the	crisis:	the	current	situation	comprises	several	problematic	elements;	economic	
lags	trigger	social	failures;	the	situation	is	very	severe;	
3. Europe’s	resources:	despite	the	severe	situation,	EU	possesses	the	resources	to	overcome	the	
crisis;	
4. Urgency	of	action:	however,	no	exit	is	possible	if	all	the	actors	take	immediate	actions;	
5. Policy	proposal:	luckily,	EU	has	a	policy	proposal	to	solve	the	crisis;	
6. Final	call	to	engage	and	re-emphasis	of	urgency:	if	we	act	together	we	can	overcome	the	crisis,	
but	we	need	to	do	it	now.	
An	analogous	structure	can	be	found	in	diverse	other	policy	documents	(Aho	et	al.,	2006;	CEC,	2000);	
for	example,	the	2010	Commission	document	on	the	Innovation	Union	opens	with:		
At	a	time	of	public	budget	constraints,	major	demographic	changes	and	increasing	global	competition,	
Europe's	competitiveness,	our	capacity	to	create	millions	of	new	jobs	to	replace	those	lost	in	the	crisis	
and,	 overall,	 our	 future	 standard	 of	 living	 depends	 on	 our	 ability	 to	 drive	 innovation	 in	 products,	
services,	business	and	social	processes	and	models.	This	is	why	innovation	has	been	placed	at	the	heart	
of	the	Europe	2020	strategy.	Innovation	is	also	our	best	means	of	successfully	tackling	major	societal	
challenges,	 such	 as	 climate	 change,	 energy	 and	 resource	 scarcity,	 health	 and	 ageing,	 which	 are	
becoming	more	urgent	by	the	day.	
Europe	has	no	shortage	of	potential.	(…)	In	a	rapidly	changing	global	economy,	we	must	build	on	our	
strengths	and	decisively	tackle	our	weaknesses	(…)	
Innovation	Union	sets	out	such	a	bold,	integrated	and	strategic	approach	(…)	Business-as-usual	equals	
gradually	losing	our	competitive	advantages,	and	accepting	Europe's	steady	decline.	(…)	
This,	in	essence,	is	what	Innovation	Union	is	all	about.	The	benefits	will	be	significant	(…)		
With	Innovation	Union,	we	have	a	vision,	an	agenda,	a	clear	distribution	of	tasks	and	robust	monitoring	
procedures.	 The	 European	 Commission	will	 do	 what	 is	 necessary	 to	make	 the	 Innovation	 Union	 a	
reality.	
In	 the	 urgency	 narrative,	 the	 «weaknesses»	 of	 the	 European	 system	 are	 not	 only	 described,	 but	
emphasized	to	varying	degrees	in	order	to	form	the	legitimation	of	the	proposed	actions.		
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Even	 if	 rhetorically	 effective,	 this	 is	 not	 the	 only	 possible	 argumentative	 structure	 to	 achieve	
persuasion,	nor	it	was	the	rule	in	European	discourses	before	the	turn	of	the	Millennium:	for	example,	the	
1993	White	Paper	on	Growth,	Competitiveness,	Employment	 (CEC,	1993b)	described	 the	problems	of	 the	
Community	 in	 a	more	 nuanced	way,	 not	 indulging	 to	 the	 urgency	 rhetoric,	 but	 invoking	 «sensitivity	 and	
caution»:	
Why	this	White	Paper?	The	one	and	only	reason	is	unemployment.		
We	are	aware	of	its	scale,	and	of	its	consequences	too.	The	difficult	thing,	as	experience	has	taught	us,	
is	knowing	how	to	tackle	it.	(…)	
The	European	Commission	is	aware	of	the	difficulty	of	the	task.	For	if	the	solutions	already	existed,	our	
countries	 would	 surely	 have	 applied	 them;	 if	 there	 were	 a	 miracle	 cure,	 it	 would	 not	 have	 gone	
unnoticed.	With	national	situations	being	so	different,	any	proposal	has	to	be	presented	with	sensitivity	
and	caution.	That	being	so,	the	Commission	does	share	the	view,	expressed	by	many	Member	States,	
that	joint	responses	would	strengthen	the	hand	of	each	player,	and	therefore	of	the	European	Union.	
Another	possible	presentation	of	new	policies	can	be	found	in	the	document	Towards	a	Europe	of	
knowledge:	although	mentioning	«two	major	preoccupations»	(related	to	the	realization	of	the	knowledge	
society	and	to	the	employment	policies),	it	didn’t	frame	them	in	a	negative	manner,	but	gave	space	to	the	
proposals	to	overcome	them	(CEC,	1997c).	
The	overall	tone	of	the	urgency-based	discourses	is	concerned	and	alarmed,	as	if	a	major	turmoil	had	
just	happened.	However,	the	appeal	to	urgency	arguments	doesn’t	appear	necessarily	correlated	to	historical	
events,	excepted	for	the	2008	financial	turmoil,	which	had	the	effect	to	increase	significantly	the	rhetorical	
level	of	anxiety	already	present	in	previous	documents	(e.g.	EC,	2011a);	for	example,	the	mentioned	2000	
document	on	the	ERA	was	published	in	a	period	that	would	have	been	defined,	only	a	couple	of	months	later	
and	by	another	 important	policy	document,	as	characterised	by	 the	«best	macro-economic	outlook	 for	a	
generation»	(Council,	2000).	
The	narrative	 structure	 resembles	 the	argumentations	used	during	conflict	periods,	 like	war-time	
speeches102;	after	all,	the	concept	of	competitiveness,	abundantly	adopted	by	the	EU,	is	in	itself	an	agonistic	
																																								 																				
102	cf.,	for	example,	Churchill’s	May	13,	1940	speech	at	the	House	of	Commons	(Churchill,	1940):	
I	beg	to	move,		
That	this	House	welcomes	the	formation	of	a	Government	representing	the	united	and	inflexible	resolve	of	the	nation	to	
prosecute	the	war	with	Germany	to	a	victorious	conclusion.	(…)	To	form	an	Administration	of	this	scale	and	complexity	is	a	
serious	undertaking	in	itself,	but	it	must	be	remembered	that	we	are	in	the	preliminary	stage	of	one	of	the	greatest	battles	
in	 history,	 that	we	 are	 in	 action	 at	many	 other	 points	 in	 Norway	 and	 in	 Holland,	 that	we	 have	 to	 be	 prepared	 in	 the	
Mediterranean,	that	the	air	battle	is	continuous	and	that	many	preparations,	such	as	have	been	indicated	by	my	hon.	Friend	
below	the	Gangway,	have	to	be	made	here	at	home.	In	this	crisis	I	hope	I	may	be	pardoned	if	I	do	not	address	the	House	at	
any	length	today.	(…)	I	would	say	to	the	House,	as	I	said	to	those	who	have	joined	this	government:	"I	have	nothing	to	offer	
but	blood,	toil,	tears	and	sweat."	We	have	before	us	an	ordeal	of	the	most	grievous	kind.	We	have	before	us	many,	many	
long	months	of	struggle	and	of	suffering.	You	ask,	what	is	our	policy?	I	can	say:	It	is	to	wage	war,	by	sea,	land	and	air,	with	
all	our	might	and	with	all	the	strength	that	God	can	give	us;	to	wage	war	against	a	monstrous	tyranny,	never	surpassed	in	
the	dark,	lamentable	catalogue	of	human	crime.	That	is	our	policy.	You	ask,	what	is	our	aim?	I	can	answer	in	one	word:	It	is	
victory,	victory	at	all	costs,	victory	in	spite	of	all	terror,	victory,	however	long	and	hard	the	road	may	be;	for	without	victory,	
there	is	no	survival.	Let	that	be	realised;	no	survival	for	the	British	Empire,	no	survival	for	all	that	the	British	Empire	has	stood	
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metaphor:	 it	 depicts	 a	 scenario	where	 the	players	 fight	 to	win	 the	 race,	 in	 a	winner-takes-all	 game.	 The	
economist	Paul	Krugman,	criticizing	Delors’	emphasis	on	competitiveness,	(Krugman,	1994)	highlighted	the	
consequences	and	motivations	of	basing	economic	policies	on	competitiveness,	which	can	actually	become	
a	harsh	confrontation	among	countries,	and	lead	to	the	perception	of	economy	as	a	race	against	competitors,	
analysed	 as	 if	 they	were	 simple	 companies	 and	not	 complex	 nation	 states.	 Trusting	 the	 competitiveness	
«obsession»,	he	argued,	serves	different	purposes:	first,	competitive	metaphors	are	exciting,	motivating	–	as	
was	the	case	 for	 the	space	race	between	USA	and	the	Soviet	Union	–;	secondly,	positioning	the	problem	
‘outside’	the	national	systems	is	convenient	for	politicians,	who	can,	in	so	doing,	avoid	facing	difficult	internal	
problems	–	like	what	Delors	did,	according	to	him,	with	the	1993	White	Paper,	where	he	put	forward	the	lack	
of	competitiveness	as	the	reason	for	unemployment,	while	he	should	have	faced	the	complex	European	taxes	
and		regulation	system,	combined	with	 its	expensive	welfare,	and	the	difficulties	related	to	the	European	
monetary	 system	 against	 the	 costs	 of	 the	 German	 reunification	 –;	 finally,	 he	 considered	 that	 the	
competitiveness	language	represents	a	very	useful	rhetorical	tool	for	politicians	as	a	leverage	to	justify	hard	
choices.	
The	urgency	frame,	hence,	can	be	regarded	as	a	by-product	of	basing	economic	policies	on	a	conflict	
metaphor	 like	competitiveness.	Even	 if	 the	roots	of	 the	competitiveness	 rationale	are	deeply	entrenched	
with	the	historical	and	conceptual	development	in	the	understanding	of	the	role	of	science	in	public	policies,	
it	is	unavoidable	to	underline	that	resorting	to	arguments	based	on	fear,	highlighting	the	difficulties	of	the	
situation	in	order	to	emphasize	the	proposed	initiatives,	also	inevitably	obtains	the	effect	of	downplaying	
critical	voices,	closing	up	the	spaces	for	further	discussions.	In	European	documents	the	more	frequent	is	the	
use	of	urgency	terms,	the	narrower	becomes	the	path	to	the	solution:	the	non-compulsory	nature	of	the	
policies	appears	vanishing	against	the	presentation	of	solid	arguments	in	favour	of	a	one-way	track.	The	use	
of	terms	referring	to	determination	and	need	contributes	to	the	presentation	of	political	imperatives	in	place	
of	options.	
«Real things!»: measurability and impact  
We	 have	 already	 mentioned	 above	 how,	 in	 the	 video	 realized	 by	 the	 Commission	 to	 introduce	
Horizon2020,	pressing	societal	challenges	were	presented	as	«real	things»,	and	later	on,	when	dealing	with	
the	 apparent	 conflict	 between	 emphasising	 concreteness	 of	 objectives	 and	 promoting	 basic	 science,	 the	
speaker	again	insisted	on	Horizon	«getting	closer	to	real	every	day	needs»	(EC,	2014e).	
Such	insistence	in	the	communication	product	on	a	peculiar	feature	of	the	research	programme	–	
the	practical	orientation	and	the	impact	on	«every	day»	lives	–	can	be	regarded	as	evidence	of	an	underlying	
shared	positive	judgement	on	concrete,	output-oriented	activities,	or,	conversely,	expresses	the	will	of	the	
																																								 																				
for,	no	survival	for	the	urge	and	impulse	of	the	ages,	that	mankind	will	move	forward	towards	its	goal.	But	I	take	up	my	task	
with	buoyancy	and	hope.	I	feel	sure	that	our	cause	will	not	be	suffered	to	fail	among	men.	At	this	time	I	feel	entitled	to	claim	
the	aid	of	all,	and	I	say,	“come	then,	let	us	go	forward	together	with	our	united	strength”.	
123	
Commission	 to	 position	 against	 time-	 (and	 money-)	 wasting	 research	 activities,	 whose	 results	 are	 not	
immediately	visible	as	tangible	improvements.	
This	 unspoken	 judgement	 is	 part	 of	 a	 wider	 conceptual	 framework	 assigning	 a	 positive	 value	 to	
practical,	tangible	spill-overs	while	at	the	same	time	unfavourably	judging	research	activities	with	opposite	
features.	The	consequences	of	such	an	evaluation	are	diverse:	a	focus	on	results	rather	than	on	the	process,	
a	 devaluation	 of	 intangible	 achievements,	 the	 rise	 of	 an	 «accountability»-based	model,	 an	 emphasis	 on	
measurability,	efficiency,	performance,	impact.	
This	 framework	 is	not	specifically	European:	a	shift	 towards	accountable,	 results-oriented	policies	
can	be	identified	in	Western	countries	since	the	‘60s,	and	it	descends	from	a	corpus	of	new	schools	of	thought	
in	the	political	and	economic	sectors,	sharing	the	common	feature	of	emphasizing	measurement	of	results	
and	evaluation	of	the	systems	performances.	
Measuring research.	 The	works	 of	 Godin	 (Godin,	 2006c,	 2009)	 trace	 the	 evolution	 of	 accounting	
exercises,	making	use	of	statistical	standards	to	measure	the	performances	of	the	national	R&D	systems,	and	
identify	 in	 the	 OECD	 the	 ‘propellant’	 institution,	 with	 the	 development	 of	 the	 Frascati	 manual	 on	 the	
measurement	of	scientific	and	technologic	activities	(OECD,	1963).	This	manual	was	not	a	simple	econometric	
exercise:	it	was	developed	as	an	answer	to	«early	policy	demand	for	statistics»,	coming	from	governments	
in	search	of	funds	allocation	criteria	and	looking	for	a	connection	between	scientific	research	and	economic	
growth.	 The	 effect	 of	 the	 manual,	 and	 of	 the	 underlying	 economic	 culture,	 was	 the	 diffusion	 of	 a	
representation	of	science	as	«research	accounting»,	evaluable	by	the	indicators	of	efficiency,	performance	
and	impact,	by	means	of	input-output	models.		
The	European	Commission	was	actively	involved	with	this	OECD	effort	during	the	‘70s	–	the	period	
when	it	was	first	developing	its	own	coordinated	science	policy	–	and	it	contributed	to	the	collection	of	data	
on	the	socioeconomic	objectives	of	government-funded	R&D,	with	the	aim	of	studying	the	political	goals	of	
research	policy	(Godin,	2009,	p.	86).		
The	publication	of	the	second	wave	of	OECD	Manuals	in	the	‘90s	(Oslo,	Canberra,	jointly	realized	by	
OECD	and	Eurostat,	and	the	family	of	related	manuals103)	reflected	the	evolution	of	the	economic	academic	
community	reflections	on	innovations,	and	answered	to	the	need	of	new	«STI	output	indicators».	Again,	the	
new	set	of	measurements	was	not	a	neutral	instrument,	but	an	active	influencer	of	the	scholarly	debates,	as	
confirmed	by	the	economists	Cristopher	Freeman	–	one	of	the	‘fathers’	the	Frascati	Manual,	and	among	the	
leading	scholars	in	the	innovation	studies	–	and	his	colleague	Luc	Soete:	«As	in	the	case	of	the	development	
																																								 																				
103	To	be	exact,	the	5th	edition	of	the	Frascati	Manual	and	Godin	(Godin,	2009;	OECD,	1993)	identify	the	following	main	
series	of	Manuals	in	the	«R&D	family»:	The	Measurement	of	Scientific	and	Technical	Activities:	Proposed	Standard	Practice	for	Surveys	
of	Research	and	Development	(Frascati	manual,	first	edition	in	1962),	R&D	Statistics	and	Output	Measurement	in	the	Higher	Education	
Sector	 -	 Frascati	 Manual	 Supplement	 (1989),	 Proposed	 Standard	 Practice	 for	 the	 Collection	 and	 Interpretation	 of	 Data	 on	 the	
Technological	 Balance	 of	 Payments	 (first	 edition	 in	 1990),	 Proposed	 Guidelines	 for	 Collecting	 and	 Interpreting	 Technological	
Innovation	Data	(Oslo	manual,	first	edition	in	1992),	Data	on	Patents	and	Their	Utilization	as	Science	and	Technology	Indicators	(first	
edition	 in	1994),	Manual	on	 the	Measurement	of	Human	Resources	 in	Science	and	Technology	 (Canberra	manual,	 first	edition	 in	
1995).	Stats	Canada	and	Eurostat	undertook	analogous	measurements,	and/or	participated	to	OECD	effort	(Freeman	&	Soete,	2009).	
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of	harmonized	industrial	R&D	statistics	within	the	Frascati	Manual,	we	would	claim	that	the	development	of	
harmonized,	 innovation-output	 indicators	within	 the	 framework	of	 the	Oslo	Manual	was	a	 central	 factor	
behind	both	a	better	understanding	of	the	science	and	technology	system	and	the	changing	nature	of	the	
innovation	process	itself»	(Freeman	&	Soete,	2009).	
From administration to management.	Another	important	international	trend,	whose	founding	values	
influenced	(and	were	influenced	by)	political	thinking,	was	the	rise	of	the	«New	Public	Management»	(NPM)	
theory	on	public	administration,	i.e.,	according	to	the	science	policy	scholar	Aant	Elzinga,	a	«shorthand	for	
applying	private	sector	or	market-based	techniques	to	public	services»	(Elzinga,	2010).		
NPM	was	developed	during	the	‘70s	and	‘80s	from	previous	theories	of	public	administration;	initially	
applied	in	the	UK	of	Margaret	Thatcher,	in	New	Zealand	and	in	Australia,	it	was	subsequently	adopted,	with	
national	 variations,	 by	most	OECD	 countries.	 The	 theory	was	 based	 on	 a	 departure	 from	 the	 traditional	
models	of	public	administration,	based	on	the	compliance	to	a	set	of	 rules	and	on	the	respect	of	a	strict	
hierarchical	organization,	in	favour	of	a	flexible	approach	to	management,	inspired	by	the	private	sector	and	
by	the	«logic	of	economics»	(Keating,	2001).	The	main	features	of	New	Public	Management	are	the	focus	on	
objectives,	 the	 imitation	 of	 market	 mechanisms	 and	 a	 reduction	 of	 control	 in	 favour	 of	 accountability;	
statistics	and	benchmarking,	hence,	play	a	significant	role	also	for	NPM.	According	to	Elzinga	(Elzinga,	2010),	
the	New	Public	Management	approach	is	based	on:	
• More	for	less		
• Marketization	(including	creation	of	quasi-markets	in	administrative	organizations)		
• Commoditization	of	health	care	services,	welfare	benefits,	teaching	packages	and	research	
results	(also	those	generated	by	publicly	funded	institutions)	
• Inducing	competition	between	task	performers	
• Turning	citizens	into	consumers	and	clients	(this	goes	for	students	too)		
• Agencification	(contractification)	
• From	administration	to	management	(fostering	the	entrepreneurial	bureaucrat)	
• From	input	to	output/outcome	control	
• Performance-based	management	(and	funding),	Performativity	metrics	(accountingization)	
• Reputation	and	image	management	(PR	&	branding)	
• Entrepreneurialism		
• Partnering	
The	reform	of	the	administration	in	the	European	Union	–	initiated	by	the	Santer	Commission	in	1995	
and	finalized,	after	the	mass	resignation	of	the	Commission	in	1999,	by	the	Prodi	Commission	(CEC,	2001;	EC	
&	 Kinnock,	 2000)	 –	 included	 various	 features	 aligning	 the	 Commission	 to	 the	 NPM	 approach,	 in	 the	
management	of	human	resources	 (Knill	&	Balint,	2008),	but	also	 in	the	criteria	related	to	agenda-setting:	
accountability,	 efficiency,	 focus	 on	 results,	 externalization	 of	 non-core	 activities,	 performance-oriented	
working	methods	(EC	&	Kinnock,	2000)	were	included	in	EU	management	procedures.	
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Since	no	policy	output	is	independent	from	the	process	that	produced	it,	it	is	not	surprising	to	find	
the	criteria	to	define	a	‘good	management’	translated	to	the	evaluation	of	‘good	policies’.	
The general neoliberal political-economic climate.	There	is	no	one-way	path	from	political-economic	
frameworks	to	real	processes	(or	vice	versa),	and	any	idea	diffuses	in	complex	ways,	influencing	and	being	
influenced	by	actual	realizations.	However,	it	is	possible	to	recognize	in	the	new	economic	theories,	in	the	
diffusion	of	statistical	 indicators	and	 in	the	rise	of	New	Public	Management	the	 influence	of	the	political-
economic	neoliberal	theory,	with	its	valorisation	of	markets	mechanism	and	private	actors	at	the	expense	of	
public	 interventions.	All	 these	components	composed	the	mainstream	political-economic	discourses	 that,	
although	seldom	patently	cited	in	documents,	contributed	to	the	definition	of	the	current	European	policies	
on	science.	
Neoliberal	 theories	 emerged	as	 a	 response	 to	 the	economic	 crises	of	 the	 ‘70s	 ad	 ‘80s,	 and	were	
characterised	 by	 the	 belief	 that	 «human	 well-being	 can	 best	 be	 advanced	 by	 liberating	 individual	
entrepreneurial	 freedoms	 and	 skills	 within	 an	 institutional	 framework	 characterized	 by	 strong	 private	
property	rights,	free	markets,	and	free	trade.	The	role	of	the	state	is	to	create	and	preserve	an	institutional	
framework	 appropriate	 to	 such	 practices»	 (Harvey,	 2005).	 Important	 tenets	 of	 neoliberalism	 are	 the	
preference	 accorded	 to	 markets	 over	 governments	 as	 policy	 instruments	 and	 the	 expectations	 from	
economic	development	to	produce	an	increase	in	the	standards	of	living	rather	than	redistribution	(Moore	
et	al.,	2011).	
The European vision.	Notwithstanding	the	fact	that	the	European	Community	has	not	expressed	a	
political	 choice	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 one	 or	 the	 other	 model	 –	 given	 also	 the	 weaknesses	 of	 its	 system	 of	
representative	democracy	–	it	is	possible	to	recognize	in	the	European	policies	on	research	a	shift	towards	
some	features	of	the	described	political-economic	visions.		
The	 original	 concern	 of	 the	 ‘70s	 first	 attempts	 of	 European	 science	 policies	 was	 the	 lack	 of	
coordination	 of	 national	 programmes,	 and	 the	 ERA	 project	 was	 especially	 designed	 to	 overcome	 the	
«compartmentalisation	of	public	research	systems»	(CEC,	2000):	
It	 cannot	be	said	 that	 there	 is	 today	a	European	policy	on	 research.	National	 research	policies	and	
Union	policy	overlap	without	 forming	a	 coherent	whole.	 If	more	progress	 is	 to	be	made	a	broader	
approach	 is	needed	than	the	one	adopted	to	date.	 (…)	Essentially,	 the	non-existence	of	a	European	
research	 area	 is	 due	 to	 the	 compartmentalisation	 of	 public	 research	 systems	 and	 to	 the	 lack	 of	
coordination	in	the	manner	in	which	national	and	European	research	policies	are	implemented.	Much	
needs	to	be	done	in	this	area,	without,	however,	putting	unwieldy	mechanisms	in	place.	At	the	same	
time	the	barriers	must	be	 lifted	between	different	disciplines,	along	with	 the	barriers	 that	curb	 the	
movement	of	knowledge	and	persons	between	the	academic	and	the	business	worlds.	
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	However,	in	the	same	years	of	ERA,	research	policy	discourses	contained	an	increased	emphasis	on	
the	 effectiveness,	 performance	 and	 impact	 of	 research,	 conceived	 as	 the	 «next	 step»	 for	 science	 policy	
(Caracostas	&	Muldur,	1998,	preface	by	Commissioner	Cresson):	
By	 focusing	 on	 increasingly	 specific	 objectives	 and	 subjects,	 this	Union	 policy104	 has	 created	 a	 real	
“European	 scientific	 and	 technological	 area”,	 built	 on	 numerous	 network	 of	 co-operation	 and	
exchange.		
The	next	and	vital	step	is	to	adapt	this	policy	to	the	new	emerging	scenario,	notably	by	improving	its	
impact	on	the	economy	and	society.	
A	few	years	later,	in	the	preparation	of	the	7th	Framework	Programme	policy	officers	advocated	for	
a	«New	Deal»	for	research,	based	on	the	benchmarking	of	national	programmes	and	the	comparison	of	«hard	
evidence	of	 the	 impact	of	 research	policies»,	 in	order	 to	maximise	 the	output/input	 ratio	 (Muldur	et	al.,	
2006):	
(..)	 7th	 Framework	 Programme	 is	 only	 a	 first	 tentative	 step	 towards	 a	 new	 governance	model	 for	
European	research	policy.	What	is	really	needed	(…)	is	a	“New	Deal”	for	research,	based	on	sharing	
and	comparing	hard	evidence	of	the	impact	of	research	policies	at	regional,	national	and	EU	levels.	
Only	in	this	way	will	Europe	be	able	to	identify	what	is	done	best	at	each	level,	and	how	to	get	the	most	
out	of	the	public	resources	it	invests.		
FP7,	besides,	was	prepared	in	the	years	2004-2006	(Andrée,	2009)	in	the	new	regulatory	frame	asking	
for	 in-depth	 impact	 assessment	 reports	 to	 accompany	 every	 legislative	 proposal	 of	 the	 Commission,	
compulsory	since	2003	(Muldur	et	al.,	2006):		
Impact	assessment	is	a	new	approach	for	improving	the	transparency	and	quality	of	policy	design.	It	
informs	decision-makers	of	the	likely	consequences	of	policy	choices	by	answering	a	common	set	of	
questions.	 It	assesses	the	issues	at	stake	and	the	objectives	to	be	pursued	by	the	policy	proposal.	 It	
examines	the	views	of	the	main	stakeholders	that	will	be	affected	by	the	policy.	It	identifies	the	main	
policy	options	for	achieving	the	objectives,	and	analyses	their	likely	economic,	environmental	and	social	
impacts.	
In	the	shift	from	the	political	objective	of	enhancing	coordination	among	national	research	systems	
to	the	emphasis	on	achieving	the	maximum	impact,	we	can	recognize	the	influence	of	the	measurement	and	
efficiency	models	of	public	policies	evaluation	and	legitimation.	The	brochure	Horizon	2020	–	two	years	on,	
published	by	the	Commission	in	2016,	graphically	depicts	the	«key	performance	indicators»	by	which	Horizon	
2020	«success	is	measured»	(EC,	2016g):		
To	make	sure	every	euro	is	spent	effectively,	the	Commission	has	introduced	a	performance	reporting	
mechanism.		
																																								 																				
104	European	research	(note	of	the	author).	
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Among	the	indicators	(see	Fig.	33)	appear	the	number	of	publications	and	patents	published	in	high-
impact	journals,	the	number	of	collaborations	established	among	research	institutes	and	other	innovation	
actors,	but	also	the	«number	of	occurrences	of	tangible	specific	impacts	on	European	policies»	(an	indicator	
of	the	JRC	performance)	and	the	«total	investments	via	debt	financing	and	venture	capital	investments»	(to	
measure	the	success	of	the	objective	“Access	to	risk	finance	for	 investing	 in	research	&	innovation”).	The	
measurement	effort	is	described	as	oriented	to	«accountability	and	transparency»,	and	ultimately	realised	
to	the	benefit	of	the	citizens:	
The	 Performance	 framework	 provides	 EU	 decision	makers	 and	 citizens	 with	 a	 clear	 picture	 of	 the	
progress	towards	expected	results	to	be	achieved	with	the	money	invested	at	the	EU	level.	
Another	notable	approach	of	the	current	policy	is	a	generally	critical	attitude	towards	«diagnosing	
the	problem»,	in	favour	of	«remedies»	–	unless	reflecting	on	the	problem,	by	means	of	«indicators»,	serves	
to	emphasize	the	urgency	to	act	(Aho	et	al.,	2006):		
There	is	a	large	gap	between	the	rhetoric	of	a	political	system	that	preaches	the	knowledge	society	
and	the	reality	of	budgetary	and	other	priorities	that	have	shown	little	shift	 in	preparing	to	engage	
with	it.	Our	emphasis	is	on	remedies	not	diagnosis	but	we	must	also	recognize	the	magnitude	of	the	
problem.	There	are	many	indicators	both	of	insufficient	effort	to	innovate	and	of	the	consequences	of	
not	doing	so	(…)	
The	emphasis	on	problem	solving,	coupled	in	this	quotation	with	a	trenchant	position	against	the	
rhetorical	preaching	of	the	political	system,	is	best	embodied	by	the	current	inclination	towards	challenge-
based	 programmes.	 The	 formulation	 of	 policy	 objectives	 in	 terms	 of	 «challenges»,	where	 the	 issues	 are	
presented	 to	 researchers	 as	problem-oriented	puzzles	 to	 solve,	 stimulating	 their	 interest	 as	well	 as	 their	
agonistic	spirit,	is	not	specifically	European,	but	it’s	part	of	a	common	Western	rhetorical	trend	focusing	on	
the	need	of	effective	solutions	at	the	expenses	of	the	confrontation	on	the	definition	of	the	problem	and	on	
the	desired	outcomes	(see	the	paragraph	on	Solving	Grand	Challenges	below).	This	focus	on	problem-solving,	
instead	of	agenda-setting,	may	be	referred	as	well	to	the	general	discourse	promoting	‘real’,	measurable	and	
tangible	outcomes	of	research.	
The	 researchers	 themselves,	 indeed,	 are	 asked	 to	 cultivate	 entrepreneurial	 skills:	 already	 FP5,	 in	
1998,	introduced	the	hybrid	term	«enterprising	researcher»,	able	to	produce	innovation	(EP	&	CEU,	1998):	
(encourage)	the	emergence	of	a	new	generation	of	enterprising	researchers	with	innovative	ideas;	
FP7	 (2006)	 advocated	 for	 the	 researchers	 to	 receive	 training	 in	 a	 broader	 spectrum	 of	 skills,	
«including	those	relating	to	technology	transfer	and	entrepreneurship»	(EP	&	CEU,	2006):	
Initial	training	of	researchers	to	improve	their	career	perspectives,	in	both	public	and	private	sectors,	
inter	 alia	 through	 the	 broadening	 of	 their	 scientific	 and	 generic	 skills,	 including	 those	 relating	 to	
technology	transfer	and	entrepreneurship,	and	attracting	more	young	people	to	scientific	careers.	
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Horizon	 2020,	 coherently	with	 its	 insistence	 on	 the	 need	 of	marketing	 ideas	 as	 fast	 as	 possible,	
posited	 for	 the	 EIT	 (European	 Institute	 of	 Technology)	 the	 objective	 of	 	 promoting	 «entrepreneurial	
education»,	oriented	to	the	creation	of	spin-offs	and	start-ups	(EP	&	CEU,	2006):		
The	EIT	should	foster	entrepreneurship	in	its	higher	education,	research	and	innovation	activities.	In	
particular,	it	should	promote	excellent	entrepreneurial	education	and	support	the	creation	of	start-ups	
and	spin-offs.	
Also	the	very	recent	“Lamy	report”,	developed	in	preparation	of	FP9	and	focused	on	«maximising	the	
impact	 of	 EU	 Research	 &	 Innovation	 Programmes»	 (Lamy	 et	 al.,	 2017),	 emphasises	 the	 entrepreneurial	
«reform»	that	should	be	promoted	in	European	education,	based	on	the	promotion	of	«self-confidence»	and	
tolerance	towards	«failures»:	
A	 fundamental	 reform	 of	 the	 role	 of	 education	 should	 systematically	 embed	 innovation	 and	
entrepreneurship	in	education	across	Europe,	starting	from	early	stage	school	curricula.	Schools	should	
foster	a	culture	that	boosts	self-confidence;	society	should	build	an	environment	that	allows	for	failure	
of	 new	 ventures	 and	 continuous	 life-long-learning.	 In	 the	 future,	 everybody	 in	 society	 should	 be	
stimulated	to	be	creative,	from	children	to	elderly,	from	employees	to	employers,	from	civil	servants	to	
start-ups.		
Europe’s	universities	need	urgent	renewal,	to	stimulate	entrepreneurship	(…)	
The	shift	 from	coordination	of	policies	to	efficiency	and	 impact,	the	emphasis	on	problem-solving	
and	 results,	 and	 the	 promotion	 of	 entrepreneurship	 of	 researchers,	 position	 EU	 innovation	 frame	 in	 the	
general	Western	shift	towards	the	valorisation	of	practical,	tangible	research	outputs	and	characterisation,	
favoured	 by	 the	 rise	 of	 neoliberal	 thinking,	 the	 OECD-promoted	 emphasis	 on	 S&T	 measurement	 and	
benchmarking,	 and	 the	 New	 Public	Management	 approach	 to	 public	 administration.	 The	 same	 political-
economic	climate	influenced	the	portrayal	of	quality	of	life	as	strictly	connected	to	wealth	production.	
Innovation is the answer: a linear path from wealth to happiness 
The	Horizon	2020	 introductory	video	(EC,	2014e)	presented	the	 improvement	of	 lives	against	 the	
picture	of	a	family	scene	at	the	supermarket	(see	above	and	Fig.	34),	and	rhetorically	identified	the	logical	
chain	leading	to	that	result	as:	
Good	ideas	à	marketization	à	boost	of	the	economy	à	creation	of	jobs	à	improvement	of	lives.	
The	envisaged	measures	of	H2020,	the	so-called	«Flagship	Initiatives»,	are	described	mostly	in	terms	
of	their	contribution	to	innovation	or	to	the	market,	with	marked	accents	on	the	efficiency	and	performance	
of	the	systems	(EC,	2010a):	
–	 "Innovation	 Union"	 to	 improve	 framework	 conditions	 and	 access	 to	 finance	 for	 research	 and	
innovation	so	as	to	ensure	that	innovative	ideas	can	be	turned	into	products	and	services	that	create	
growth	and	jobs.	
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–	"Youth	on	the	move"	to	enhance	the	performance	of	education	systems	and	to	facilitate	the	entry	of	
young	people	to	the	labour	market.	
–	"A	digital	agenda	for	Europe"	to	speed	up	the	roll-out	of	high-speed	internet	and	reap	the	benefits	of	
a	digital	single	market	for	households	and	firms.	
–	"Resource	efficient	Europe"	to	help	decouple	economic	growth	from	the	use	of	resources,	support	the	
shift	 towards	a	 low	carbon	economy,	 increase	the	use	of	renewable	energy	sources,	modernise	our	
transport	sector	and	promote	energy	efficiency.	
–	 "An	 industrial	 policy	 for	 the	 globalisation	 era"	 to	 improve	 the	 business	 environment,	 notably	 for	
SMEs,	and	to	support	the	development	of	a	strong	and	sustainable	 industrial	base	able	to	compete	
globally.	
–	"An	agenda	for	new	skills	and	jobs"	to	modernise	labour	markets	and	empower	people	by	developing	
their	of	skills105	throughout	the	lifecycle	with	a	view	to	increase	labour	participation	and	better	match	
labour	supply	and	demand,	including	through	labour	mobility.	
–	"European	platform	against	poverty"	to	ensure	social	and	territorial	cohesion	such	that	the	benefits	
of	growth	and	jobs	are	widely	shared	and	people	experiencing	poverty	and	social	exclusion	are	enabled	
to	live	in	dignity	and	take	an	active	part	in	society.	
Each	 priority,	 even	 those	 belonging	 to	 the	 social	 care	 and	 education	 sectors,	 are	 ultimately	
legitimized	by	economic	factors:	education	systems	need	to	increase	their	«performance»	in	order	to	speed	
up	the	entry	 in	the	 labour	market,	and	so	the	acquisition	of	new	skills	 is	geared	to	the	empowerment	of	
people,	portrayed	as	workers	–	the	cultural	and	civil	contribution	of	education	are	here	not	mentioned;	high-
speed	internet	needs	to	be	boosted	in	order	to	increase	the	firm’s	competitiveness;	poverty	is	framed	as	a	
problem	of	missed	access	to	the	benefits	of	economic	growth.	Finally,	research	and	innovation	need	to	be	
financed	in	order	to	«turn»	innovative	ideas	into	«products	and	services	that	create	growth	and	jobs».	
The	tendency	to	identify	market-based	solutions	to	social	and	political	issues	is	a	recurrent	trait	of	
EU	 research	 policy	 documents,	 particularly	 visible	 in	 its	 most	 recent	 developments,	 like	 the	 last	 few	
Framework	Programmes	establishing	acts	–	where	we	noticed	an	evolution	from	a	parallelism	of	social	and	
economic	objectives	to	a	causal	relationship	between	them	(i.e.,	economic	wealth	as	the	source	of	social	
value,	see	above)	–	and	the	documents	related	to	Europe	2020	and	the	Innovation	Union	(EC,	2010c):	
At	a	time	of	public	budget	constraints,	major	demographic	changes	and	increasing	global	competition,	
Europe's	competitiveness,	our	capacity	to	create	millions	of	new	jobs	to	replace	those	lost	in	the	crisis	
and,	 overall,	 our	 future	 standard	 of	 living	 depends	 on	 our	 ability	 to	 drive	 innovation	 in	 products,	
services,	business	and	social	processes	and	models.	This	is	why	innovation	has	been	placed	at	the	heart	
of	the	Europe	2020	strategy.	Innovation	is	also	our	best	means	of	successfully	tackling	major	societal	
challenges,	 such	 as	 climate	 change,	 energy	 and	 resource	 scarcity,	 health	 and	 ageing,	 which	 are	
becoming	more	urgent	by	the	day.		
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Innovation	is	proposed	in	this	document	as	the	crucial	driver	of	«our	future	standard	of	living»;	it	is	
identified	as	the	main	instrument	to	address	issues	like	climate	change,	health,	ageing	and	resource	scarcity,	
which	belong	to	different	realms,	and	are	subject	to	multiple	understandings:	climate	change	is	a	complex	
environmental	 problem,	 related	 to	 scientific,	 technical,	 political,	 economic	 and	 social	 factors;	 health	 and	
ageing	are	significantly	value-based	subjects,	as	well	as	medical,	social	and	administrative;	resource	scarcity	
may	be	treated	as	an	engineering,	geological,	political	and	economic	problem.		
This	approach	shows	a	double	simplification:	on	one	side,	the	discourse	is	based	on	the	belief	that	
the	marketization	of	ideas,	through	the	focus	on	innovation,	will	be	able	to	solve	complex	problems;	on	the	
other	hand,	in	the	specific	context	of	research	policy,	the	community	leans	principally	on	scientific	ideas	to	
address	the	issues	at	stake.	Scientism	and	economism,	deeply	intertwined	with	each	other,	are	hence	two	
critical	features	of	the	EU	discourses	on	science	policy,	particularly	in	the	innovation	frame.	
This	approach	is	not	free	of	tensions:	in	2006,	the	Aho	report	could	perceive	a	friction	between	«what	
is	distinctive	about	European	values»	and	«a	market-led	vision»	if	it	bothered	to	justify	it,	and	advocated	for	
a	«reformed	social	model	conducive	to	innovation»	(Aho	et	al.,	2006):	
A	market-led	vision	does	not	mean	an	abandonment	of	what	is	distinctive	about	European	values	but	
rather	the	use	of	the	force	of	the	market	to	preserve	them,	both	by	harnessing	innovation	to	engage	
with	 public	 services	 and	 by	 creating	 the	 wealth	 necessary	 to	 finance	 the	 equality,	 health,	 social	
cohesion	and	common	security	that	our	citizens	desire.	Investments	in	education,	science,	research	and	
innovation	should	not	be	seen	as	alternatives	to	investments	in	the	welfare	society	in	Europe,	but	as	
necessary	 though	not	sufficient	means	to	ensure	 its	sustainability,	albeit	 through	a	reformed	social	
model	conducive	to	innovation.	
The	 report,	 focused	 on	 «creating	 an	 innovative	 Europe»,	 promoted	 the	 «use	 of	 the	 force	 of	 the	
market»	 to	 «preserve»	 the	 European	 values,	 highlighting	 financial	 wealth	 as	 a	 necessary	 condition	 for	
equality,	health,	social	cohesion	and	security.	Again	here	we	spot	the	reference	to	the	neoliberal	discourse	
on	economic	prosperity	as	the	basis	not	only	of	a	secure	and	comfortable	life,	but	even	of	personal	fulfilment	
(Moore	et	al.,	2011).	
Moreover,	the	report	includes	the	citizens	in	the	argumentation,	using	their	«desires»	as	the	ultimate	
legitimising	reason	for	action.	However,	 the	same	citizens,	elsewhere	 in	 the	same	work,	are	described	as	
alarmingly	reluctant	to	change,	and	are	suggested	to	adapt	to	the	proposed	innovation-oriented	actions	if	
they	want	 to	maintain	their	«way	of	 life».	The	reduction	of	 the	complex	dimensions	of	citizenship	to	the	
function-wise	definitions	of	the	Europeans	as	«users»	or	«consumers»	(see	below	for	a	detailed	description)	
is	another	consequence	of	the	economisation	 in	the	understanding	of	policies,	 included	scientific	policies		
(EC,	2011a):	
Europe's	taxpayers	have	a	right	to	know	how	their	money	is	invested.	Because	research	and	
innovation	are	vital	to	people's	futures,	it	is	important	to	bring	the	research	and	innovation	
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activities	funded	through	Horizon	2020	to	the	attention	of	the	general	public,	showing	in	
particular	 the	 added	 value	 of	 Union	 level	 action.	 This	 will	 generate	 better	 public	 understanding,	
engagement	and	debate.		
This	quote	from	the	Commission’s	communication	on	Horizon	2020,	even	while	advocating	for	more	
public	participation,	cannot	hide	a	pre-set	orientation	of	 the	debate	towards	the	acknowledgment	of	 the	
importance	of	R&I,	and	of	the	Commission’s	efforts	to	support	them.	Moreover,	the	need	to	engage	them	is	
motivated	in	first	instance	with	the	right	of	the	«taxpayers»	to	know	«how	their	money	is	invested»,	and	not	
by	their	right	of	citizens	to	transparency.	
It	appears	likely	that	the	approach	grounding	quality	of	life	on	innovation	will	be	maintained	in	the	
next	Framework	Programme:	Pascal	Lamy,	former	EU	Commissioner	for	Trade	and	director-general	of	WTO	
(World	Trade	Organization),	 chairman	of	 the	experts	group	on	“maximising	 the	 impact	of	EU	Research	&	
Innovation	Programmes»,	states	in	the	preface	to	the	report	Lab,	Fab,	App:	investing	in	the	future	we	want	
(Lamy	et	al.,	2017):	
We	need	to	get	rid	of	the	notion	that	research	and	innovation	is	not	relevant	to	society.	To	shape	our	
future	 together,	 we	 need	 to	 imagine,	 invent	 and	 create.	 We	 need	 research	 (“Labs”),	 innovation	
(competitive	fabrication	(“Fabs”)	and	applications	for	the	benefit	of	all	(“Apps”).	Hence	the	title	of	our	
report:	Lab,	Fab,	App:	investing	in	the	future	we	want.	
I	hope	we	will	succeed	in	convincing	public	opinion	and	decision-makers	that	further	EU	investment	in	
research	and	 innovation	and	maximising	 its	 impact	 is	 probably	 the	best	option	 that	Europe	has	 to	
deliver	solutions	and	future	well-being	for	its	citizens.	
The Innovation frame as a political instrument 
The	 European	 choice	 to	 base	 R&D	 funding	 to	 innovation,	 although	 historically	 and	 conceptually	
motivated	by	a	tendency	shared	by	most	of	the	Western	countries,	presents	distinct	features	that	mark	the	
use	of	the	innovation	frame	as	a	political	instrument.	
As	 shown,	 indeed,	 relying	on	 innovation	 is	not	a	neutral,	 technical,	 choice,	but	 it	proves,	at	 least	
implicitly,	the	adherence	to	a	political	and	economic	vision	of	Europe	–	with	many	features	in	common	with	
neoliberal	theories	–	and	it	has	far-reaching	consequences.		
The	innovation	frame	qualifies	‘good’	science	by	means	of	performance	and	effectiveness	indicators,	
excluding	considerations	on	its	contribution	to	the	advancement	of	knowledge,	or	to	the	citizens’	cultural	
development.	It	favours	the	vision	of	knowledge	as	a	commodity,	that	can	be	sold	and	bought	on	the	market,	
and	 as	 an	 instrument	 of	 wealth	 and	 power.	 It	 weds	 with	 the	 enhancement	 of	 entrepreneurship	 in	 the	
administration,	 research	 and	 education	 sectors.	 Finally,	 it	 focuses	 on	 problem-solving,	 downplaying	 the	
importance	of	problem-setting.		
Often,	especially	when	in	conjunction	with	the	rhetoric	of	urgency,	it	obtains	the	effect	of	foreclosing	
alternative	paths,	reducing	the	space	for	political	confrontation	(Stirling,	2015).	
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The	innovation	frame	resembles	to	some	extents	the	progress	narrative:	conceptually,	it	champions	
novelties	 per	 se,	 despite	 their	meaning	 or	 orientation,	 likewise	 progress	 backed	 the	most	 recent	 at	 the	
expense	 of	 the	 old.	 Both	 narratives,	 moreover,	 rely	 on	 simplifications	 and	 linearization	 of	 complex	
phenomena,	working	as	a	tool	to	realize	value-based	judgements	on	new	phenomena	or	developments.	
From	 this	 perspective,	 the	 innovation	 frame	 has	 to	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	 political	 tool,	 with	 distinct	
features	and	orientation.	
However,	despite	 the	 fact	 that,	as	 shown,	 innovation	 represents	 the	backbone	of	 research	policy	
framing,	discourses	on	science	 in	Europe	are	complex	and	multifaceted,	 include	different	voices,	possess	
internal	dynamics	that	cannot	be	reduced	to	a	single	totalitarian	mind-set,	as	the	existence	and	relevance	of	
the	competing	social	and	pure-science	frames	show.	
Social orientation of knowledge, or the “knowledge for society” frame 
The	effort	to	couple	growth	and	social	model	is	a	peculiar	and	distinctive	trait	of	European	policy,	at	
least	since	the	first	‘90s,	when	the	Maastricht	Treaty	added	social	objectives	among	the	areas	concerned	by	
communitarian	policies.	The	«European	social	model»	was	described	in	the	1994	White	Paper	on	European	
social	 policy	 (CEC,	 1994)	 as	 based	 on	 a	 set	 of	 shared	 values	 and	 constituted	 by	 the	 pairing	 of	
«competitiveness»	and	«solidarity»:	
The	contributions	to	the	Green	Paper106	confirm	that	there	are	a	number	of	shared	values	which	form	
the	basis	of	the	European	social	model.	These	include	democracy	and	individual	rights,	free	collective	
bargaining,	the	market	economy,	equality	of	opportunity	for	all	and	social	welfare	and	solidarity.	These	
values	(…)	are	held	together	by	the	conviction	that	economic	and	social	progress	must	go	hand	in	hand.	
Competitiveness	and	solidarity	have	both	to	be	taken	into	account	in	building	a	successful	Europe	for	
the	future.		
The	interplay	between	«economic	and	social	progress»,	however,	has	been	interpreted	in	different	
ways,	according	to	which	of	 the	two	concepts	 leads,	and	which	one	follows.	The	current	European	social	
policy	has	been	described	by	the	scholars	in	European	studies	as	«multi-tiered»,	i.e.	realized	concurrently	at	
different	 levels	–	ranging	from	the	European	to	the	national	 levels	–	and	the	resulting	policy	«results	 less	
from	the	ambitions	of	Eurocrats	to	build	a	welfare	state	than	from	spill-overs	from	the	single	market	process,	
which	has	invaded	the	domain	of	social	policy»	(Leibfried,	2015).	Often,	as	a	consequence	of	the	constraints	
resulting	from	such	a	complex	architecture	on	the	central	policy,	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	
plays	a	relevant	role	in	shaping,	regulatory-wise,	the	policies.	
As	mentioned,	an	analogous	effort	towards	coupling	competitiveness	and	quality	of	life	is	visible	in	
the	policies	on	science,	and	in	the	prevailing	innovation	conceptual	frame	the	leading	role	has	been	assigned	
																																								 																				
106	The	previous	Green	Paper	on	European	social	policy	(CEC,	1993a).	
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to	economic	development,	while	the	benefits	for	society	are	believed	to	come	as	a	natural	consequence.	
Governments	need	to	foster	this	chain	by	acting	as	«partners	of	industry»	(Caracostas	&	Muldur,	1998):	
Governments	will	always	act	as	partners	of	industry,	not	to	help	companies	maximize	their	profits,	but	
to	help	them	market	those	innovations	which	are	most	beneficial	to	society.		
In	this	perspective,	scientists	are	asked	to	tune	their	activities	towards	more	practical,	market-ready	
products,	but	also	towards	established	«societal	challenges».	
The	 economic	 frame	 didn’t	 receive,	 however,	 the	 full	 consensus	 of	 the	 European	 citizens,	 who	
expressed	their	concerns	 in	 the	public	debate	and	through	protest	events.	The	apprehension	regarding	a	
good	 integration	of	scientific	developments	 in	the	European	society,	 from	its	very	conception	to	the	final	
outcome,	has	been	among	the	most	contested	issues	in	the	previous	Framework	Programmes,	and	continue	
to	be	disputed	also	in	Horizon2020.		
The	aforementioned	H2020	introductory	video	puts	forward	H2020’s	position	in	this	regard:	
Horizon	2020	will	also	be	more	in	tune	with	science’s	role	 in	society,	so	 it	focuses	on	challenges	we	
urgently	need	to	address,	like	clean	energy	and	recycling,	caring	for	the	elderly,	health	care,	food	safety	
and	our	oceans:	real	things!	(…)	
Science’s	 role	 in	society,	however,	 is	a	complex	and	multifaceted	subject,	 involving	value-related,	
political,	 social	 and	 ethical	 reflections;	 the	 history	 of	 the	 disputes	 around	 this	 topic	 is	 recent	 but	 lively,	
including	debates	about	the	rights	 to	a	“scientific”	 form	of	citizenship	 for	 the	people	 living	 in	democratic	
states	(Elam	&	Bertilsson,	2003;	Goven,	2006;	Irwin,	2001,	see	also	the	following	paragraph).		
In	Horizon2020,	the	main	instrument	to	«tune»	science	with	society	is	represented	by	a	special	focus	
on	a	set	of	“Grand	Challenges”,	belonging	to	the	environmental	and	social	fields	and	valued	as	particularly	
important	for	citizens’	concerns.	The	choice	among	relevant	and	non-relevant	issues,	and	the	definition	of	
the	dimensions	of	the	problems	are	not	considered	the	first	line	of	research,	while	the	emphasis	is	set	on	
problem-solving.	
Another	 device	 of	 inclusion	of	 citizens’	 concerns	 to	 science	policies	 design	 is	 represented	by	 the	
ongoing	lively	debate	on	«Responsible	Research	and	Innovation»	(RRI),	which	was	integrated	in	Horizon	2020	
as	 the	most	updated	stage	of	 the	 reflections	on	«Science	and	Society»,	emerged	at	 the	beginning	of	 the	
Millennium	and	developed	in	EU	research	policies	through	the	successive	steps	of	«Science	in	Society»	and	
«Science	 with	 and	 for	 Society»	 (the	 current	 denomination);	 the	 concept	 of	 RRI,	 as	 inserted	 in	 H2020,	
however,	incorporates	also	other	lines	of	thought,	mainly	centred	on	the	ethical	evaluation	of	research	and	
on	social	equality	in	the	field	of	science.			
The	 following	 paragraphs	 will	 describe	 and	 analyse	 in	 details	 «Science	 and	 Society»,	 «RRI»	 and	
«Societal	Challenges»	as	instruments	of	citizens’	inclusion,	on	the	background	of	the	emergence	of	the	public	
interest	in	the	modes	and	orientations	of	science,	the	EU’s	portrayal	of	citizenry,	and	of	the	reflections	on	
the	interplay	between	science	and	society.	
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The citizens’ place in EU democracy 
The	EU	witnessed	in	the	late	‘90s	the	emergence	of	a	new	political	actor:	European	citizens	began	
claiming	a	new	and	more	active	role	in	the	definition	of	scientific	policies.	This	new	sensibility	in	European	
society	was	elicited	mainly	by	two	main	scientific-related	crises:	the	BSE	(Bovine	Spongiform	Encephalopathy)	
outbreak	in	the	mid	‘90s	and	the	“GM	Wars”	on	genetically	modified	food	at	the	end	of	the	century.		
An	epidemic	of	Bovine	Spongiform	Encephalopathy	diffused	in	the	late	‘80s	in	the	UK;	the	disease	
could	 infect	also	humans,	and	 in	1996	UK	authorities	admitted	that	 the	human	variant	of	 the	BSE,	called	
nvCJD	(new	variant	of	the	Creutzfeldt-Jakob	Disease),	had	made	the	first	victims.	The	government	had	for	a	
decade	heavily	underestimated	the	risk	related	to	the	disease	and	misinformed	the	public,	as	the	BSE	Inquiry,	
published	in	2000,	established.	When,	in	1996,	contrary	to	previous	governmental	assurances,	the	problem	
was	acknowledged,	the	public	in	Britain	and	Europe	was	shocked.	British	beef	imports	were	banned	for	two	
and	 a	 half	 years	 and	 the	 confidence	 in	 the	 public	 authorities	 experienced	 a	 complete	 breakdown.	 The	
transmission	of	the	disease,	it	was	later	discovered,	had	been	caused	by	a	series	of	human	interventions	in	
the	livestock	farming	industry,	aimed	at	reducing	the	costs	and	augmenting	profits,	and	it	had	proved	possible	
because	of	political	support.	The	Inquiry	found	that	the	British	health	and	safety	experts	acted	as	a	closed	
community,	protecting	the	farmers	and	industrial	interests	and	being	«reluctant	to	display	any	uncertainty	
to	a	public	they	saw	as	irrational	and	prone	to	panic»	(Jasanoff,	2005;	Sturloni,	2006).	
The	second	science-related	crisis	reached	its	apex	in	1999,	when	a	Greenpeace	truck	dumped	tons	
of	genetically	modified	soy	beans	in	front	the	residence	of	Britain’s	Prime	Minister.	The	conflict	on	GMOs	
(Genetically	Modified	Organisms)	 dates	back	 to	 the	mid	 ‘80s,	with	 the	emergence	of	biotechnology	 as	 a	
promising	scientific	field	in	the	United	States	and	in	Europe.	The	first	genetically	modified	beans	were	grown	
in	the	US	in	1996	by	the	agro-chemical	company	Monsanto,	and	easily	passed	the	controls	for	the	importation	
into	Europe.	In	the	EU,	however,	the	unregulated	introduction	of	genetically	modified	organisms	ignited	a	
growing	public	opposition,	that	caused	a	u-turn	in	European	policy:	no	new	authorizations	for	GM	foods	were	
issued	and	a	de-facto	moratorium	was	started,	leading	to	a	dispute	in	front	of	the	World	Trade	Organization	
(WTO)	tribunal	between	US,	Canada	and	Argentina	on	one	side	and	Europe	on	the	other	(Winickoff,	Jasanoff,	
Busch,	Grove-White,	&	Wynne,	2005).	
It	 appears	 clear	how	 these	 two	 crises,	 centred	on	 the	 superficial	management	of	 science-related	
issues	by	the	authorities	and	resulting	in	the	generation	of	public	health	risks,	affected	citizens’	sensibilities,	
changed	their	attitude	towards	scientific	research	and	the	control	authorities,	and	helped	triggering	the	so-
called	“public	unease	with	science”	that	European	institutions	started	perceiving	at	the	end	of	the	‘90s.	
The troubled interplay between science and the public.	The	troubled	relations	between	science	and	
the	public	in	Europe	date	back	to	the	‘80s,	when	a	Royal	Society	Report	titled	The	Public	Understanding	of	
Science	was	published	in	UK	(Bodmer,	1985):		
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More	than	ever,	people	need	some	understanding	of	science,	whether	they	are	involved	in	decision-
making	 at	 a	 national	 or	 local	 level,	 in	 managing	 industrial	 companies,	 in	 skilled	 or	 semi-skilled	
employment,	in	voting	as	private	citizens	or	in	making	a	wide	range	of	personal	decisions.	In	publishing	
this	report	the	Council	hopes	that	it	will	highlight	this	need	for	an	overall	awareness	of	the	nature	of	
science	and,	more	particularly,	of	the	way	that	science	and	technology	pervade	modern	life,	and	that	
it	will	generate	both	debate	and	decisions	on	how	best	they	can	be	fostered	
The	report	identified	the	flaw	related	to	the	lack	of	scientific	understanding	in	contemporary	society,	
and	underlined	the	need	to	fill	it	order	to	foster	science	and	technology.	Indeed:	
Science	and	technology	play	a	major	role	in	most	aspects	of	our	daily	lives	both	at	home	and	at	work.	
Our	 industry	and	thus	our	national	prosperity	depend	on	them.	Almost	all	public	policy	 issues	have	
scientific	or	technological	implications.	Everybody,	therefore,	needs	some	understanding	of	science,	its	
accomplishments	and	its	limitations.	
The	narrative	on	 S&T	as	 an	 important	 factor	of	 every-day	 lives,	 and	 its	 contribution	 to	«national	
prosperity»,	resembled	the	European	policy	documents	argumentations:	
Hostility,	or	even	indifference,	to	science	and	technology,	whether	by	shopfloor	workers,	by	middle	or	
senior	industrial	management	or	by	investors,	weakens	the	nation's	industry.	
The	document	identified	the	main	reason	of	the	changing	attitude	towards	science	–	from	trust	to	
diffused	concern	–	in	the	scarce	quality	of	people’s	scientific	knowledge,	which	would	prevent	them	from	
fully	 understand	 the	 complex	 scientific	 issues	 at	 stake,	 in	 case	 of,	 for	 example,	 the	 control	 of	 weight,	
vaccinations,	 smoking,	 personal	 hygiene	 or	 safety.	 The	 report	 emphasised	 also	 the	 importance	 of	
understanding	science	in	order	to	take	proper	decisions	in	public	consultations	on	scientific-related	issues.	
The	proposed	solution	centred	on	initiatives	to	fill	the	knowledge	deficit	through	scientific	alphabetization	
campaigns,	in	schools	as	well	as	on	the	media.		
Since	the	‘80s,	then,	scientific	vulgarisation	campaigns	were	launched,	and	surveys	and	analysis	were	
realized	to	measure	the	increase	in	public	understanding	of	science	–	or,	conversely,	their	residual	ignorance.	
The	“Public	Understanding	of	Science”	 (PUS)	model	has	been	widely	criticized,	at	different	 levels.	
First,	the	surveys	actually	managed	to	show	that	more	scientific	knowledge	implies	a	more	positive	vision	of	
science	 in	general,	but	 failed	to	 find	the	same	good	disposition	when	narrowing	the	spectrum	to	specific	
technologies	 or	 research	 fields:	 in	 other	 words,	 the	more	 scientific	 details	 a	 person	 received,	 the	more	
controversial	the	answers	became.	The	survey	method	itself	was	criticised,	because	the	questions	proposed,	
reporting	high	rates	of	incorrect	answers,	were	presented	out	of	context:	people	tend	to	show	a	much	better	
competence	when	dealing	with	contextualized	topics	rather	than	with	‘yes	or	no’	tests.		
Deeper	criticism	was	directed	towards	the	PUS’	representation	of	the	public,	depicted	as	a	passive	
and	anonymous	receiver	of	knowledge,	totally	excluding	any	every-day,	pre-acquired	knowledge	that	was	
not	measurable	through	the	surveys.	On	the	contrary,	some	scholars	showed	peculiar	situations	in	which	a	
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“local”,	every-day	competence	had	been	more	suitable	to	solve	a	scientific	issue	than	scientists’	formalized	
and	systematic	knowledge107.	Furthermore,	when	educated,	people	tend	to	retain	only	what	is	meaningful	
or	useful	for	them:	in	other	words,	only	the	parts	of	knowledge	in	which	they	can	have	an	active	role,	and	
this	is	not	usually	the	case	of	science	vulgarisation	programmes.	
In	the	‘90s	it	appeared	to	scholars	that	the	“Public	Understanding	of	Science”	programme	had	failed:	
no	significant	change	in	the	attitude	of	the	public	towards	science	was	visible	by	then,	notwithstanding	the	
efforts	to	fill	the	public	information	deficit.	Further	studies	developed	alternative	strategies,	abandoning	the	
top-down	 vision,	 re-examining	 the	 publics	 and	 its	 abilities	 and	 engaging	 the	 citizens	 in	 communication	
activities.	The	Royal	 Society	 itself	 in	2002	published	a	new	Report,	 acknowledging	 the	 inadequacy	of	 the	
“Public	Understanding	of	Science”	approach	to	the	new	scientific	and	social	context.	
The European portrayal of citizens in the Framework Programmes.	The	European	institutions’	vision	
of	the	public	was	influenced	by	this	debate.	
During	the	‘80s,	in	the	first	two	Framework	Programmes,	the	citizens	–	of	the	single	nations	but	not	
yet	European	citizens	–	had	a	marginal	role,	and	were	mainly	considered	«consumers»,	coherently	with	the	
focus	on	the	contribution	of	research	to	competitiveness.		
In	the	Third	and	Fourth	Frameworks	Programmes	(1990-1998)	the	citizens	appeared,	and	acquired	a	
better	 status.	 First,	 the	 research	 topics	were	 increasingly	 designed	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 needs	 of	 the	
«users»:	the	public	was	no	more	considered	completely	passive,	with	the	only	task	to	fit	as	final	consumer	
into	 the	production	process,	but	began	participating	 in	 that	process;	nonetheless,	 citizens	were	 still	 only	
considered	as	part	of	a	procedure.	
The	terms	related	to	«citizenship»	began	to	appear	significantly	only	in	the	Fifth	and	Sixth	Framework	
Programmes	 (1998-2006,	 see	Fig.	32),	but	 then	experienced	a	drop	 in	 the	Seventh,	where	 the	document	
referred	overall	more	often	 to	«users»	and	«consumers»	 than	 to	«citizens».	Horizon	2020	 increased	 the	
reference	 to	«citizens»,	 although	without	 reaching	 the	 FP6	 frequency,	while	diminished	 the	mentions	of	
«users».	
The	 development	 in	 linguistic	 references	 reflected	 the	 changes	 in	 research	 themes:	 particularly	
meaningful	 to	 understand	 the	 relations	 science-society	 is	 the	 aforementioned	 appearance	 of	 lines	 of	
research	 on	 socio-economical	 themes,	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 «strengthening	 the	 interface	 between	 science,	
research	and	society»	and	increasing	the	«public	understanding	of	science»	(EP	&	CEU,	1994):		
The	latest	developments	in	the	Community	also	indicate	an	increasing	need	for	public	understanding	
of	science	and	for	strengthening	the	interface	between	science,	research	and	society.		
																																								 																				
107		E.g.	the	case	of	the	Cumbrian	radioactive	sheep,	after	Chernobyl	disaster	(Wynne,	1992):	the	farmers,	basing	on	their	
experience	on	local	soils	and	waters,	had	correctly	judged	the	incidence	of	the	radioactive	fallout,	while	experts	tended	to	minimise	
the	risk.	
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It	is	possible	to	recognise	the	“Public	Understanding	of	Science”	influence	in	the	top-down	approach	
to	 the	 issue;	 in	 the	Fifth	and	Sixth	Programmes	these	 lines	of	 research	were	enforced	and	a	new	one	on	
«Citizens	and	governance	in	a	knowledge-based	society»	was	inserted,	showing	a	greater	concern	for	the	
critical	issues	of	the	European	citizenship.	However,	the	Seventh	Framework	Programme	reversed	the	trend,	
reabsorbing	again	the	reflection	on	citizenship	and	European	institutions	in	the	socio-economic	research	line.		
On	the	ground	of	the	role	of	citizens,	we	recognize	in	FP7	a	reversion	to	positions	similar	to	a	decade	
earlier	–	people	don’t	support	science	policies	because	they	don’t	understand	science	(EP	&	CEU,	2006):	
The	influence	of	science	and	technology	on	our	daily	lives	is	becoming	increasingly	profound.	Products	
of	social	activity	and	shaped	by	social	and	cultural	factors,	science	and	technology	nevertheless	remain	
a	remote	domain	far	from	the	daily	concerns	of	a	large	part	of	the	public	and	of	policy	decision	makers,	
and	 continue	 to	 be	 the	 subject	 of	 misunderstandings.	 Contentious	 issues	 relating	 to	 emerging	
technologies	should	be	addressed	by	society	on	the	basis	of	well	 informed	debate	 leading	to	sound	
choices	and	decisions.		
The	need	to	intensify	the	«dialogue	between	science	and	society»	was	acknowledged,	provided	the	
output	remained	fixed	at	«reinforcing	public	confidence	in	science»	(EP	&	CEU,	2006):	
the	dialogue	between	science	and	society	in	Europe	should	be	intensified	in	order	to	develop	a	science	
and	 research	 agenda	 that	meets	 citizens'	 concerns,	 including	 by	 fostering	 critical	 reflection,	 and	 is	
aimed	at	reinforcing	public	confidence	in	science.		
Horizon	2020	didn’t	substantially	modify	the	approach,	the	target	being	«to	generate	and	sustain	
public	support	for	Horizon	2020»	(EP	&	CEU,	2013):	
With	 the	 aim	 of	 deepening	 the	 relationship	 between	 science	 and	 society	 and	 reinforcing	 public	
confidence	in	science,	Horizon	2020	should	foster	the	informed	engagement	of	citizens	and	civil	society	
in	research	and	innovation	matters	by	promoting	science	education,	by	making	scientific	knowledge	
more	accessible,	by	developing	responsible	research	and	innovation	agendas	that	meet	citizens'	and	
civil	 society's	 concerns	 and	 expectations	 and	 by	 facilitating	 their	 participation	 in	 Horizon	 2020	
activities.	The	engagement	of	citizens	and	civil	society	should	be	coupled	with	public	outreach	activities	
to	generate	and	sustain	public	support	for	Horizon	2020.	
«Fostering a genuine culture of innovation».	 While	 before	 Maastricht,	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 the	
Europeans	were	 addressed	 in	 Framework	 Programmes	 documents	 as	 «consumers»,	 «workers»,	 «users»,	
after	1993,	with	the	enlargement	of	the	agenda	to	include	the	quality	of	life	and	social	objectives	and	with	
the	 rise	of	 the	debate	on	European	governance	and	science-society	 interplay,	 the	portrait	of	 the	citizens	
acquired	more	nuanced,	democracy-oriented	dimensions.	
The	policy	documents,	however	–	especially	those	connoted	by	an	economic	orientation	–	since	the	
earliest	years	of	the	elaboration	of	the	innovation	frame,	showed	to	be	worried	by	a	problematic	attitude	of	
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the	 public,	 characterised	 by	 «resistance»	 against	 the	 promoted	 changes,	 and	 they	 pushed	 for	 the	
development	of	«an	innovation	culture»	in	Europe	(CEC,	1995):	
According	 to	 the	 dictionary,	 the	 opposite	 of	 innovation	 is	 “archaism	 and	 routine”.	 That	 is	 why	
innovation	comes	up	against	so	many	obstacles	and	encounters	such	fierce	resistance.	It	is	also	why	
developing	and	sharing	an	innovation	culture	is	becoming	a	decisive	challenge	for	European	societies.	
The	First	Action	Plan	for	Innovation	in	Europe	(CEC,	1997b),	argued	for	the	need	to	foster	«a	genuine	
culture	of	innovation»,	whose	features	were	described	as:	
Innovation	 requires,	 first	 and	 foremost,	 a	 state	 of	 mind	 combining	 creativity,	 entrepreneurship,	
willingness	to	take	calculated	risks	and	an	acceptance	of	social,	geographical	or	professional	mobility.	
Being	innovative	also	demands	an	ability	to	anticipate	needs,	rigorous	organization	and	a	capacity	for	
meeting	deadlines	and	controlling	costs.	
An	innovation	mentality	needs	to	be	promoted,	and	neither	legislation	nor	short-term	measures	will	
be	of	any	use	here!		
The	report	acknowledged	the	need	of	«changing	the	culture	and	the	mentality	of	a	people»	in	order	
to	promote	the	innovation	«state	of	mind»;	to	achieve	the	desired	compliance	with	the	change,	it	suggested	
to	make	use	of	participatory	processes:	
It	is	easier	to	make	innovation	acceptable	and	hence	successful	in	the	long	run	if	citizens,	industry,	and	
their	representatives	are	involved	in	the	debate	on	the	major	technological	choices	to	be	made	and	if	
employees,	users	and	consumers	take	part	in	the	process.	
The	PUS	approach	is	visible	in	the	portrayal	of	a	citizenry	in	need	of	explanations	about	the	necessity	
of	the	reform,	not	being	able	to	understand	the	«dry	economic	indicators»,	as	described	in	the	Kok	report	
(Kok	et	al.,	2004):	
The	need	for	reform	has	to	be	explained	especially	to	citizens	who	are	not	always	aware	of	the	urgency	
and	 scale	 of	 the	 situation.	 ‘Competitiveness’	 is	 not	 just	 some	 dry	 economic	 indicator	 that	 is	 often	
unintelligible	to	the	man	in	the	street;	rather,	it	provides	a	diagnosis	of	the	state	of	economic	health	of	
a	country	or	a	region.	In	the	present	circumstances,	the	clear	message	must	be:	if	we	want	to	preserve	
and	improve	our	social	model	we	have	to	adapt:	it	is	not	too	late	to	change.	In	any	event	the	status	
quo	is	not	an	option.		
The	need	to	nurture	a	«cultural	shift»	towards	innovation	was	particularly	highlighted	by	the	Aho	
report,	arguing	that	(Aho	et	al.,	2006):	
further	steps	need	to	be	taken	to	(…)	foster	a	cultural	shift	which	celebrates	innovation	and	a	desire	to	
possess	innovative	goods	and	experience	innovative	services,	such	that	Europe	develops	as	a	natural	
home	 for	 innovators.	 At	 the	 core	 of	 our	 recommendations	 is	 the	 need	 for	 Europe	 to	 provide	 an	
innovation-friendly	market	for	the	creative	outputs	of	its	businesses	and	to	gear	the	Internal	Market	in	
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this	direction.	This	needs	(…)	a	cultural	shift	which	celebrates	innovation,	using	the	media	and	other	
means	to	encourage	citizens	to	embrace	innovative	goods	and	services.	
The	new	culture,	according	to	the	experts	group,	would	have	been	characterised	by	the	celebration	
of	innovation,	and	by	the	desire	to	possess	innovative	goods;	it’s	a	culture	favourable	and	functional	to	the	
market.	Further	on,	the	report	advocated	an	oriented	use	of	the	media,	in	order	to	promote	a	consumeristic	
attitude	in	the	citizens.			
The	combination	of	the	visions	about	a	passive,	unaware	and	innovation-resistant	citizenry	and	of	
the	urgency	to	change	the	people’s	culture	in	order	to	foster	innovation	depicts	a	problematic	point	in	the	
EU	consideration	of	its	citizens.	Since	the	late	‘90s,	a	better	involvement	of	the	public	was	advocated	in	policy	
discourses,	 however,	 mainly	 from	 the	 side	 of	 the	 economic	 analyses,	 the	 aim	 of	 such	 participatory	
experiments	was	not	open	to	collective,	democratic-wise,	shaping	of	political	actions,	but	they	were	meant	
as	 instruments	 to	 convince	 the	public	 of	 the	pre-set	 orientation	 towards	 innovation,	 and	 to	obtain	 their	
complacency.		
This	perspective	reveals	an	inherent	tension	in	the	EU	visions	about	citizenry:	paraphrasing	the	words	
of	Sheila	Jasanoff	about	the	PUS	approach,	this	passive,	ignorant	and	change-adverse	public	«would	not	be	
capable	of	carrying	out	the	housework	of	democracy»	(Jasanoff,	2005);	moreover,	envisaging	a	process	to	
change	 people’	 «mentality»,	 in	 order	 to	 promote	 the	 approval	 of	 policy	 lines	 previously	 established	 by	
political	authorities,	appears	conflicting	with	the	role	of	public	institutions	in	democracies.	Apparently,	the	
two	approaches	are	intertwined:	the	need	to	direct	people’s	attitude	stems	from	the	perception	of	a	passive,	
misinformed	and	oppositional	citizenry.	
In	the	EU	context,	however,	different	positions	find	place	as	well,	focusing	on	the	re-thinking	of	the	
framing	of	both	society	and	the	institutions,	and	of	the	processes	that	relate	the	two.		
 “Tricks” and inclusive processes 
In	 the	Horizon	2020	 introductory	video,	the	 interaction	of	knowledge	with	society	 is	defined	as	a	
«trick»:	the	smart	approach	to	knowledge	–	defined	as	an	instrument	of	power,	and	a	currency	in	the	global	
economy	–	is	to	make	it	«work	for	you».	The	portrayal	of	a	complex	dynamic	as	a	«trick»	reveals	a	conceptual	
orientation	 towards	 reducing	 a	 difficult	 process,	 involving	 in	 a	 crucial	 position	 the	 dimension	 of	 public	
participation,	to	a	smart	stratagem.	Such	reduction	represents	a	critical	point	at	the	heart	of	a	democratic	
institution.		
In	spite	of	not	having	a	long	history	of	political	union,	Europe	has	a	recent	but	lively	record	of	debates	
and	protests	regarding	its	democratic	functioning	and	legitimacy.	Some	features	of	the	European	political	
structure	–	distant	and	intricate	policy-making	process,	strong	role	of	Council	and	Commission	non-elected	
officers,	weakness	of	the	Parliament	and	inclination	of	the	Treaties	in	favour	of	market	liberalization	over	
social	regulation	–	have	led	scholars	to	argue	about	a	“democratic	deficit”,	arising	from	the	combination	of	
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an	 erosion	 of	 national	 sovereignty	 through	 legal	 decisions	 and	 regulations	 (particularly	 relevant	 in	 the	
financial	field)	with	the	weakness	of	the	citizens’	participation	in	EU	decision-making	(Pollack,	2014).	
At	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 Millennium	 a	 rethinking	 of	 the	 EU	 decision-making	 process	 and	 institutional	
functioning		was	set	as	a	priority	by	the	Prodi	Commission,	leading	to	the	publication	in	2001	of	the	White	
Paper	 on	 Governance	 (CEC,	 2001),	 articulated	 on	 the	 needs	 of	 improving	 openness,	 participation,	
accountability,	effectiveness	and	coherence	of	action.	Especially	in	the	participation	domain,	the	document	
acknowledged	the	democratic	core	of	the	governance	reform:		
reforming	governance	addresses	the	question	of	how	the	EU	uses	the	powers	given	by	its	citizens.	It	is	
about	how	things	could	and	should	be	done.	The	goal	 is	to	open	up	policy-making	to	make	 it	more	
inclusive	and	accountable.	A	better	use	of	powers	should	connect	the	EU	more	closely	to	its	citizens	
and	lead	to	more	effective	policies	
However,	 the	 White	 Paper	 also	 recognized	 that	 the	 EU	 multi-level	 structure	 does	 not	 help	 in	
favouring	 direct	 citizens’	 involvement	 (very	 often	 mediated	 by	 regional	 and	 national	 institutions),	 and	
advocated	more	prominence	of	the	European	Parliament	and	an	increased	involvement	of	the	civil	society	
organizations	in	the	consultations.	
As	mentioned,	the	earlier	institutional	approach	to	the	issue	of	the	citizens	involvement	in	science	
focused	on	the	scientific	illiteracy	of	the	public	and	consequently	on	the	requirement	to	educate	the	citizens,	
before	 admitting	 them	 in	 the	 debate	 about	 science	 and	 technology	 policies	 (the	 PUS	 approach);	 the	
Eurobarometers	of	the	1990	and	1993	on	Europeans,	science	and	technology	devoted	significant	space	to	
the	 assessment	 of	 the	 public	 understanding	 of	 science,	 in	 order	 to	 determine	 the	 Europeans’	 attitudes	
towards	science	(CEC,	1990;	INRA,	Report	International,	&	CEC,	1993).		
The	 document	 proposing	 the	 European	 Research	 Area	 (CEC,	 2000)	 addressed	 the	 issue	 of	 the	
Europeans’	negative	perception	of	science,	inspiring	«as	much	anguish	as	hope»:	
Europe	 is	 not	 only	 investing	 less	 and	 less	 of	 its	 richness	 in	 progress	 in	 knowledge,	 the	 image	 that	
Europeans	have	of	science	is	also	less	positive	than	it	was.	Scientific	progress	seems	to	inspire	as	much	
anguish	as	hope,	and	the	gap	between	the	scientific	world	and	the	people	at	large	is	growing.	
The	debate	–	and	funding	line	–	on	“Science	and	Society”	was	launched	against	this	background.	
In	 the	meanwhile,	however,	 the	academic	debate	on	 the	subject	was	changing.	An	expert	group,	
asked	by	the	Commission	to	explore	the	concern	of	the	«public	unease	with	science»,	disassembled	the	same	
concept	of	a	real	“unease”	with	science,	and	recognized	it	as	part	of	a	more	complex	and	subtle	issue	related	
to	policy-making:	it	didn’t	appear	to	exist	an	indiscriminate	disaffection	with	science,	but	rather	a	«selective	
disaffection	in	particular	fields	of	science,	amidst	wider	areas	of	acceptance	–	even	enthusiasm»	(Wynne	et	
al.,	 2007).	 Public	 unease,	 if	 any,	 is	 not	 caused	 by	 scientific	 developments,	 but	 rather	 by	 how	 these	 are	
managed,	and	by	the	behaviour	of	the	institutions	in	charge	of	regulating	new	technologies	and	of	shaping	
science-related	policies.	When	public	engagement	activities	are	played	as	«a	way	of	addressing	the	impacts	
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of	technology	–	be	they	health,	social,	environmental	or	ethical	–	rather	than	helping	to	shape	the	trajectory	
of	technological	development»	(Wilsdon,	2007),	or	when	they	are	used	to	head-off	controversies	before	their	
very	rising,	people	feel	ruled	out	from	policy	definition,	and	they	lose	their	confidence	in	the	authorities.		
From «Science and Society» to «Science with and for Society».	 In	2000	the	Commission	 launched	the	
debate	on	the	topic	with	a	working	document	on	Science,	society	and	the	citizen	 in	Europe	 (CEC,	2000a),	
which	led	to	the	publication	of	the	first	Science	and	Society	Action	Plan,	published	at	the	end	of	2001	(CEC,	
2002).	The	purpose	was	double-fold:	«how	to	implement	research	policy	around	the	real	aims	of	society»	
and	 how	 to	 «fully	 involve	 society	 in	 seeing	 through	 the	 research	 agenda».	 In	 this	 document,	 the	 issues	
pertaining	 to	 the	 critical	 interplay	 of	 science	 and	 society	 were	 recognized	 in	 risk	 management	 and	 the	
implications	of	the	precautionary	principle,	in	the	ethical	consequences	of	technological	progress,	in	freedom	
of	research	and	access	to	knowledge,	in	the	use	of	expertise	in	policy	making	and	in	the	underrepresentation	
of	women	in	S&T	(CEC,	2000a).		
The	legitimation	for	introducing	the	subject	of	Science	and	Society	in	the	public	policy	debate	was	
explicitly	articulated	with	 reference	 to	 the	developments	 in	 the	nature	of	S&T	and	of	 its	 impacts	–	 rapid	
changes,	affecting	social	relations,	generating	new	needs	and	challenging	the	«basic	values	and	principles	of	
social	 life»	 –	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 changing	 awareness	 of	 the	 European	 citizens	 regarding	 science	 –	 their	
oscillation	between	confidence	in	science	and	fear	of	technological	risks,	together	with	the	advances	in	the	
«capacity	 among	 the	 better-informed	 and	 better	 educated	members	 of	 the	 public	 to	 apply	 their	 critical	
faculties	to	developments	they	regard	as	being	imposed	rather	than	desired,	together	with	the	erosion	of	
confidence	 in	political	authority»	 (CEC,	2000a).	Finally,	 the	document	 introduced	the	 innovation-oriented	
rationale,	arguing	for	a	«full	commitment	of	society»	(in	partial	tension	with	the	previously	stated	concern	
about	the	public	feeling	of	«imposed	developments»):	
New	relationships	are	needed	that	fit	the	new	mould	of	science,	technology	and	society.	These	have	to	
change	because	of	the	impact	of	science	and	research	on	competitiveness,	growth	and	jobs	and	on	the	
quality	 of	 life	 in	 Europe.	 All	 the	more	 so,	 given	 the	 central	 role	 they	 play	 in	 the	 knowledge-based	
economy	and	society	 that	 the	European	Union	committed	 itself	 to	building	at	 the	Lisbon	European	
Council.	 	 (…)	the	Lisbon	objectives	will	be	achieved	only	by	an	economy	geared	to	 innovation	and	a	
society	fully	committed	to	it.	
The	Action	Plan	politically	positioned	the	topic	of	Science	and	Society	at	the	intersection	of	the	three	
pivotal	 Community	 strategies	 of	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	Millennium:	 building	 a	 knowledge-based	 economy	
(Lisbon	strategy),	realizing	a	European	Research	Area	(ERA)	and	reforming	the	European	governance	(White	
Paper	on	Governance).	The	key	lines	of	activity	were	identified	in	the	improvement	of	scientific	education,	in	
the	assessment	of	the	ethical	dimension	of	science	and	technology,	including	risk	governance	and	the	use	of	
expertise,	and	in	the	promotion	of	public	engagement,	involving	the	citizens	as	«partners	in	the	debate	on	
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science,	 technology	 and	 innovation»	 through	 consultations,	 participatory	 procedures,	 establishment	 of	
gender	equality	and	the	contribution	of	human,	economic	and	social	sciences.	
The	«Science	and	Society»	topic	was	included	for	the	first	time	in	the	Sixth	Framework	Programme	
(2002-2006)	with	a	budget	of	88	million	euro.	
A	 further	 development	 in	 the	 understanding	 and	 governance	of	 the	 issue	 in	 the	 EU	 context	was	
realized	in	preparation	of	the	Seventh	Framework	Programme,	when	a	shift	was	promoted	from	the	label	of	
«Science	and	 Society»	 to	«Science	 in	 Society»,	 and	 such	denomination	was	adopted	 for	 the	 funding	 line	
included	in	FP7	(Stirling,	2006,	emphasis	as	in	the	original):	
The	process	of	‘science	and	governance’,	is	therefore	not	just	one	of	linking	separate	arenas	of	‘science	
and	 society’.	 It	 is	much	more	one	of	governing	 ‘science	 in	 society’	 –	 recognising	 that	 research	and	
innovation	are	not	autonomous,	but	are	contained	within,	and	subject	to	wider	economic,	cultural	and	
political	processes.	
The	concept	was	set	up	during	the	2005	“Gover’Science”	seminar,	organized	by	the	Governance	and	
Scientific	Advice	Unit	of	DG	Research,	focussing	intensively	on	the	role	of	public	engagement:	the	idea	was	
to	move	away	 from	an	 idea	of	 engagement	 as	 an	effective	process	of	 information	 transfer,	mainly	 from	
scientists	 to	 citizens,	 towards	 a	 two-ways	 communication,	 and	 further	 arguing	 for	 the	elimination	of	 the	
division	into	two	secluded	groups	–	science	and	society,	the	first	composed	of	scientists	and	experts	and	the	
second	of	common	people,	with	no	scientific	competences	–	for	a	more	complex	understanding	of	the	ways	
in	which	scientific	knowledge	and	technological	innovations	are	produced.	According	to	this	vision,	research	
activities	should	incorporate	inputs	from	a	wide	variety	of	social	actors	and	should	tend	to	a	«new	style	of	
‘co-operative	research’»	(Stirling,	2006):	
It	is	emphatically	not	about	second-guessing	the	technical	expertise	of	scientists	and	engineers.	Rather,	
it	is	about	acknowledging	the	fact	that	science	and	innovation	are	social,	cultural	and	institutional	–	
as	well	as	technical	and	specialist	–	activities.	As	such,	public	engagement	offers	a	way	to	be	more	
accountable	for	the	particular	values	and	interests,	which	underpin	both	the	governance	of	science	and	
the	 general	 use	 of	 science	 in	 governance.	What	 are	 the	 priorities	 and	 purposes,	 which	 justify	 the	
allocation	of	resources	to	different	areas	of	innovation	or	lines	of	enquiry?	What	are	the	assumptions	
that	 inform	 the	 interpretation	 of	 scientific	 advice,	 concerning	 the	 behaviour	 of	 institutions	 or	
technologies	in	the	real	world?	
Understood	in	this	way,	public	participation	should	be	fostered	throughout	the	whole	process,	but	
especially	at	the	beginning,	in	setting	the	landscape,	the	aims	and	the	priorities	of	public	research:	
In	short,	public	engagement	is	about	the	‘framing’	of	scientific	evidence	and	technological	projects,	not	
about	the	details	of	specialist	methods	or	technical	analysis.	
As	mentioned,	in	parallel	to	this	debate	the	Commission	established	an	Expert	Group	on	Science	and	
Governance	in	order	to	shed	light	on	the	occurrence	of	the	“public	uneasiness	with	science”	and	with	the	
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aim	of	“restoring	public	trust	in	science”.	The	final	report	(Wynne	et	al.,	2007)	of	the	Group,	whose	members	
were	 mainly	 STS	 scholars,	 was	 an	 extended	 analysis	 of	 the	 science-society	 interplay,	 ranging	 from	 the	
evaluation	of	the	framing	of	research	as	innovation,	to	the	exploration	of	the	other	master	narratives	that	
are	used	to	legitimize	public	funding	of	science;	from	the	debate	on	risk-governance,	reconsidered	here	as	
innovation-governance	since	«the	concerns	which	citizens	express	can	be	seen	to	be	about	innovation	and	
its	social	purposes	and	priorities»,	to	the	over-use	of	expert	recommendations	in	EU	policy-making,	especially	
critical	for	what	concerns	ethical	issues;	from	the	evolution	of	the	public	understanding	of	science	framing	
towards	public	engagement,	to	the	exploration	of	new	«regimes	of	collective	experimentation».	The	‘public	
unease’,	they	argue:	
is	not	so	much	based	on	the	outcomes	of	science	and	technology	in	the	form	of	innovations,	but	much	
more	on	how	these	developments	are	shaped,	and	about	the	behaviour	of	the	institutions	primarily	in	
charge	of	innovation,	and	risk	regulation,	and	public	engagement.	
They	 conclude	 suggesting	 that	 policy	 making	 should	 not	 be	 tempted	 by	 «simple	 or	 mechanical	
solutions»,	but	should	address	«Europe’s	rich	democratic	and	scientific	tradition»,	especially	considering	the	
recent	formulation	of	the	European	Knowledge	Society.		
The	most	 up-to-date	 elaboration	 of	 the	 debate	 on	 the	 science-society	 interplay,	 included	 in	 the	
current	Horizon2020	Framework	Programme,	is	the	«Science	with	and	for	Society»	approach,	where	the	new	
change	 in	 the	 prepositions	 underlines	 the	 need	 to	 deepen	 the	 social	 relevance	 of	 science,	 through	 an	
«ethical,	inclusive,	democratic	and	equitable»	identification	of	the	targets	for	innovation	–	Science	for	Society	
–	and	the	further	deepening	of	the	dimension	of	co-production	of	science	and	society,	though	an	«iterative,	
continuous	and	flexible	process	of	adaptive	learning»	–	Science	with	Society	(Owen,	Macnaghten,	&	Stilgoe,	
2012).		
Responsible Research and Innovation.	A	parallel	and	linked	approach	currently	goes	under	the	label	
of	«Responsible	Research	and	 Innovation»	 (RRI),	 articulated	 in	 the	«keys»	of	public	engagement,	 gender	
equality,	science	education,	open	access	and	ethics,	all	grouped	under	the	umbrella	concept	of	governance	
(EC,	2012b,	2014i;	Owen	et	al.,	2012).		
A	seminal	work	by	the	EC	policy	officer	Von	Schomberg,	circulated	in	2011,	attempted	a	definition	of	
RRI	(Von	Schomberg,	2013):	
Responsible	Research	and	Innovation	is	a	transparent,	interactive	process	by	which	societal	actors	and	
innovators	 become	 mutually	 responsive	 to	 each	 other	 with	 a	 view	 to	 the	 (ethical)	 acceptability,	
sustainability	and	societal	desirability	of	the	innovation	process	and	its	marketable	products	(in	order	
to	allow	a	proper	embedding	of	scientific	and	technological	advances	in	our	society).	
Although	the	subjects	of	RRI	are	approximately	the	same	contained	in	the	2002	Action	Plan,	and	so	
the	concerned	activities,	the	transition	from	the	interplay	of	science	and	society	–	whatever	the	prepositions	
–	to	the	responsibility	dimension	of	the	scientific	activity	reveals	a	shift	in	focus	from	the	engagement	of	the	
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citizens	 to	 the	ethical	evaluation	of	 research,	and	 from	the	 issues	 related	to	 the	process	 to	 the	puzzle	of	
defining	clear	and	comprehensive	conceptual	bases	(see	van	den	Hoven	et	al.,	2013;	Von	Schomberg,	2013).	
On	the	other	side,	the	schematic	science-society	polarization	is	abandoned	in	favour	of	the	embedding	of	
societal	contributions	in	the	re-definition	of	the	understanding	of	research.		
The	general	RRI	landscape	is	set	in	wide-enough	terms	to	be	interpreted	with	different	anchor	points.	
For	example,	a	2011	report	on	Responsible	Research	and	Innovation	developed	the	concept	mainly	around	
«the	consistent,	ongoing	involvement	of	society,	from	the	beginning	to	the	end	of	the	innovation	process»	
(Sutcliffe,	2011),	while	a	2013	Expert	Group	report,	although	elaborating	on	multistakeholder	participation,	
devoted	considerable	space	to	the	economic	desirability	of	RRI	(van	den	Hoven	et	al.,	2013):		
Taking	ethical	concerns	and	societal	needs	better	into	account	brings	considerable	economic	benefits.	
Ethics	is	often	seen	as	an	impediment	to	economic	growth,	but	it	can	serve	as	a	driver	for	new	areas	in	
research	 and	 innovations,	 creating	 jobs,	 increasing	 social	 welfare	 and	 helping	 to	 avoid	 risks	 of	
misallocation	of	R&D	funds,	as	the	growing	economic	importance	of	green	technologies	across	Europe	
shows.	
The	 problem,	 argued	 the	 document,	 is	 that	 both	 the	 innovation	 and	 the	 research	 system	 fail	 to	
sufficiently	consider	social	and	ethical	aspects,	and	this	causes	an	«inefficient	use	of	R&D	funding»	(see	Fig.	
35).	
In	the	same	document,	as	well	as	on	the	Commission	website	and	on	the	promotional	videos	and	
leaflets,	RRI	is	presented	with	the	metaphor	of	the	alignment	of	science	and	society	(EC,	2012b,	2014,	2015d),	
re-proposing	the	conceptualization	of	the	two	secluded	social	spheres:	
Responsible	Research	and	 Innovation	 (RRI)	 implies	 that	 societal	 actors	 (researchers,	 citizens,	 policy	
makers,	 business,	 third	 sector	 organisations,	 etc.)	 work	 together	 during	 the	 whole	 research	 and	
innovation	process	in	order	to	better	align	both	the	process	and	its	outcomes	with	the	values,	needs	
and	expectations	of	society.	
In	 the	 2015	 video	Responsible	 Research	 and	 Innovation:	 aligning	 R&I	with	 European	 society	 (EC,	
2015d)	 citizens’	 engagement	 is	 listed	 after	 ethics,	 science	 education	 and	 open	 access	 as	 one	 of	 the	
dimensions	 of	 RRI;	 moreover,	 despite	 the	 richer	 understanding	 presented	 by	 the	 interviewed	 scholars,	
engagement	is	presented	as	a	matter	of	access	to	the	data,	geared	to	pooling	everyone’s	resources	in	the	
generation	of	new	ideas	–	the	background	images	to	this	concept	are	computer	cables	and	electronic	circuits	
–,	while	the	open	discussion	on	research	instruments	and	orientations	is	less	underlined.	
In	 media	 and	 policy	 documents,	 RRI	 appears	 very	 often	 paired	 with	 the	 concept	 of	 Societal	
Challenges,	the	one	presented	as	the	European	‘ability’	to	solve	the	second,	while	at	the	same	time	ensuring	
research	efficiency	(EC,	2012b,	2015d;	van	den	Hoven	et	al.,	2013):	the	two	models	are	currently	the	main	
strategical	 instruments	through	which	the	EU	endeavours	to	include	the	citizens’	contribution	in	scientific	
governance.	
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Similarly	 to	 the	 case	 of	 Societal	 Challenges,	 the	 debate	 about	 the	 ‘responsibility’	 dimension	 of	
research	 and	 innovation	 activities	 shows	 a	 diverse	 landscape,	 including	 visions	 leaning	 towards	 different	
objectives:	the	utilitarian	framing	of	RRI	as	an	early	neutralizer	of	future	time-	and	money-wasting	conflicts;	
the	democratic	argument	advocating	the	involvement	of	the	citizens’	deliberation	about	values	in	the	policy-
making	process;	 the	pragmatic	approach	of	building	an	online	repository	of	RRI	experiences,	 to	act	as	an	
operative	reference	for	all	the	stakeholders,	framed	as	«the	RRI	toolkit»	(RRI	Tools,	2014).	
Solving Grand Challenges 
The	emphasis	on	the	definition	of	“Grand	Challenges”	instead	of	abstract	political	strategies,	in	order	
to	focus	the	efforts	and	stimulate	public	support,	has	particularly	grown	in	recent	years,	both	globally	and	in	
Europe.	 In	 the	 EU,	 this	 rhetoric	 has	 gradually	 emerged	 during	 the	 years	 of	 the	 Lisbon	 Strategy	 as	 an	
alternative	narrative	to	competitiveness	for	the	research	and	innovation	activities	(Ulnicane,	2016).		
As	 early	 as	 1995,	 the	 task	 force	 on	 research	 and	 industries	 identified	 research	 priorities	 of	 key	
importance	to	European	industry	and	society,	and	FP5	was	designed	and	articulated	around	«key	actions»,	
focusing	(Caracostas	&	Muldur,	1998):	
(…)	 on	 all	 manner	 of	 bottlenecks	 (scientific,	 technological	 and	 socio-economic)	 which	 hamper	 the	
resolution	of	problems	common	to	all	fifteen	Member	States	
However,	the	subsequent	concentration	on	strategical	reforms	(the	ERA	and	Bologna	processes,	and	
the	 Lisbon	 Strategy)	 shifted	 the	 FPs	 focus	 towards	 supporting	 the	 structural	 adaptation	 of	 the	 research	
system	(especially	in	FP6).	
In	2004,	in	the	context	of	rethinking	a	compelling	political	project	for	Europe,	the	Strauss-Kahn	Report	
(Strauss-Kahn	et	al.,	2004)	reoriented	the	attention	towards	a	challenge-based	reasoning:	it	identified	seven	
internal	and	external	issues	for	Europe	to	address	–	economic	change,	social	change,	demographic	challenge,	
environmental	change,	democratic	distrust,	globalisation,	post	9/11	strategic	reality	–	and	underlined	the	
role	of	research	and	education	in	tackling	them.		
The	2006	book	on	the	design	and	implementation	of	FP7	(Muldur	et	al.,	2006)	mentioned	the	report	
and	adopted	the	challenge-based	description	to	position	and	legitimate	research	in	the	European	context.	
The	chosen	issues,	in	this	analysis,	compared	to	the	Strauss-Kahn’s	ones,	appear	to	have	evolved	towards	a	
more	pragmatic	characterisation:	slow	economic	growth	and	feeble	competitive	position,	unemployment,	
poverty	 and	 inequality,	 fertility	 decline	 and	 ageing,	 lifestyle	 and	 communicable	 diseases,	 and	 the	
environmental	challenges:	water,	climate	change	and	biodiversity.	It	is	particularly	interesting	to	notice	the	
challenge-identifying	 method	 reported	 in	 the	 book,	 regarding	 the	 environmental	 priorities:	 the	 authors	
describe	 a	 benchmarking	 process	 of	 the	 Eurobarometers,	 the	 previous	 EU	 strategies,	 and	 a	 number	 of	
international	publications	from	various	bodies,	some	of	them	environment-related,	like	the	United	Nations	
Environment	 Program,	 and	 some	 other	 belonging	 to	 the	 economical	 and	 strategical	 domains	 like	OECD,	
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World	Bank	and	even	the	CIA	(see	Fig.	17).	All	these	institutions	were	in	the	same	period	adopting	a	challenge-
based	approach;	each	one,	however,	with	regards	to	its	own	specific	field	and	political	objectives,	which	not	
necessarily	coincided	with	the	EU	R&D	policy	aims.	
The	recommendation	of	focussing	R&D	programming	on	the	identification	and	solution	of	complex	
challenges	 was	 introduced	 in	 EU	 official	 documents	 with	 the	 2007	 Green	 Paper	 on	 ERA,	 proposing	 the	
concept	 of	 grand	 challenges	 as	 an	 instrument	 to	 facilitate	 the	 involvement	 of	 a	 wider	 spectrum	 of	
stakeholders	in	the	research	agendas	definition	process	(CEC,	2007c):	
Such	a	process	would	allow	European,	national	and	regional	 research	priorities	 to	be	based	on	 the	
systematic	identification	of	major	societal	challenges.	Common	foresight	and	technology	assessment	
exercises	 carried	 out	 in	 close	 collaboration	 between	 national	 organisations	 and	 involving	 the	
participation	of	stakeholders	and	citizens	could	help	structure	and	enrich	such	an	approach.	
The	“Grand	Challenges”	were	in	this	document	named	«Societal	Challenges»,	 in	contrast	with	the	
«topics	arising	from	business	interest»:	the	process	of	challenges	identification,	initially	employed	as	a	device	
to	motivate	the	community	around	shared	concerns,	overcoming	disciplinary	and	national	boundaries	and	
building	public	consensus,	was	indeed	evolving	in	the	European	context	towards	being	considered	a	political	
answer	to	societal	pressures.		
A	key	document	in	shaping	the	European	political	use	of	Grand	Challenges	was	the	2008	follow	up	to	
the	ERA	Green	Paper	consultation,	Challenging	Europe’s	Research:	Rationales	for	the	European	Research	Area	
(ERA),	prepared	by	an	expert	group	chaired	by	Luke	Georghiou	(who	previously	co-authored	the	Aho	Report	
in	 2006).	 Acknowledging	 the	 need	 for	 a	 «European	 Research	 Area	 that	 has	 a	 clear	 purpose	 which	 is	
meaningful	to	Europe’s	citizens	and	political	leaders	and	relevant	to	its	key	actors»,	the	report	recommended	
to	structure	the	European	Research	Area	around	the	concept	of	Grand	Challenges	(Georghiou	et	al.,	2008):	
The	central	means	to	achieve	this	is	to	engage	the	research	system	in	Europe’s	response	to	a	series	of	
Grand	Challenges	which	depend	upon	research	but	which	also	involve	actions	to	ensure	innovation	and	
the	development	of	markets	and/or	public	service	environments.		
Challenges	may	be	rooted	in	economic,	social	or	scientific	goals	but	share	a	need	to	demonstrate	their	
relevance	at	the	European	level,	their	feasibility	in	terms	of	Europe’s	capability	to	engage	with	them,	
and	a	clear	research	dimension	such	that	they	gain	the	commitment	of	the	research	community	and	
pull-through	the	necessary	improvements	in	its	efficiency	and	effectiveness.	
For	the	expert	group,	Grand	Challenges	need	to	share	the	features	of	being	related	to	both	research	
and	 innovation	sectors	and,	no	matter	the	content	 (economic,	social	or	scientific),	 their	 relevance	should	
appear	self-evident.	Moreover,	they	should	be	feasible	for	Europe	and	appropriate	to	gain	the	commitment	
of	the	research	community,	in	order	«to	capture	political	and	public	imagination,	create	widespread	interest	
through	scientific	and	business	communities	and	NGOs	and	inspire	younger	people».		
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However,	the	selection	of	such	challenges	is	not	straightforward,	the	report	acknowledged,	and	has	
to	be	realized	applying	a	checklist	based	on	the	criteria	of	attractiveness	and	feasibility	(Georghiou	et	al.,	
2008,	emphasis	as	in	the	original):	
Prioritisation	of	Grand	Challenges	is	also	likely	to	prove	a	stumbling	block	in	terms	of	whether	to	opt	
for	 more	 society-driven,	 education-driven,	 industry-driven,	 innovation-driven	 or	 research-driven	
challenges.	 Two	broad	 sets	of	 criteria	 (…)	underpin	 the	 selection	of	 the	Grand	Challenges,	 namely:	
attractiveness	 (broken	 down	 into	 relevance	 and	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 clear	 research	 dimension)	 and	
feasibility.	Each	criterion	requires	in-depth	consideration	in	order	to	address	its	constituent	elements	
and	 issues	 of	 appropriate	 balance	 between	 potentially	 conflicting	 ideals/principles	 (European	 vs.	
global,	scientific	vs.	social	priority;	doability	vs.	ambition).	
Interestingly	enough,	even	 if	 the	 challenges	were	 seen	as	answers	 to	pressing	 societal	needs,	no	
reference	was	made	in	the	report	to	the	option	of	asking	the	citizens	to	express	on	their	identification;	these	
were	counted	as	«actors	in	the	research-friendly	ecology»,	with	the	role	of	being	informed	about	the	issues	
at	stake:	their	inclusion	in	the	process	was	described	as	«tied	to	communication,	training	and	education»:	
Our	comments	on	the	role	of	citizens	as	stakeholders	in	ERA	will	be	brief	and	to	the	point.	These	are	to	
endorse	the	Green	Paper’s	statement	that	ERA	requires	that	European	citizens	are	well	informed	about	
all	 the	 issues	at	 stake,	and	 that	 there	should	be	a	spread	of	“research	approaches	geared	 towards	
society’s	needs	and	aspirations	and	of	a	culture	and	spirit	of	innovation	throughout	society	as	a	whole.”	
This	is	seen	as	an	issue	tied	to	communication,	training	and	education.	All	of	these	we	endorse	but	the	
central	thesis	of	this	report	is	that	citizens	are	much	more	likely	to	form	a	positive	engagement	with	
research	if	it	is	clear	to	them	that	research	is	a	key	component	in	meeting	society’s	economic	and	social	
challenges.	To	do	this	we	propose	the	Grand	Challenge	model	for	ERA.	
The	ultimate	goal	of	focusing	on	Grand	Challenges	was	presented	in	this	report	(Ulnicane,	2016),	as	
in	 the	 following	year	Lund	Declaration,	as	 the	 increase	of	 the	 funds	available	 to	 research	and	 innovation	
sectors	(Lund	Declaration,	2009):		
Europe	needs	 to	mobilize	 substantially	 increased	 investments	 in	 research	and	 innovation	 targeting	
Grand	 Challenges,	 as	 this	 is	 required	 to	meet	 the	 rapidly	 increasing	 global	 competition	 and	 other	
threats	to	our	well-being	and	in	order	to	take	part	in	the	widening	and	deepening	global	cooperation.	
We	must	build	 trust	with	society	so	 the	required	resources	are	made	available	 to	 the	research	and	
innovation	sectors.	
A	subsequent	document	(Soete	et	al.,	2009),	explicitly	based	on	the	2008	Georghiou	Report,	provided	
a	broader	understanding	of	the	concept	of	Grand	Challenges,	recognizing	it	as	a	multi-purpose	instrument,	
enabling	Europe	to	profit	economically	from	possible	new	markets	together	with	triggering	intra-European	
policy	coordination.	Moreover:	
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addressing	Societal	Challenges	seems	a	sensible	response	to	the	increasing	social	demand	for	relevance	
and	impact	of	research,	as	well	as	for	global	justice	for	all.	The	approach	can	increase	the	legitimacy	
of	science	and	technology	and	investments	therein,	and	foster	better	relations	between	the	scientific	
communities	and	the	public	opinion.	
Although	the	document	was	largely	an	economic	analysis,	the	democratic	argument	for	the	definition	
of	the	challenges	was	particularly	stressed	in	the	Appendix	On	society’s	need	for	research,	where	the	expert	
group	discussed	the	political	legitimation	of	public	investments	in	research.	The	economic	rationale	usually	
invoked	was	questioned	with	respect	to	the	democratic	one,	based	on	the	right	of	the	citizens	to	be	involved	
in	defining	the	decision	on	science	and	technology:	
The	problem	of	finding	the	right	justification	for	public	policy	action	has	become	even	more	crucial	in	
recent	years	particularly	after	it	became	evident	that	the	expansion	of	State	intervention	was,	and	is	
likely	 to	 continue	 in	 the	 future	even	more	 so,	 to	be	 in	 contradiction	with	 the	upper	 limits	 to	public	
expenditure	(the	so-called	fiscal	crisis	of	the	State).	Since	public	policy	involves	the	allocation	of	scarce	
resources,	it	has	become	standard	practice	to	invoke	an	economic	justification,	usually	associated	with	
theories	that	predict	a	relation	between	expenditure	and	desirable	outcomes.	(…)	
But	one	also	needs	to	take	into	account	an	important	democratic	component.	Today,	the	role	of	science	
in	 society	 is	 fully	 accepted	 in	modern	 liberal	 democracies.	 The	 sometimes	uneasy	 relationship	 that	
arises	 around	 the	 imagined	 or	 real	 risks	 associated	 with	 scientific-technological	 developments	 is	
acknowledged	and	serious	efforts	are	undertaken	to	include	citizens’	participation	in	deliberative	ways.	
In	 a	 pluralistic	 society	 in	which	 differences	 in	 values	 cannot	 be	 simply	 reduced	 to	 those	 held	 by	 a	
majority	and	where	public	discourse	often	juxtaposes	‘values’	to	‘science’,	one	should	not	forget	that	
science	itself	is	based	on	a	deeply	held,	societal	value:	that	of	free	inquiry	into	what	is	yet	unknown.	In	
this	sense,	science	and	democracy	are	completely	aligned	today.	Investing	into	research	is	itself	based	
on	a	profound	societal	value.	
Moreover,	grounding	R&D	to	societal	relevance	was	presented	as	a	path	to	overcome	political	short-
termism,	 linked	 to	 electoral	 cycles,	 in	 favour	 of	 long-term	 visions	 than	 can	 improve	 public	 support;	 the	
difficulties	connected	with	the	process	of	agenda	setting	were	also	recognized.	
The	increased	attention	to	the	instrument	of	Grand	Challenges	during	the	years	2007-2010	played	a	
key	role	in	the	preparation	of	the	Europe	2020	strategy	and	especially	of	the	new	Framework	Programme	
Horizon	2020,	where	tackling	societal	challenges	is	one	of	the	three	main	priorities108.		
A	number	of	 instruments	were	developed	 in	the	same	years	by	the	EU	with	a	peculiar	challenge-
based	approach:	Joint	Technology	Initiatives,	European	Technology	Platforms,	Joint	Programming	Initiatives	
																																								 																				
108	The	challenges	are	 identified	 in	H2020	as:	«health,	demographic	change	and	wellbeing»,	«food	security,	sustainable	
agriculture	and	forestry,	marine	and	maritime	and	inland	water	research,	and	the	bioeconomy»,	«secure,	clean	and	efficient	energy»,	
«smart,	 green	 and	 integrated	 transport»,	 «climate	 action,	 environment,	 resource	 efficiency	 and	 raw	 materials»,	 «Europe	 in	 a	
changing	world	-	inclusive,	innovative	and	reflective	societies»,	«secure	societies	-	protecting	freedom	and	security	of	Europe	and	its	
citizens».	
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(JPIs),	 European	 Innovation	 Partnerships	 and	 Knowledge	 and	 Innovation	 Communities.	 However,	 the	
interplay	 among	 these	 platforms	 was	 not	 clearly	 defined,	 sometimes	 raising	 the	 same	 expert	 groups’	
concerns	(Hunter,	Hernani,	Giry,	Danielsen,	&	Antoniou,	2016).		
With	Horizon	 still	 ongoing,	 negotiations	 have	 started	 for	 the	 preparation	of	 the	 next	 Framework	
Programme,	and	it	appears	that	the	Grand	Challenges	approach	will	be	maintained	also	in	FP9;	furthermore,	
the	debate	is	open	on	a	conceptual	remodelling	of	the	metaphor	in	the	case	of	the	FET	(Future	and	Emerging	
Technologies)	 “flagships”	 –	 now	 conceived	 as	 «visionary,	 science-driven,	 large-scale	 research	 initiatives	
addressing	grand	Scientific	and	Technological	(S&T)	challenges»	(EC,	2014).	The	Human	Brain	Project	and	the	
Graphene	 flagship,	 financed	 with	 one	 billion	 euro	 each,	 are	 the	 two	 currently	 running	 flagships.	 The	
Commission	is	now	thinking	about	enhancing	the	result-oriented	nature	of	flagships,	transforming	them	into	
«missions»,	i.e.	from	“understanding	human	brain”	to	“curing	Alzheimer”;	the	reference	models,	according	
to	Commissioner	Moedas,	are	the	US	goals	of	landing	on	the	Moon	and	curing	cancer,	launched	respectively	
by	Kennedy	in	1961	and	Nixon	in	1975:	indeed	the	metaphor	of	«moonshots»	to	identify	flagships	is	emerging	
in	public	declarations	 (Kelly,	2017b,	2017c).	Discussion	are	 focusing	on	a	number	of	10	moonshots	 to	be	
inserted	 in	 FP9;	 however,	 the	 process	 of	 challenges	 definition,	 although	 underlined	 as	 critical	 by	 the	
previously	mentioned	reports,	is	not	yet	defined.	It	is	clear,	conversely,	the	Commissioner’s	objective:	instil	
a	sense	of	urgency	and	obtain	the	support	of	the	unaware	citizens	(Kelly,	2017b):		
We	don’t	feel	the	same	sense	of	purpose	as	we	did	in	the	past.	We	say	we	will	invest	more	in	materials	
or	in	renewables	but	people	in	the	street	don’t	understand	much	of	that.	If	I	talked	to	my	mother	or	my	
grandmother	about	mapping	the	brain,	they	will	wonder	why.	People	will	connect	more	with	a	goal,	
such	as	creating	an	all-electric	plane.	
Grand/Societal Challenges as political instruments. The	concept	of	Grand/Societal	Challenges,	used	
as	 a	 strategy	 to	 reorganize	 R&D	 resources	 and	 improving	 its	 impact,	 in	 the	 European	 discourse	 wavers	
between	a	democratic	understanding,	favouring	the	inclusion	of	the	citizens’	concerns	in	the	R&D	agenda,	
to	an	instrumental	one,	in	which	it	is	used	as	a	rhetorical	tool	to	promote	research	and	obtain	the	people’s	
positive	engagement	with	science.	
The	 evolution	 from	 the	 challenges	 identified	 in	 the	 Strauss-Kahn’s	 2004	 report	 to	 the	 H2020	
documents	shows	a	development	from	a	strategical,	political,	 institutional	as	well	as	societal	framing	to	a	
more	 pragmatic,	 techno-scientific	 definition:	 e.g.	 from	 «economic	 and	 social	 change»	 to	 «health,	
demographic	 change	 and	 wellbeing»;	 from	 «ecological	 imbalance»	 to	 «climate	 action,	 environment,	
resource	efficiency	and	raw	materials»;	from	«post	9/11	strategic	reality»	to	«secure	societies	-	protecting	
freedom	and	security	of	Europe	and	its	citizens».	
The	 process	 of	 gradual	 reduction	 of	 the	 social	 and	 political	 meanings	 for	 the	 emphasis	 on	 the	
technical	possibilities	of	science	 in	solving	the	challenges	contributes	to	cause	a	parallel	evolution	from	a	
focus	on	the	complexity	of	agenda-setting	–	related	to	the	democratic	inclusion	of	a	wide	representation	of	
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stakeholders,	citizens	included	–	to	an	emphasis	on	problem-solving,	and	the	consequent	request	to	the	R&D	
community	to	contribute	with	techno-scientific	fixes,	rather	than	with	political,	social,	ethical	ideas,	to	the	
solution	of	the	challenges.	We	have	seen	how	the	same	identification	of	the	common	issues	is	proposed,	in	
the	Georghiou	report,	to	be	realized	via	a	checklist	of	questions,	and	with	the	guiding	criteria	of	feasibility	
and	attractiveness;	on	the	other	hand,	other	documents	show	that	the	interpretation	of	the	grand-challenges	
approach	is	not	unique	and	the	debate	is	still	open	to	different	framings,	e.g.	exploiting	it	at	the	service	of	
societal	concerns,	as	an	instrument	of	citizens’	inclusion.	However,	also	this	interpretation	implies	that	the	
deliberative	 moment	 is	 postponed,	 and	 it	 is	 exposed	 at	 the	 risk	 of	 working	 as	 a	 surrogate	 of	 public	
participation,	substituting	it	instead	of	facilitating	it.	
The social orientation of knowledge in EU science policy 
An	articulated	landscape	emerges	from	the	historical	tracing	of	the	European	social	orientation	of	
knowledge	and	from	the	analysis	of	the	most	relevant	conceptualizations.	
EU	discourses	in	this	respect	range	between	opposite	positions:	on	one	side,	the	vision	centring	on	
the	democratic	right	of	citizens	to	take	part	in	policy	shaping;	on	the	other,	the	idea	that	science	needs	to	be	
promoted	 for	 strategic	 reasons	 and	 that	 society	 has	 to	 adapt.	 Crucial	 distinguishing	 element	 is	 the	
conceptualization	of	citizens:	active	actors	in	the	political	confrontation,	carriers	of	values	and	able	to	take	
decisions	on	the	 future	on	one	side;	passive	 figures,	whose	deficit	of	scientific	knowledge	prevents	 them	
from	being	able	to	make	sound	and	appropriate	choices	on	the	other.	In	the	first	case,	participation	processes	
are	envisaged	in	order	to	ameliorate	decisions,	and	to	take	into	account	value-related	aspects;	in	the	second,	
the	 involvement	of	 the	citizens	 is	 reduced	 to	 information	and	education	programmes,	 in	order	 to	obtain	
people’s	approval	on	the	political	choices.	Consequently,	on	one	side	the	citizens’	participation	is	advocated	
during	the	agenda-setting	stage,	on	the	other,	at	the	moment	of	problem-solving,	in	order	to	appraise	the	
envisaged	initiatives.	
The	features	of	the	two	approaches	are	schematically	summarised	in	Table	15.		
Table	 15:	 A	 summary	 of	 the	 approaches	 identified	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 social	 orientation	 of	 knowledge	 in	 EU	 scientific	 policy	
discourses.		
Adult-citizen	frame	 Child-citizen109	frame	
Citizens:	active	actors,	carriers	of	values,	able	to	take	
decisions	
Citizens:	passive	actors,	knowledge	deficient,	
inadequate	to	take	decisions	
Involvement:	participation	to	policy	shaping,	with	
the	aim	of	ameliorating	the	proposals	
Involvement:	information	and	communication	
activities,	with	the	aim	of	complying	to	the	decisions	
Involvement	stage:	agenda-setting	 Involvement	stage:	appraisal	of	problem-solving	
	
																																								 																				
109	 The	 reference	 here	 is	 to	 the	 denominations	 used	 in	 the	 studies	 of	 education	 policies	 to	 define	 the	 traditional	
conservative	or	democratic	positions:	people	are/are	not	children,	people	can/cannot	be	philosophers,	as	described	in	(Manacorda,	
2015)	to	describe	Gramsci’s	position.	
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The	overview	of	 the	social	orientation	of	knowledge	 in	EU	discourses	 reveals	primarily	 that,	here	
more	than	anywhere	else,	arguments	and	issues	are	framed	in	different,	even	opposite,	manners,	contain	
different	interpretations	and	finalizations	of	the	same	instruments,	and	consequently	include	diverse	seeds	
of	confrontation	and	possible	evolutions	of	the	democratic	debate.	
Pure science, or “knowledge for knowledge itself” 
The	third	«key	priority»	of	Horizon	2020	is	«Excellent	Science»,	geared	«to	reinforce	and	extend	the	
excellence	of	the	Union's	science	base»	(EP	&	CEU,	2013)	and	articulated	in	the	four	subsections	of	European	
Research	Council	(ERC,	with	the	maximum	budget	share,	17%	of	the	total	budget,	see	Table	20),	Future	and	
Emerging	Technologies	(FET),	Marie-Skłodowska-Curie	Actions	and	European	research	infrastructures.	All	the	
activities,	according	to	the	Programme	stablishing	act,	share	a	«forward-looking»,	«long-term»	orientation	
and	pay	a	special	attention	to	the	support	of	talented	researchers.		
The	funding	under	the	«Excellent	Science»	priority	 is	qualitatively	different	from	the	other	H2020	
lines:	the	scientific	contents	are	proposed	bottom-up,	and	chosen	with	the	scientific	community’s	specific	
methods	(EP	&	CEU,	2013):		
In	 view	 of	 their	 science-driven	 nature	 and	 largely	 'bottom-up',	 investigator-driven	 funding	
arrangements,	the	European	scientific	community	will	play	a	strong	role	in	determining	the	avenues	of	
research	followed	under	Horizon	2020.	
The	 inclusion	of	 funding	 lines	with	differentiated	methods	of	 content	 setting	and	evaluation	was	
prompted	by	the	foundation	and	rise	of	the	ERC	in	the	European	research	funding	landscape,	introduced	in	
the	Seventh	Framework	Programme	 in	2007.	The	debate	about	the	shaping	of	 the	ERC	elicited	questions	
regarding	basic	research,	research	finalization	and	research	excellence	in	the	European	science	policy.	
As	mentioned,	 a	major	distinction	 can	be	drawn	between	 research	 funding	models	 assigning	 the	
agenda-setting	role	to	governments,	on	the	basis	of	strategic	priorities,	and	models	in	which	the	scientific	
community	 chooses	 among	 the	 different	 proposals,	 basing	 on	 its	 proper	 internal	 dynamics	 (previously	
defined	«Steelman	model»	and	«Bush	model»,	see	Table	14).	
The	«Excellent	Science»	priority	ideally	belongs	to	the	second	category,	however	its	positioning	in	
the	frame	of	Horizon	2020	‘forces’	the	“ivory	tower”	vision	into	the	innovation	oriented	frame	–	and,	indeed,	
the	 H2020	 establishing	 act	 frames	 its	 contribution	 as	 functional	 «to	 make	 the	 Union's	 research	 and	
innovation	 system	 more	 competitive	 on	 a	 global	 scale»	 (EP	 &	 CEU,	 2013).	 A	 friction	 emerges	 also	 in	
communication	 products,	 when	 dealing	 with	 the	 uncomfortable	 positioning	 of	 basic	 research	 in	 the	
economy-led	innovation	frame	(EC,	2014e):	
Getting	close	to	real	every	day	needs	like	these	doesn’t	mean	basic	research	is	out	in	the	cold.	That’s	
the	beauty	of	coupling	science	and	innovation:	it	covers	a	much	wider	range,	from	research	to	retail	
and	all	forms	of	blue-sky	thinking	and	innovative	approach	that	make	this	possible.	
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Basic	research	or	blue-sky	thinking,	in	the	vision	of	the	Commission’s	H2020	introductory	video,	are	
advocated	and	supported,	provided	they	are	innovative	in	approach:	however,	the	concept	of	innovation	is	
closely	 related	 to	 the	exploitation	of	 ideas	 in	 the	market,	 and	 an	 innovative	approach	 can	be	difficult	 to	
reconcile	with	the	inherent	features	of	basic	research,	whose	practical	outputs,	if	any,	are	often	visible	only	
decades	after	the	ideas	were	conceived.	
The European approach to basic research.	 The	 traditional	 European	approach	 to	 research	 favours,	
with	 the	 relevant	 examples	 of	 the	 big	 laboratories	 established	 in	 the	 post-war	 period,	 applied	 and	
competitiveness-oriented	 research.	 However,	 the	 debate	 around	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 European	 Research	
Council	triggered	a	reflection	of	the	role	of	basic	research	in	the	European	context.	
The	2004	document	Europe	and	basic	research	(CEC,	2004)	acknowledged	such	debate	and	situated	
EU’s	 view	 in	 the	 frame	 of	 the	 «emerging	 knowledge-based	 economy	 and	 society»	 and	 of	 the	 European	
Research	Area,	describing	the	European	vision	against	the	historical	background	of	the	conceptualizations	of	
basic	research	–	an	approach	that	is	very	uncommon	for	Commission’s	communications:	
During	 the	 years	 immediately	 after	 the	 Second	World	War,	when	 research	 policies	 originated	 and	
developed	in	Europe	and	the	USA,	the	emphasis	was	on	basic	research.	
This	is	well	illustrated	by	what	Vannevar	Bush,	President	Roosevelt’s	scientific	adviser,	wrote	in	1945	
in	his	famous	report	"Science:	the	Endless	Frontier":	“Scientific	progress	on	a	broad	front	results	from	
the	free	play	of	free	intellects,	working	on	subjects	of	their	own	choice,	in	the	manner	dictated	by	their	
curiosity	for	exploration	of	the	unknown").	
During	 the	 decades	 which	 followed	 and	 in	 view	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 science	 for	 industrial	
competitiveness	 and	 its	 role	 in	 meeting	 social	 needs,	 this	 emphasis,	 and	 with	 it	 public	 funding,	
gradually	shifted	towards	applied	research	and	technological	and	industrial	development.	
Today,	the	general	value	of	increasing	knowledge	and	the	importance	of	basic	research	for	economic	
and	social	development,	tend	to	be	fully	recognised	again.		
The	report	 is	structured	in	order	to	explain	and	legitimise	the	changing	EU	attitude	towards	basic	
research.		
Basic	research	may	be	characterised,	according	to	the	Commission	communication,	«by	reference	to	
its	 ultimate	 purpose	 (research	 carried	 out	with	 the	 sole	 aim	 of	 increasing	 knowledge);	 its	 distance	 from	
application	(research	on	the	basic	aspects	of	phenomena);	or	the	time	frame	in	which	it	is	situated	(research	
in	 a	 long-term	 perspective)».	 The	 2000	 document	 Towards	 a	 European	 Research	 Area	 (CEC,	 2000),	 had	
underlined	in	particular	this	 last	aspect	of	the	time	frame,	although	emphasizing	the	exceptional	cases	of	
rapid	concrete	applications:	
Basic	research	(…)	In	some	cases	(…)	can	be	translated	fairly	rapidly	into	concrete	applications.	This	
has	been	the	case,	for	example,	with	breakthroughs	in	molecular	biology	and	immunology	in	the	field	
of	health.	It	can	also	give	rise	to	unexpected	applications	years	later	in	fields	somewhat	removed	from	
the	ones	they	started	out	in	.		
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The	definition	chosen	in	the	2004	document	on	Europe	and	basic	research	(CEC,	2004)	was	very	close	
to	the	one	adopted	by	OECD	in	the	Frascati	Manual:	it	was	defined	as	the	activity	carried	out	«with	no	direct	
link	to	a	given	application	and,	if	not	exclusively,	in	any	case	and	above	all	with	the	objective	pf	progressing	
knowledge»110.		
Support	for	basic	research,	according	to	the	report,	was	justified	with	its	«indirect,	but	undeniable,	
impact	(…)	on	economic	competitiveness,	growth	and,	more	generally,	well-being»,	with	the	rising	cost	of	
the	infrastructure,	which	the	private	cannot	afford,	and	with	«the	value	of	knowledge	as	“public	property”,	
which	means	that,	in	principle,	there	must	be	free	access	to	it,	this	being	easier	to	guarantee	if	there	is	public	
funding»;	 moreover,	 the	 documents	 highlighted	 the	 contribution	 of	 basic	 research	 to	 the	 training	 of	
researchers.	Due	to	the	compartmentalisation	of	national	research	systems	and	sometimes	the	lack	of	critical	
mass,	the	report	argued,	«there	would	seem	to	be	a	need	for	this	public	support	to	be	given	at	a	European	
level».	
However,	this	document	was	apparently	not	sufficient	to	rule	out	the	doubts	about	funding	basic	
research,	if	 in	a	2009	ERA	report	(Soete	et	al.,	2009)	the	authors	discussed	the	nature	and	legitimation	of	
basic	research:	
First,	investing	in	basic	research	is	in	need	of	political	justification.	Second,	whatever	arguments	are	
used,	 they	 reveal	 –	 often	 unintentionally	 –	 the	 inherent	 tension	 between	 investing	 into	 frontier,	
curiosity-driven	research	and	the	desired,	economically	profitable	outcome.	
Whatever	the	choice	of	terminology,	they	argued,	–	basic,	fundamental,	frontier,	scientific,	blue	sky,	
curiosity-driven	research	–	all	these	activities	involve	the	production	of	new	knowledge,	and	«an	open	and	
an	open-ended	process	in	which	serendipity,	the	accidental	finding	of	interesting	and	relevant	phenomena	
that	one	was	not	looking	for,	is	often	decisive»;	the	experts	group’s	approach	was	thus	slightly	different	from	
the	Commission’s	one.	
The	choice	of	the	denomination	is	not	uninfluential,	and	it	is	linked	to	the	friction	among	different	
research	 orientation	 frames	 in	 European	 science	 policy:	 the	 term	 «frontier	 research»,	 instead	 of	 «basic	
research»,	was	proposed,	and	adopted	in	subsequent	Commission’s	accounts,	by	an	ad-hoc	expert	group,	
committed	to	«provide,	by	collecting	and	analysing	existing	data,	a	clear	indication	of	the	types	of	effects	
and	benefits	 that	may	be	expected,	and	their	 scientific	and	economic	significance».	 In	 fact,	 (Harris	et	al.,	
2005):	
classical	distinctions	between	‘basic’	and	‘applied’	research	have	lost	much	of	their	relevance	at	a	time	
when	 emerging	 areas	 of	 science	 and	 technology	 often	 embrace	 substantial	 elements	 of	 both.	 The	
report	 therefore	 adopts	 the	 term	 frontier	 research,	 rather	 than	 basic	 research,	 to	 reflect	 this	 new	
																																								 																				
110	 The	OECD	definition	was:	 «Basic	 research	 is	 experimental	 or	 theoretical	work	undertaken	primarily	 to	 acquire	new	
knowledge	of	the	underlying	foundations	of	phenomena	and	observable	facts,	without	any	particular	application	or	use	in	view»	
(OECD,	1993).	
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reality.	Frontier	research,	because	it	is	at	the	forefront	of	creating	new	knowledge,	is	an	intrinsically	
risky	 endeavour	 that	 involves	 the	 pursuit	 of	 questions	 without	 regard	 for	 established	 disciplinary	
boundaries	or	national	borders.	
In	 other	words,	 the	 concept	 of	 «frontier	 research»	 could	 identify	 fundamental	 research	without	
excluding	the	creation	of	useful	knowledge,	and	embrace	both	the	domains	of	basic	research	and	application-
oriented	activities	(Luukkonen,	2014).	
Not only a different orientation, but also a different rationale for research funding.	Admitting	the	ERC	
idea	 at	 the	 EU-level	 political	 debate	 didn’t	 only	 mean	 discussing	 on	 a	 different	 research	 orientation	
(production	of	 new	knowledge	per	 se),	 but	 involved	 the	development	of	 a	 completely	 new	 rationale	 for	
justifying	research	funding:	while	the	traditional	one	was	targeted	at	‘pre-competitive’	research,	achieved	
through	 cooperation	 and	 mobility,	 the	 new	 one	 was	 focused	 on	 ‘frontier’	 research,	 attained	 through	
competition;	the	added	value	was	not	transnational	collaboration,	but	scientific	excellence	(König,	2016).	
«Excellence»	appears	indeed	to	be	the	distinctive	feature	of	the	ERC	model:	it	is	the	most	promoted	
concept	when	the	ERC	is	presented	in	relation	to	the	other	funding	programmes	and	described	to	the	public.	
Conversely,	 the	establishing	documents,	designing	the	governance	structure	of	ERC,	 focus	much	more	on	
«autonomy»	and	«independence»	as	its	peculiar	features,	and	on	the	family	of	concepts	related	to	moral	
integrity	and	reputation.	
Regaining the autonomy of the scientific community: the rise of the ERC 
During	the	‘90s,	the	Framework	Programmes	‘format’	developed	and	consolidated;	however,	the	FP	
growing	 administrative	 burden	 involved	 also	 a	 significant	 institutional	 inertia,	 and	 it	 proved	 difficult	 to	
change	 its	 procedures,	 along	 with	 its	 rationale	 for	 research	 funding.	 The	 success	 of	 the	 Framework	
Programmes	led	to	their	broadening	in	scale	and	scope,	but	it	prevented	from	changing	the	orientation	and	
procedure	of	research	policy111.	
During	 the	 ‘90s,	different	new	actors	entered	 the	political	 stage	of	 the	European	research	policy;	
along	with	the	citizens	–	whose	influence,	as	seen,	elicited	a	debate	about	the	democratic	enhancement	of	
decision-making	in	the	scientific	field	–	also	some	representatives	from	the	scientific	community,	concerned	
with	the	changing	nature	of	research,	began	discussing	about	the	need	to	re-affirm	the	autonomy	of	science.	
The	debate	focused	on	the	flaws	of	the	FP	format,	but	in	this	first	phase	failed	to	show	to	EU	authorities	the	
need	of	a	new	independent	body.	
It	was	with	the	contribution	of	Keith	Pavitt,	experienced	professor	at	the	Science	Policy	Research	Unit	
(SPRU)	at	the	Sussex-University	–	one	of	the	most	influential	think-tanks	in	the	field	innovation	studies	–	that	
an	intellectual	synthesis	able	to	breach	the	EU	traditional	narratives	could	be	found.	He	emphasized	the	role	
																																								 																				
111	This	paragraph,	excepted	where	referenced,	is	based	on	the	account	on	the	rise	of	ERC	drafted	by	Thomas	König,	the	
former	scientific	adviser	to	the	ERC	President	Helga	Nowotny	(from	2010	to	2013),	in	his	2016	book	(König,	2016).	
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of	 academic	 research,	 opposing	 the	 mainstream	 diagnosis	 of	 the	 “European	 paradox”,	 and	 the	 well-
established	remedy	focusing	on	national	systems	of	innovation:	the	low	performance	of	EU	research	system,	
he	argued,	was	not	due	to	a	weak	uptake	of	high-quality	academic	knowledge	by	the	production	system,	but	
to	the	fact	that	the	firms	were	increasingly	externalizing	R&D	to	non-EU	countries,	especially	in	the	USA.	He	
showed	that	the	superior	performances	of	US	science	were	due	to	the	willingness	to	fund	basic	research	
without	politically-established	conditions	on	the	content	or	on	the	envisaged	applications.	As	Thomas	König,	
scientific	adviser	to	the	ERC	President	Nowotny,	described	it	(König,	2016):	
he	 destroyed	 the	 core	 basics	 of	 the	 FP	 format:	 instead	 of	 foresight,	 ‘in	 matching	 long-term	
technological	opportunities	with	economic	and	 social	needs’,	 the	US	was	 successful	because	of	 the	
‘unintended	consequences’	of	massive	spending	in	basic	research;	instead	of	demonstrating	‘practical	
usefulness	and	user	involvement	at	the	project	level’,	‘usefulness	was	defined	in	broad	terms	[…]	which	
allowed	the	development	of	both	long-term,	speculative	and	fundamental	research	programmes,	and	
post-graduate	training’;	and	instead	of	a	“democratic”	spread	of	funding	to	many	regions’,	‘funding	
tended	to	be	concentrated	in	relatively	few	elite	institutions’.112	
Pavitt,	 hence,	 managed	 to	 combine	 the	 arguments	 of	 the	 FP	 critics	 and,	 most	 importantly,	 he	
expressed	them	in	the	EU	innovation	policy	language.		
His	arguments	created	a	counter-narrative	that	spread	in	the	academic	community	tied	to	research	
policy,	also	by	means	of	the	numerous	workshops	and	conferences	organized	around	the	launch	of	the	Lisbon	
Strategy.	However,	it	took	two	years	before,	in	December	2002,	the	European	Research	Council	Expert	Group	
(ERCEG)	was	established,	chaired	by	Federico	Mayor,	former	UNESCO	Director	General,	in	order	to	study	the	
possible	options	for	creating	an	ERC.	A	few	months	later,	what	previously	had	been	a	movement	of	engaged	
scientists	and	research	managers,	was	endorsed	by	the	Commission	(commissioner	Busquin	publicly	stated	
his	support	to	the	ERC	campaign	in	autumn	2003),	probably	in	consideration	of	the	slow	progresses	in	the	
realization	of	the	ERA,	and	of	the	incipient	negotiations	for	the	preparation	of	FP7.		
The	report	proposed	the	building	of	a	Council	geared	«to	support	investigator-driven	research	of	the	
highest	quality	selected	through	European	competition»	(Mayor	et	al.,	2003).		
However,	the	focus	on	competition,	instead	of	the	traditional	cooperation	rationale,	didn’t	find	the	
approval	of	all	the	EU	Member	States,	and	in	particular	the	Italian	government	was	worried	that	competition	
would	have	 led	to	the	strengthening	of	scientific	 inequalities	across	Europe,	disadvantaging	the	countries	
less	investing	in	R&D;	this	represented	anyway	a	minority	positions,	and	the	Council	felt	entitled	to	disregard	
it:	henceforth	the	Commission	could	proceed	on	the	basis	of	Council	Conclusions113	favourable	to	the	ERC.		
																																								 																				
112	The	in-line	quotes	are	from	Pavitt’s	article	Why	European	Union	funding	of	academic	research	should	be	increased:	a	
radical	proposal	(Pavitt,	2000).	
113	The	Competitiveness	Council	held	in	December	2004.	
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A	 further	 expert	 group	was	 set	 up	 in	 2004	 to	 study	 the	 contribution	 of	 the	 ERC	 to	 the	 Union’s	
objective	of	competitiveness:	the	result	was	the	report,	issued	in	early	2005,	proposing	the	adoption	of	the	
expression	 «frontier	 research»	 instead	 of	 «basic	 research»	 in	 order	 to	 hold	 together	 fundamental	 and	
oriented	research	(Harris	et	al.,	2005).		
The	legal	and	administrative	structure	of	the	ERC	represented	a	contentious	issue	between	the	ERC	
advocates	and	the	Commission,	the	former	in	favour	of	a	completely	autonomous	body,	the	latter	supporting	
the	model	of	an	executive	agency,	formally	independent	but	subject	to	the	Commission	as	for	the	structure.	
Despite	interested	in	setting	up	an	executive	agency,	the	Commission	could	not	risk	losing	the	approval	of	
the	ERC	advocates,	so	it	included	many	of	them	in	the	Scientific	Council,	the	Steering	body	of	the	ERC,	that	
was	announced	 in	 July	2005.	 That	move	didn’t	diminish	 their	opposition	 to	 the	executive	agency	model,	
however	it	ended	up	representing	the	only	viable	option	if	the	ERC	had	to	be	included	in	the	7th	Framework	
Programme,	launched	in	2007:	the	ERC,	conceived	as	a	critical	alternative	to	the	FP	format,	modelled	on	the	
American	NSF,	was	going	to	become	part	of	the	FPs	themselves.	
The	European	Research	Council	was	officially	launched	in	February	2007,	as	part	of	the	‘Ideas	Specific	
Programme’	in	FP7.	
Fostering excellence, defending autonomy and promoting the reputation of EU 
research funding 
As	the	account	on	the	emergence	and	launch	of	the	ERC	has	showed,	the	new	research	funding	body	
entailed	different	significant	changes	to	the	EU	traditional	research	policy	vision.	
Europe needs excellence. The	 first	 and	most	 visible	 one	 revolves	 around	 the	 guiding	 principle	 of	
«excellence».	Before	the	ERC,	the	term	was	used	in	policy	documents	but	it	didn’t	substantiate	into	concrete	
instruments	(CEC,	2003b;	Luukkonen,	2014):	
Europe	needs	excellence	in	its	universities,	to	optimise	the	processes	which	underpin	the	knowledge	
society	 and	 meet	 the	 target,	 set	 out	 by	 the	 European	 Council	 in	 Lisbon,	 of	 becoming	 the	 most	
competitive	and	dynamic	knowledge-based	economy	in	the	world,	capable	of	sustainable	economic	
growth	with	more	and	better	jobs	and	greater	social	cohesion.		
In	 the	 EU	 political	 universe,	 accepting	 to	 gear	 research	 towards	 «excellence»	 implied	 a	 radical	
rethinking	of	the	role	of	science	policy	in	the	European	integration	process.	Research	funding	at	the	EU	level,	
as	mentioned,	was	considered	justified	when	a	proven	‘added	value’,	with	respect	to	national	programmes,	
could	be	demonstrated	(cf.	the	‘Reisenhuber	criteria’,	see	paragraph	Which	science	for	which	Europe?),	and	
«collaboration	of	research	teams	in	different	countries»	was	regarded	as	the	most	significant	contribution	of	
research	policy	to	EU	integration;	with	the	focus	on	excellence,	the	‘added	value’	was	redefined	in	terms	of	
the	opening	up	of	 the	possibility	 for	 researchers	 «to	 compete	with	 all	 other	 researchers	 on	 the	basis	 of	
excellence»	(Mayor	et	al.,	2003):	
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In	view	of	the	importance	of	a	strong	research	capacity	for	economic	stability	and	growth,	the	Expert	
Group	recommends	a	new	European	dimension	for	research	funding.	
Until	now	European	added	value	has	been	defined	as	the	collaboration	of	research	teams	in	different	
countries.	It	is	now	time	to	bring	a	new	definition	of	added	value,	one	that	incorporates	the	principle	
of	allowing	a	researcher	in	any	European	state	to	compete	with	all	other	researchers	on	the	basis	of	
excellence.	Competition	in	order	to	achieve	real	excellence	in	research	should	become	an	essential	part	
of	a	new,	forward-	looking	definition	of	European	added	value.	
Hence,	the	focus	on	excellence	involved	a	shift	from	collaboration	to	competition,	i.e.	a	departure	
from	the	guiding	EU	objective	of	«cohesion»,	based	on	the	redistribution	of	resources	among	the	Member	
States,	 in	 order	 to	 reduce	 the	national	 differences;	 in	 EU	 research	policy	 lingo,	mentioning	 «excellence»	
signaled	the	positioning	in	a	sector	of	research	funding	where	the	juste	retour	criterion	–	the	Member	States	
receive	 in	 proportion	 to	 their	 contribution	–	was	not	 considered	 (König,	 2016).	 The	 choice	of	 excellence	
entailed	as	well	a	shift	from	funding	organizations	to	funding	individuals,	who	are	given	by	ERC	grants	the	
resources	to	form	their	team	in	a	chosen	institution.	
The	ERC	was	conceived	with	«excellence	as	the	ultimate	goal»	(Mayor	et	al.,	2003):	
The	mission	of	 the	European	Research	Council	 (ERC)	 is	 to	promote	excellence	as	a	basis	 for	 social,	
cultural	and	technological	progress	throughout	Europe	by	funding	world	class	research.	
In	order	to	establish	the	excellence	of	new	proposals,	the	ERC	scientific	officers	had	to	rely	on	the	
scientific	community’s	well-established	method,	peer	review:	
It	should	base	its	funding	decisions	on	scientific	criteria	and	use	a	rigorous	and	transparent	peer	review	
process	in	deciding	which	research	proposals	to	fund.	(Mayor	et	al.,	2003)	
Proposals	for	"frontier	research"	should	be	evaluated	on	the	basis	of	the	sole	criterion	of	excellence	as	
judged	by	peer	review	and	should	put	the	emphasis	on	inter-	and	multidisciplinary,	high	risk	pioneering	
projects	and	new	groups	and	new	generation	researchers	as	well	as	established	teams		(CEU,	2006)	
Relying	 on	 the	 peer-review	 method	 positioned	 the	 ERC	 patently	 under	 the	 ‘jurisdiction’	 of	 the	
scientific	community’s	norms	and	values,	enforcing	the	original	call	of	ERC	advocates	to	re-establish	them	at	
the	EU	research	policy	level.	
To	 this	 aim,	 when	 dealing	 with	 the	 organization	 of	 the	 funding	 body,	 an	 abiding	 –	 borderline	
obsessive	–	reference	is	made	to	the	concepts	of	«autonomy»	and	«independence»	(see,	for	example,	(CEC,	
2007b),	with	the	different	contributions	highlighted	in	Fig.	36):	
In	designing	the	governance	structure	of	the	ERC	it	is	imperative	that	it	has	full	autonomy	in	research	
matters,	granting	decisions	and	funding	policies	(…)	(Mayor	et	al.,	2003)	
The	Scientific	Council	should	be	composed	of	scientists,	engineers	and	scholars	of	the	highest	repute,	
appointed	 by	 the	 Commission,	 and	 acting	 in	 their	 personal	 capacity,	 independent	 of	 any	 outside	
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influence.	(…)	The	Scientific	Council	shall	operate	in	an	autonomous	and	independent	manner.	(…)	The	
Commission	shall	provide	information	and	assistance	necessary	for	the	work	of	the	Scientific	Council	
allowing	it	to	operate	under	conditions	of	autonomy	and	independence.	(…)	The	Scientific	Council	shall	
independently	 select	 a	 Secretary-General	 (…)	 The	 composition	 of	 the	 Scientific	 Council	 must	
demonstrate	that	the	Council	can	exercise	scientific	leadership	which	is	authoritative	and	absolutely	
independent	(…)	(CEC,	2007b)	
The	founding	idea	of	the	ERC,	according	to	these	citations,	appears	to	reside	more	in	the	vision	of	
the	scientific	community	as	autonomous	and	independent	from	extra-scientific	influences,	rather	than	in	the	
principle	of	excellence.	Indeed,	 independence	from	pre-established	political	orientation	of	research	is	the	
distinguishing	feature	of	the	“pure	knowledge”,	‘Bush’	frame,	as	opposed	to	the	Steelman’s	idea	of	orienting	
the	research	towards	strategic	lines	of	research.		
A	third	element	of	the	ERC	characterization	relates	to	the	dimensions	of	 integrity	and	reputation,	
depicting	them	as	indispensable	features	of	the	Scientific	Council	and	of	its	members;	even	their	«probity»	
is	mentioned.	The	overall	characterization	appears	belonging	to	the	realm	of	the	moral	qualities:	reputation,	
together	with	autonomy,	 is	described	as	necessary	 to	«earn»	ERC’s	«credibility	 in	 the	European	research	
community	and	in	society	at	large»:	
The	ERC	must	be	able	to	operate	independently	in	order	to	establish	its	reputation	as	a	research	funding	
institution	of	highest	quality	and	thus	earn	its	credibility	in	the	European	research	community	and	in	
society	at	large.	The	decisions	of	the	ERC	on	research	priorities	and	funding	issues	must	be	protected	
from	any	undue	outside	intervention.	(Mayor	et	al.,	2003)	
The	Scientific	Council	shall	be	composed	of	scientists,	engineers	and	scholars	of	the	highest	repute	and	
appropriate	 expertise,	 ensuring	 a	 diversity	 of	 research	 areas,	 acting	 in	 their	 personal	 capacity,	
independent	of	extraneous	interests.	(CEU,	2006)	
The	Scientific	Council	shall	exclusively	act	in	the	interest	of	achieving	the	scientific,	technological	and	
scholarly	objectives	of	the	Specific	Programme	‘Ideas’.	It	shall	act	with	integrity	and	probity	(…)	
Members	of	the	Scientific	Council	must	individually	have	an	undisputed	reputation	as	research	leaders	
and	for	their	independence	and	commitment	to	research.	(CEC,	2007b)	
The	attractiveness	of	 the	new	 funding	body,	 and	 its	 capacity	 to	 influence	 the	European	 research	
environment	is	indeed	presented	as	an	important	point	of	the	ERC	model	(EP	&	CEU,	2013):	
Beyond	this,	the	ERC	has	a	significant	structural	impact	by	generating	a	powerful	stimulus	for	driving	
up	the	quality	of	the	European	research	system,	over	and	above	the	researchers	and	projects	which	
the	ERC	 funds	directly.	ERC-funded	projects	and	 researchers	 set	a	clear	and	 inspirational	 target	 for	
frontier	research	 in	Europe,	raise	 its	profile	and	make	 it	more	attractive	for	the	best	researchers	at	
global	level.	The	prestige	of	hosting	ERC	grant-holders	and	the	accompanying	'stamp	of	excellence'	are	
intensifying	competition	between	Europe's	universities	and	other	research	organisations	to	offer	the	
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most	 attractive	 conditions	 for	 top	 researchers.	 And	 the	 ability	 of	 national	 systems	 and	 individual	
research	institutions	to	attract	and	host	ERC	grant-winners	sets	a	benchmark	allowing	them	to	assess	
their	 relative	 strengths	 and	 weaknesses	 and	 reform	 their	 policies	 and	 practices	 accordingly.	 ERC	
funding	is	therefore	in	addition	to	ongoing	efforts	at	Union,	national	and	regional	level	to	reform,	build	
capacity	and	unlock	the	full	potential	and	attractiveness	of	the	European	research	system.		
The	 quest	 for	 credibility	 and	 attractiveness	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 ground-breaking	 novelty	
represented	by	ERC	in	the	European	research	funding	landscape,	and	by	the	need	to	justify	it	adequately.	
Besides,	as	T.	König	notes	in	his	first-hand	account	of	the	rise	of	the	ERC,	the	new	body’s	political	aim	was	to	
“get	the	aura	back”	to	European	research	policy,	against	the	background	of	Frameworks	Programmes	that	
were	considered	by	scientists	a	sort	of	«Loch	Ness	monsters	of	bureaucracy»	(König,	2016).		
The	rise	of	the	ERC	appears	to	be	built	on	a	series	of	convergences	of	interests	between	a	group	of	
engaged	scientists	advocating	for	a	new	research	funding	mechanism,	modelled	on	the	scientific	community,	
and	a	Commission	in	search	of	alliances	among	the	societal	actors	to	regain	consensus	and	supports.	
The ERC as a political instrument 
According	to	the	described	representation	in	policy	documents,	the	ERC	appears	framed	in	a	double-
face	depiction:	the	documents	describing	it	‘from	outside’,	i.e.	presenting	it	to	the	public,	or	inserting	it	in	
the	 overarching	 strategies,	 alongside	 the	 other	 programmes	 (e.g.	 in	 Horizon	 2020	 documents),	 tend	 to	
underline	the	production	of	high-quality	science,	leading	Europe	to	achieving	excellence	in	research;	when	
dealing	with	the	‘internal’	characteristics	of	ERC,	conversely,	the	documents	greatly	emphasize	the	dimension	
of	autonomy	and	independence	of	the	new	funding	body.		
The	rhetoric	of	excellence,	based	on	competition,	could	not	fail	to	attract	consensus	in	the	European	
political	 community,	 given	 EU’s	 history	 of	 grounding	 research	 to	 competitiveness	 and	 growth;	 indeed,	
another	key	feature	of	the	ERC,	accompanying	excellence,	autonomy	and	transparency,	was	efficiency,	and	
we	have	already	seen	how	this	concept	resonates	with	measurability	and	accountability	of	research.	That	
was	 not	 the	 only	moment	 where	 the	 ERC	 advocates	 proved	 to	 be	 politically	 clever	 in	 formulating	 their	
proposal	basing	on	EU	established	frames	and	interests,	in	order	to	facilitate	their	acceptance	and	insertion	
in	the	political	agenda.	The	reformulation	of	the	new	policy	orientation	in	terms	of	a	European	core	concept	
as	the	‘added	value’	was	another	example,	that	allowed	for	the	political	negotiations	to	proceed	towards	an	
integrated	European	body,	instead	of	an	autonomous	intergovernmental	organization.		
On	the	other	side,	from	the	perspective	of	the	scientists,	the	new	structure	had	to	respect	strictly	the	
requirement	of	autonomy	and	independence	to	absolve	its	mandate	and	realize	a	communitarian	funding	
body	more	respectful	of	the	scientific	community’s	principles.	
The	history	of	the	ERC	ideation	and	creation	can	hence	be	read	as	a	successful	story	of	clever	framing,	
by	 two	different	communities,	 in	order	 to	show	the	attractiveness	and	 feasibility	of	 their	project	 to	each	
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other,	and	gain	a	win-win	result:	the	establishment	of	a	new	body	that	was	honestly	unforeseeable	only	a	
decade	earlier.		
The	newly	established	body,	with	its	radically	new	rationale	for	EU,	represented	a	major	tension	point	
in	the	research	funding	landscape,	that	added	to	the	frictions	among	the	different	orientations	for	research	
of	the	innovation	and	social	aiming	frames.			
Tensions in the European vision of scientific research 
The	 2014	 introductory	 video	 on	 H2020	 concluded	 with	 the	 promise	 of	 a	 «bright	 future»,	 to	 be	
achieved	with	the	contribution	of	the	new	Framework	Programme	(EC,	2014e).		
Which	possible	futures	are	envisaged	by	European	research	policies?	Conceptual	 frameworks	and	
master	narratives,	alongside	the	interpretations	on	past	and	present	events,	always	project	visions	of	desired	
or	feared	futures.	
«The knowledge future». A	 2015	 report	 by	 an	 expert	 group	 on	 foresight114,	 mainly	 composed	 by	
academics	and	policy	experts,	reflected	about	the	future	of	European	knowledge	policies,	underlining	the	
importance	of	the	«knowledge	engine»	to	transform	ideas	into	reality	and	improve	the	European	citizens’	
quality	of	life	(Hudson	et	al.,	2015):	
How	do	ideas	become	reality?	The	whole	process	of	transforming	knowledge	-	creating	it,	sharing	it,	
and	using	it	-	has	become	important	to	policy	makers.	They	see	it	as	connected	somehow	with	how	rich	
we	are,	how	competitive	Europe	can	be,	how	healthy	or	happy	our	citizens	are,	and	how	sustainable	
our	world	will	be.	This	report	to	the	European	Commission,	by	a	diverse	group	of	academics,	policy	
experts	and	private-sector	representatives,	looks	at	the	future	of	this	knowledge	engine	–	towards	the	
challenges	of	2050.	It	recommends	steps	to	ensure	that,	through	maintenance	of	a	robust	system	for	
transforming	knowledge	 into	action,	Europe’s	 citizens	are	better	off,	 rather	 than	worse	off,	 in	 that	
distant	future.	
The	 report,	 titled	The	Knowledge	Future:	 Intelligent	policy	choices	 for	Europe	2050	projected	 two	
visions	 of	 «what	 Europe	 could	 look	 like	 in	 2050	 if	 it	 does,	 or	 doesn’t,	manage	 its	 system	 of	 knowledge	
transformation	well»	(Hudson	et	al.,	2015):	
																																								 																				
114	“Foresight	on	Key	Long-term	Transformations	of	European	systems:	Research,	Innovation	and	Higher	Education”	experts	
group	(KT2050).	
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Fig.	10:	The	two	scenarios	of	Europe	in	2050,	according	to	the	document	(Hudson	et	al.,	2015).		
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Although	 the	 experts	 insist	 on	 the	 purpose	 to	 «dramatise	 the	 importance	 of	making	wise	 policy	
choices,	and	to	suggest	what	those	choices	might	be»,	denying	any	real	forecasting	intention,	the	projected	
scenarios	are	very	interesting	for	what	they	tell	about	their	authors’	frames	about	knowledge	policies	and,	
more	in	general,	about	the	visions	circulating	in	European	research	policy	circles.	
Indeed,	it	 is	possible	to	recognise	in	the	proposed	scenarios	the	elements	of	all	the	identified	and	
analysed	conceptual	frameworks.		
The	innovation	frame,	based	on	the	economic	orientation	of	research,	is	patently	applied	since	the	
first	lines:	a	competitive	knowledge	economy	is	presented	as	the	key	of	European	success,	and	big	cities	are	
defined	as	«a	focus	for	innovation».		
Conversely,	the	failure	to	realize	a	competitive	knowledge	economy	is	described	emphasizing	a	list	
of	negative	consequences	on	the	quality	of	life	–	«unemployment,	social	exclusion,	discontent»	–	;	warnings	
and	threats	over	a	deterioration	of	the	«European	way	of	life»,	in	case	of	missed	application	of	economic	
measures,	were	highlighted	above	as	recurrent	features	of	the	urgency	frame.	In	the	success	scenario,	the	
situation	is	the	opposite:	«new	skills,	new	jobs,	new	capacity	to	cope	with	rapid	change,	new	perspectives	
for	leading	fulfilled	lives	–	from	cradle	to	grave».	Furthermore,	multiple	references	are	made	to	the	ability	to	
cope	with	the	fast-changing	environment	–	again,	the	scenarios	resort	to	the	urgency	frame	–	as	the	key	to	
obtain	results	and	solve	problems.		
The	 positive	 evaluation	 of	 practical,	 problem-oriented	 scientific	 activity	 emerges	 from	 the	
description	of	a	«research	game»	focused	on	«fields	that	attract	strong	public	interest»	–	we	recognise	here	
the	same	framing	employed	in	H2020	for	societal	challenges.		
The	nerve	of	an	insufficient	democratic	functioning	of	the	Union	–	including	the	critical	interplay	of	
science	 and	 society	 –	 is	 addressed	 depicting	 a	 successful	 future	 where	 the	 regions	 and	 cities	 represent	
«Europe’s	 growing	 laboratories	 of	 democracy»	 and	 are	 described	 as	 places	 of	 «community	 identity	 and	
involvement».		
The	areas	pertaining	to	basic	science	and	to	the	scientific	community	support	–	highlighted	in	the	
pure-science	 frame	 –	 are	 presented	 as	 Europe’s	 leading	 research	 sectors:	 universities	 are	 «renowned»,	
research	 infrastructures	 are	 «the	new	 cathedrals»	of	 science115	 and	 frontier	 science,	 administered	by	 an	
«enlarged»	ERC,	is	the	leading	research	trend.	The	funding	method	is	competitive,	but	the	possibly	arising	
inequalities	are	compensated	through	structural	funds.		
In	 the	 failure	scenario,	conversely,	 inequalities	are	dominating:	between	regions,	skilled	and	non-
skilled	 people,	 rich	 and	 impoverished	 citizens,	 public	 and	 private	 sectors,	 strong	 and	 weak	 universities,	
wealthy	and	poor	companies,	actors	with	and	without	access	to	data	and	discoveries.	
																																								 																				
115	The	clear	reference	here	is	to	Weinberg’s	definition	of	Big	Science	realizations	as	the	«Notre	Dame»	of	the	20th	century	
(Weinberg,	1961).	
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The	overall	result	is,	in	the	first	option,	a	feeling	of	confidence	in	the	future,	based	on	the	support	to	
the	«core	values»	of	Europe:	«equality,	openness,	social	inclusion	and	environmental	responsibility»;	in	case	
of	“missing	out”,	«Europe	looks	inward,	fears	the	future,	and	sees	its	values	gradually	discredited».		
The	European	knowledge	system	success	is	linked	in	the	projected	scenarios	to	the	same	future	of	
European	integration:	the	EU	institutions’	role	of	coordination	is	strengthened	in	the	success	case,	while	in	
the	opposite	only	the	«Northern	Arc»	has	maintained	freedom	of	movements,	and	Europe	 is	depicted	as	
fragmented	and	unequal.	
Diverse frames in EU research policy.	Table	16	summarizes	the	different	conceptual	frames	identified	
and	analysed	in	this	work,	with	the	respective	dominant	sub-discourses	and	the	relative	key	concepts	and	
features,	as	observed	in	EU	policy	discourses.		
Each	line	of	thought	derives	from	a	diverse	cultural	background,	and	emerged	at	a	different	moment	
in	EU	research	policy	history.	Different	frames	imply	different	visions	on	research	funding	rationales,	relevant	
actors	 and	 issues.	 Each	 frame	 materialised	 in	 specific	 funding	 lines	 inside	 Framework	 Programmes:	
technologies	 useful	 for	 industrial	 expansion,	 research	 in	 fields	 critically	 affecting	 the	 citizens’	 lives	 and	
support	of	the	scientific	community	development.		
The	fabric	of	the	current	European	research	policy	 is	woven	principally	with	these	threads,	as	the	
tripartite	organisation	of	Horizon	2020	shows.	
Table	16:	A	summary	table	with	the	dominant	features	of	the	three	analysed	frames	and	of	the	identified	sub-discourses.		
	 Innovation	frame	knowledge	for	growth	
Societal	frame	
knowledge	for	society	
Pure-science	frame	
knowledge	for	knowledge	
itself	
Research	
funding	
model116	
Economic	Steelman	model	 Mixed	Steelman	model	 Bush	model	
Rationale	
research	funding	is	
legitimized	by	its	
contribution	to	economic	
growth	
research	funding	is	
legitimized	by	science’s	
power	to	solve	problems	
relevant	for	society	
research	funding	is	
legitimized	by	the	increase	
of	knowledge	itself,	which	
is	a	final	good	
																																								 																				
116	The	reference	here	is	to	the	models	described	above,	in	Table	14.	However,	a	further	specification	is	necessary	for	the	
Steelman	model:	the	original	Steelman	approach	to	research	funding	established	the	need	of	a	political	control	over	the	directions	
of	research,	that	needed	to	be	focused	on	national	priorities	and	held	democratically	accountable	(se	paragraph	Horizon	2020:	three	
priorities	for	three	visions	of	the	role	of	research).		
The	same	cannot	be	said	for	the	Innovation	and	societal	frames:	as	we	have	seen,	the	political	control	is	often	more	formal	
than	substantial:	in	the	first,	the	choice	of	the	research	orientation	is	often	established	with	reference	to	the	objectives	set	inside	the	
economic	community;	in	the	societal	frame,	as	shown,	different	interpretations	of	democratic	accountability	coexist,	and	priorities	
are	 chosen	 by	 means	 of	 technical	 evaluations	 (e.g.	 benchmarking	 of	 international	 organisations’	 priorities),	 political	 objectives	
(including	reflections	on	the	strategic	scientific	fields	to	develop,	or	the	articulation	around	grand	challenges	to	structure	the	research	
funding	programmes,	inspire	researchers	and	build	consensus)	and	properly	democratic	mechanisms	(the	realisation	of	participative	
programmes	to	include	the	citizens’	opinions	in	the	technological	assessments).	
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	 Innovation	frame	knowledge	for	growth	
Societal	frame	
knowledge	for	society	
Pure-science	frame	
knowledge	for	knowledge	
itself	
Su
b-
di
sc
ou
rs
es
	-	
ke
y	
co
nc
ep
ts
	a
nd
	fe
at
ur
es
	
«real	things»:	preference	for	
practical	orientation.	
- measurability	of	R&D,	
accountability	
- performance,	efficiency,	
impact	
- entrepreneurial	skills	
«reinforcing	public	
confidence	in	science»:	
citizens’	participation	is	
finalized	to	consensus-
building	
- the	citizenry	is	not	
knowledgeable	and	
oppositional:	“child-
citizens”	
- PUS	approach	to	
engagement	
«excellent	science»:	the	best	
ideas	have	to	be	supported,	
regardless	of	any	other	
criteria	
- competition	
«before	it	is	too	late»:	if	we	
postpone	economic	action,	we	
will	lose	in	quality	of	life	
- short-termism	
- debate	foreclosure	
«grand	challenges»:	
research	efforts	should	
focus	on	defined	problems.	
- problem-solving	
- reduction	of	inclusion	to	
trust	in	the	scientific	fix	of	
societal	issues	
«independent	of	any	
outside	influence»:	
autonomy	of	the	scientific	
community	
- community	self-governance	
based	on	peer-review	
«innovation	is	the	answer»:		
quality	of	life	grounded	to	
economic	wealth.	
- economic	reductionism	
	 «probity	and	integrity»:	
moral	values	to	ground	
reputation	and	attractiveness	
- regain	the	‘aura’	to	EU	
research	system	
Advocate	
communities	/	
discourses	
developers	
Innovation	studies	scholars,	
OECD	
Social	studies	(esp.	STS	
scholars),	
socio-democratic	activists	
ERC	advocates,	scientific	
community	
Prevailing	
actors	
Private	sector	(«businesses»:	
companies,	SMEs,	industries,	
financial	sector),	universities	
Universities,		
private	sector	R&D	
Universities,	public	research	
organizations	
Relevant	
issues117	
«key	industrial	
technologies»:		
ICT,	nanotechnologies,	advanced	
materials,	biotechnology,	advanced	
manufacturing	and	processing,	
space	
«major	concerns	shared	
by	citizens	in	Europe	and	
elsewhere»:		
health,	demographic	change;	
sustainable	transport;	
sustainable	energy;	food	
security,	sustainable	
agriculture,	forestry,	marine	
research,	bioeconomy;	climate	
action,	environment	and	raw	
materials;	(secure	societies;	
reflective	societies)	
«best	ideas»:	
science-driven	research;	
researchers’	training	and	
mobility;	future	and	emerging	
technologies;	research	
infrastructures	
																																								 																				
117	The	quotes	in	this	line	refer	to	the	description	of	the	priorities	in	Horizon	2020	(EC,	2011a);	the	issues	are	mentioned	in	
the	H2020	establishing	act	(EP	&	CEU,	2013)	as	headers	of	the	funding	lines	in	the	three	priorities	of	«Industrial	Leadership»,	«Societal	
Challenges»,	«Excellent	Science»	(adaptation	of	the	author);	with	the	exception	of	industrial	technologies	(the	indicative	breakdown	
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If,	as	shown,	the	roots	of	the	three	frames	can	be	identified	in	long-standing	intellectual	traditions,	
the	identified	sub-narratives	describe	the	specific	EU	understanding	of	the	reference	models,	at	times	giving	
rise	to	problematic	points;	for	example,	the	PUS	approach	to	citizens’	engagement	or	the	articulation	around	
grand	 challenges,	 as	 described,	 reveal	 a	 reductionist	 and	 instrumental	 conceptualisation	 of	 the	 societal	
relevance	of	research118.	Although	the	Commission	strived	to	cleverly	distribute	and	group	the	issues	inside	
FPs	in	order	to	organise	funding	along	complementary	channels,	it	cannot	avoid	the	emergence	of	frictions	
among	the	different	rationales	and	orientations,	which	are	even	more	visible	when	analysing	the	frames’	
sub-discourses.	
Indeed,	 a	 research	 topic	 oriented	 to	 industrial	 development	 may	 well	 be	 disrespectful	 of	
environmental	precautions,	or	be	 reluctant	 to	 include	 the	citizens	at	an	early	design	stage	 to	discuss	 the	
social	 acceptability	 of	 the	 innovation.	Moreover,	 the	 aim	 of	 producing	 knowledge	 following	 the	 internal	
dynamics	of	science,	obeying	only	to	the	needs	of	scientific	development,	can	be	regarded	as	an	undue	loss	
of	time	and	money	by	an	environmental	activist,	fighting	to	find	remedies	to	the	consequences	of	industrial	
pollution.	Again,	the	bias	towards	practical	and	measurable	research	outputs	is	hardly	consistent	with	the	
abstract	nature	of	a	big	part	of	frontier	science.	The	same	research	funding	models	–	that	we	have	named	
Bush	and	Steelman	models,	see	Table	14	–	are	at	odds,	and	in	fact	ERC	advocates	built	their	campaign	along	
critical	reviews	of	the	FP	finalized	research	format.	
A	critical	point,	as	mentioned,	is	represented	by	the	role	of	citizens,	whose	participation	is	frequently	
demanded,	but	seldom	seriously	incorporated	in	the	research	process;	the	same	citizens	are	portrayed	from	
case	to	case	as	consumers,	users	or	taxpayers,	and	their	engagement	with	the	scientific	activity	is	requested	
in	order	to	build	their	support	for	science	and	EU	research	policy	(see	Table	15).	
Analysing	the	historical	and	conceptual	development	of	the	research	policy	frames,	it	emerges	that	
the	different	visions	are	not	simple	complementary	perspectives,	but	ground	on	very	different	convictions	
on	 the	political	 role	of	 scientific	 research,	on	 the	value	of	knowledge	 for	 society,	on	 the	 responsibility	of	
public	policies	in	supporting	scientific	developments	and	on	the	same	nature	of	the	scientific	activity.	As	for	
the	projected	scenarios,	decisions	on	the	policies	of	knowledge	concern	the	beliefs	on	the	guiding	values	of	
societies	and	affect	the	future	of	political	entities.	
In	such	a	diverse	landscape,	the	European	futures	of	success	or	failure	may	depend,	rather	than	on	
the	adoption	of	political-economic	measures	suggested	by	experts	groups,	on	the	capacity	to	deal	with	the	
tensions	contained	in	EU	research	policy	in	a	constructive	way,	open	to	a	serious	confrontation	among	all	the	
societal	actors	and	in	search	for	a	shared	definition	of	the	founding	values	of	Europe,	on	which	to	ground	a	
coherent	and	cohesive	research	policy.	 	
																																								 																				
is	not	specified),	the	topics	are	listed	in	decreasing	order	of	allocated	funds,	and	the	topics	with	less	than	3%	of	the	total	budget	are	
between	brackets.	
118	See	the	paragraph	The	temptation	of	reductionisms.	

Conclusion: critical points in EU science policy 
Political	freedom	with	these	foundations119	will	not	just	have	a	formal	meaning	but	a	real	meaning	for	
all	since	citizens	will	be	independent,	and	will	be	sufficiently	informed	as	to	be	able	to	exert	continuous	
and	effective	control	over	the	ruling	class.	(Spinelli	et	al.,	1944)	
The	 «free	 and	 united	 Europe»	 emerging	 from	 the	 defeat	 of	 totalitarianism	 needed	 to	 be	 based,	
according	to	the	authors	of	the	Ventotene	Manifesto,	on	the	realization	of	substantial	–	and	not	only	formal	
–	political	 freedom:	citizens	were	envisaged	 to	be	 independent,	and	 to	possess	sufficient	knowledge	and	
understanding	to	«exert	continuous	and	effective	control	over	the	ruling	class»	(Spinelli	et	al.,	1944).	
Reading	between	the	lines	of	policy	documents,	identifying	and	studying	the	conceptual	frameworks	
employed	in	the	European	discourses	on	science,	was	meant	as	a	contribution	to	the	quality	of	deliberative	
democracy:	 unspoken,	 prescriptive	 discourses	 need	 to	 emerge	 and	 their	 premises	 and	 orientations	 be	
discussed	to	set	the	basis	for	a	real	open	confrontation	among	the	different	visions,	before	they	transform	
into	hardly	questionable	ideologies.		
The	analysis	of	the	policy	frames	shaping	European	research	policies	led	to	the	identification	of	the	
three	described	major	understandings	of	the	role	of	knowledge	production:	knowledge	for	economic	growth,	
best	incorporated	in	the	current	innovation	frame;	knowledge	with	social	orientation;	and	knowledge	for	the	
advancement	 of	 knowledge	 itself	 (see	 Table	 16).	Moreover,	 this	 work	 recognised	 and	 described	 several	
features	 of	 the	 actual	 interpretation	of	 these	broad	 frames	 in	 the	 specific	 context	 of	 European	 research	
policies,	identifying	the	respective	conceptual	background	and	highlighting	the	most	critical	points.	
The	innovation	frame,	developed	by	scholars	in	the	political-economic	academic	field,	was	promoted	
principally	by	the	OECD,	and	adopted	by	most	Western	countries	during	the	‘90s;	in	the	EU	context,	it	easily	
rooted	on	the	communitarian	economic	orientation	and	on	the	focus	on	competitiveness	and	growth.	The	
emphasis	on	innovation	was	developed	in	the	first	years	after	the	turn	of	the	Millennium	thanks	to	a	series	
of	economic	analyses,	which	 identified	 in	the	 lack	of	 innovation	the	motivation	of	the	 insufficient	growth	
																																								 																				
119	The	authors	of	 the	Ventotene	Manifesto	were	referring	here	 to	 these	conditions:	«a)	Enterprises	with	a	necessarily	
monopolistic	activity,	and	in	a	position	to	exploit	consumers,	cannot	be	left	in	the	hands	of	private	ownership	(…)	b)	Private	property	
and	inheritance	legislation	in	the	past	was	so	drawn	up	as	to	permit	the	accumulation	of	wealth	in	the	hands	of	a	few,	privileged	
members	of	society.	In	a	revolutionary	crisis	this	wealth	must	be	distributed	in	an	egalitarian	way	thereby	eliminating	the	parasitic	
classes	 and	 giving	 the	 workers	 the	 means	 of	 production	 they	 need	 to	 improve	 their	 economic	 standing	 and	 achieve	 greater	
independence	(…)	c)	The	young	need	to	be	assisted	with	all	the	measures	needed	to	reduce	the	gap	between	the	starting	positions	
in	the	struggle	to	survive	to	a	minimum	(…)	d)	The	almost	unlimited	potential	of	modern	technology	to	mass	produce	essential	goods	
guarantees,	with	relatively	low	social	costs,	that	everyone	can	have	food,	lodging,	clothing	and	the	minimum	of	comfort	needed	to	
preserve	a	sense	of	human	dignity»	(Spinelli	et	al.,	1944).	
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performance	and	contributed	imbuing	the	debate	with	a	strong	feeling	of	urgency.	The	target	of	innovation	
was	 set	 as	 a	 priority	 in	 the	 current	 Europe2020	 growth	 strategy	 and	 the	 Framework	 Programme	 is	 built	
around	 the	 realization	 of	 an	 «Innovation	 Union».	 However,	 innovation,	 despite	 the	 term’s	 openness	 of	
meanings,	in	the	political	lingo	is	properly	denoting	an	economic	target:	the	innovation	frame,	based	on	the	
contribution	of	R&D	to	growth,	influences	policy	discourses,	notably	favouring	practical,	measurable	research	
activities,	 promoting	 accountability	 and	 performance	 surveys	 and	 supporting	 the	 development	 of	
entrepreneurial	attitudes	to	research;	furthermore,	it	upholds	an	overall	reduction	of	the	dimensions	related	
to	quality	of	life	to	the	achievement	of	economic	wealth.	
The	societal	frame	emerged	at	end	of	the	‘90s,	following	the	Maastricht	Treaty	political	unification	
and	the	enlargement	of	EU	concerned	areas	to	social	policies	and	citizenship;	it	strengthened	in	the	wake	of	
the	science-related	crises	of	the	‘90s,	which	eroded	the	citizens’	trust	in	the	public	authorities’	capacity	of	
risk	management.	The	EU	approach	to	the	inclusion	of	social	instances	in	scientific	policies	was	two-fold:	on	
one	side,	a	deep	insight	on	the	science-society	interplay	was	promoted,	especially	by	scholars	from	the	social	
studies	and	STS	fields,	and	devoted	research	lines	were	inserted	in	FPs.	On	the	other	side,	the	documents	
show	a	recurrent	temptation	to	minimise	societal	engagement,	reducing	it	to	a	matter	of	information	and	
scientific	education,	finalizing	it	to	consensus-building,	or	substituting	deliberation	on	agenda-setting	with	a	
research	focus	on	societal	relevant	issues.	
Finally,	the	pure-science	frame	rose	around	the	turn	of	the	Millennium,	when	a	group	of	engaged	
scientists	began	advocating	the	creation	at	European	level	of	a	research	funding	mechanism	respectful	of	the	
long-established	 scientific	 community’s	 method	 of	 self-management,	 especially	 for	 what	 concerns	 the	
autonomy	 from	 any	 outside	 influence	 on	 the	 orientation	 of	 knowledge.	 The	 project	materialised	 in	 the	
creation	of	the	European	Research	Council	in	2006,	aimed	at	funding	investigator-driven	frontier	research,	
evaluated	with	the	sole	criterion	of	excellence	by	means	of	scientific	peer-review.	The	ERC	was	embedded	in	
the	Framework	Programmes,	despite	it	shows	not	only	a	different	orientation,	but	even	a	different	research	
funding	 model:	 while	 the	 Innovation	 and	 Societal	 frames	 are	 conceived	 as	 functional	 to	 the	 strategic	
objectives	 of	 the	 Union,	 the	 ERC	 refuses	 to	 apply	 any	 EU-relevant	 criterion	 –	 like	 a	 cohesion-oriented	
distribution	of	funds,	or	the	principle	of	juste	retour	–	;	moreover	ERC	projects	are	selected	by	means	of	the	
peer-review	mechanism,	totally	 internal	 to	the	scientific	community.	From	the	analysis	of	 the	documents	
emerges	that,	while	the	ERC	is	promoted	with	an	abiding	reference	to	high	quality,	excellent	science,	the	
driving	 value	of	 its	 organization	 is	 autonomy	–	 a	 peculiar	 feature	of	 the	 scientific	 community	 –,	 and	 the	
frequent	references	to	moral	qualities	like	integrity	and	reputation	are	linked	to	the	objective	of	regaining,	
by	means	of	the	ERC,	the	attractiveness	(‘aura’)	of	European	research	policy.	
From	the	historical	analysis,	the	years	around	the	turn	of	the	Millennium	appear	as	a	crucial	moment	
for	EU	contemporary	research	policy:	the	launch	of	the	Lisbon	strategy,	alongside	the	reform	of	the	higher	
education	system	and	the	construction	of	the	ERA,	promoted	knowledge	policies	at	the	top	of	the	European	
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agenda.	 In	that	period,	the	understanding	of	knowledge	 in	public	policies	was	not	univocal,	and	different	
perspectives	coexisted	in	political	discourses.	The	two	paradigmatic	expressions	of	the	«European	knowledge	
society»	or	of	the	«Innovation	union»	embody	the	two	conceptual	poles	of	the	debate:	the	first	including	the	
cultural,	social	and	economic	dimensions	of	knowledge	as	a	common	good;	the	second	aiming	to	emphasize	
the	economic	value	of	knowledge,	and	to	promote	its	rapid	transformation	into	products	in	order	to	boost	
growth	 (see	 Table	 13).	 In	 the	 first	 years	 of	 the	Millennium	 the	 confrontation	 between	 these	 two	major	
orientations	 evolved	 towards	 the	 second	 conceptual	 pole,	with	 the	 affirmation	 of	 innovation	 as	 the	 key	
overarching	concept	of	research	policy,	the	weakening	of	social	and	citizens’	participation	instances	and	the	
strengthening	of	the	accent	on	efficiency	and	impact	of	the	research	system.	
Although,	 however,	 the	 innovation	 frame	 can	 be	 currently	 identified	 as	 the	 principal	 axis	 of	 EU	
research	 policies,	 the	 other	 perspectives	 are	 still	 visible	 and	 incorporated	 in	 the	 organization	 of	 science	
funding,	 notwithstanding	 their	 points	 of	 tension,	 and	 they	 are	engaged	 in	 an	enduring	 struggle	over	 the	
choice	and	framing	of	issues.	
The temptation of reductionisms 
The	tripartite	articulation	of	Horizon	2020	is	the	most	visible	effect	of	the	struggle	over	the	framing	
of	European	research	policies.	Defined	by	the	Commission	as	«distinct,	yet	mutually	reinforcing»	(EC,	2011a),	
the	 three	perspectives	 conversely	 show,	 as	mentioned,	multiple	points	of	 tension,	 originating	 from	 their	
diverse	founding	principles	and	promoted	orientations.	
Where	 the	subjects	 lie	at	 the	 intersection	of	multiple	understandings	–	 like	 the	citizens’	 role	and	
characterization,	and	the	choice	of	societal	concerns	to	be	addressed	by	scientific	research	–	critical	points	
emerge.	 Specifically,	 it	 appears	 particularly	 evident	 in	 European	 policy	 discourses	 a	 tendency	 to	 rely	 on	
reductive	arguments	to	reframe	the	issues	in	order	to	suit	the	prevailing	orientation.	
The	representation	of	the	citizens	ranges	between	the	two	opposite	visions	of	not	knowledgeable,	
prejudicially	oppositional,	passive	mass,	on	one	side,	and	real	co-producers	of	the	research	outputs,	carriers	
of	values	and	able	to	take	sound	decisions,	ultimately	able	to	bear	the	load	of	deliberative	democracy	on	the	
other	side	(see	Table	15).		
As	shown,	in	many	documents	the	efforts	to	involve	the	citizens	in	the	definition	of	research	policies	
are	reduced	to	a	matter	of	scientific	information	(the	“PUS”	approach);	engagement	is	frequently	portrayed	
opportunistically	 as	 an	 instrument	 to	 build	 consensus	 for	 the	 planned	 initiatives	 since	 the	 earliest	
development	stages.	In	Framework	Programmes	establishing	acts,	the	participation	of	citizens	is	enhanced	
and	advocated,	provided	the	output	is	«reinforcing	public	confidence	in	science».	To	these	double	reductions	
–	of	responsible	“adult-citizens”	to	unaware	“child-citizens”,	and	of	participation	to	filling	the	information	
deficit	and	building	consensus	–	adds	the	contraction	of	citizenship	to	the	economic	or	functional	behaviors	
170	
of	people:	a	 further	 reduction	of	citizens	 to	consumers,	users,	workers,	 taxpayers,	with	 their	consequent	
repositioning	in	passive,	end-of-process,	roles.	
The	inclusion	of	citizens’	concerns	and	expectations	via	the	funding	of	research	on	societal	challenges	
is	another	ambiguous	instrument:	on	the	one	hand,	it	formally	identifies	society	as	the	agenda-setter	of	the	
corresponding	pillar;	on	the	other	hand,	the	choice	of	research	subjects	is	not	based	on	new	processes	of	
societal	 involvement,	 or	 on	 the	 opening	 of	 a	 debate	 over	 the	 European	 priorities,	 but	 on	 stakeholders’	
consultation,	benchmarking	of	global	institutions’	positions	and	the	opinions	of	experts.	The	challenge-based	
approach	is	promoted	as	an	instrument	to	attract	the	interests	of	researchers	and	investors	and	to	regain	
the	attractiveness	of	EU	research	policy,	while	at	the	same	time	addressing	societal	concerns.	The	reduction	
of	agenda-setting	to	problem	solving,	however,	gets	the	effect	of	drawing	the	attention	away	from	the	crucial	
stage	of	policy	design.	The	same	procedure	inside	the	Commission	leading	to	the	identification	of	priorities	
and	to	the	design	of	research	policies	is	not	publicly	traceable,	as	shown	in	this	work.	
Quality	of	 life,	 in	 European	discourses,	 is	 repeatedly	 connected	with	 the	 generation	of	 economic	
wealth:	 as	mentioned,	 this	 long-standing	position	 is	 enhanced	 in	 the	 innovation	 frame,	 and	 the	 complex	
interplay	of	social,	cultural	and	economic	factors	affecting	well-being	and	personal	fulfillment	is	frequently	
reduced	to	the	sole	economic	dimension.	Performance,	efficiency	and	impact	are	the	evaluation	criteria	of	
R&D.	Furthermore,	economic	analyses	 repeatedly	 invoke	 fears	of	 social	 failures	 to	 support	 the	proposed	
measures	 in	 the	economic	 field,	and	the	urgency	frame	 is	employed	to	emphasize	the	 importance	of	 the	
initiatives	and	legitimize	actions.	
Besides,	while	the	societal	and	pure-knowledge	frames	are	formulated	in	terms	of	their	content	or	
orientation,	the	concept	of	innovation	denotes	a	feature	of	the	research	output,	i.e.	to	be	“innovative”:	it	is	
intrinsically	 a	 criterion,	 an	 operational	 instrument	 to	 discriminate	 between	 different	 options.	 Since,	 as	
shown,	innovation	is	properly	an	economic	idea,	the	choice	is	naturally	oriented	towards	economic	outputs.	
Innovation,	in	other	words,	works	as	a	reductionist	tool	in	favour	of	profitable	research	orientations.	
Against	this	background	the	scientific	community,	with	the	recent	introduction	of	the	“pure-science”	
funding	line,	insisted	on	the	dimension	of	autonomy	from	any	political	and	economic	control	exerted	by	EU	
institutions	 in	 the	 evaluation	 of	 projects,	while	with	 the	 focus	 on	 excellence,	 as	 judged	 by	 peer	 review,	
excluded	any	pre-set	finalization	of	knowledge	production.	
The	clash	among	the	three	conceptual	frames,	in	other	words,	is	being	conducted	by	means	of	clever	
reframing	of	issues	in	order	to	neutralize	the	competing	perspectives,	or	defending	from	the	attempts	to	be	
incorporated	by	other	visions.		
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A climate conducive to a democratic confrontation on European shared values 
The	 temptation	 to	 rely	on	 reductionist	perspectives	 in	European	 research	policies,	 a	 symptom	of	
“democratic	fatigue”120,	is	grounded	to	long-term	historical	and	political	roots.		
First	 of	 all,	 the	 European	 Communities	 were	 primarily	 set	 as	 internal	markets,	 in	 the	 respective	
sectors:	against	the	reluctance	of	states	to	cede	sovereignty,	the	founding	fathers	of	Europe	trusted	that	de	
facto	collaborations,	in	fields	perceived	as	politically	neutral,	would	have	led	in	the	long	term	to	complete	
political	 realisations.	 The	 confrontation	 between	 centralist	 and	 intergovernmental	models	 of	 integration	
continued	over	the	years,	giving	rise	to	the	peculiar	mixture	of	institutions	of	the	European	Union.	The	formal	
political	unification	in	the	Maastricht	Treaty	didn’t	conclude	the	process,	although	it	represented	a	turning	
point	 for	 European	policies,	 included,	 as	 seen,	 the	 field	of	 knowledge	production,	 from	 that	moment	on	
embedded	in	the	wider	realm	of	social	and	political,	as	well	as	economic,	policies.	Anyway,	as	mentioned,	
notwithstanding	 the	emergence	of	 the	 social	and	pure-science	 frames,	 the	economic	orientation	set	and	
developed	in	the	previous	four	decades	is	still	the	prevailing	one	in	EU	research	policies.			
Secondly,	we	have	shown	how	certain	features	of	the	innovation	frame	for	scientific	research	have	
been	influenced	by	the	rising	of	new	economic	theories	and	by	the	new	public	management	approach	to	
public	administration;	more	generally,	the	marks	of	neoliberal	economic-political	climate	are	recognisable	in	
the	 emphasis	 on	 competitiveness,	 markets	 mechanisms	 and	 private	 actors	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 public	
interventions.	 Such	 influence	 certainly	 increased	 after	 the	 1989	 fall	 of	 the	 Berlin	 wall,	 with	 the	 general	
Western	shift	towards	liberal	politics,	promoted	also	by	economic	institutions	like	the	OCED.	The	far	roots	of	
the	European	 inclination	 towards	 liberal	 and	 capitalistic	 policy	models,	 also	 in	 the	 scientific	 field,	 can	be	
ascribed,	as	argued	by	the	historian	John	Krige,	to	the	US	inclination	in	post-war	Europe	to	contribute	to	the	
reconstruction	of	science	in	Europe	as	a	dimension	of	a	wider	strategy	to	«promote	American	values	and	
interests	 in	the	post-war	world»,	especially	 in	conjunction	with	anti-Soviet	 interests	 (Krige,	2008).	On	the	
other	hand,	the	conflict	between	liberal	and	social-democratic	values	is	also	reflected	in	the	different	visions	
of	knowledge	as	based	on	competition	over	excellence,	and	oriented	to	individual	realisation,	or	concerned	
with	to	social	justice	and	personal	emancipation.	Due	to	the	weakness	of	the	political	debate	in	the	European	
context,	values	ascribed	to	political	worldviews	and	incorporated	in	discourses	appear	particularly	relevant	
to	be	identified	and	analysed.	
The	complexity	of	the	institutional	asset	can	be	regarded	as	a	further	interpretive	dimension	of	the	
European	 tendency	 of	 taking	 shelter	 in	 reductionist	 visions:	 the	 struggles	 between	 bodies	 representing	
intergovernmental	and	central	positions,	the	continuous	gap	between	national	and	communitarian	levels	in	
the	design	and	implementation	of	policies,	the	distance	between	the	elected	representatives	and	the	citizens	
undermine	the	realisation	of	a	proper,	comprehensive,	democratic	debate.	In	such	a	context,	and	the	more	
																																								 																				
120	I	take	this	expression	from	the	works	of	A.	Appadurai.		
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so	with	the	emergence	of	anti-EU	political	tendencies,	European	institutions	are	at	risk	of	retreating	in	self-
conservation,	moving	away	the	moment	of	open	confrontation	on	political	directions,	or	surrogating	it	with	
expert	opinions,	benchmarking	of	international	policies	or	hiding	behind	procedural	efficiency.	For	example,	
in	 the	 early	 2000s,	 the	 concurrence	 of	 the	 Constitution	 rejection,	 the	 biggest	 enlargement	 to	 Eastern	
European	countries,	added	to	the	change	of	Commission	Presidency,	may	have	favoured	a	concentration	on	
bureaucratic	issues	at	the	expenses	of	the	confrontation	on	values.	Moreover,	the	current	configuration	of	
policy-making	in	the	field	of	research	does	not	help	the	establishment	of	a	discourse	taking	into	account	all	
the	 appropriate	 dimensions	 of	 knowledge	 production:	 on	 one	 side,	 in	 fact,	 the	 prevalence	 of	 the	
distributional	mode	of	policy-making	implies	that	often	clashes	on	political	values	are	masked	by	conflicts	on	
budget	allocations,	efficiency	or	impact	of	the	distribution	mechanisms.	Moreover,	the	European	tradition	
of	detaching	economic	and	social	policies,	the	first	decided	at	communitarian	level	and	the	second	left	to	the	
states,	inevitably	complicates	the	incorporation	of	the	social	dimension	into	R&D	policies.	
Against	 this	 long-established	political	and	historical	background,	 the	elaboration	of	a	coordinated	
European	R&D	policy	and	the	establishment	of	the	EU	political	dimension	appear	recent	developments,	and	
are	understandable	as	still	in	fieri.	The	same	innovation	frame,	as	argued	in	the	historical	section	of	this	work,	
doesn’t	show	the	features	of	and	authentic	paradigm	shift,	if	compared	to	the	previous	period	focused	on	
technology	and	industry,	but	could	be	understood	as	a	transitional	moment,	bearing	the	influences	of	the	
previous	 period	 (especially	 the	 economic	 orientation)	 but	marked	 by	 the	 emergence	 of	 new,	 competing	
frames.	
Understood	in	this	context,	the	laborious	coexistence	of	different	frames	in	the	European	policy	on	
research	may	be	regarded	as	a	token	of	vitality	in	the	debate	about	the	role	and	features	of	science	policy.	If	
properly	acknowledged	and	explored,	 the	different	visions	may	 represent	 fruitful	 seeds	of	confrontation,	
leading	 to	 both	 sounder	 and	more	democratically	 grounded	policies,	 provided	 that	 EU	 renounces	 to	 the	
temptation	of	reductionism,	faces	its	critical	points	and	creates	the	conditions	for	an	open	confrontation	on	
the	European	shared	values.	
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Fig.	11:	Commissioners	College	structure,	as	depicted	in	a	Commission	infographics	(Juncker	Commission,	2014-2019)	(EC,	n.d.).	
	
	
Table	17:	The	Commissioners	and	their	responsibility	over	Directorates	and	Services,	2017	(EC	2014b	and	links	therein;	EC	2014a);	
some	Vice-Presidents	don’t	have	a	direct	leadership	on	specific	DGs121;	their	mandate	is	here	summarised,	but	the	document	(EC,	
2014c)	reports	the	details	and	exceptions	of	their	tasks.	The	Commissioner	to	research	is	highlighted	in	light	grey.	
Commissioner	 DGs	and	Services	
President		
Jean-Claude	Juncker	
Secretariat-General	(SG)	
Legal	Service	(SJ)	
DG	 Communication	 (COMM),	 including	 the	 Spokesperson's	
Service	(SPP)	
Bureau	of	European	Policy	Advisors	(BEPA)	
First	 Vice-President,	 in	 charge	 of	 Better	
Regulation,	
Inter-Institutional	Relations,	the	Rule	of	Law	and	
the	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	
Internal	Audit	Service	(IAS)	
																																								 																				
121	One	innovation	of	the	Juncker	Commission	is	the	creation	of	“project	teams”,	each	of	which	is	led	by	one	of	the	seven	
Vice-Presidents.	Each	Commissioner	is	either	full	member	or	associated	of	a	project	team	(EC,	n.d.;	EP,	2016).	See	Fig.	12	
Frans Timmermans
Better Regulation, 
Interinstitutional Relations, 
Rule of Law & Charter of 
Fundamental Rights
First Vice-President
Federica Mogherini 
High Representative of the Union  
for Foreign Policy & Security 
Policy/Vice-President
High Representative
 Maroš Šefčovič
Energy Union
Vice-President
Jyrki Katainen 
Jobs, Growth, Investment
& Competitiveness
Vice-President
Valdis Dombrovskis
The Euro & Social Dialogue, 
also in charge of Financial 
Stability, Financial Services and 
Capital Markets Union
Vice-President
Andrus Ansip 
Digital Single Market
Vice-President
Margrethe Vestager
Competition
Commissioner
Tibor Navracsics
Education, Culture, 
Youth & Sport
Commissioner
Violeta Bulc
Transport
Commissioner
Cecilia Malmström
Trade
Commissioner
Karmenu Vella
Environment, Maritime Affairs 
& Fisheries
Commissioner
Carlos Moedas
Research, Science
& Innovation
Commissioner
Phil Hogan
Agriculture 
& Rural Development
Commissioner
Christos Stylianides
Humanitarian Aid 
& Crisis Management
Commissioner
Digital Economy & Society 
Commissioner
Julian King
Security Union
Commissioner
Věra Jourová 
Justice, Consumers
& Gender Equality
Commissioner
Günther Oettinger 
Budget & Human Resources
Commissioner
Pierre Moscovici 
Economic & Financial Affairs, 
Taxation & Customs
Commissioner
Marianne Thyssen 
Employment, Social Affairs, 
Skills & Labour Mobility
Commissioner
Corina Crețu 
Regional Policy
Commissioner
Johannes Hahn
European Neighbourhood Policy 
& Enlargement Negotiations*
Commissioner
Dimitris Avramopoulos
Migration, Home Affairs 
& Citizenship 
Commissioner
Vytenis Andriukaitis
Health & Food Safety
Commissioner
Elżbieta Bieńkowska
Internal Market, Industry, 
Entrepreneurship & SMEs 
Commissioner
Miguel Arias Cañete 
Climate Action & Energy
Commissioner
Neven Mimica
International Cooperation 
& Development
Commissioner
PRESIDENT
JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER
*The HRVP may ask this Commissioner 
(and other Commissioners) to deputise 
for her in areas related to Commission 
competence.
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Commissioner	 DGs	and	Services	
Frans	Timmermans	
Vice-President	 and	 High	 Representative	 of	 the	
Union	for	Foreign	Affairs	and	Security	Policy	
Federica	Mogherini	
European	External	Action	Service	
Service	for	Foreign	Policy	Instruments	(FPI)	
Vice-President:	Digital	Single	Market		
Andrus	Ansip	
Communications	Networks,	Content	and	Technology	(CONNECT)	
Informatics	(DIGIT)	
Vice-President:	Energy	Union	
Maroš	Šefčovič		
	
Vice-President:	Euro	and	Social	Dialogue,	also	in	
charge	 of	 Financial	 Stability,	 Financial	 Services	
and	Capital	Markets	Union	
Valdis	Dombrovskis	
Financial	 Stability,	 Financial	 Services	and	Capital	Markets	Union	
(DG	FISMA)	
Vice-President:	Jobs,	Growth,	Investment	and	
Competitiveness		
Jyrki	Katainen	
	
	
Commissioner:	Agriculture	&	Rural	
Development	
Phil	Hogan	
Agriculture	and	Rural	Development	
(DG	AGRI)	
The	relevant	parts	of	the	Research	Executive	Agency	(REA)	
Commissioner:	Climate	Action	&	Energy		
Miguel	Arias	Cañete	
Climate	Action	(DG	CLIMA)	
Energy	(DG	ENER)	
The	Euratom	Supply	Agency	(ESA)	
The	relevant	parts	of	the	Executive	Agency	for	Small	and	Medium-
Sized	Enterprises	
(EASME)	
The	 relevant	 parts	 of	 the	 Innovation	 and	 Networks	 Executive	
Agency	(INEA)	
Commissioner:	Competition		
Margrethe	Vestager	
Competition	(DG	COMP)	
Commissioner:	 Economic	 and	 Financial	 Affairs,	
Taxation	and	Customs		
Pierre	Moscovici	
Economic	and	Financial	Affairs	(ECFIN)	
Taxation	and	Customs	Union	(DG	TAXUD)	
Commissioner:	 Education,	 Culture,	 Youth	 and	
Sport	
Tibor	Navracsics	
Education	&	Culture	(DG	EAC)	
Joint	Research	Centre	(JRC)	
The	relevant	parts	of	the	Education,	Audiovisual	and	Culture	
Executive	Agency	(EACEA)	
The	relevant	parts	of	the	Research	Executive	Agency	(REA)	
Commissioner:	Employment,	Social	Affairs,	Skills	
and	Labour	Mobility	
Marianne	Thyssen	
Employment,	Social	Affairs	and	Inclusion	(DG	EMPL)	
Eurostat	-	European	statistics	(DG	ESTAT)	
Commissioner:	 Environment,	 Maritime	 Affairs	
and	Fisheries	
Karmenu	Vella	
Environment	(DG	ENV)	
Maritime	Affairs	and	Fisheries	(DG	MARE)	
The	relevant	parts	of	the	Executive	Agency	for	Small	and	Medium-
Sized	Enterprises	(EASME)	
Commissioner:	 Humanitarian	 Aid	 &	 Crisis	
Management	
Christos	Stylianides	
European	Civil	Protection	and	Humanitarian	Aid	Operations	(DG	
ECHO)	
The	 relevant	 part	 of	 the	 Education,	 Audiovisual	 and	 Culture	
Executive	Agency	(EACEA)	
Commissioner:	European	Neighbourhood	Policy	
&	Enlargement	Negotiations	
Johannes	Hahn	
European	 Neighbourhood	 Policy	 and	 Enlargement	 Negotiations	
(DG	NEAR)	
Commissioner:	Health	&	Food	Safety	
Vytenis	Andriukaitis	
Health	and	Food	Safety	(DG	SANTE)	
The	relevant	parts	of	the	Consumers,	Health	and	Food	Executive	
Agency	(CHAFEA)	
Commissioner:	Budget	&	Human	Resources	
Günther	H.	Oettinger	
DG	Budget	(BUDG)	
DG	Human	Resources	and	Security	(HR)	
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Commissioner	 DGs	and	Services	
European	Anti-Fraud	Office	(OLAF)	
DG	Translation	(DGT)	
DG	Interpretation	(SCIC)	
The	 office	 for	 the	 administration	 and	 payment	 of	 individual	
entitlements	(PMO)	
The	office	for	infrastructure	and	logistics	in	Brussels	(OIB)	
The	office	for	infrastructure	and	logistics	in	Luxembourg	(OIL)	
Commissioner:	 Internal	 Market,	 Industry,	
Entrepreneurship	and	SMEs	
Elżbieta	Bieńkowska	
Internal	 Market,	 Industry,	 Entrepreneurship	 and	 SMEs	 (DG	
GROW)	
The	relevant	parts	of	the	Executive	Agency	for	Small	and	Medium-
Sized	Enterprises	(EASME)	
The	relevant	parts	of	the	Research	Executive	Agency	(REA)	
Commissioner:	 International	 Cooperation	 &	
Development	
Neven	Mimica	
International	Cooperation	and	Development	(DG	DEVCO)	
Commissioner:	 Justice,	Consumers	and	Gender	
Equality	
Věra	Jourová	
Justice	and	Consumers	(DG	JUST)	
The	relevant	parts	of	the	Consumer,	Health	and	Food	Executive	
Agency	(CHAFEA)	
Commissioner:	 Migration,	 Home	 Affairs	 and	
Citizenship	
Dimitris	Avramopoulos	
Migration	and	Home	Affairs	(DG	HOME)	
The	relevant	parts	of	the	Research	Executive	Agency	(REA)	
Commissioner:	Security	Union	
Julian	King	
Migration	and	Home	Affairs	(DG	HOME)	
Commissioner:	Transport		
Violeta	Bulc	
Mobility	and	Transport	(DG	MOVE)	
The	 relevant	 parts	 of	 the	 Innovation	 and	 Networks	 Executive	
Agency	(INEA)	
Commissioner:	Regional	Policy		
Corina	Crețu	
Regional	and	Urban	Policy	(DG	REGIO)	
Commissioner:	Trade	
Cecilia	Malmström	
Trade	(DG	TRADE)	
Commissioner:	Research,	Science	and	
Innovation	
Carlos	Moedas	
Research	and	Innovation	(DG	RTD)	
The	relevant	parts	of	the	Research	Executive	Agency	(REA)	
The	 relevant	 parts	 of	 the	 European	Research	 Council	 Executive	
agency	(ERCEA)	
The	 relevant	 parts	 of	 the	 Innovation	 and	 Networks	 Executive	
agency	(INEA)	
The	relevant	parts	of	the	Executive	Agency	for	Small	and	Medium-
sized	Enterprises	(EASME)	
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Fig.	12:	The	memberships	of	the	various	Commissioners	in	the	“project	teams”	led	by	Vice-Presidents	in	Juncker	Commission	
	
	
Table	18:	The	Commissioners	responsible	for	the	“Research”	portfolio,	under	its	various	denominations	(in	the	period	1970-1973	
Altiero	Spinelli	was	Commissioner	for	Industry	and	Technology,	cf.	Table	19)	
Commissioner	 Nationality	 Commission	 Period	 Responsibilities	
Fritz	Hellwig	 West	Germany	 Rey	Commission	 1967	–	1970	
Research	and	Technology	
JRC,	Distribution	of	Information	
Ralf	
Dahrendorf	 West	Germany	
Ortoli	
Commission	 1973	–	1977	
Research,	Science,	Education	
JRC,	Statistical	Office,	S&T	Information	
Guido	Brunner	 West	Germany	 Jenkins	Commission	 1977	–	1981	
Research,	Science	
Energy,	Euratom	Supply	Agency,	
Education,	Scientific	Information,	JRC	
Étienne	
Davignon	 Belgium	
Thorn	
Commission	 1981	–	1985	
Research,	Science		
JRC,	Industrial	Affairs,	Energy,	Euratom	
Supply	Agency	
Karl-Heinz	
Narjes	 Germany	
Delors	
Commission	I	 1985	–	1989	
Research,	Science		
Information	Technology,	industrial	
Affairs,	JRC	
Filippo	Maria	
Pandolfi	 Italy	
Delors	
Commission	II	 1989	–	1993	 Science,	research,	development	
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Commissioner	 Nationality	 Commission	 Period	 Responsibilities	
JRC,	Telecommunications,	information	
technology	and	innovation	
Antonio	
Ruberti	 Italy	
Delors	
Commission	III	 1993	–	1995	
Science,	research,	technological	
development	
JRC,	Human	Resources,	Education,	
Training	and	Youth	
Édith	Cresson	 Spain	 Santer	Commission	 1995	–	1999	
Research,	Science	and	
Technology	
JRC,	Human	Resources,	Education,	
Training	and	Youth	
Philippe	
Busquin	 Belgium	
Prodi	
Commission	 1999	–	2004	
Research	
JRC	
Louis	Michel	 Belgium	 Prodi	Commission	 2004	
Research	
JRC	
Janez	Potočnik	 Slovenia	 Barroso	Commission	I		 2004	–	2010	
Science	and	Research	
JRC	
Máire	
Geoghegan-
Quinn	
Ireland	 Barroso	Commission	II	 2010	–	2014	
Research,	Innovation	and	
Science	
Carlos	Moedas	 Portugal	 Juncker	Commission	 2014	–		
Research,	Science	and	
Innovation	
Table	19:	The	Commissioners	responsible	of	the	“Industry”	portfolio	
Commissioner	 Nationality	 Commission	 Period	 Responsibilities	
Guido	Colonna	
di	Paliano	 Italy	 Rey	Commission	 1967	-	1970	 Industrial	Affairs	
Altiero	Spinelli	 Italy	
Malfatti	
Commission	
Mansholt	
Commission	
Ortoli	
Commission	
1970	–	1977	
Industry	and	Technology		
Training	and	Education,	JRC,	Customs	
Union	(1970-1973)122	
	
Étienne	
Davignon	 Belgium	
Jenkins	
Commission	
Thorn	
Commission	
1977	-	1985	
Industrial	Affairs	
Internal	Market,	Customs	Union	(1977-
1981)	
Energy	Euratom	Supply	Agency	Research,	
Science	Joint	Research	Centre	(1981-1985)		
	
Karl-Heinz	
Narjes	 Germany	
Thorn	
Commission	 1981	–	1985	
Industrial	Innovation		
Internal	Market,	Customs	Union,	
Environment,	Consumer	Protection,	
Nuclear	Safety	
Karl-Heinz	
Narjes	 Germany	
Delors	
Commission	I	 1985	–	1989	
Industrial	Affairs		
Information	Technology,	Research,	
Science,	JRC	
Martin	
Bangemann	 Germany	
Delors	
Commission	II	
Delors	
Commission	III	
Santer	
Commission	
1989	-	1999	
Industrial	Affairs		
Internal	Market,	Relations	with	Parliament	
(1989-1993)	
Information	Technologies	and	
Telecommunications	(1993-1999)	
	
																																								 																				
122	during	Ortoli	Commission	(1973-1977)	Altiero	Spinelli	maintained	the	“Industry	and	Technology”	portfolio,	but	the	other	
responsibilities	were	re-assigned:	Education	and	JRC	went	to	Dahrendorf	(cf.	Table	18)	
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Commissioner	 Nationality	 Commission	 Period	 Responsibilities	
Erkki	Liikanen	 Finland	 Prodi	Commission	 1999	–	30	may	2004	
Enterprise		
Information	Society	
Olli	Rehn	 Finland	 Prodi	Commission	
12	July	–	21	
November	2004	
Enterprise		
Information	Society	
Günter	
Verheugen	 Germany	
Barroso	
Commission	I	
22	November	2004	–		
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Fig.	13:	The	«Ordinary	Legislative	Procedure»,	as	explained	in	the	European	Parliament	website	(EP,	n.d.-a)	
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposal adopted
Once both European Parliament and Council have approved the final
text of a legislative proposal, it is jointly signed by the Presidents and
Secretaries General of both institutions. After signature, the texts are
published in the Official Journal and become official.
Regulations are directly binding throughout the EU as of the date
set down in the Official Journal.
Directives lay down end results to be achieved in every member
state, but leaves it up to national governments to decide how to
adapt their laws to achieve these goals. Each directive specifies the
date by which the national laws must be adapted.
Decisions apply in specific cases, involving particular authorities or
individuals and are fully binding.
 
Proposal not adopted
If a legislative proposal is rejected at any stage of
the procedure, or the Parliament and Council cannot
reach a compromise, the proposal is not adopted
and the procedure is ended. A new procedure can
start only with a new proposal from the Commission.
 
 
 The legislative proposal
is not adopted
 
 
 
 #7b 3rd reading in the Council
Council examines the joint text. It cannot change the wording. If it either rejects or
does not act on it, act will not enter into force and the procedure is ended. If it
approves the text and the Parliament also approves it, the act is adopted
 
 
 The legislative
proposal is not
adopted
 
 
 
 #7a 3rd reading in
Parliament
The European Parliament examines the joint text
and votes in plenary. It cannot change the
wording of the joint text. If it rejects it or fails to
act on it, the act is not adopted and the
procedure is ended. If it is approved by
Parliament and Council, the act is adopted.
 
 
 The legislative
proposal is not
adopted
 
 #6 Conciliation
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Parliament examines Council's position and approves it, in which case the act
is approved; or rejects it, in which case the act will not enter into force and the
whole procedure is ended; or proposes amendments and returns the proposal
to Council for a 2nd reading.
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During its 1st reading, the Council may decide to accept Parliament's position in which case the
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Fig.	14:	The	«Ordinary	Legislative	Procedure»,	as	explained	in	the	European	Parliament	website	(continues	from	previous	page)	(EP,	
n.d.-a)	
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Fig.	15:	The	structure	of	FP7	(source:	European	Parliament	Research	service	(EPRS	&	Reillon,	2015))		
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Fig.	16:	The	structure	of	Horizon	2020	(source:	European	Parliament	Research	service	(EPRS	&	Reillon,	2015))		
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Fig.	 17:	 The	 environmental	 challenges,	 as	 compared	 by	 a	 «2004	 review	 of	 nine	 recent	 comprehensive	 analyses	 of	 global	
environmental	problems»,	in	a	table	reported	in	the	2006	book	“A	New	Deal	for	an	Effective	European	Research	Policy”	(Muldur	et	
al.	2006,	pp.16–17,	reference	to	the	original	paper	at	the	bottom	of	the	table)	
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Fig.	18:	The	stakeholders’	consultation	tools,	or	methods,	as	summarised	in	Muldur	et	al.	2006,	p.150	for	FP7,	on	the	left,	and	in	EC	
2012b,	p.12	for	Horizon	2020	on	the	right.	
	
	
Fig.	19:	The	share	of	EU	budget	devoted	to	agriculture	in	the	period	1985-2008	(source	(Lyon,	2010))	
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Fig.	20:	The	First	Framework	Programme	objectives	and	budget	breakdown	(source:	CEU,	1990)	
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Fig.	21:	The	Second	Framework	Programme	objectives	and	budget	breakdown	(source:	EP	&	CEU,	1994)	
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Fig.	22:	The	Third	Framework	Programme	objectives	and	budget	breakdown	(source:	EP	&	CEU,	1998)	
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Fig.	23:	The	Fourth	Framework	Programme	objectives	and	budget	breakdown	(source:	EP	&	CEU,	1998,	page	1/2)	
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Fig.	24:	The	Fifth	Framework	Programme	objectives	and	budget	breakdown	(source:	EP	&	CEU,	1998,	page	2/2)	
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Fig.	25:	The	Sixth	Framework	Programme	objectives	and	budget	breakdown	(source:	EP	&	CEU,	2006)	
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Fig.	26:	The	Sixth	Framework	Programme	objectives	and	budget	breakdown	(source:	EC,	2013b)	
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Fig.	27:	The	Seventh	Framework	Programme	objectives	and	budget	breakdown	(see	EC,	2017a)	
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Table	20:	The	budget	breakdown	of	Horizon	2020	(EC,	2013b).	
Horizon	2020	(2014-2020)		 Final	breakdown	 Estimated	final	amount	in	million	euro	(in	current	prices)	
I	Excellent	science	 31,73%	 24441	
1.	The	European	Research	Council		 17%	 13095	
2.	Future	and	Emerging	Technologies	 3,5%	 2696	
3.	Marie-Skłodowska-Curie	Actions		 8%	 6162	
4.	European	research	infrastructures	
(including	e-Infrastructures)	 3,23%	 2488	
II	Industrial	leadership	 22,09%	 17016	
1.	Leadership	in	enabling	and	industrial	
technologies	 17,6%	 13557	
2.	Access	to	risk	finance		 3,69%	 2842	
3.	Innovation	in	SMEs	 0,8%	 616	
III	Societal	challenges	 38,53%	 29679	
1.	Health,	demographic	change	and	
wellbeing	 9,7%	 7472	
2.	Food	security,	sustainable	agriculture	
and	forestry,	marine	maritime	and	
inland	water	research	and	the	
Bioeconomy	
5%	 3851	
3.	Secure,	clean	and	efficient	energy		 7,7%	 5931	
4.	Smart,	green	and	integrated	
transport		 8,23%	 6339	
5.	Climate	action,	environment	
resource	efficiency	and	raw	materials	 4%	 3081	
6.	Europe	in	a	changing	world	-	
Inclusive	innovative	and	reflective	
societies	
1,7%	 1309	
7.	Secure	societies	–	Protecting	
freedom	and	security	of	Europe	and	its	
citizens	
2,2%	 1695	
Science	with	and	for	society	 0,6%	 462	
Spreading	excellence	and	widening	
participation	 1,06%	 816	
European	Institute	of	Innovation	and	
Technology	(EIT)	 3,52%	 2711	
Non-nuclear	direct	actions	of	the	JRC	 2,47%	 1903	
TOTAL	EU	REGULATION	 100%	 77028	
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Fig.	28:	The	Horizon	2020	budget	breakdown	
	
Fig.	29:The	budget	for	Horizon	2020	shared	by	the	different	involved	Directorates	(source:	(EPRS	&	Reillon,	2015))	
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Fig.	 30:	 The	 evolution	 in	 the	 Framework	 Programmes	 of	 the	 occurrences	 of	 the	 family	 of	 words	 related	 to	 innovation123.	 The	
occurrences	are	showed	normalized	to	the	total	number	of	words	of	each	document;	the	numbers	in	the	horizontal	axis	refer	to	the	
FP	number	–	8	stands	for	H2020.	
	
Fig.	31:	The	evolution,	 in	the	Framework	Programmes	establishing	acts,	of	 the	“market”,	“socio-democratic”,	“pure-science”	and	
“industry”	families	of	terms;	the	occurrences	are	showed	normalized	to	the	total	number	of	words	of	each	document;	the	numbers	
in	the	horizontal	axis	refer	to	the	FP	number	–	8	stands	for	H2020	(see	footnote	80	for	more	details).		
	
																																								 																				
123	The	asterisk	means	that	all	the	word	endings	are	included.	
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Fig.	32:	The	relative	frequencies	of	the	terms	"consumer",	"worker",	"user",	and	of	the	words	referring	to	"citizen"	in	the	Framework	
Programmes	establishing	documents.	
	
Fig.	33:	Infographics	on	the	«key	performance	indicators	for	Horizon	2020»,	from	the	Commission	brochure	Horizon	2020	–	two	years	
on	(EC,	2016g).	
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Fig.	34:	The	photograms	associated	with	the	sentence:	«That’s	why	we	want	to	turn	the	European	Union	in	an	Innovation	Union,	the	
plan	to	get	good	ideas	to	market	faster,	to	boost	the	economy,	create	jobs	and	improve	lives»	in	the	introductory	video	“Horizon2020	
–	General	overview”	(EC,	2014e).	
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Fig.	 35:	 The	 «underlying	 causes	 that	 lead	 to	 an	 insufficient	 consideration	 of	 ethical	 aspects	 and	 societal	 needs	 in	 research	 and	
innovation»,	in	a	graph	taken	from	(van	den	Hoven	et	al.,	2013).	
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Fig.	36:	The	2007	Commission	decision	establishing	the	European	Research	Council	 (CEC,	2007b);	highlighted	in	yellow	the	terms	
connected	 to	 independency	 and	 autonomy,	 in	 pink	 the	mention	 to	 excellence,	 in	 green	 the	 expressions	 linked	 to	 integrity	 and	
reputation.		
	
 

List of acronyms 
I	 tried	 to	keep	 the	use	of	acronyms,	very	 frequent	 in	European	 institutions’	 lingo,	at	a	minimum.	
However,	both	along	the	text	and	in	the	bibliography,	it	may	have	resulted	useful	or	necessary	to	avoid	the	
use	of	long	denominations,	substituting	them	with	their	acronyms,	whose	meaning	may	be	found	here	below.	
	
BRITE	 Basic	Research	in	Industrial	Technologies	
BSE	 Bovine	Spongiform	Encephalopathy	
CAP	 Common	Agricultural	Policy	
CEC	 Commission	of	the	European	Communities	(the	denomination	of	the	European	Commission	
adopted	until	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon	enter	into	force	in	2009)	
CECs	 Council	of	the	European	Communities	
CERN	 Conseil	Européen	pour	la	Recherche	Nucléaire	
CEU	 Council	of	the	European	Union	
CIP	 Competitiveness	and	Innovation	Framework	Programme	
COSME	 Competitiveness	of	Small	and	Medium-sized	Enterprises	
COST	 Coopération	européenne	dans	le	domaine	de	la	recherche	scientifique	et	technique	
Council	 European	Council	
CREST	 Scientific	and	Technical	Research	Committee		
EC	 European	Commission	
ECSC	 European	Coal	and	Steel	Community	
EEC	 European	Economic	Community	
EFSI	 European	Fund	for	Strategic	Investments	
EIT	 European	Institute	of	Innovation	and	Technology	
ELDO	 European	Launcher	Development	Organisation	
EMBL	 European	Molecular	Biology	Laboratory	
EP	 European	Parliament	
ERA	 European	Research	Area	
ERC	 European	Research	Council	
ESA	 European	Space	Agency	
ESF	 European	Science	Foundation	
ESIF	 European	Structural	and	Investment	Funds	
ESO	 European	Southern	Observatory	
ESPRIT	 European	Strategic	Programme	for	Research	and	Development	in	Information	Technology	
ESRO	 European	Space	Research	Organisation	
EU	 European	Union	
EURAM	 European	Research	in	Advanced	Materials	
Euratom	 European	Atomic	Energy	Community	
EUREKA	 EUrope	REsearch	Koordination	Action	
FPx	 Framework	Programme	number	x	
GDP	 Gross	Domestic	Product	
GMO	 Genetically	Modified	Organism	
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IIA	 Interinstitutional	Agreement	
ITRE	 Committee	on	Industry,	Research	and	Energy	of	the	European	Parliament	
JET	 Joint	European	Torus	
JRC	 Joint	Research	Center	
MEP	 Member	of	the	European	Parliament	
MFF	 Multiannual	Financial	Framework	
NCP	 National	Contact	Point	
NCP	 National	Contact	Point	
NSF	 National	Science	Foundation	
nvCJD	 new	variant	of	the	Creutzfeldt-Jakob	Disease	
OECD	 Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development	
OLP	 Ordinary	Legislative	Procedure	
OMC	 Open	Method	of	Coordination	
PUS	 Public	Understanding	of	Science	
R&D	 Research	and	Development	
R&I	 Research	and	Innovation	
R&T	 Research	and	Technology	
RRI	 Responsible	Research	and	Innovation	
S&T	 Science	and	Technology	
SME(s)	 Small	and	Medium	Enterprise(s)	
SPRU	 Science	Policy	Research	Unit	
STI	 Science,	Technology	and	Innovation	
TFEU	 Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union	(Treaty	of	Lisbon)	
UN	 United	Nations	
WPs	 Work	Programmes	
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